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Abstract 
In this thesis I shall present the argument that intranets increase the role of ambiguity 
– confrontation between contradicting frames of interpretation – in organisational 
communication by encouraging processes across organisational borders. In the first 
chapter I discuss philosophical aspects of ambiguity and interpretation. Based on the 
ideal of rationality I emphasize the ‘challenges’ of ambiguity, which is inhibitive to 
rational processes, but also holds a potential for a rational and universalising 
resolution. In the second chapter I identify the role of ambiguity in organisations. 
Ambiguity increases with tendencies to cooperate and communicate across 
organisational boundaries, mainly as a reaction to developments in markets and 
industrial knowledge base, but also due to the potential provided by computer 
network. In the third chapter I identify some characteristics of two fundamental 
intranet media, email and the web, partly in the perspective of media richness theory, 
partly compared with philosophical discussions of classical media. The fourth chapter 
presents an intranet in a global company, in which problems and challenges related to 
ambiguity have proven significant.  
  
Dansk resumé 
I denne afhandling argumenterer jeg for, at intranet medier understøtter processer på 
tværs af organisatoriske grænser og dermed medfører en kraftigere tendens til 
tvetydighed i organisationer – hvor tvetydighed er forstået som en konfrontation 
mellem modstridende fortolkningsrammer. I første kapitel fokuserer jeg på de 
filosofiske aspekter af tvetydighed og fortolkning. Baseret på rationalitetsidealet frem 
understreger jeg, at tvetydighed indebærer en ’udfordring’: det er en potentiel trussel 
mod rationelle processer, men rummer samtidig et potentiale for en rationel og 
universaliserende hermeneutisk forståelse. I det andet kapitel identificerer jeg 
’tvetydige’ processer i organisationer. De opstår med tendensen til 
netværksorganisering på tværs af organisatoriske grænser. Tværgående processer er 
primært motiveret af markedsbetingelser og udviklingen i den industrielle vidensbase, 
men forstærkes med det potentiale som computer netværk tilbyder. I det tredje kapitel 
identificerer jeg nogle karakteristika ved to centrale intranet medier, e-mail og web, 
dels i lyset af ’media richness theory’, dels i lyset af klassiske filosofiske diskussioner 
af traditionelle medier. I fjerde kapitel ser jeg på et intranet i en multinational og 
stærkt differentieret virksomhed, hvor problemer med tvetydighed truer teknologiens 
brugbarhed og dermed muligheden for at udnytte dens potentiale. 
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1. Introduction – the ambiguous challenge of intranets 
In this thesis I shall present the argument that intranets increase the role of ambiguity 
– confrontation between contradicting frames of interpretation – in organisational 
communication by encouraging processes across organisational borders. I further 
argue that ambiguity is a challenge to organisations: while there is a potential for a 
rational or universal resolution, ambiguity is also problematic as a source of conflicts, 
vulnerable compromises and sub-optimal solutions – and it inhibits the realisation of 
the potential benefits of the technology. 
This argument brings to the problem treated in this thesis: how organisations – and 
organisational members – can and will handle the problem of ambiguity. There is a 
technical as well as an organisational aspect of this problem. The first aspect concerns 
the capacity of intranet media for processes aimed at resolving ambiguity: are they 
rich enough or too poor for resolution of ambiguity? And to what extent does richness 
matter.  
The second aspect concerns the organisational means of resolving ambiguity: is it 
possible to resolve or reduce overall organisational ambiguity in order to realise the 
potential of intranet technology, by establishing common standards and terminology, 
thus by some degree of centralisation as a reaction to ambiguity. Or is it sufficient to 
support local, ad hoc resolution of ambiguity? 
I emphasize a distinction between two different approaches to the latter organisational 
aspect. One is local, instrumental and normative: how should the individual 
organisation solve the problem of ambiguity? The other approach is general and 
analytical and aims at a causal explanation: how will organisations in general react to 
ambiguity, what are the most likely organisational consequences? Is the intranet a 
vehicle for reducing ambiguity by control and central planning – but also for 
universality? Or is it a vehicle for structural dissolution – or segmentation – and an 
increasing role of ambiguity? I intend to address the latter sociological question by 
considering the alternatives available in the first, thus by understanding means and 
motives of organisational action.  
In this thesis I shall analyse the relation between ambiguity and intranets in 
organisations by integrating three different theoretical areas – ambiguity and 
interpretation as a more philosophical issue; the role of ambiguity in organisations; 
and the role and potential of intranet media – and finally looking at an empirical 
example of intranet implementation, in order to discuss the problem presented above. 
1.1.1. Justification for this research theme 
I have a double motivation with choosing this theme of research: It is of practical 
relevance, but also provides an opportunity to pursue my own theoretical interests.  
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During the case study exploring the experimentation with intranet technology in a 
multinational company we thus heard of many problems or challenges associated with 
ambiguity, and I found this theme to be a general problem behind many symptoms. 
My thesis will provide a better understanding of the relationship between ambiguity 
and computer media in organisations, which is a precondition for better facing the 
challenges. 
Furthermore, I have a foundation in critical theory, and this thesis has thus also been 
motivated by a theoretical interest in arguing and testing its relevance in relation to 
phenomena associated with new technology, to confront it critically with phenomena 
that may deny its relevance. In this case, IT-supported organisational networking is 
interesting both as an example of a new form of organisation that is often regarded as 
replacing the classical bureaucracy, but also as an example of media use. Although 
modifications are required, this thesis will demonstrate that critical theory is still 
relevant. 
1.2. Ambiguity and media – basic concepts of the thesis 
Before presenting the outline of this thesis, I shall shortly explain two concepts that 
are essential to the theme of research: the concept of ambiguity, which is closely 
related to that of interpretation, and the concept of media, because I generally regard 
intranet technologies as media. Finally, I shall describe intranet technology at some 
length by focusing on characteristics relevant for this thesis. 
1.2.1. Interpretation and ambiguity 
Ambiguity is a conceptual meta-level conflict: a conflict not between individual 
statements, but between frames of interpretation. Normally, a problem is solved within 
a given frame of interpretation, by logical inference, subsuming under existing 
categories, i.e. identifying the proper routine (or combination of routines) to be 
applied. In case of ambiguity, the choice cannot be made within one of the 
interpretations. 
Ambiguity is thus based on – contradicting – (frames of) interpretations, but it also 
provides a useful perspective on interpretations. Situations of ambiguity illustrate that 
an interpretation – ‘community knowledge’ as emphasized in ‘social construction’ 
literature – is not closed and that interpretations do not live in ‘different worlds’.  
An interpretation is a perspective that is applied when solving a problem, when 
looking at the world or a particular set of information. It is based on a set of implicit 
assumptions. Ambiguity arises when different interpretations are applied to the same 
problem or set of information. This situation cannot merely be resolved by processing 
the information itself, or by acquiring more information. Instead, people have to direct 
the attention ‘away’ from the issue and towards the frames, paradigms or mental 
models applied by the others, as well as one’s own. 
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The situation may arise in an organisational decision process, when the participants 
realize that the problem is not simply to find a solution, but to choose among or 
combine apparently incommensurable solutions (or perhaps different routines).  
1.2.2. Media characteristics: Linking and buffering 
To understand the theme of research, it is convenient to distinguish between two 
different aspects of media: on the one hand media have a capacity for linking people; 
on the other hand they define the conditions for the resulting interaction, by filtering 
or buffering the interaction. 
By their capacity for linking people together, media provide a potential for 
cooperation and coordination across internal as well as external organisational 
barriers. Cross-barrier cooperation is an attractive opportunity for organisations, in 
particular in relation to innovation in industries, where the technology and knowledge 
base is changing or developing rapidly, and the sources of knowledge are dispersed. 
However, cross-barrier cooperation is complicated by ambiguity, because the barriers 
are not merely physical but cognitive, since organisations have differentiated into 
multiple units and professions with different frames of interpretation.  
The question is then how well these computer media, by their capacity for buffering, 
actually represent ambiguity and support resolution of ambiguity. 
This situation puts the organisation in a dilemma of how to deal with increased 
ambiguity: either by reducing ambiguity and imposing corporate standards, etc., or by 
supporting the local processes aimed at ad hoc resolution of ambiguity. 
Before elaborating on the research question I shall provide a short definition of the 
concepts involved and at the same time introduce to the chapters in which they are 
discussed. 
1.2.3. Intranet media 
An intranet is a local Internet with a firewall, where only a ‘limited’ number of people 
have access, usually the members of an organisation. The technical foundation of the 
Internet is a set of protocols that enables communication between all computers 
irrespective of differences in hardware, software etc. The term internet refers to the 
fact that these protocols link different (local) networks. 
Internet technology provides a platform – whether the Internet or an intranet – that 
hosts a number of different applications. I shall focus the two most prominent: email 
and hypertext (the web), which represent two different aspects of media, either as a 
medium for communication between people, as a subject-subject relation, or as a 
medium for organisation of knowledge, for representation, a subject-object relation. 
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1.2.3.1. Email – (interactive) communication 
Email is the most significant of the internet applications that support horizontal 
communication between organisational members. It is more successful in 
organisations than both the ‘chat’ function supporting synchronous multiparty 
communication, and discussion groups (BBS) that support asynchronous multiparty 
communication and sharing of documents. All these media are basically text-based, 
although for example it is possible to include ‘richer’ files – graphic, images, sound, 
movies – as attachment in an email. Email is a new medium, because it is text-based 
and highly interactive – in the sense that the (potential) response time is much shorter 
than a postal letter.  
1.2.3.2. Hypertext – knowledge organized 
The ‘web’ hypertext system as implemented in Berners-Lee’s World Wide Web is the 
other main application. Two aspects of the web should be emphasized. First, it is a 
static medium characterized by openness and universality rather than interactivity. 
Second, the hypertext links provides a particular means for structuring and organising 
the content. 
‘Distribution’ replaced by archive, ‘sharing’ 
Hypertext turns vertical and horizontal communication – in the sense of physical 
transmission – into public files. Distribution or exchange by email of documents, 
deadlines, decisions etc. is replaced by web publication. Readers must access such a 
site, be aware of changes, news etc., instead of receiving information. And this is one 
reason why the ability to navigate on the intranet is so crucial. 
This change in communication patterns is often described as one from ‘push’ to ‘pull’. 
It is based on the potential for having only one copy of a document on the network, 
because ‘access’ to the electronic library has become so easy compared with the 
physical ‘ancestor’. There are many potential advantages associated with this 
potential. One is the possibility for having one complete file on the intranet instead of 
several redundant and incomplete files. Another advantage is the possibility for having 
only updated information available and removing outdated information.  
Dislocation: texts are separated from their local (situated) context 
When organisational documents developed for – and sometimes by – one department 
are made accessible on the intranet, they are potentially separated from their ‘local’ 
context. This ability of text to go beyond their context is not new as such, but a basic 
characteristic of writing butt is reasonable to assume that this process is accentuated or 
magnified with the potential for publishing documents – ‘sharing’ information and 
knowledge – on the intranet. 
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Links - structure 
The link is the basic feature of hypertext and is primarily a tool for organisation of 
knowledge. Hypertext allows a network without structure or standardization, 
unconstrained by the type definition requirements of a database. The links expose the 
schizophrenic character of the WWW, which aspires to be both a personal tool, with 
links representing subjective associations, and something beyond personal sphere by 
linking different ‘files’ into one shared, universal hypertext. Associative links may be 
useful as a tool to organise personal files, but the resulting structure is difficult to 
navigate and inhibits orientation. Further adding to the potential for chaos, the web is 
based on a particular type of hypertext links: embedded, unidirectional links. 
1.3. Outline of the thesis 
1.3.1.1. Ambiguity and interpretations – chapter 1 
In the first chapter I shall discuss interpretations and ambiguity at a philosophical – 
and epistemological – level, without focusing on a specific context, organisational or 
other. I shall seek to answer a number of questions: what is the character of an 
interpretation, can one specify its elements? What is the relation between an 
interpretation and reality – is it a ‘different world’ or is it related to reality in terms of 
truth, efficiency or success? How can ambiguity be resolved – is there a potential for a 
rational resolution? 
With the last question I introduce the essential issue of rationality, which I shall first 
present as an ideal in order to discuss the rationality of interpretations. In my 
definition of rationally I draw on various sources, notably Habermas and Popper. 
I then continue to discuss interpretations in two different strands of literature. First I 
look at how the concept – and related concepts – has been used in organisational 
literature, contrasting ‘charitable’ or at least neutral approaches with more critical 
once. I then look at similar issues in philosophical literature, focusing on the concept 
of ideology in critical theory. The discussion of ‘critique of ideology’ is a useful 
perspective on interpretations because the very possibility for a critique is based on the 
assumption that is possible to transcend an interpretation. If one accepts a social 
constructivist or interpretivist definition of ‘truth’, then it is difficult to see a potential 
for a critical position. 
1.3.1.2. Ambiguity in organisations – chapter 2  
Organisations that implement computer networks in the hopes of communicating, 
sharing knowledge and cooperating across physical barriers and geographical 
distances will face the problem of ambiguity: the fact that barriers within organisations 
are not merely physical or geographical, but also cognitive. Communication with 
people from other departments suffers from misunderstandings and breakdowns, and 
information published on the intranet (by others) can be difficult to navigate and 
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decode. Departments battle and negotiate over organisational strategies and resources. 
These conflicts and misunderstandings are largely organisational rather than 
individual, in that they reflect the complexity of the organisation itself. 
In the second chapter I thus focus on the role of interpretations and ambiguity in 
organisations, seeking answers to the following questions: where do individual 
interpretations come from? Why does ambiguity arise? Basically I argue that 
ambiguity should be understood in terms of three different processes: rationalisation, 
differentiation and networking.  
1.3.1.3. The role and potential of intranet media – chapter 3 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the capacity of intranet media for resolution 
of, or dealing with, ambiguity.  
In order to do this I shall first discuss the basic characteristics of the technology. Then 
I turn to the contemporary discussion of media richness. The richness of a medium is 
generally determined by its capacity for feedback (interactivity), variety of cues (or 
modality), degree of personalisation and variety of languages. However, while Daft & 
Lengel argue that richer media are better suited for resolution of ambiguity in a timely 
manner, I shall emphasize – with Sproull & Kiesler – the potential conflict between 
the need for an open, ‘rational’ process and the ‘need for speed’. I argue that rich 
media are convenient for conflict resolution and consensus making in a timely 
manner, but often at the cost of ‘rationality’, while the ‘poor’ text-based media (so far) 
characteristic of internet technology encourage critical verbalisation and clarification 
of frames of interpretation. 
I shall then look at more philosophical discussions of traditional media, oral vs. 
written communication and to some extent nonverbal communication (art). The 
purpose is on the one hand to compare these discussions to the previous one of media 
richness, and on the other hand to identify the particularities of the new media. While 
text is traditionally tangible and objectified (orphaned), electronic text-based media 
are characterised by a high degree of interactivity (richer) and a paradoxical 
combination of ephemerality and potential for storage. 
I suggest that organisations may be changed by three different changes associated with 
the new media 
Verbalisation1: virtual communication requires that people ‘put things in words’. 
                                                     
1 I emphasize that I use the term ‘verbalisation’ in the sense described in my dictionary: “to 
express (something) in words” – thus, to make something explicit as opposed to i.e. ‘tacit 
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Scripturisation2: new areas of communication are being transferred from oral to written 
communication, as when people use a mail in stead of the telephone 
Electrification: paper files are transferred to electronic files. 
1.3.1.4. Intranet in a global company – chapter 4 
In the case study, I shall identify problems of ambiguity in relation to the intranet. I 
shall discuss whether ambiguity does play as significant a role as presumed, compared 
to other issues, and whether it is reasonable to speak of a connection between intranet 
technology and ambiguity. I shall further look at what is being done to reduce or 
handle ambiguity. 
The case study was carried out as part of a larger research project, to which this thesis 
belongs. The focus in the larger project was on organisational experimentation with, 
and implementation of intranet technology, and that focus was guiding in our choices 
of which intranet applications we wished to investigate deeper, as well as in our 
interview guides. In this thesis I have selected those examples corresponding to my 
own emphasis on ambiguity, which is related to but also different from the over-all 
focus of the research project. 
Intranet as a whole 
The case is treated as four sub cases, starting with a look at the intranet as a whole. 
The organisation (primarily the IT department) has chosen a ‘laissez faire’ strategy to 
begin with: any department that is interested enough to invest the resources required 
can establish a site on the intranet. The quantitative success has been overwhelming, 
the total intranet growing rapidly with sites and application of very different scope and 
ambition, but it seems that the strategy has had problematic consequences: it is 
difficult to navigate and find relevant information, and some information resources are 
redundant. 
After looking at the intranet as a whole, three of these applications will be 
investigated. Most are quite simple, but some of them have wider perspectives, and 
they all demonstrate relevant aspects of problems with ambiguity.  
                                                                                                                                            
knowledge’. The term does thus not serve to distinguish verbal communication from written 
communication. 
2 ‘Scripturisation’ is my translation of the Danish word ‘skriftliggørelse’. 
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SHARING 
This application was chosen for further study as an example of a more sophisticated 
use of intranet technology – in its intentions rather than its design. It was envisioned as 
a system for knowledge sharing, replacing top-down communication of formal 
routines with horizontal exchange of (written) informal routines. It was a corporate 
database of process knowledge, shared by employees in all units of the company. The 
system it is illustrative despite its lack of success, because this failure is hardly due 
merely to poor design, but also to fundamental problems with exchanging knowledge 
across organisational barriers (ambiguity). 
SQUARE 
This application is illustrative as a complementary to SHARING. It is a database of 
(obligatory) formal routines, combined with a system for distribution via the intranet 
to relevant departments– and an example of top down communication. It may be 
categorised as asymmetric interaction or even mere publication. This application 
demonstrates the technology’s capacity as a tool for reduction (elimination) of 
ambiguity, both because this is the essence of formal routines, and because SQUARE 
is based on the separation between a description of processes, and a specification of 
the organisational context (unit, department) in which the processes are to be executed 
– assuming that (the description of) a process or routine can be de-contextualised, that 
it persists independent of organisational changes.  
ProjectWeb 
This application was designed as a standard website to be owned by a development 
project ’group’. It was chosen mainly for the long-term perspectives in using the 
technology to support a distributed or ‘virtual’ project group – characterised by high 
ambiguity. In the first group of interviews (on which this study is based), however, 
only a few simple functions were implemented. It thus contains a variety of documents 
produced during the project, including minutes, agendas, reports, information about 
deadlines etc.  
1.4. Approach: Instrumental vs. Sociological perspective 
This thesis will attempt to span two different approaches to technology: the 
instrumental aspect investigating its potential as a tool, and a ‘sociological’ aspect 
emphasizing its effect on organisations in general, i.e. on organisational structure and 
patterns of communication. As an example, a ‘sociological’ perspective will seek to 
explain why knowledge management systems fail, whereas the instrumental 
perspective will try to provide advices on how to avoid failure. 
The instrumental approach may focus on the alternatives available to an organisation, 
i.e. a choice or balance between a ‘control’ strategy and a ‘laissez-faire’ strategy, 
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between an emphasis on centralised databases, reduction in publication and 
distribution costs etc., and an emphasis on achieving a new ‘information culture’.  
This approach may imply the role (for the researcher: me) as a consultant: what are the 
strengths and weaknesses of each strategy? It is basically a normative approach: i.e. I 
can ‘commit myself to’ rationality, advice the use of rational means over others 
(instead of asking – descriptively – whether organisations actually act rationally). 
This approach is somewhat based on the other: analyses and advices are based on the 
assumption that technology has ‘effects’, or at least a potential: an objective ‘feature’ 
that guides the choices. 
This approach may be criticized for focusing on ‘strategies’ and thus assuming the role 
of some rational organisational subject/actor that is able to calculate and choose on the 
behalf of the whole organisation. This critique is relevant, but I shall try to argue that 
the assumption is reasonable and necessary, at least as an ideal, which the researcher 
must address… 
(Personally, I am uncomfortable with focusing solely on this instrumental approach: it 
is not my goal to end up as a management consultant. My research theme is thus not 
based on formulating and addressing problems faced by individual organisations 
(management) – yet the research should also offer such observations, as a ‘by-
product.) 
This approach is more descriptive, too ‘elevated’ from the individual organisation to 
provide advises at that level. 
Yet it is connected to the first approach. It is based on the assumption that the 
organisations actually adopt (choose) the technology for some reason, that the 
organisations have good – rational – reasons for adopting it. And it further assumes 
that organisations (should) adopt one strategy rather than the other; a theory about the 
general effect of the technology cannot be based on the argument that the choice is 
arbitrary. 
1.4.1. Theoretical intentions 
The purpose is to establish an understanding of organisation, rationality, knowledge, 
language and experience, inspired by critical theory and the Weberian tradition. This 
understanding needs to be updated, so the presentation shall include a comparison 
with more recent literature on knowledge in organisations (OL and KM literature), and 
consideration of some of the most relevant critiques against Weber and critical theory. 
The theoretical purpose is a major part of this thesis: I shall attempt to translate issues 
from classical critical theory into current issues in organisational literature. 
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I shall then move on to discuss, what KM (and OL) is about as an actual trend and 
problem, seen from this perspective. 
1.4.1.1. Why critical theory? 
Critical theory shared with Weber the thesis that the process of rationalization – and 
its intertwining with capitalism – constitutes the driving force of modern society, that 
the ambiguities and contradictions of this process provide the key to understand most 
phenomena. 
The main focus was on the role of knowledge in society: the development and 
fundamental changes in the societal base of knowledge. One example was the shift in 
production from a craft-based experience to rational planning and scientific 
knowledge. In this perspective critical theory were also concerned with media. On the 
one hand in carrying out studies on the effect of technologies like radio and television 
under a sociological and psychological perspective. But also on a ‘self-reflective’ 
level: how different media and genres support and limit the process of thought. 
Benjamin analysed the relation between (the decline of) experience and the narrative 
as its medium. Both Benjamin and Adorno emphasized and defended the essay as a 
convenient ‘form’ for philosophical thought. And Adorno defended the capability of 
art to express aspects of knowledge excluded by scientific thinking. 
Critical theory maintained an ambiguous dialogue with philosophy. Their general 
intention was to convert philosophical themes into social research, based on a critique 
of all metaphysical systems. On the one hand, philosophy is an important source of 
inspiration. On the other, philosophy in itself is at a dead end: attempts at reviving 
metaphysical systems in the form of fundamental truths are futile; and confining 
philosophy to critical examination of logical arguments and structures in science is 
fruitless. Still, Adorno differed from Horkheimer in a less dismissive attitude towards 
philosophy:  
"Adorno much more than Horkheimer tries to redeem the utopian elements in 
the transcendental notions of subjectivity and the unconditional. His plan of 
materialistic criticism here is to save the best parts of idealism rather than to 
get rid of it completely, which is the more radical intention of Horkheimer's 
antiphilosophy." (Brunkhorst 1999) 
The project of critical theory required a confrontation not only with logical positivism, 
but also with other ‘critical’ movements emphasizing problematic aspects of 
modernization, i.e. Husserl, Heidegger, and Bergson. This may appear paradoxical, as 
critical theory had much in common with these critiques of modernity. Yet they parted 
from these in the attempt to rescue the hopes of progress, and the remaining 
emancipatory potential of rationality and modernity. 
These philosophical questions still have relevance today. There are many similarities 
between the hype about knowledge management and best practice sharing and 
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taylorisation. Many critical contemporary theories about organisation and 
organisational knowledge are directly or indirectly inspired by these other (anti-
modern) critiques of modernity: communities-of-practice, situated practice, social 
construction. 
To a large extent, today’s debates about organisational knowledge repeat philosophical 
discussions between positivism and phenomenology. The conversion to social or 
organisational studies in principle constitutes a progress, yet the historical dimension 
is too easily forgotten, and many approaches suffer from inattentiveness to 
philosophical issues. 
The combination of rationality and capitalism makes critical theory more relevant than 
other Marxist approaches. One example is Braverman and his school of ‘labour 
process studies’: he contributed with a critical account of scientific management, yet 
his analysis and those he inspired suffered – and suffers still – severely from the fact 
that he didn’t really understand the concept of rationality. He was right in emphasizing 
the control aspect, but wrong in dismissing rationality as mere ‘control by capital’. 
Weber dealt with ‘organisational theory’ but not with empirical studies of 
organisations. Neither can critical theory be characterized as organisational studies, 
and most of their research was oriented towards the societal and cultural level 
(although Adorno played an influential role in research on groups). Yet processes of 
organisation were the key to all these studies. On the one hand, organisations cannot 
be analysed in isolation, as independent units. On the other, ‘organizing’ 
(rationalization) is a fundamental process in modernization – the organisation is not 
merely a product of external forces. 
1.4.1.2. Selection of literature 
The thrust of this study is on theoretical and philosophical analysis. The researcher 
must qualify his theses and avoid cementation of prejudices by seeking falsification 
and contradiction. This qualification is based on confrontation with either theoretical 
literature or empirical material (or both). Within the limitations of this thesis I have 
found a greater necessity for theoretical and conceptual ‘clarification’ than for the 
establishment of ‘controlled experiments’. 
Besides the emphasis on critical theory I employ a ‘contrapuntal’ strategy in the 
selection of literature – this strategy is a central element in my ‘method’ or approach 
and requires a few words of justification.  
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This study is based on a very broad selection of literature3. The aim is to encompass 
the discussion between different traditions instead of focusing merely on one tradition. 
The criterion for including this multitude of authors and texts is twofold: a text 
(author) is selected either for its ‘positive’ contribution to the issue, or for a ‘negative’ 
contribution in the form of a counter-argument to a central thesis. 
The danger of eclecticism is to ignore the contradictions between various traditions – 
an ignorance that will result in incoherence. I try to avoid this risk by emphasizing 
contradictions and disagreements with the ambition of resolving them, rather than 
ignoring them. Rather than weaving an eclectic patchwork, I strive to overcome 
apparent incommensurability by identifying similarities and contradictions. 
The choice of Adorno, Habermas and Weber needs no further argumentation, but the 
other philosophical authors deserve some introduction in terms of relevance. 
Evidently, the approach to these authors is very selective, i.e. a few texts by Popper, 
and a small (50 p) section of Gadamer’s Wahrheit und Methode. It may be argued that 
this selective attitude can never do justice to these authors, that the risk of 
misunderstanding them is much greater on such scarce material. Again I argue that 
they are selected for their contribution (negative or positive) to the central issue. The 
texts are chosen for their ‘good arguments’, although the ‘proper’ (or reasonable) 
presentation and interpretation of these arguments does require deeper ‘understanding’ 
of the tradition behind them. The arguments cannot simply be ‘picked’ out of their 
context… 
Popper is included for quite ambiguous reasons. On the one hand he contributes as a 
critic and opponent to both Marxist and interpretivist theories. I.e. his critique of the 
concept of ideology is used to elaborate and qualify it by considering his arguments. 
On the other hand there are strong parallels between his ‘critical rationalism’ and 
Habermas’ (and Adorno’s) defence of rationality. He is thus an interesting companion 
in the reading of the main literature. 
Gadamer is relevant as a philosophical background to the interpretivist tradition in 
organisational theory, and to the question of ‘basic assumptions’, ‘theories-in-use’, 
‘interpretation’ etc. – concepts that are essential for an analysis of organisational 
                                                     
3 In this context, a few words on my use of language are required. I prefer to bring citations in 
original language when possible, and therefore this thesis includes text in German as well as a 
few French citations. At some occasions I have found it necessary to include citations in 
Danish, either because it is a relevant Danish reference, or because I have not been able to get 
hold of the original and therefore contends with a Danish translation. Furthermore, I have 
preferred to cite from the case study in Danish, in order to emphasize authenticity. I provide 
English translation for all Danish citations in the main text. 
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knowledge. Furthermore, the debate between Gadamer and Habermas has much to 
offer for the analysis of organisations. 
Derrida is included mainly for his discussion of writing vs. speech, which has 
relevance for the analysis of media use in organisations. Furthermore, there are strong 
parallels between Adorno and Derrida, which serve to qualify the understanding of 
both. 
1.4.1.3. Compliance or critique? 
How shall the observer or researcher approach the ‘sensemaking’ (Weick) of an 
organisation? By accepting it as ‘what the organisational members regard as true’, or 
by approaching it with the armour of a critical rationality: ‘what are your reasons for 
this belief – are they valid’ (and not accept it as the sovereign ‘decisions’ of 
‘competent practitioners’/communities of practice? 
With an ethnomethodological or social constructivist approach it is assumed that 
people ‘know what they do’, that they are (the) experts in their domain, and that 
technology should support and ‘match’ the existing processes. The theories of situated 
learning and communities of practice share this affirmative approach to basic 
assumptions and tacit knowledge of a community. This approach does not allow itself 
to be critical of its object of study (i.e. a community). The rational analysis of the 
theory would – per definition – fall short of the tacit knowledge of the members of the 
community. The approach is based on the assumption that behind any apparent 
irrationality in organisational action, there is surely a good ‘reason’. 
The affirmative approach is intellectual suicide and distinguishes the proponents both 
from the more cynical ‘sociology of knowledge’, and from methodologies analysing 
basic assumptions as the expression of some cultural identity, or a ‘historical’ point of 
view. Yet, neither approach is capable of rationally accepting the truth claim of the 
assumptions or expressions, as an attempt to say something about the world, an 
attempt that is exposed to rational critique. People (texts) must be taken serious in the 
sense that we not only see their utterances and activities as expressive, but that we go 
far enough in our understanding to open for a critical analysis. 
Even if the relativist approach – to some extent – is acceptable when dealing with 
foreign cultures or primitive societies, it seems to lose all credibility when 
communities in question are dealing with the same technologies, product and material 
as many others in modern organisations. 
March and various co-authors seem to take a different approach. They regard 
rationality (problem solving) as an ideal, but observe several other forms of 
‘organisational learning’, and they acknowledge fallibility in organisational action. If 
it were based on fundamental assumptions of human (and organisational) inadequacy, 
then it would be highly problematic; as recognition of fallibility, however, their 
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critical attitude towards organisational action presupposes the possibility of rationality 
- organisations are measured against the ideal of rationality4. There is a possibility that 
reason (in research) may ‘recognize itself’ in organisational action. This provides a 
level of communication between research and organisational actors. According to 
Popper and Habermas, critical rationality constitutes a common ground. To ask 
critical questions or point out potential inefficiencies is not a sign of arrogance, but of 
understanding and dialogue. 
The question of rationality is not an incidental one in a discussion of methodology. 
Habermas argue – with Weber – that rationality is the fundamental issue ‘of our 
times’, and that it integrates three different ‘levels’: a meta-theoretical 
(‘philosophical’), an empirical, and a methodological level. Thus, any methodological 
discussion of rationality is already deeply integrated in and dependent on theoretical 
and empirical levels of analysis. 
                                                     
4 "the idea of error implies that of truth as the standard of which we may fall short." (Popper 
1961) 
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2. Ambiguity and Interpretation 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to discuss the role of interpretation (and 
ambiguity), which is relevant for organisational studies, but not restricted to 
organisations. I shall compare the issue as treated in organisational theories with 
similar discussions in philosophy, sociology and theory of science. And even though I 
thus do treat organisational theory, I attempt to abstract the discussion of 
interpretations and ambiguity from the organisational context. This chapter is not 
about organisations, but about organisations in general. 
This discussion is a precondition for the later discussion of media and the concept of 
media richness: once we know more about the different aspects of interpretations and 
ambiguity, and of the processes for reduction of ambiguity, we will be in a better 
position to judge the role of – and need for – media. 
I shall emphasize the problematic aspects of interpretations, by confronting 
affirmative theories of interpretations – or culture, basic assumptions, theories-in-use, 
sensemaking etc. – with theories that focus on groupthink, irrationality, inefficiency as 
well as inequalities in status and power as a source of bias. Some of the most obvious 
critical questions are: what are the sources of interpretations, where do they come 
from – from ‘inside’ or ‘outside’? How do they survive, and how can they be 
challenged? How is ambiguity – due to contradicting interpretations – reduced? How 
is consensus achieved? Is there any relationship between interpretation and reality – 
must the interpretation somehow ‘answer’ to reality? 
The literature in this chapter is thus distributed across two different dimensions: I 
present both affirmative and more critical theories; and I draw parallels and arguments 
are from different disciplines, different levels: organizational theory, psychology, 
sociology, philosophy and hermeneutics. The cross-disciplinary approach obviously 
faces serious difficulties in comparing different levels and disciplines: there is a risk of 
drawing dubious analogies, and of weaving an eclectic patchwork by disregarding 
contradictions and ‘ambiguities’ between traditions. Yet I am convinced that the 
theories cannot be ‘incommensurable’ in any fundamental sense, and the struggle with 
achieving ‘communication’ between different theories with the intention of identifying 
contradictions is the precondition for avoiding the pitfalls of eclecticism. 
This chapter opens with a short presentation of the concept of rationality, to a large 
extent inspired by Weber, Habermas and Popper. I have several reasons for taking 
rationality as starting point. One is that many (affirmative) ‘interpretivist’ theories 
have been developed in a reaction to assumptions about rationality etc. Another reason 
is my fundamental motivation in this thesis is to preserve rationality as an ideal and a 
source of critique against certain aspects of interpretation and ambiguity. Yet, this 
does not imply a simple contrast and distinction between ‘rationality’ and 
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‘interpretation’. Rationality should be regarded as a particular form of interpretation5, 
and not all forms of interpretation are rational. A main purpose in this chapter is to be 
able to distinguish between rational and irrational forms of interpretation. 
After this definition of rationality I shall proceed to present the issues of interpretation 
and ambiguity as treated in various strands of organizational theory. Different theories 
have different perspectives and will emphasize different (critical) aspects. Many of the 
encountered problems will be philosophical and sociological in nature, suggesting that 
the study of organisations is too important to be left entirely to organisational theory. 
Indeed, several of the organisational theories presented are based on psychological 
theories, notably social psychology. Nevertheless, although psychology (Weick, 
Sproull & Kiesler) offers a relevant perspective on and contribution to organisational 
studies, it is too narrow a foundation for a study of both organisations and groups – 
these are issues that cannot be reduced to psychology. Instead I emphasize 
philosophical aspects of ‘psychological’ theories, i.e. by identifying general 
epistemological questions behind Weick’s theory. And ‘groupthink’ discussed by 
Sproull & Kiesler is basically a micro-level example of interpretation and ambiguity – 
tendencies to groupthink are not merely a ‘law of psychology’. 
Thus, I proceed to identify issues of interpretation and ambiguity in philosophical 
literature. I shall present the theory of hermeneutic understanding as developed by 
Gadamer: basically an affirmative approach to interpretation, yet with due 
consideration of critical issues. These approaches are then confronted with their 
critical opponents, on the one hand arguments from the classical philosophy of 
enlightenment, including the critical rationalism of Popper, on the other hand – and 
with greater emphasis – the modern, albeit paradoxical inheritors of this tradition: 
critical theory and the notion of critique of ideology. This tradition appears to be the 
most irreconcilable with hermeneutic (and interpretivist) approaches, because it is 
based on a fundamental suspicion and dismay vis-à-vis (almost) any ‘interpretation’. 
                                                     
5 Habermas distinguishes between to views on rationality: the realist, which assumes that 
rational discussion are based on references to an objective world; and the phenomenological, 
which involves a consideration of the mediating subject – assuming that all ‘references’ are 
based on a particular view or interpretation, eventually based on an intersubjective agreement 
about the objective world: “Der Phänomenologe bedient sich nicht umstandslos des Leitfadens 
zielgerichteter oder problemlösender Handlungen. Er geht nämlich von der ontologischen 
Voraussetzung einer objectiven Welt nicht einfach aus, sondern macht diese zum Problem, 
indem er nach den Bedingungen fragt, unter denen sich die Einheit einer objektiven Welt für 
die Angehörigen einer Kommunikationsgemeinschaft konstituiert. Objektivität gewinnt die 
Welt erst dadurch, dass sie für eine Gemeinschaft sprach- und handlungsfähiger Subjekte als 
ein und dieselbe Welt gilt” (Habermas 1981). Habermas’ account of the ‚phenomenological’ 
view on rationality has something in common with Adorno’s insisting on the awareness of the 
discrepancy between thought and matter; but Adorno would probably not agree that the world 
only achieves objectivity in the perception of a ‚community’... 
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The hermeneutics debate between Gadamer and Habermas thus provides rich and 
useful material for the study of ambiguity in organisations. 
Finally I shall shortly discuss experience as a particular foundation for interpretation, 
an alternative and contrast to (critical) rationality. 
2.1. Characteristics of rationality 
In the following, the concept of rationality will be specified by emphasizing the most 
relevant characteristics. 
2.1.1.1. Rules and laws – universality  
We are presumed to live in a world of objects that will act the same way in similar 
situations: this regularity can be expressed in ‘laws of nature’ to be ‘discovered’ – 
suggested – by science. This emphasis on causality has implications on practice: The 
anticipatory calculation characterizing ‘rational action’ is based on prediction, which 
presupposes causality. Furthermore, the universality and de-personalization 
characteristic of rules is the basis for the materialization of formal rules in modern 
organisations, in contrast to situated, context-dependent experience. 
Causality is necessarily an abstraction from experience (or from facts), according to 
Hume’s classical argument that observations – sense impressions, ‘factual knowledge’ 
– cannot tell us anything about causality.  As an example, March & Olsen emphasize 
ambiguity of understanding, which refers to the difficulties in identifying cause-effect 
relationships. The point is that ‘experience’ does not by itself offer explanations that 
are necessary to understanding the complex (or even non-existent) connections 
between actions and outcomes. Such explanation/understanding requires 
interpretation. We cannot generalize from singular observations to universal laws. 
Laws are not simply ‘discovered’ but constructed, which is related to the next 
characteristic. 
2.1.1.2. Duality of theory and observations – atomisation of knowledge 
Gellner – an anthropologist in defence of Western rationality against relativism – sees 
atomisation of information, the separation between theories (explanations) and facts as 
a means or strategy to avoid and “eliminate self-maintaining circular belief systems”:  
"As the main device of self-maintaining systems is the package-deal 
principle, which brings about the self-maintaining circle of ideas, break up 
information into as many parts as possible, and scrutinize each item 
separately. This breaks up the circles and destroys the selfmaintenance.” 
(Gellner 1997) 
It’s an argument quite similar to Poppers critical rationalism: it implies a critical 
distance to explanations, which should be ‘clearly’ stated rather than ‘woven’ into 
experience and narratives. This principle is illustrated by Benjamin’s distinction 
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between different historical forms of mediation. It’s convenient to regard it as a 
distinction between pre-modern and modern forms of knowledge6, although Benjamin 
himself does not emphasize modernity – nor does he share Gellners explicit 
commitment to rationalism, but attempts a more neutral distinction. 
„Historisch besteht eine Konkurrenz zwischen den verschiedenen Formen 
der Mitteilung. In der Ablösung der älteren Relation durch die Information, 
der Information durch die Sensation spiegelt sich die zunehmende 
Verkümmerung der Erfahrung wider. Alle diese Formen heben sich 
ihrerseits von der Erzählung ab; sie ist eine der ältesten Formen der 
Mitteilung. Sie legt es nicht darauf an, das pure An-sich des Geschehenen zu 
übermitteln (wie die Information das tut); sie senkt es dem Leben des 
Berichtenden ein, um es als Erfahrung den Hörern mitzugeben. So haftet an 
ihr die Spur des Erzählenden wie die Spur der Töpferhand an der 
Tonschale.” (Benjamin 1992) 
Benjamin emphasizes the discrepancy between information and experience. 
Information – the ideal of newspaper journalism – focuses on individual ‘atomistic’ 
occurrences. Information is de-contextualised and does therefore neither fit into 
(personal) experience, nor with tradition: „Die Abdichtung der Information gegen die 
Erfahrung hängt weiter daran, dass die erstere nicht in die ’Tradition’ eingeht“(Benjamin 1992). 
Information differs from the narrative an older form of mediation, in which 
occurrences are integrated into a ‘lived’ context. 
”Hätte die Presse es darauf abgesehen, dass der Leser sich ihre 
Informationen als einen Teil seiner Erfahrung zu eigne macht, so würde sie 
ihren Zweck nicht erreichen. Aber ihre Absicht ist die umgekehrte und wird 
erreicht. Sie besteht darin, die Ereignisse gegen den Bereich abzudichten, in 
dem sie die Erfahrung des Lesers betreffen könnten.“ (Benjamin 1992) 
We are no longer capable of narratives because today events only reach us ripe with 
explanations; because what we hear is already equipped with explanations, and 
matches the form of information, not that of the narrative:  
“Jeder Morgen unterrichtet uns über die Neuigkeiten des Erdkreises. Und 
doch sind wir an merkwürdigen Geschichten arm. Das kommt, weil uns 
keine Begebenheit mehr erreicht, die nicht mit Erklärungen schon durchsetzt 
wäre. Mit andern Worten: beinah nichts mehr, was geschieht, kommt der 
Erzählung, beinah alles der Information zugute. Es ist nämlich schon die 
halbe Kunst des Erzählens, eine Geschichte, indem man sie wiedergibt, von 
Erklärungen freizuhalten.” (Benjamin 1991a)  
                                                     
6 Habermas contrasts the modern ‘understanding of the world’ (‘Weltverständnis’) with the 
mythological one, which corresponds largely to Gellners characteristic of ‘selfmaintaining 
circles of ideas’ (Habermas 1981). 
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The narrative is always practical and may contain an implicit advice (for the listener 
who learns to re-tell it) – thus integrating the practical and the descriptive, contrary to 
the principle of basing rational anticipatory action on descriptive prepositional 
knowledge (causal explanations). 
"[Die Erfahrung] führt, offen oder versteckt, ihren Nutzen mit sich. Dieser 
Nutzen mag einmal in einer Moral bestehen, ein andermal in einer 
praktischen Anweisung, ein drittes in einem Sprichwort oder in einer 
Lebensregel – in jedem Falle ist der Erzähler ein Mann, der dem Hörer Rat 
weiß. Wenn aber ‘Rat wissen’ heute altmodisch im Ohre zu klingen anfängt, 
so ist daran der Umstand schuld, dass die Mitteilbarkeit der Erfahrung 
abnimmt. Infolge davon wissen wir uns und andern keinen Rat.” (Benjamin 
1991a) 
The narrative described by Benjamin is thus an example of the ‘suspicious’ form of 
knowledge that Gellner, cited in the beginning, strives to overcome by ‘breaking up 
information’. A similar point can be derived from Benjamin’s distinction between the 
(pre-modern) chronicler and the (modern) historian. The latter must focus on 
explanations rather than allude to the ‘general patterns of history’: 
“Der Historiker ist gehalten, die Vorfälle, mit denen er es zu tun hat, auf die 
eine oder andere Art zu erklären; er kann sich unter keinen Umständen damit 
begnügen, sie als Musterstücke des Weltlaufs herzuzeigen. Genau das aber 
tut der Chronist... Indem jene ihre Geschichtserzählung den göttlichen 
Heilsplan zugrunde legen, der ein unerforschlicher ist, haben sie die Last 
beweisbarer Erklärung von vornherein von sich abgewälzt. An ihre Stelle 
tritt die Auslegung, die es nicht mit einer genauen Verkettung von 
bestimmten Ereignissen, sondern mit der Art ihrer Einbettung in den großen 
unerforschlichen Weltlauf zu tun hat.“ (Benjamin 1991a) 
Gellners argument about ‘breaking up information’ seems to acknowledge the role of 
mediation, because it implies that that knowledge about the world, by itself, does not 
comes to us in the form of facts and atomic observations – information must be 
atomised, i.e. by dissolution or destruction of existing holistic ‘package-deal’ 
explanations.   
2.1.1.3. Intellectual rationalisation – a social body of knowledge 
As already suggested, with Benjamin’s idea of the decline of experience in face of 
modern ‘information’, the accumulation of rational, scientific knowledge affects 
ordinary life. Science does have implications for the world outside the ivory towers of 
academia – to counter the argument made by Berger & Luck man that the history of 
‘ideas’ have no impact on daily life: 
"Theoretical thought, 'ideas', Weltanschauungen are not that important in 
society". "To exaggerate the importance of theoretical thought in society and 
history is a natural failing of theorizers"; "... common sense 'knowledge' 
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rather than 'ideas' must be the central focus for the sociology of knowledge." 
(Berger & Luckman 1967)   
I find their argument unacceptable, because modern science provides ‘knowledge’ of a 
particular (rational) structure, a knowledge that is applied in most 
institutions/organizations and everyday practices of modern living. 
In Weber’s attempt to explain the fundamental implications of the intellectual 
rationalisation characteristic of the Western world, he speaks of ‘disenchantment’ as 
the loss of a magical perception of the world. This does not mean that every individual 
possesses the scientific or technical knowledge of all things, for example what makes 
the trolley capable of moving. In fact we may individually be less knowledgeable 
about our tools and everyday practices than Primitive Man. But we are all convinced 
that there is a technical and rational explanation available, and that all things can in 
principle be controlled via calculation – and we would no longer regard it as a 
mystery, a result of magic. 
“Machen wir uns zunächst klar, was denn eigentlich diese intellektualistische 
Rationalisierung durch Wissenschaft und wissenschaftlich orientierte 
Technik praktisch bedeutet. Etwa, dass wir heute, jeder z. B., der hier im 
Saale sitzt, eine größere Kenntnis der Lebensbedingungen hat, unter denen er 
existiert, als ein Indianer oder ein Hottentotte? Schwerlich. Wer von uns auf 
der Straßenbahn fährt, hat – wenn er nicht Fachphysiker ist – keine Ahnung, 
wie sie das macht, sich in Bewegung zu setzen. Er braucht auch nichts davon 
zu wissen. Es genügt ihm, dass er auf das Verhalten des Straßenbahnwagens 
‘rechnen’ kann, er orientiert sein Verhalten daran; aber wie man eine 
Trambahn so herstellt, dass sie sich bewegt, davon weiß er nichts. Der Wilde 
weiß das von seinen Werkzeugen ungleich besser. Wenn wir heute Geld 
ausgeben, so wette ich, dass, sogar wenn nationalökonomische Fachkollegen 
im Saale sind, fast jeder eine andere Antwort bereit halten wird auf die 
Frage: Wie macht das Geld es, dass man dafür etwas – bald viel, bald wenig 
– kaufen kann? Wie der Wilde es macht, um zu seiner täglichen Nahrung zu 
kommen, und welche Institutionen ihm dabei dienen, das weiß er. Die 
zunehmende Intellektualisierung und Rationalisierung bedeutet also nicht 
eine zunehmende allgemeine Kenntnis der Lebensbedingungen, unter denen 
man steht. Sondern sie bedeutet etwas anderes: das Wissen davon oder den 
Glauben daran: dass man, wenn man nur wollte, es jederzeit erfahren könnte, 
dass es also prinzipiell keine geheimnisvollen unberechenbaren Mächte 
gebe, die da hineinspielen, dass man vielmehr alle Dinge – im Prinzip – 
durch Berechnen beherrschen könne. Das aber bedeutet: die Entzauberung der 
Welt. Nicht mehr, wie der Wilde, für den es solche Mächte gab, muss man 
zu magischen Mitteln greifen, um die Geister zu beherrschen oder zu 
erbitten. Sondern technische Mittel und Berechnung leisten das. Dies vor 
allem bedeutet die Intellektualisierung als solche.” (Weber 1919) 
I have taken the liberty to cite Weber’s classical argument at some length, in order to 
justify, against Berger & Luckman’s argument above, that rationalisation and 
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‘theoretical thought’ has profound implications for everyday life and has affected 
‘common sense knowledge’. 
Similarly, Habermas argues that ‘Primitive Man’ differs from people of civilized 
societies because of the ‘social body of knowledge’, not because he is (more) capable 
of logical thinking. All human beings, primitive as well as civilized, have the same 
capacity for logical inference. 
“Der Grad der Rationalität von Weltbildern variiert... nicht mit der Stufe der 
kognitiven Entwicklung der Individuen, die ihr Handeln an ihnen orientieren. 
Wir müssen davon ausgehen, dass erwachsene Mitglieder primitiver 
Stammesgesellschaften grundsätzlich dieselben formalen Operationen 
erwerben können wie Angehörige moderner Gesellschaften, wenngleich die 
höherstufigen Kompetenzen dort weniger häufig auftreten und selektiver, d. 
h. in engeren Lebensbereichen angewendet werden.” (Habermas 1981) 
Habermas basically argues that rationality is a fundamental human capacity. Yet while 
rationality of everyday life and practices is given (as a potential) with natural language 
and hence not ‘imposed’ on the Lifeworld from ‘the history of ideas’, the possibility 
for exploiting the rational potential of language depends on the knowledge available in 
a particular society or culture. This potential has historically been repressed, but is 
being emancipated through modernization, particularly with the ‘symbolization of the 
sacred’ – calling into question all that was hitherto accepted as given. Modernisation is 
characterised as an extension and development of this social body of knowledge more 
or less available to the individuals living in modernity. 
This duality between a ‘social body of knowledge’ and a fundamental potential for 
rationality in ordinary language can be illustrated by comparison with Heidegger (and 
Derrida). According to Heidegger, our understanding of the world is based on ‘world-
disclosing’ paradigms created by ‘demi-gods’ or poets, with Galileo as the most 
prominent and influential. Galileo thus founded a mathematical view of the world in 
order to ‘disclose’ it for calculation, by reducing Nature to dead objectsi(Heidegger 
1962). And Derrida argues that literature has primacy over oral communication in the 
sense that literature has shaped the interpretations we employ – also in everyday life.  
Compared with Heidegger and Derrida, however, Habermas seems to have something 
in common with Berger & Luckman in admitting everyday life some autonomy. 
According to Habermas, the process of modernization is characterized by 
differentiation, the separation of various expert cultures – science, art – from the 
everyday life of the Lifeworld7. On the one hand, everyday life is affected by expert 
cultures in the sense that knowledge or experience developed/acquired in those 
                                                     
7 I.e. the separation of monological theories characteristic of science from the hermeneutic 
understanding in natural language. 
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spheres are translated into the Lifeworld, i.e. new experience gained in art is imported 
via literary critics. On the other hand, everyday life has some autonomy, in the sense 
that it has the ‘power of negation’: it is capable of critically testing the theoretically 
based knowledge (originating in expert cultures), for example by testing its problem 
solving capacity. 
I emphasize argument about the potential of everyday life for negation, and the duality 
between natural language and ‘theoretical ideas’, because is essential to the approach 
to interpretations. It emphasizes the potential for rationality and progress against more 
fatalistic theories, according to which we are helplessly enclosed in totalising 
‘frameworks of interpretation’. 
2.1.1.4. Action anticipatory 
Rational action is characterized by: anticipatory calculation of alternatives, intention 
(Weber, March), and ‘logic of consequentiality’. This characteristic is often qualified 
by comparing with alternative ‘forms of action’. Thus, Weber distinguishes rational 
from traditional and affective action: 
“Zweckrational handelt, wer sein Handeln nach Zweck, Mitteln und 
Nebenfolgen orientiert und dabei sowohl die Mittel gegen die Zwecke, wie 
die Zwecke gegen die Nebenfolgen, wie endlich auch die verschiedenen 
möglichen Zwecke gegeneinander rational abwägt: also jedenfalls weder 
affektuell … noch traditional handelt.” (Weber 1998)  
March prefers to contrast the ‘logic of consequentiality’ with that of ‘appropriateness’, 
acting according to routines that are (considered) ‘appropriate’ in the actual situation.  
Essential in rational action (and in the concept of problem solving) is thus the 
emphasis on ‘anticipatory’, the separation between plan and execution: i.e. problem 
solving is a separate, purely intellectual task that is carried out before the act itself, 
before the solution is actually applied. Rationality is thus defined by a distinction 
between action and learning (acquisition, evaluation of knowledge), while experience 
is based on integration of action and learning, or to some extent action before 
learning: ‘shoot first, ask questions afterwards’. 
This distinction between plan and execution is often criticized. One critique is 
exemplified in Lucy Suchman’s (ethnomethodological, phenomenological) theory of 
situated action (Suchman 1990)): the argument is that people are not able to calculate 
actions in advance, but must always act ‘in situ’ by taking the unique context in 
consideration. Separation – between plan and execution, as well as that between 
subject and object (see below) – is a conceptual misunderstanding of human practice; 
that is not how people act.  
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Marxists (both Braverman and critical theory) emphasize that the separation between 
plan and execution corresponds to the social separation between Capital and Labour, 
or between management and employees, i.e.:  
“Die Distanz des Subjekts zum Objekt, Voraussetzung der Abstraktion, 
gründet in der Distanz zur Sache, die der Herr durch den Beherrschten 
gewinnt” (Horkheimer & Adorno 1968).  
I find that Suchman’s denial of this separation is a fruitless denial of an unavoidable 
and irrevocable characteristic of rationality. It may be very relevant to question and 
criticize the implications of this distanciation and mediation, but to deny it by referring 
to some fundamental characteristic of human practice is delusive. And by apparently 
denouncing the very separation between plan and execution Braverman, too, shuts 
himself of from modernity. As argued by Horkheimer & Adorno, the separation 
between plan and execution is closely linked to another fundamental characteristics of 
rationality: the separation between subject and object (see below). 
A similar, though not identical, critique of the emphasis on anticipation seems implied 
in Weick’s theory about sensemaking, which he characterizes as retrospective (Weick 
1995). To some extent, though, rational action is also ‘retrospective’ in the sense that 
it should be ‘justifiable’ and able to answer to critique (see later). 
A psychological aspect of the separation between plan and execution is the 
suppression or postponement of drives (Freud, Hegel), i.e. as emphasized by 
Habermas in his analysis of Hegel:  
„labor breaks the dictates of immediate desires and, as it were, arrests the 
process of drive satisfaction.“(Habermas 1971a) 
2.1.1.5. Subject-object 
Knowledge refers to an objective world, one that is perceived instrumentally in order 
to manipulate it. 
2.1.1.6. Publicity, intersubjectivity, universality 
There is a tension between the principles of universality and intersubjectivity, though, 
a problem that is essential to the discussion of interpretations. A ‘community’ can be 
too narrow; the clear demarcation of a community as opposed to others contradicts the 
idea of universality  – universality goes beyond community and intersubjectivity.  
Adorno thus strongly criticizes the ‚fetish of collectivity and organization’ and – in 
Brunkhorst’s words -  “the insidious tyranny of neighbourhood opinion” (Brunkhorst 1999). 
He regards groups or collectivities as less capable of grasping truth than an isolated 
individual. 
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“Das individuelle Bewusstsein, welches das Ganze erkennt, worin die 
Individuen eingespannt sind, ist auch heute noch nicht bloß individuell, 
sondern hält in der Konsequenz des Gedankens das Allgemeine fest. 
Gegenüber den kollektiven Mächten, die in der gegenwärtigen Welt den 
Weltgeist usurpieren, kann das Allgemeine und Vernünftige beim isolierten 
Einzelnen besser überwintern, als bei den stärkeren Bataillonen, welche die 
Allgemeinheit der Vernunft gehorsam preisgeben haben. Der Satz, dass 
tausend Augen mehr sehen als zwei, ist Lüge und der genaue Ausdruck jener 
Fetischisierung von Kollektivität und Organisation, die zu durchbrechen die 
oberste Verpflichtung von gesellschaftlicher Erkenntnis heute bildet." 
(Adorno 1979a)  
Thus, while groups generally are socialized and conformist, (rational) thinking in the 
individual mind reaches beyond the individual qua its inherent universality. Yet this 
knowledge residing – hibernating – in the individual mind is not private or tacit: the 
reference to the ‘consequentiality’ of thought is in my opinion best understood as a 
reference to the logical structure and rational potential of language. Knowledge is 
possible only through cognition and use of language (or art) – it must be expressed. 
And language is not the ‘property’ of some community. Brunkhorst emphasizes 
„how distant Adorno’s radical individualism is from all forms of communal 
or collective identity. Whereas, for instance, the ‚communitarianism’ 
fashionable today in the West developed from Herder to Hegel, for Adorno 
all freedom of modernity begins with criticism of that model’s metaphysical 
character of compulsion.“  
Habermas more or less agrees with Adorno’s critique of narrow-minded communities, 
but he struggles with a dilemma. On the one hand he argues that truth is based on 
consensus, and thus established in a ‘community’ – an argument apparently in conflict 
with Adorno. On the other hand he argues against communitarianism that 
communicative rationality within the community ‘reaches beyond’ any local, self-
sufficient consensus by appealing to universality.  
"The moral point of view ... requires that maxims and contested interests be 
generalized, which compels the participants to transcend the social and 
historical context of their particular form of life and particular community 
and adopt the perspective of all those possibly affected. This exercise of 
abstraction explodes the culture-specific lifeworld horizon within which 
processes of ethical self-understanding take place… [M]oral knowledge that 
raises a claim to universal validity must in addition detach itself from the 
contexts in which ethical knowledge remains embedded." (Habermas 1993) 
Habermas thus draws a compromise between the emphasis on intersubjectivity and 
Adorno’s critique of communities by referring to an (ideal of) open-ended consensus. 
In summarizing this discussion I shall emphasize a distinction between two different 
critiques of ‘community knowledge’. On the one hand, there is the argument, 
elaborated above, that a community is ‘particularistic’ and narrow-minded if it does 
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not appeal to universality. One could add that the ideal of an isolated autonomous 
community may also be ‘totalitarian’ on a small scale, repressing unpopular views.  
On the other hand, there is the sociological argument, often forwarded by Adorno, that 
any actual ‘community’ in the modern world is in fact subsumed under, and 
determined by (false, unjust) totality. No modern community or group is autonomous, 
but a representative totality. It is naïve to regard communities of today as fundamental 
or primary, because they are in reality mediated and socially ‘determined’. As an 
example, Adorno criticizes Popper’s emphasis on intersubjectivity as a guarantee for 
critical rationality in scientific institutions: the ideal of research as based on 
‘cooperation’ does not recognize that research today is no independent activity but 
fundamentally mediated and conditioned by societal structure. One may say that 
science is both social (intersubjective etc.) and societal: 
“Die Formen wissenschaftlicher Kooperation enthalten unendlich viel an 
gesellschaftlicher Vermittlung; Popper nennt sie zwar eine 'sozial 
Angelegenheit', kümmert sich aber nicht um deren Implikate" (Adorno 
1979b).  
2.1.1.7. Transparency 
The ideal of publicity is related to that of transparency (or explicitness), which is 
associated with a deep suspicion against any form of tacit knowledge. In a colourful 
allegory, Hume argues that obscurity is used as a shield against critical reason – in this 
case by metaphysics:  
"But this obscurity in the profound and abstract philosophy, is objected to, 
not only as painful and fatiguing, but as the inevitable source of uncertainty 
and error. Here indeed lies the justest and most plausible objection against a 
considerable part of metaphysics, that they are not properly a science; but 
arise either from the fruitless efforts of human vanity, which would penetrate 
into subjects utterly inaccessible to the understanding, or from the craft of 
popular superstitions, which, being unable to defend themselves on fair 
ground, raise these intangling brambles to cover and protect their weakness. 
Chased from the open country, these robbers fly into the forest, and lie in 
wait to break in upon every unguarded avenue of the mind, and overwhelm it 
with religious fears and prejudices. The stoutest antagonist, if he remit his 
watch a moment, is oppressed. And many, through cowardice and folly, open 
the gates to the enemies, and willingly receive them with reverence and 
submission, as their legal sovereigns." (Hume 1910).  
Clarity? 
In order to avoid the dangers in the forests of obscurity and ensure transparency, 
clarity is often presented as a requirement – implying that ‘unclear’ arguments must be 
discarded. The emphasis on clarity goes back to Descartes (Adorno 1991), who also 
emphasizes the need for simplicity, by breaking down complex issues. A more recent 
proponent of clarity is Popper, whose critical rationalism requires such ‘formal’ 
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criteria: a theory cannot be true, but it can be more or less open to criticism and 
falsification, which is the only means of progress (see later): 
"we do possess criteria which, if we are lucky, may allow us to recognize 
error and falsity. Clarity and distinctness are not criteria of truth, but such 
things as obscurity or confusion may indicate error. Similarly coherence 
cannot establish truth, but incoherence and inconsistency do establish 
falsehood. And, when they are recognized, our own errors provide the dim 
red lights which help us in groping our way out of the darkness of our cave." 
(Popper 1963)8 
On the other hand, he does not regard accuracy and precision as reasonable criteria:  
"Although clarity is valuable in itself, exactness or precision is not: there can 
be no point in trying to be more precise than our problem demands. 
Linguistic precision is a phantom, and problems connected with the meaning 
or definition of words are unimportant." (Popper 1963) 
As evident from Hume’s example, clarity has served the positivists as a weapon in 
their denouncement of metaphysical systems, and of philosophers like Hegel, who 
could thus be easily discarded for being unclear (rather than read and criticized). And 
Popper refuses to take Adorno serious for the same reason. 
It is thus not surprising that Adorno finds these criteria problematic. Such subjective 
criteria are inevitably based on the problematic assumption that reality is always 
‘clear’. A rigid demand for clarity creates blindness towards those areas or moments 
that do not fit in. Rather than displaying clarity at any price, philosophy should strain 
itself to put words on that, which cannot be spoken – the unspeakable. Basically, he 
argues that the demand for clarity emphasizes one function of language: 
communication, over the other: expressing the matter (‘Ausdruck der Sache’) – it 
requires that in order to make yourself understandable to others, you must compromise 
with what you want say, with the content.  
"Am ehesten würde der Not eine Philosophische Sprache gerecht, die auf 
Verständlichkeit dringt, ohne mit Klarheit sie zu verwechseln. Sprache, als 
Ausdruck der Sache, geht nicht in der Kommunikation, der Mitteilung an 
andere auf. Sie ist aber - und das wusste Hegel - auch nicht schlechthin 
unabhängig von Kommunikation.“ (Adorno 1991) 
His argument seems to question the previous emphasis on critical reception and 
dialogue. Nevertheless, he does admit that the two functions of language cannot be 
                                                     
8 Kuhn arrives at similar criteria in his later attempts to defend the rationality of paradigm 
choice. He argues that particular values are stable (and valid) across different paradigms – and 
may therefore act as paradigm-neutral criteria for choice: accuracy, consistency, perspective, 
simplicity and fruitfulness (Kuhn 1970;Pedersen 1996). 
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separated, and by suggesting comprehensibility as a more relevant criterion (for 
philosophy) he still adheres to the ideal of transparency.  
2.1.1.8. Language, symbolization 
As already emphasized, rationality is communicative and based on language. It is a 
precondition for a critical dialogue that things and issues can be ‘symbolized’, pulled 
into the realm of language – a process I already characterised as verbalisation. 
Language reaches beyond the isolated individual because of its universality, and 
because of its objectivity, its capacity for ‘reference’ to something external to human 
‘community’. 
"die Sprache selbst [verneint] bereits jenen ganzen Menschen, das je redende 
Einzelsubjekt, vermöge ihrer Allgemeinheit und Objektivität…: erst einmal 
geht sie auf Kosten des Soseins der Individuen." (Adorno 1964) 
Language is a mediator between (human) Mind and Matter, an objectified 
externalisation of Man, no longer merely a ‘member’ of its ‘subject’. In Habermas’ 
analysis of Hegel: 
“As the name of things, the symbol has a double function. On the one hand, 
the power of representation consists in making present something that is not 
immediately given through something else that is immediately given, but 
which stands for something other than itself. The representational symbol 
indicates an object or a state of affairs as something else [ein Anderes], and 
designates it in the meaning that it has for us. On the other hand, we 
ourselves have produced the symbols. By means of them speaking 
consciousness becomes objective for itself and them experiences itself as a 
subject. ... In order that nature can constitute itself into the world of an "I," 
language must thus achieve a twofold mediation: on the one hand, of 
resolving and preserving the perceived [angeschaut] thing in a symbol, which 
represents it, and on the other, a distancing of consciousness from its objects, 
in which the "I," by means of symbols it has produced itself, is 
simultaneously with the thing and with itself. Thus language is the first 
category in which spirit is not conceived as something internal, but as a 
medium which is neither internal nor external. In this, spirit is the logos of a 
world and not a solitary self-consciousness.” (Habermas 1974)  
In accordance with the emphasis on anticipation, language is the foundation for 
rational action. 
“... a subject can carry out only those actions whose intentions he can in 
principle describe. The limits of action are determined by the range of 
possible descriptions. This in turn is established by the structures of language 
in which the self-understanding and worldview of a social group is 
articulated. Thus the boundaries of action are drawn by the boundaries of 
language” (Habermas 1988) 
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2.1.1.9. Law of contradiction - coherence 
This refers to the requirement that all (rational) knowledge be included in a unitary 
system, free of contradictions. This principle guarantees coherence and excludes 
relativism, emphasizing that rationality in principle cannot tolerate alternative forms of 
knowledge. Drawing on Kant, Horkheimer & Adorno thus argue that the idea of 
systematic unity, and the ability to derive the particular from universal, is the sole 
contribution from reason: 
“Forstanden … sætter ‘en vis kollektiv enhed som mål for 
forstandshandlingerne’, og denne enhed er systemet. Dens foreskrifter er 
anvisninger på, hvorledes begreberne skal bygges hierarkisk op. Hos Kant – 
som hos Leibniz og Descartes – består rationaliteten i, ’at man såvel ved 
opstigningen til højere arter som ved nedstigningen til lavere sorter fuldender 
den systematiske sammenhæng’. Det ’systematiske’ i erkendelsen er ’dennes 
sammenhæng ud fra ét princip’. Tænkning, som oplysningen forstår den, er 
ensbetydende med tilvejebringelsen af en samlet, videnskabelig orden og 
afledningen af erkendelser af kendsgerninger fra principper, hvad enten disse 
tydes som vilkårligt satte axiomer, medfødte ideer eller højeste 
abstraktioner… Modsigelsessætningen er systemet i en nøddeskal. 
Erkendelse består i subsumering under principper. Den er ét med den dom, 
der føjer sig ind i systemet. Anden tænkning end den, der tager sigte på 
systemet, er uden retning eller autoritær.” (Horkheimer & Adorno 1993)9 
2.1.1.10. Critique and justification  
Critical dialogue is often emphasized as fundamental characteristics of rationality: 
“Rationalität hat weniger mit dem Haben von Erkenntnis als damit zu tun, 
wie sprach- und handlungsfähige Subjekte Wissen erwerben und verwenden.” 
(Habermas 1981) 
Popper10 describes the scientific community (the ideal of rationality) as one where 
theories are accepted but always potentially open to critique, be it based on counter-
                                                     
9 “The intellect [‘Verstand’] … aims at a certain collective unity, and this unity is the system. 
Its prescriptions are guidelines to build up concepts hierarchically. For Kant, rationality means 
that by ascending to to higher species, as well as by descending to lower sorts, one fulfils the 
systematic coherence. The ‘systematic’ in knowledge is this coherence based on one principle. 
Thought, as conceived by the Enlightenment, is equivalent to the construction of a united 
scientific order, and to the deduction of knowledge of facts from principles, be they arbitrary 
axioms, inborn ideas or the highest abstractions… The law of contradiction is the system in a 
nutshell. Knowledge means subsuming under principles. It is identical to the judgment that is 
inserted into the system. Any other thought than that aiming for the system, is without direction 
or authoritarian.” 
10 Critical theory (Habermas, Adorno) vs. critical rationality (Popper) Association of these two 
traditions is ambiguous. There are similarities, yet the differences and disagreements have been 
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evidence or on logical arguments. Theories are open to ‘rigorous refutations’. They are 
never ‘true’ in any absolute sense, but they are better than earlier versions – and they 
cannot constitute a closed framework or paradigm (or horizon). Fallibilism is based on 
an asymmetry between true and false: the critical method is fundamentally different 
from any other method and does not depend on a justified ‘foundation’ for its validity. 
Popper rejects the 
”untenable dogma that criticism, in order to be ’valid’, must proceed from 
assumptions which are established or justified.” (Popper 1961)   
And he emphasizes the possibility for immanent criticism, which is distinct from 
transcendent criticism. While the latter is based on an alternative: “assumptions which are 
of the nature of a competing theory”, immanent criticism is based on assumptions that  
“may, for example, be part of the theory against which the criticism is 
directed… Or they may be assumptions which would be generally found 
acceptable, even though they do not form part of the theory criticized.” 
(Popper 1961) 
The asymmetry and role of critique is also emphasized in the distinction between 
genesis and justification of a theory, a principle Popper also maintains in isolating the 
source of knowledge from the process of rational critique, and in his distinction – in 
relation to the theory of science – between Context of Discovery and Context of 
Justification. 
Similarly, Habermas defines modernity as based on a rationality, where consensus is 
potentially open to critique and requires justification: "die Rationalität einer Äusserung [ist] 
auf Kritisierbarkeit und Begründungsfähigkeit zurückzuführen." (Habermas 1981). He argues 
that this applies to actions as well as to statements, that there is no fundamental 
difference between know-how and know-that: “auch dieses know-how kann grundsätzlich in 
die Form eines know-that übergeführt werden” (Habermas 1981). He thus rejects the 
                                                                                                                                            
manifest as well: Adorno characterized Popper as a positivist, while Popper later neglected his 
role – and interest – in the debate on positivism in German sociology, dismissing Adorno as 
irrelevant and with a tiresome tendency to blur a banal content in unnecessarily complicated 
sentences – incapable of clarity. Brunkhorst concludes that Adorno agreed with Popper’s idea 
of a critical science, because it coincides with his own critique of metaphysics or idealism. Yet, 
metaphysics or idealism only one form of the identity thinking criticized by Adorno, who also 
criticizes instrumental reason (the third form of identity thinking being "subsuming of single 
elements or objects under general concepts") – “this idea is strange to the analytical 
philosophers like Popper or Quine”. “For Adorno, fallibility alone is not enough to avoid 
unconscious and uncomprehended relations of domination, repression and unjust exclusion” 
(Brunkhorst 1999). Habermas’ emphasis on criticizability and justifiability is similar to the 
strong Popperian demand of falsifiability, but less rigorous and less dependent on ‚hard facts’ 
or ‚clarity’. 
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classical Aristotelian distinction between theory and practice, which regards the latter 
as a different realm. 
Against Derrida, Heidegger, Rorty and others that regard language (or Being, 
literature, culture) as closed and self-reproducing systems of meaning, Habermas 
emphasizes the potential for negation in everyday language. This is achieved because 
the demand for justification (‘Geltungsanspruch’) reaches beyond the horizon of the 
given context: 
“Ihre Negationskraft zieht die innerweltliche Sprachpraxis aus 
Geltungsansprüchen, die über die Horizonte des jeweils bestehenden 
Kontextes herauszielen.” (Habermas 1985) 
2.1.1.11. Who, and what, can be rational?  
Weber argues for methodological individualism: only individuals, not classes or 
nations, can act rationally. Weick uses a similar restriction to argue that organizations 
cannot be said to act rationally, because they cannot be assumed to achieve the ‘four-
fold agreement’ necessary for rational action. Rationality thus requires an acting 
subject to agree on ends and means and principles of evaluation – to emphasize the 
central elements. Compared to Weber, however, does not focus on individuals, but 
also recognizes (small) groups as capable of rational action. 
"rationality is best understood as in the eye of the beholder. It is his aims and 
how he consciously sets out to accomplish them that constitute the clearest, 
most easily specified component of rationality. To say that 'systems' or 
organizations engage in rational decision-making makes sense only if we can 
specify some set of persons who agree on some desired outcome, on a 
specified set of means to attain this outcome, on ways in which the specific 
means will be activated, and on how it will be known whether the desired 
outcome was attained or not. Since this fourfold agreement is more difficult 
when large numbers of persons are involved, it is likely that rationality will 
characterize mostly small groups of actors and that, at any moment in time, 
organizations will have several different and contradictory rationalities." 
(Weick 1979) 
It seems necessary here to anticipate the later discussion of organisations in order to 
illustrate the implications of this definition of rationality. If Weick’s argument is read 
as a refusal to regard organisations as rational – and the reference to ‘several different 
and contradictory rationalities’ refers to ambiguity in organisations, which will soon 
be discussed – then it obviously disagrees with Weber’s theory about modern 
organisations being fundamentally rational. It may seem paradoxical that Weber bases 
his conclusion on an individualist (or subjectivist) concept of rationality, similar to 
Weick’s. The reason may be that Weber sees organisations not as a ‘large group of 
people’, but as the rational ‘design’ of an individual entrepreneur. 
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It is too narrow to apply the term rational merely to people – and even more 
inadequate to reserve it for individuals. This restrictions fails to recognize that 
rationality also been ‘objectified’ or externalised into objects, i.e. modern science, or 
the formal procedures of a bureaucratic organisation – both examples in fact being 
essential to Weber’s own sociology.  
Habermas appears to extend the definition by arguing that the term rational can be 
applied not only to persons, but also to ‘symbolic expressions’ (acts as well as 
statements): 
“Wenn wir nach grammatischen Subjekten suchen, die den Prädikatausdruck 
‘rational’ ergänzen können, bieten sich zunächst zwei Kandidaten an. 
Personen, die über Wissen verfügen, und symbolische Äußerungen, 
sprachliche und nicht-sprachliche, kommunikative oder nicht-
kommunikative Handlungen, die Wissen verkörpern, können mehr oder 
wenig rational sein. Wir können Männer und Frauen, Kinder und 
Erwachsene, Minister und Busschaffner ‘rational’ nennen, nicht aber Fische 
oder Fliederbüsche, Gebirge, Strassen oder Stühle. Wir können 
Entschuldigungen, Verspätungen, chirurgische Eingriffe, Kriegserklärungen, 
Reparaturen, Baupläne oder Konferenzbeschlüsse ’irrational’ nennen, nicht 
aber ein Unwetter, einen Unfall, einen Lottogewinn oder eine Erkrankung.” 
(Habermas 1981)  
Although he thus does not restrict his definition to individual behaviour, even rational 
‘expressions’ must apparently be associated with an agent, an acting subject. Neither 
the ‘change of state’ in an automatic (‘selbstgeregelt’) system, nor a stimuli-provoked 
response can be ‘rational’ – or only in a ‘transferred’ (‘übertragen’) sense. The 
concept requires that the acting – or speaking – subject by itself can justify its (speech) 
acts: 
“Manchmal sprechen wir ja von der ‘Rationalität’ eines Reizstimulierten 
Verhaltens, der ’Rationalität’ der Zustandsänderung eines Systems. Solche 
Reaktion können als Lösungen von Problemen gedeutet werden, ohne dass 
der Beobachter der interpolierten Zweckmäßigkeit der beobachteten Reaktion 
eine Zwecktätigkeit unterstellt und diese einem entscheidungsfähigen, 
propositionales Wissen verwendenden Subjekt als Handlung zurechnet... 
Verhaltensreaktionen durch innere oder äußere Stimuli gereizten 
Organismus, umweltinduzierte Zustandsänderungen eines selbstgeregelten 
Systems lassen sich zwar als Quasihandlungen verstehen, nämlich so, als ob 
sich darin die Handlungsfähigkeit eines Subjekts äußerte. Aber von 
Rationalität sprechen wir hier nur in einem übertragenen Sinne. Denn dir für 
rationale Äusserungen geforderte Begründungsfähigkeit bedeutet, dass das 
Subjekt, dem diese zugerechnet werden, unter geeigneten Umständen selbst 
in der Lage sein soll, Gründe anzuführen.” (Habermas 1981) 
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2.1.1.12. Individual autonomy 
Rationality is associated with autonomy. The individual subject is capable of acquiring 
(objective) knowledge, and of acting according to its own knowledge (and 
calculations), instead of submitting to authority, or by accepting the prejudices of a 
given community. ”Man can know: thus he can be free” (Popper 1963). Or in Kant’s words 
about enlightenment: 
“Aufklärung ist der Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbst verschuldeten 
Unmündigkeit. Unmündigkeit ist das Unvermögen, sich seines Verstandes 
ohne Leitung eines anderen zu bedienen. Selbstverschuldet ist diese 
Unmündigkeit, wenn die Ursache derselben nicht am Mangel des 
Verstandes, sondern der Entschließung und des Mutes liegt, sich seiner ohne 
Leitung eines andern zu bedienen. Sapere aude! Habe Mut, dich deines 
eigenen Verstandes zu bedienen! ist also der Wahlspruch der Aufklärung.” 
(Kant 1784) 
The ideal of autonomy was a core idea of both liberalists and philosophers of 
enlightenment. It was maintained by critical theory against late capitalism, which they 
believed to be on the verge of engulfing this fundamental principle of liberalism.  
The ideal of autonomy is complex and ambiguous. It seems to contradict the principles 
of intersubjectivity, but that would be mistaken. It does not correspond to an 
anarchistic or solipsist ideal of an isolated subject: there may be a tension, but no 
fundamental and irreconcilable contradiction between socialization and autonomy. On 
the contrary: both Adorno and Habermas maintain that autonomy is based on 
socialization.  
Nevertheless, the principle of autonomy does confront the emphasis on community – it 
emphasizes the individual before the – local, primary – community (see also previous 
discussion). This principle anticipates an essential issue regarding interpretations. It is 
a point of critique against radical versions of ‘social construction’ etc., notably the 
idea of legitimate peripheral participation: learning as socialization (Lave & Wenger 
1991). Their theory appears to reduce the individual to a ‘cultural dope’, to paraphrase 
(paradoxically) Garfinkel’s own ethnomethodological critique of Parsons. This is a 
theory of pure, un-mediated socialization, of total individual submission under the 
collective, where the ideal of autonomy is abandoned. 
2.2. Interpretation and ambiguity in organizational theory 
Weick’s book about The Social Psychology of Organisations (Weick 1979) has been 
influential in organizational theory and is a major work in what his been labeled the 
‘interpretivist’ school or paradigm (Burrell & Morgan 1979;Hatch 1997). His theory 
differs from rationalist and functionalist approaches by focusing on processes of 
ambiguity, interpretation, enactment and, more recently, sensemaking. Daft & 
Lengel’s theory of media richness is based on Weick’s distinction between ambiguity 
and uncertainty(Daft & Lengel 1986). 
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March & Olsen are interesting, because they take inspiration from Weick and 
incorporate concepts of interpretation and ambiguity within a functionalist and 
rationalist framework. As a result, they emphasize other, more problematic aspects of 
consensus-based understanding than Weick. 
The same is true for Sproull & Kiesler. They focus on the micro-sociological level and 
draw on group studies carried out within the discipline of social psychology. They 
describe processes of ‘groupthink’, which I think may be regarded as somewhat 
similar to those described by Weick, though restricted to the level of groups – whereas 
as Weick has been more elaborate in extending social psychology to the level of 
organizations.  
2.2.1. Weick: ambiguity and sensemaking 
Weick and Daft & Lengel define ambiguity/equivocality as ‘two or more conflicting 
interpretations’. In his more recent work Weick prefers the term equivocality, because 
ambiguity is too often associated with ‘clarity’: 
"it is important to retain the word equivocal ... because it explicitly points to 
the presence of two or more interpretations as a trigger to sensemaking. 
Although the word ambiguity also means the presence of two or more 
interpretations, it can also mean something quite different, namely, a lack of 
clarity, which … makes it quite similar to uncertainty." (Weick 1995) 
Nevertheless, in this thesis I shall use the concepts of ambiguity and equivocality in 
the same meaning, and the literature generally seems to use them interchangeably. But 
the distinction between ambiguity/equivocality and uncertainty is essential to the 
definition. 
Uncertainty is associated with traditional (rational) decision theory etc. It is 
characterized by ‘lack of data’, and the way to reduce uncertainty is by gathering more 
data. Weick also characterizes uncertainty as the absence of any interpretation. To 
some extent, the process of reducing uncertainty corresponds to the previous definition 
of (instrumental) rationality, and Weick’s distinction aims at identifying a process of 
intersubjective ‘understanding’ that differs significantly from processes analyzed by 
decision theory etc. On the other hand, reduction of uncertainty in Weick’s definition 
is not quite identical to (critical) rationality: Critical rationality is not characterized by 
‘lack of interpretation’ (= theory). On the contrary, it requires a theory for its critique, 
and the theory itself does not emerge from ‘more data’ (as argued by Hume etc.), but 
has its origin elsewhere: experience, inspiration etc. – according to Popper, context of 
discovery is not ‘rational’.  
The problems of ambiguity, on their part, do not meet “the assumptions necessary for 
rational decision making”.  
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"The problem is that there are too many meanings, not too few. The problem 
faced by the sensemaker is one of equivocality, not one of uncertainty. The 
problem is confusion, not ignorance." (Weick 1995) 
In order to reduce ambiguity, people do not need more information, because 
information will not resolve misunderstandings. “Instead, they need values, priorities, and 
clarity about preferences” (Weick 1995) – although it would be misleading to associate 
interpretations merely with values: In most definitions, interpretation also includes 
causal explanations, assumptions about cause-effect relationships, which suggest 
appropriate means. This is, for instance, implied in his reference to the ‘fourfold 
agreement’ of rationality (see p. 30), emphasizing ‘elements’ of knowledge that cannot 
be specified in terms of evidence and are thus open to interpretation. 
2.2.1.1. Reduction of ambiguity 
According to Daft & Lengel, equivocality is reduced when participants “exchange 
opinions to clarify ambiguities, define problems, and reach agreement" (Daft & Lengel 1986). 
The emphasis is on definition and enactment as a collective ‘act’ – on agreeing and 
consensus formation rather than truth. And Weick thus focuses on the process of 
sensemaking rather than on fixed interpretations, not unlike Zimmerman’s distinction 
between the ethnomethodological emphasis on the ‘occasioned’ character of ongoing 
processes of understanding, and the notion of culture as something more static: 
“By use of the term occasioned corpus, we wish to emphasize that the 
features of socially organized activities are particular, contingent 
accomplishments of the production and recognition work of parties to the 
activity. We underscore the occasioned character of the corpus in contrast to 
a corpus of member’s knowledge, skill, and belief standing prior to and 
independent of any actual occasion in which such knowledge, skill, and 
belief is displayed or recognized. The latter conception is usually referred to 
by the term culture.” (Zimmerman & Power 1971), cited in (Habermas 1981). 
A crucial point in Weick’s definition is that the process of reducing ambiguity will not 
gain from more information. How should this be understood? In one sense it is correct 
that the process will gain less from more ‘data’ than from a clarification of both frames 
and values. Still, once various ‘interpretations’ are specified, it is not evident that 
information cannot support the choice of one over the other. Furthermore, it could be 
argued that clarification of ‘frames’ or ‘basic assumptions’ is just another type of 
information.11 
                                                     
11 Thus, paradoxically, Habermas characterizes hermeneutic understanding as a process where 
one can specify what further information is needed (thus the opposite of Weick’s definition): 
”Bei Verständnisschwierigkeiten, die sich aus einem grossen kulturellen, zeitlichen oder 
sozialen Abstand ergeben, können wir prinzipiell angeben, über welche zusätztlechen 
Information wir verfügen müssten, um zu verstehen: wir wissen, dass wir ein Alphabet 
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2.2.1.2. Social and cognitive aspects of equivocality 
Weick’s theory combines the purely cognitive aspect emphasizing the difficulty in 
understanding the issue and applying an appropriate interpretation, with the social 
aspect of equivocality: that conflicting interpretations are held by different (groups of) 
people. This corresponds to the agent or subject of a rational action. 
It may be useful to compare Weick’s theory of ‘enactment’ with Poppers ‘bold 
conjectures’: tentative scientific theories fostered in the Context of Discovery. 
‘Enactment’ corresponds to the process by which a theory is accepted ‘for the time 
being’, a process Popper characterizes as decisionism. The difference is that Weick’s 
model does not seem to distinguish between genesis and justification, that he does not 
share the idea of critical reception envisioned in Popper’s ideal of a scientific 
community. Poppers emphasis on the truth claim of any theory, and the idea of 
progressing towards truth has no correspondence in Weick’s ‘psychology of 
knowledge’. 
2.2.2. March: ambiguity and interpretation as a distortion 
March’ and others’ focus on ambiguity on the micro- or meso-level is inspired by 
Weick but differs by their emphasis on its potentially dysfunctional role, both as a 
distortion of rational choice processes (March & Olsen 1976a), and as a de-coupling of 
the ideal (experiential) learning cycle (Levitt & March 1988;March & Olsen 
1976b;March & Olsen 1976a;March & Olsen 1976b). March & Olsen refers to four 
types of ambiguity, two of which correspond to the two elements of interpretation 
mentioned previously:  
"By the term ambiguity we intend to signify four major kinds of opaqueness 
in organizations. The first is the ambiguity of intention. Many organizations 
are characterized by inconsistent and ill-defined objectives. It is often 
impossible to specify a meaningful preference function for an organization 
that satisfies both the consistency requirements of theories of choice and the 
empirical requirements of describing organizational motive. The second lack 
of clarity is the ambiguity of understanding. For many organizations the 
causal world in which they live is obscure. Technologies are unclear; 
environments are difficult to interpret. It is hard to see the connections 
between organizational actions and their consequences. The third lack of 
                                                                                                                                            
entziffern, das Lexikon kennenlernen oder kontext-spezifische Anwendungsregeln erschliessen 
müssen. Innerhalb der Toleranzgrenzen der üblichen umgangssprachlichen Kommunikation 
können wir beim Versuch, unverständliche Sinnzusammenhänge hermeneutisch aufzuklären, 
wissen, was wir (noch) nicht wissen” (Habermas 1971a). And he further argues that this 
characteristic also reveals the constraints of hermeneutic understanding: in situations where 
one cannot specify the need for information, other processes are needed.   
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clarity is the ambiguity of history. The past is important, but it is not easily 
specified or interpreted. History can be reconstructed or twisted. What 
happened, why it happened, and whether it had to happen are all 
problematic. The fourth lack of clarity is the ambiguity of organization. At 
any point in time, individuals vary in the attention they provide to different 
decisions; they vary from one time to another. As a result, the pattern of 
participation is uncertain and changing." (March & Olsen 1976a)  
They thus argue that specific and essential elements of decision-making cannot be 
clear and thus are vulnerable to politics and dissent. I shall emphasize two of these 
elements, quite similar to Weick’s remark about a ‘fourfold agreement’.  
2.2.2.1. Purpose and causality – two ‘elements’ of interpretation 
One ambiguous element is purpose and criterions of success: goals, values, and 
preferences. On the one hand this is generally regarded as a subjective category and 
may not seem controversial. On the other hand it complicates significantly the view of 
organisations, which are often defined as means to a (given) end (Adorno), or “oriented 
to targets” (Levitt & March 1988) (see later). 
The second element vulnerable to ambiguity is causality: knowledge about cause-
effect relations, ‘connections between organizational actions and their consequences’ 
in particular, are essential to the choice of means in rational decision making. I see this 
element as the essence of their second and third types of ambiguity: knowledge of 
causal relationships in the environment, and in the interpretation of history. 
To regard causality as ‘open’ to interpretation corresponds to the classical argument 
(Hume, Kant) that causality is not observable, that it is not possible to make an 
induction12, to infer a universal rule on the basis of (any amount of) empirical 
observations. However March and his co-authors do not lean on this abstract 
argument, but emphasize strongly the objective dimension, insisting that some 
environments are more complex and difficult to ‘explain’ than others. March & Olsen 
thus seem to argue that real-life organisations are generally more exposed to complex 
environments than individuals. Such environments amplify the need for interpretation 
and may be the original, objective source of ambiguity between interpretations. This 
emphasis on the objective dimensions differs from Weick’s interpretivist approach – 
and from social constructivist approaches in general – who maintain a ‘subjective’ or 
‘epistemological’ distinction: ambiguity defined as two ore more conflicting 
interpretations. As opposed to interpretivism and social construction, March & Olsen 
explicitly "wish to acknowledge the possibility, and frequent dominance, of what is usually called 
objective reality" (March & Olsen 1976b). 
                                                     
12 It should be clear that I use this term in the logical sense, as the opposite of deduction: to 
derive a particular statement from a general rule. 
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The argument about types of ambiguity can be ‘converted’ to an idea about the nature 
of a (frame of) interpretation. An interpretation is defined by agreement – 
corresponding to Weick’s ‘fourfold agreement’ – about, at least, those elements: – 
purpose and causality. There is no ambiguity within an interpretation. 
2.2.2.2. Ambiguity or one-eyedness: both restrictions on rationality 
Similar to Weick’s reference to ‘several different and conflicting rationalities’, March 
and his co-authors argue that large, complex organisations have various subgroups 
with different frames of interpretations. March emphasizes the (potential) irrationality, 
both within individual interpretations (no ambiguity), and of the processes involving 
several interpretations (ambiguity).  
Basically, individual interpretations are here regarded as fallible, rather suspicious 
assumptions about the objective reality. On the one hand, interpretations are 
‘conservative’ and “resistant to experience”, and may even be enacting these experiences 
(Levitt & March 1988). On the other hand, if interpretations may be modified, it is not 
necessarily – even unlikely – due to better information about the environment, because 
they are “vulnerable to paradigm peddling and paradigm politics” (Levitt & March 1988). The 
choice of words clearly emphasizes the irrational aspects: "Individuals, as well as 
organizations or nations, develop myths, fictions, legends, and illusions" (March & Olsen 
1976a). (Mis-)interpretations jeopardize the possibility for choosing adequate 
strategies. 
On the other hand, March emphasizes that processes involving ambiguity threaten the 
rationality of decision making, evaluation etc. Fractions bargain over decisions with a 
tendency to inflated promises – characteristic of political processes – and they tend to 
be critical and negative in their evaluation of results (of the actions suggested by ‘the 
others’): 
”Conflict and decision advocacy within putatively rational decision 
processes lead to inflated expectations and problems of implementation and 
thus to disappointment”. “[E]valuations of outcomes are likely to be more 
negative or more mixed in organizations than they are in individual” (Levitt 
& March 1988). 
2.2.2.3. Rationality as an implicit ideal 
It is worth noticing March’s rather ‘ambiguous’ attitude to rationality. He tends to 
emphasize the more irrational aspects of organizations, i.e. referring to signal and 
symbol, garbage cans, interpretation and ambiguity. But the more or less explicit 
conclusion: that organizations tend to behave irrationally is not a dismissal of the 
concept and relevance of rationality. On the contrary, the critique preserves rationality 
as an implicit ideal – as evident in Habermas’ and McIntyre’s argument (in another 
context) that the distinction between irrational and rational practices (which is crucial 
for several of March’ texts) is a normative evaluation on the part of the researcher:  
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“… to characterize actions and institutionalised practices as rational or 
irrational is to evaluate them. Nor is it the case that this evaluation is an 
element superadded to an original merely descriptive element. To call an 
argument fallacious is always at once to describe and to evaluate it. It is 
highly paradoxical that the impossibility of deducing evaluative conclusions 
from factual premises should have been advanced as a truth of logic, when 
logic is itself the science in which the coincidence of description and 
evaluation is most obvious. The social scientist is, if I am right, committed to 
the values of rationality in virtue of his explanatory projects in a stronger 
sense than the natural scientist is. For it is not only the case that his own 
procedures must be rational; but he cannot escape the use of the concept in 
his inquiries.” (MacIntyre 1971), cited in (Habermas 1981).  
2.2.3. Groupthink 
Just as March remains within the tradition of assuming ‘rational behaviour’, the theory 
of groupthink presented by Sproull & Kiesler converges towards a theory of ‘the 
inevitable irrationality of groups’. Here, too, the critical approach is based on an ideal 
of rationality, against which organizational (and group) processes are measured. 
Sproull & Kiesler deliver a critical account of the processes – at the micro-level – that 
lead to common interpretations and results in groups, and they argue that the 
problematic processes may result in inferior or sub-efficient solutions/performance. 
While groups are potent action-oriented, they are also inhibited in their tendency to 
groupthink, characterized by: cohesiveness, egocentrism, and extremism. They are 
capable of swift and coordinated action, but they can also be problematic or sub-
optimal when they tend to consider only a narrow range of alternatives, and to avoid 
critique.  
2.2.3.1. The virtues of critique 
Before elaborating on the critique-inhibitive factors, it is essential to notice that this 
argument implies a positive view on the role of critique and dissent in problem 
solving, corresponding to the emphasis on critique and justification in the previous 
definition of rationality. Contrary to Levitt & March’s denunciation of the negative 
role of “conflict and decision advocacy within putatively rational decision processes”, Sproull & 
Kiesler might thus regard ambiguity and political processes in organisations more 
positively: they force decision makers to put forward arguments and clarify 
assumptions. Factors that encourage critique and increase the number of alternatives 
considered will only strengthen the rationality of decision-making. A similar positive 
account of ambiguity is implied in the argument, presented by Brown & Duguid and 
others, that the very strength of organisations lies in their potential for challenging the 
‘blindfolds’ and myopic tendencies of individual communities (groups) within the 
organisation: 
"most formal organizations are not single communities of practice, but, 
rather, hybrid groups of overlapping and interdependent communities. Such 
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hybrid collectivities represent another level in the complex of knowledge 
creation. Intercommunal relationships allow the organization to develop 
collective, coherent, synergistic organizational knowledge out of the 
potentially separate, independent contributions of the individual 
communities". "By yoking diverse communities - with different belief 
systems and distinct evaluative practices - together into cohesive hybrids, 
organizations as a whole challenge the limits of each community's belief. 
This process generates knowledge through what Hirschhorn calls the 
'productive tension' or Leonard-Barton, 'creative abrasion,' forcing particular 
communities beyond their own limits and their own evaluative criteria." 
(Brown & Duguid 1998) 
However, while Levitt & March seemed unaware of the rational potential of dialogue, 
the argument above is a little too enthusiastic, without regard for the negative aspects 
of ambiguity and conflict. Conflicts and bargaining between (representatives) fractions 
in organisations are no guarantee of rational debate and hermeneutic understanding, 
and disagreements may also be ‘resolved’ – or appeased – by other, and less rational 
means. Habermas thus argues that communicative rationality may be obstructed by 
strategic behaviour – when persuasion replaces convincing. I find the enthusiasm 
expressed by Brown & Duguid somewhat hollow when it is not based on a distinction 
between rational debate and other processes for ‘reduction of ambiguity’. 
2.2.3.2. Critique-inhibitive factors: pleasantness, time, and attention to status 
Sproull & Kiesler suggest various reasons for the tendency of groups to avoid critique.  
Pleasantness, trust, and social relations 
One reason is that conflicts would threaten cohesiveness and the sense of belonging 
and identity (cosiness). The focus on the experience of pleasantness (cohesiveness), 
rather than efficiency (or rationality) is illustrated by an experiment reported by 
Sproull & Kiesler: 
"Because people like working in groups, they often do not measure and 
report their group behavior objectively. Cohesiveness and consensus are 
pleasant, so group members conclude that their group has done well, whether 
or not this impression has validity. Experiments can separate perceptions 
from actual group behavior. An experimental study of brainstorming in a 
computer-based group decision support system at the University of Arizona 
illustrates the sometimes incorrect connection between how well group 
members like a group and how they evaluate its performance. Researchers 
put a confederate in each group to compare the effect of a critical member 
with a supportive member. Electronic discussion groups with a planted group 
member who criticized others produced more new ideas and achieved more 
than groups whose planted member was highly supportive. Yet group 
members' perceptions of their success did not match the performance facts. 
Groups with the critical group member did not like their group and 
incorrectly thought the group did poorly, whereas groups with the supportive 
  40
member liked their group and incorrectly thought they did very well.” 
(Sproull & Kiesler 1991) 
By this example they emphasize a conflict between critique and cohesiveness: rational 
critique is a potential threat to the experience of pleasantness, while the maintenance 
of group identity tends to inhibit critique. And because critique is essential to 
rationality and thus to group performance, this cohesive tendency may also affect the 
quality of the result. That group work is perceived as pleasant is no guarantee that it 
performs well, rather the opposite. 
This argument may also be extended to provide a critical perspective on the recent 
emphasis on personal relations, social networks or social capital (Bourdieu 1977). In 
an argument quite similar to Sproull & Kiesler’s, O’Reilly et al suggest that the 
tendency of managers to rely on trusted sources tends to exclude sources of expertise.  
“when obtaining information in this manner, managers may judge the 
validity of the information based on the credibility of the source, not the 
facts of the matter. This may lead to the acceptance of a piece of information 
as "true" or "false" depending on how much the recipient trusts the sender. 
The research on source credibility also suggests that it may be the "safeness" 
or trustworthiness of the source, more than expertise, that determines 
whether information is believed ... Thus information may be acquired from 
accessible, trustworthy sources rather than from potentially higher quality 
sources that, while being perceived of as having the expertise, are not 
considered trustworthy. These tendencies may … reflect the structural 
barriers that are created by group pressures and can act to limit the range of 
"acceptable" information seeking." (O'Reilly et al. 1987) 
This observation implies a potential conflict between trust and rationality: using 
personal relations and relying on trust is a restriction on rationality because it threatens 
the potential for critical and unprejudiced reception. And the tendency to embrace a 
trusted source seems to be the antithesis to Poppers critical rationality: he argues that 
the source is not important, because any content must in principle be subject to 
‘ruthless critique’ (p. 28)13. 
                                                     
13 It may be argued that even Poppers critical rationality seems to imply some level of trust. 
Although any theory is in principle subject to critique and never true in an absolute sense, some 
theories have to be accepted until they are falsified. Critical rationality is not a scepticist 
distrust of all ‘knowledge’. Yet this (‘performative’) accept of a theory may hardly be 
described as trust, because it is – in principle – based on the institution of science rather than 
personal relations. Perhaps the reliance on scientific theories should be described as confidence 
in Luhmann’s terms? Luhmann defines trust – as opposed to confidence and familiarity – as 
related to action: trusting means taking a risk (Luhmann 1988). (Relying on ‘falsifiable’ 
scientific theories by applying them also means ‘taking risks’, but the structure is different). 
And he argues that trust is inevitable in social life (Luhmann 1968). He also suggests a 
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Besides the limitations on rational critique, O’Reilly et al also emphasize another 
negative aspect of relying on personal networks: it narrows the range of knowledge 
available and thus limits the range of alternatives considered, as also emphasized in 
more recent literature emphasizing the potential weakness of strong ties (personal 
relations, social network) and the benefits of weak ties in terms of searchability and 
avoiding redundancy: 
"strong ties … inhibit efficient search, whereas weak ties … provide a more 
advantageous search position in the network than strong ties as these ties are 
less likely to provide redundant knowledge." (Augier & Vendelø 1999)14 
This argument about the potential contradiction between critical rationality and 
cohesiveness, emphasizing the tendency of reliance on trust and personal relations to 
inhibit critical distance, anticipates the media discussion, where Sproull & Kiesler link 
the potential for rational critique with the ‘detachment’ and social buffering 
characterizing electronic communication (p. 144). 
Need for speed 
Another reason for the reluctance to critique is that groups often operate within a time 
limit, and critique will prolong the process and delay the product.  
Attention to status and hierarchy 
Last, but not least, there is a tendency to accept, without critique, suggestions and 
arguments from high status members. The critical and rational potential is thus 
inhibited by attentiveness to status (among other factors), a status that is based on 
organisational hierarchy or other ‘irrelevant’ (from a rational perspective) factors, 
rather than expertise. By thus emphasizing factors external to the group such as status 
and hierarchy Sproull & Kiesler seem to recognize that a group is not an independent 
unit, primarily determined by group-internal forces. Group performance is not merely 
explained with reference to some properties of the group defined as an abstract 
category, independent of social structure etc., with emphasis on emerging leadership 
based on individual qualities and social skills. Instead of such a ‘narrow’ perspective, 
they also explore the actual processes through which social structure affects group 
processes, how it affects information processing in groups. Group dynamics allow the 
                                                                                                                                            
historical change in the function of trust, and that the traditional distinction between familiar 
and unfamiliar fields of activity has lost importance (Luhmann 1988). 
14 It should be mentioned, however, that this literature also emphasizes the potential of strong 
ties for providing ‘non-codified’ knowledge (Augier & Vendelø 1999) or other ’types’ of 
knowledge that differ from the rational ideal. Yet I have omitted that perspective in this 
context, and it does not contradict the argument presented here about a tension or conflict 
between trust and critical rationality. 
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influence of ‘external factors’, because group members are aware of hierarchy and 
status. 
In the citation above, Sproull & Kiesler emphasize the need for observation of group 
behaviour and performance, rather relying on people’s own experience. Taken at face 
value, this argument faces severe methodological and philosophical difficulties. In 
real-life groups, operating in real-life organisations rather than the laboratories of 
social psychologists it is not so evident to identify an external, ‘objective’ observer 
capable of soberly judging the results of the group. And Sproull & Kiesler actually 
recognize that not all tasks can be ‘estimated objectively’. Instead, they try to apply 
‘neutral’ criteria such as the ‘number of alternatives considered’.  
Groupthink is complementary to ambiguity. To some extent, ambiguity in large 
organisations may be caused by the tendency to ‘groupthink’, to form local consensus 
– although it would be mistaken to imply a merely psychological explanation of 
organisational ambiguity. On the other hand, ‘groupthink’ is also the reason why 
group meetings (face-to-face) constitute a good organisational tool to reduce 
ambiguity. 
2.3. Gadamer: hermeneutic recovery of inheritance 
The principle of hermeneutic understanding, presented by the German philosopher 
Gadamer, as a process involving the clash between different horizons has much in 
common with Weick’s sensemaking and the reduction of ambiguity between 
conflicting interpretations. There is no direct inspiration, as Weick generally refers to 
Anglo-Saxon rather than continental literature, but there are parallels between 
continental hermeneutics and Anglo-Saxon interpretivism. The advantage of bringing 
in Gadamer and other philosophers is to draw attention to the philosophical problems 
of interpretivism etc. 
Gadamer argues that common understanding must be based in a common system of 
prejudice (‘horizon’, paradigm). His concept of understanding departures from the 
psychological focus of classical hermeneutics and philology, the study of texts: instead 
of looking for the ‘inner’ life – ambitions, intentions, history – of the author, the 
hermeneutic reader of an ‘alien’ text must investigate and reveal the historical and 
cultural context, from which the text emerged. Gadamer extends this principle beyond 
the study of texts, to a general concept of (hermeneutic) understanding, which is not 
about identifying the subjective intentions of an individual, but about revealing the 
pre-understandings characterizing his historical period (or culture). The process of 
understanding consists in establishing such common ground, generally by merging 
initially ‘incommensurable’ horizons.  
The argument to some extent hinges on the concept and role of prejudice, which was 
denounced vividly by the enlightenment philosophers. Gadamer basically argues that 
the enlightenment has been too critical and failed to see that prejudice may also 
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contain valuable knowledge – that some parts of our inheritance and tradition are 
worth preserving. To understand the controversial in this argument a few examples of 
enlightened remarks about prejudice will be illustrative. Such critiques are the 
classical roots of March’ and Sproull & Kiesler’s suspicious approach to 
interpretations and groupthink, and they remain relevant as a counterbalance to 
Gadamer, as well as to Weick’s rather too affirmative (suspiciously neutral) approach 
to sensemaking. 
2.3.1.1. Enlightened denunciation of prejudice 
An archetype of the suspicious and critical view of ‘common understanding’ is Bacons 
theory of a systematic tendency to prejudice in the human nature, the various idols. He 
is suspicious of common language, because words are generally ‘infected’ by 
commonly accepted, but erroneous and untrustworthy meanings, the idols of the 
marketplaceii. According to Bacon, people (by the nature of man) are likely to accept a 
given viewpoint once and for all and then resist any form of critique and 
counterevidence:  
“The human understanding, once it has adopted opinions, either because they 
were already accepted and believed, or because it likes them, draws 
everything else to support and agree with them. And though it may meet a 
greater number and weight of contrary instances, it will, with great and 
harmful prejudice, ignore or condemn or exclude them by introducing some 
distinction, in order that the authority of those earlier assumptions may 
remain intact and unharmed.” (Bacon 1994)   
The enlightened remedy against the seductive entrapments of passed-on (pseudo-) 
knowledge was to avoid prejudice altogether and rely only on ‘secure’ knowledge, as 
illustrated in the first law of Descartes’ method:  
“never to accept anything for true which I did not clearly know to be such; 
that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitancy and prejudice, and to comprise 
nothing more in my judgement than what was presented to my mind so 
clearly and distinctly as to exclude all ground of doubt” (Descartes 1637).  
Quite similar to Kant’s later definition of enlightenment, d’Holbach bases his critique 
of prejudice on the ideal of autonomy: to rely on prejudice is childlike, immature. Yet 
he also suggests another reason for the persistence, quite different from Bacons theory 
about inborn (anthropological) tendencies: he argues that prejudice can have the 
function of serving particular interests and maintaining unjust conditions – which makes 
him the ancestor of modern ‘critique of ideology’. 
“The source of man’s unhappiness is his ignorance of Nature. The pertinacy 
with which he clings to blind opinions imbibed in his infancy, which 
interweave themselves with his existence, the consequent prejudice that 
warps his mind, that prevents its expansion, that renders him the slave of 
fiction, appears to doom him to continual errour. He resembles a child 
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destitute of experience, full of idle notions: a dangerous leaven mixes itself 
with all his knowledge: it is of necessity obscure, it is vacillating and false: - 
He takes the tone of his ideas on the authority of others, who are themselves 
in errour, or else have an interest in deceiving him.” (d'Holbach 1770) 
2.3.1.2. Gadamer to the rescue – of useful prejudice 
Gadamer, though, argues that the enlightenment is in fact haunted by its own 
prejudice, the prejudice against prejudice:  
”Es gibt nämlich sehr wohl auch ein Vorurteil der Aufklärung, das ihr Wesen 
trägt und bestimmt: Dies grundlegende Vorurteil der Aufklärung ist das 
Vorurteil gegen die Vorurteile überhaupt und damit die Entmachtung der 
Überlieferung.” (Gadamer 1960) 
He insists that some prejudices are worse than others, and some are indispensable. 
Instead of denouncing prejudice altogether, one should aim to distinguish harmful or 
inhibitive prejudices from those that are useful. In order to do this, he maintains a 
classical distinction between two different sources of prejudice: 1) the authority of 
others (i.e. tradition), vs. 2) one’s own hastiness:  
”Man müsse unterscheiden das Vorurteil des menschlichen Ansehens und 
das der Übereilung. Diese Einteilung hat ihren Grund in dem Ursprung der 
Vorurteil im Hinblick auf die Personen, die sie hegen. Es ist weder das 
Ansehen anderer, ihre Autorität, was uns zu Irrtümern verführt, oder es ist 
die in einem selbst gelegene Übereilung.“ (Gadamer 1960) 
Comparing with organisational theory, one might say that enactment and 
sensemaking, understood as local and internal processes, falls in the second category, 
whereas Sproull & Kiesler’s attention to status and hierarchy emphasizes the first: the 
authorities of others. 
2.3.1.3. Authority recognized 
This first source of prejudice, the authority of others, is yet another example where the 
philosophers of enlightenment have been too ’hasty’ in their own judgment. As 
evident from the previous citations, and in Kant’s definition, the enlightened, 
autonomous subject should no longer rely on others’ judgment (see the previous 
discussion of community vs. universality, p.23). Now Gadamer argues that this 
disregard of authority must be modified. It is indispensable to recognize authority 
based on expertise. He even argues that this is the basic foundation of authority, that 
authority is mostly based on better knowledge rather than obedience – the authority of 
‘one who knows better’: 
"Der von der Aufklärung in Anspruch genommene Gegensatz von 
Autoritätsglaube und Gebrauch der eigenen Vernunft besteht an sich zu 
Recht. Sofern die Geltung der Autorität an die Stelle des eigenen Urteils tritt, 
ist Autorität in der Tat eine Quelle von Vorurteilen. Aber dass sie auch eine 
Wahrheitsquelle sein kann, ist damit nicht ausgeschlossen, und das hat die 
  45
Aufklärung verkannt, als sie schlechthin alle Autorität diffamierte... In der 
Tat ist nicht nur die Diffamierung aller Autorität ein durch die Aufklärung 
selber festgewordenes Vorurteil. Sie hat auch dazu geführt, dass der Begriff 
der Autorität deformiert worden ist. Auf dem Grunde eines aufklärerischen 
Begriffs von Vernunft und Freiheit konnte sich im Begriff der Autorität das 
schlechthinnige Gegenteil von Vernunft und Freiheit, der blinde Gehorsam 
hervorkehren… Dergleichen liegt aber keineswegs im Wesen von Autorität. 
Gewiss kommt Autorität zunächst Personen zu. Die Autorität von Personen 
hat aber ihren letzten Grund nicht in einem Akte der Unterwerfung, sondern 
in einem Akt der Anerkennung und der Erkenntnis – der Erkenntnis nämlich, 
dass der andre einem an Urteil und Einsicht überlegen ist und dass daher sein 
Urteil vorgeht, d.h. vor dem eigenen Urteil den Vorrang hat. Damit hängt 
zusammen, dass Autorität nicht eigentlich verliehen, sondern erworben wird 
und erworben sein muss, wenn einer sie in Anspruch nehmen will. Sie beruht 
auf Anerkennung und insofern auf einer Handlung der Vernunft selbst, die, 
ihrer Grenzen inne, anderen bessere Einsicht zutraut. Mit blinden 
Kommandogehorsam hat dieser richtig verstandene Sinn von Autorität nichts 
zu tun. Ja, unmittelbar hat Autorität überhaupt nichts mit Gehorsam, sondern 
mit Erkenntnis zu tun... Gewiss gehört Autorität dazu, befehlen zu können 
und Gehorsam zu finden. Aber das folgt nur aus der Autorität, die einer hat. 
Auch die anonyme und unpersönliche Autorität des Vorgesetzten, die sich 
aus der Befehlsordnung herleitet, entspringt zuletzt nicht dieser Ordnung, 
sondern macht sie möglich. Ihr wahrer Grund ist auch hier ein Akt der 
Freiheit und der Vernunft, die grundsätzlich dem Vorgesetzten, weil er mehr 
überschaut oder besser eingeweiht ist, Autorität zubilligt, also auch hier, weil 
er es besser weiß." (Gadamer 1960) 
It easy to imagine situations where one feels obliged to accept others’ expertise on a 
subject where one’s own knowledge appears insufficient. Recall Sproull & Kiesler’s 
argument that critique was inhibited in groups because of the wrong type of authority, 
based on status and hierarchy rather than expertise. This argument also illustrates 
another distinction, however: that organisational hierarchy is not (necessarily) based 
on expertise – contrary to Gadamer’s argument about ‘die Befehlsordnung’ as being 
based on recognition of someone as knowledgeable (or qualifications, to use a modern 
term). 
2.3.1.4. Focus on the message, not the messenger 
In the process of understanding, one is simply trying to test the validity in what the 
other says (writes), by achieving his perspective and reconstruct, even strengthen his 
argument: 
“Wenn wir einen Text zu verstehen suchen, versetzen wir uns nicht in die 
seelische Verfassung des Autors, sondern wenn man schon von 
Sichversetzen sprechen will, so versetzen wir uns in die Perspektive, unter 
der der andere seine Meinung gewonnen hat. Das heißt aber nichts anderes, 
als dass wir das sachliche Recht dessen, was der andere, was der anderen 
sagt, gelten zu lassen suchen. Wir werden sogar, wenn wir verstehen wollen, 
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seine Argumente noch zu verstärken trachten. So geschieht es schon im 
Gespräch. Wieviel mehr noch gilt es beim Verstehen von Schriftlichem, dass 
wir uns in einer Dimension von Sinnhaftem bewegen, das in sich 
verständlich ist und als solches keinen Rückgang auf die Subjektivität des 
anderen motiviert. Es ist die Aufgabe der Hermeneutik, dies Wunder des 
Verstehens aufzuklären, das nicht eine geheimnisvolle Kommunion der 
Seelen, sondern eine Teilhabe am gemeinsamen Sinn ist.” (Gadamer 1960)  
The aim is to understand what the other has to say, not primarily to ‘identify’ with the 
other. It is motivated by the expectation that the Other has something useful or 
relevant to say. Thus, Gadamer distinguishes hermeneutic understanding from what he 
characterizes as the historical reading, which regards a text as merely an expression of 
its historical period, as a means to learn more about this period (or horizon) for its own 
sake, rather than because of its relevance to us. 
While understanding is not identification (‘Einfühlung’) of one individual with 
another or ‘secret communion of the souls’, neither does it imply subsuming the other 
under one’s own perspective – as implied in (instrumental) rationality, where new 
knowledge must be entered into an existing system of categories etc. This distinction – 
between understanding as a merger of horizons, and as simply subsuming new 
elements under an existing horizon – may illustrate a difference between Gadamer and 
Popper. Popper, too, wants to acquire useful knowledge from sources denounced by 
some of the philosophers of enlightenment, when he acknowledges tradition as a 
useful source of knowledge: 
“The fact that most of the sources of our knowledge are traditional condemns 
anti-traditionalism as futile. But this fact must not be held to support a 
traditionalist attitude: every bit of our traditional knowledge (and even our 
inborn knowledge) is open to critical examination and may be overthrown”. 
”Knowledge cannot start from nothing – from a tabula rasa – not yet from 
observation. The advance of knowledge consists, mainly, in the modification 
of earlier knowledge” (Popper 1963). 
Compared with Gadamer, however, Poppers emphasis on ‘the modification of earlier 
knowledge’ seems to assume that we can merely extract useful knowledge from 
‘ancient’ sources and after ‘critical examination’ fit it into our modern (scientific) 
knowledge. This process does not imply that we also have to question our own 
‘horizon’ – not least because Popper vividly rejects the very idea of a ‘framework’. By 
contrast, Gadamer’s hermeneutic understanding means achieving higher universality 
by overcoming one’s own particularity (i.e. that of the modern world), as well as that 
of the other (i.e. tradition). 
2.3.1.5. Transparency and consciousness 
The ‘miracle of understanding’ is not some secretive community of the souls. In this 
argument Gadamer seems to side with the enlightenment against romanticist ideas of 
an ‘obscure’ or tacit cultural or mythological baggage. While the horizon or prejudice 
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per definition cannot be confirmed in terms of ‘empirical evidence’, Gadamer still 
defends the classical principle of transparency: the process of understanding is 
triggered when we meet with alien horizons (i.e. a text from a different historical 
period), which requires us to direct our attention against our own as well: 
"Es sind die undurchschauten Vorurteile, deren Herrschaft uns gegen die in 
der Überlieferung sprechende Sache taub macht." (Gadamer 1960)  
Only by becoming conscious of our prejudice are we able to distinguish between 
inhibitory and productive ones. The idea of a tacit, collective knowledge is a romantic 
and sterile reaction against enlightenment: 
“In Wahrheit ist die Voraussetzung des geheimnisvollen Dunkels, in dem ein 
allem Denken vorausliegendes mythisches Kollektivbewusstsein liegt, 
ebenso dogmatisch-abstrakt, wie die eines Perfektionszustandes vollendeter 
Aufklärung oder die des absoluten Wissens. Die Urweisheit ist nur das 
Gegenbild der ‘Urdummheit’. Alles mythische Bewusstsein ist immer schon 
Wissen, und indem es von göttlichen Mächten weiß, ist es über ein bloßes 
Zittern vor der Macht (wenn man schon ein solches für das Urstadium halten 
soll), aber auch über ein in magische Rituale gebanntes Kollektivleben (wie 
wir es etwa im frühen Orient antreffen) hinaus. Es weiß von sich, und in 
diesem Wissen ist es schon nicht mehr schlechthin außer sich.” (Gadamer 
1960) 
2.4. Critique of ideology – Adorno and Habermas 
Critique of ideology is the opposite of hermeneutic understanding, with its inherently 
critical approach to interpretation and prejudice. It is interesting as an archetype of all 
critical approaches to interpretation, uncompromising and consequent in its rejection 
of consensus and prejudice, but also illustrative in facing epistemological problems 
that are relevant for other traditions. 
First, I shall present Adorno’s strong definition of ideology and discuss it in the light 
of Popper’s critique and rejection of the very concept of ideology – and that of 
frameworks in general. Then I shall look at Habermas’ attempt to maintain the notion 
of ideology while incorporating the idea of hermeneutic understanding.  
Adorno defines ideology as ‘false consciousness’: a system of beliefs and values that 
is socially reproduced (functional) – not ‘incidental’ – and false (Adorno 1979c). 
Before elaborating on these two criteria it is worth noticing the anti-pragmatic 
distinction between truth and function: that an idea survives or ‘works’ is no 
compensation for truth. 
2.4.1. Socially reproduced 
That ideology is socially reproduced (functional – socially ‘necessary’) is generally 
accepted as a basic requirement in a critical theory and analysis of ideology. With 
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some modification, this theory takes up d’Holbach’s reference to people having an 
interest in deception. By emphasizing social reproduction or necessity, Adorno rejects 
the idea that the persistence of prejudice be due to people’s stupidity or inborn 
blindness (‘eingeborene Verblendung’), the idea that people by nature are easy victims 
to seduction – of which Bacons anthropological theory of ‘idols’ is an illustrative 
example.  
Adorno’s theory of ideology is thus not based on the epistemological pessimism 
rejected by Popper, not least with a moral-political argument denouncing its 
authoritarian tendencies:  
“Disbelief in the power of human reason, in man’s power to discern the 
truth, is almost invariably linked with distrust of man. Thus epistemological 
pessimism is linked, historically, with a doctrine of human depravity, and it 
tends to lead to the demand for the establishment of powerful traditions and 
the entrenchment of a powerful authority which would save man from his 
folly and his wickedness.” (Popper 1963) 
This ‘agreement’ between Popper and Adorno on the rejection of epistemological 
pessimism does not go much further, however: while Adorno concludes that there 
must be a social explanation for the persistence of an ideology, Popper denies the idea 
of systematically reproduced ignorance, and denounces any conspiracy theory of 
ignorance: 
“which interprets ignorance not as a mere lack of knowledge but as the work 
of some sinister power, the source of impure and evil influences which 
pervert and poison our minds and instil in us the habit of resistance to 
knowledge.” (Popper 1963) 
The emphasis on the social reproduction or function of an ideology seems to conflict 
with Poppers argument that the source of knowledge is irrelevant: there can be no 
‘suspicious’ sources of knowledge, and no sources have more authority than others 
(Popper 1963) – in contrast to Gadamer’s argument, no-one can be assumed to ‘know 
better’. Rational critique is in principle not affected by the source, and no source can 
protect an idea from critical rationality – because processes of justification are 
separated from those of genesis.  
However, Poppers argument about the irrelevance of the source of knowledge may not 
contradict the idea of a social reproduction of ideology. There is a difference between 
1) source or origin, and 2) function/social reproduction. Adorno does not denounce 
the source of an ideology – on the contrary, going back to the source may reveal 
progressive and emancipatory elements of an ideology. Ideologies are not necessarily 
designed for deception. 
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Complementary elements 
The two elements emphasized by Adorno – falsity and social reproduction – are 
complementary: if an idea seems irrational or false, we must look for another 
explanation for its persistence. But interpretivism or hermeneutic understanding would 
now require that we make an extra effort to acknowledge the rationality, by 
strengthening the arguments of the opponent, and by questioning our own 
assumptions. The dilemma is illustrated by Lukes’ argument that we must choose 
between a charitable and a critical attitude: 
“When I come across a set of beliefs which appear prima facie irrational, 
what should be my attitude towards them? Should I adopt a critical attitude, 
taking it as a fact about the beliefs that they are irrational and seek to explain 
how they came to be held, how they managed to survive unprofaned by 
rational criticism, what their consequences are, etc.? Or should I treat such 
beliefs charitably: should I begin from the assumption that what appears to 
me to be irrational may be interpreted as rational when fully understood in its 
context?” (Lukes 1970)15 
Conversely, if there is a ‘causal’ explanation for the accept of an idea, this should at 
least make us suspicious and provoke the question whether the idea in itself is in fact 
false or irrational – since it depends on other factors than truth for its survival. This 
principle is illustrated by the asymmetric principle in classical history of science: we 
look for social explanations only for beliefs that are false or mistaken – the true beliefs 
are upheld because of good arguments, not because they are socially reproduced. 
2.4.2. The falsity of ideology – truth claim 
The second characteristic is crucial to Adorno, and he criticizes a general tendency to 
abandon the emphasis on the ‘falsity’ of ideology (Adorno 1979c). He rejects the idea 
that ideology operates in a category, where the notion of truth and justification is 
meaningless. And he rejects the idea that the critique itself must remain neutral to the 
content of the ideology – or ‘knowledge’ – it studies. 
This latter point is illustrated in Adorno’s critique of the ‘sociology of knowledge’, 
which was directed at Mannheim, but remains relevant for more recent versions of this 
discipline, not least theories of ‘social construction’. Critique of ideology, and critical 
thought in general, must take the ‘content’ seriously (Adorno 1970a). Without being 
able to address this question, the question of social reproduction is irrelevant or at 
                                                     
15 “More briefly, the problem comes down to whether or not there are alternative standards of 
rationality,” he continues. Habermas criticizes two assumptions in this citation: 1) that 
understanding is a question of choice, that one can ‘deselect’ understanding; 2) that 
hermeneutic understanding implies the recognition of alternative standards of rationality 
(Habermas 1981). 
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least without critical force. In Adorno’s emphasis on denunciation of falsity there is a 
– albeit negative – parallel to Gadamer’s requirement: that we must i.e. read a text 
with the intention of revealing what it has to tell us about something, revealing its 
relevance for us, rather than merely seeing it as an expression of its own historical 
period. The reader or subject must ‘take the text seriously’, respect its claim for truth – 
even though he may eventually reject it.  
To illustrate this requirement, sociology of knowledge provides an example of a truth-
neutral approach that does not respect the truth claim. According to this Adorno (and 
Gadamer, I suppose), it is not satisfactory to dispense with the question of truth and 
focus on how ‘knowledge’ works and develops, as sociologists of knowledge and 
more recent theories of ideology argue – as illustrated by proponents of the Social 
Construction of Technology (SCOT theory): "... the truth or falsity of scientific knowledge is 
irrelevant to sociological analysis of belief." (Pinch & Bijker 1997), and by the authors of 
The Social Construction of Reality: 
"To include epistemological questions concerning the validity of sociological 
knowledge in the sociology of knowledge is somewhat like trying to push a 
bus in which one is riding… [T]hese questions are not themselves part of the 
empirical discipline of sociology." (Berger & Luckman 1967) 
Another example of neutral approaches dispensing with the truth claim is the literary 
approach to philosophy (and science) employed by Derrida – according to Habermas. 
Like Heidegger, who regarded Galileo as a poet, an artistic creator or inventor of the 
‘mechanical’ worldview that enables modern science, Derrida approaches all texts in 
the role of a literary critic focusing on the aesthetic value and effectualness of a text, 
without interest for the truth ‘content’. Habermas criticizes Derrida – and his 
American followers – for not respecting (or accepting) the distinction between 
Literature and Philosophy (And it seems that Derrida fails to fulfil a requirement for 
hermeneutic understanding by not expecting the text to tell anything relevant) 
(Habermas 1985). To Habermas the distinction is crucial: art is a separate sphere that 
dispenses with the normal conditions for a speech act in everyday life. He does 
recognize that art is not merely a self-sufficient art pour l’art, but is capable of 
‘experiencing’ new knowledge, which must then be transferred to other spheres: 
everyday language or science. Yet the potential of art for experiencing something new 
emphasized by Habermas (and Adorno) differs from the irrevocable creation or 
disclosure described by Heidegger. 
A further example is the symbolic concept of organisational culture (Schultz 1990) or 
other theories emphasizing symbolic meaning as a separate sphere with no claim of 
correspondence or universal truth. 
After these examples of unacceptable truth-neutrality it is convenient to recapitulate 
the distinction and comparison between Gadamer and Adorno: they both avoid the 
neutral approach, but whereas Gadamer’s understanding approach is compliant and 
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forthcoming (‘charitable’), Adorno is suspicious and critical. There is a conflict 
between these approaches: understanding cannot be ‘too’ critical and certainly not 
dismissive, because it is to some extent inclined to listen and accept. 
2.4.2.1. Meaning and values 
Still, Adorno’s attitude is not total rejection. His intention is to rescue the ‘idea 
content’ of an ideology: the ideals inherent in any ideology should not be dismissed or 
ignored as meaningless, as mere subjective (irrational) values. Ideals must be taken 
seriously and then confronted with reality – and in some sense it is possible that reality 
is false, and ideals true! As an example, Horkheimer argues that despite the hypocrisy 
in preaching democracy in a society based on slavery and exclusion of women from 
political life, the ancient Greeks were not merely trying to protect the ruling elite by 
disguising the reality of their society, but also carried and developed the principle of 
universality, of universalising the conditions of the elite to be enjoyed by everybody. 
Similarly, Feuerbach criticized Religion as a ‘twisted’ expression for true needs and 
hopes: the idea of Paradise is in its essence a vision of a better future for humanity, but 
religion confined this utopia to a separate sphere, and nullified both the inherent 
critique of the actual conditions and the hope for change. 
Adorno thus emphasizes the importance of what could be labelled the ‘value’-element 
of interpretation or ideology (purpose, criteria for evaluation, see p.36), although he 
actually rejects the term ‘value’. His point is that on the one hand the critical 
researcher cannot remain ‘value-neutral’, while on the other hand one should be 
critical rather than affirmative towards ‘values’ – because ‘values’ are not merely 
subjective and irrational but also hold a ‘claim for truth’. 
The blindfolding concept of values 
This dilemma is illustrated in Adorno’s critique of Weber and Durkheim, who 
practiced opposite approaches to values. Their examples can be regarded as archetypes 
of the Scylla and Charybdis of critical social research, and one can recognize the same 
methodological problems and choices in contemporary theories – and Adorno argues 
that in both cases the concept of value is blindfolding. 
While Durkheim implicitly affirms collective values – as cohesive forces underlying 
the division of labour, to offer one example – Weber rejects moral judgments in 
science, with a methodological argument similar to the critique of the naturalistic 
fallacy: 
"Weber eifert wider die Werturteile in der Wissenschaft; Durkheim 
übernimmt die kollektiv sanktionierten Werte, setzt ihre Kollektivität ihrer 
Objektivität gleich und dispensiert sich damit von der Frage nach ihrer 
Möglichkeit in der Moral." (Adorno 1979d)  
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Adorno finds the very concept of values misleading and inhibitory for critical and 
rational analysis – it offers an unsatisfactory choice between (irrational) affirmation 
and rejection (and neutrality), neither of these being based on critical judgment. For 
Adorno, this demonstrates the impotence of scientific thought in dealing with 
questions of ‘meaning’. By categorizing ‘value’ and meaning as private and subjective 
– whether requiring the researcher to remain neutral, or simply to take sides – modern 
thought and reproduces an objective condition of ‘loss of meaning’ characteristic of 
modernity, “die Katastrophe des Sinns” (Adorno 1996). Adorno argues that critical thought 
must be able to address such questions – and to understand them in terms of 
justification – without retreating to positivist neutrality, corresponding to the previous 
emphasis on ‘truth claim’.  
"Der Wertbegriff selbst ist eine heteronome Verdinglichung. Ihn zu bejahen 
oder zu verneinen partizipiert gleichermaßen am falschen Bewusstsein. 
Freiheit zum Objekt heißt in der gesamten Tradition von Aufklärung, Hegel 
inbegriffen: Loslösung vom Wunsch als dem Vater des Gedankens. Zugleich 
aber steckt bereits im einfachen logischen Urteil, seinem Anspruch auf 
Wahrheit und auf die Verwerfung von Unwahrheit, konstitutiv jene 
Verhaltensweise, welche das Cliché den ihrerseits von ihrem 
Erkenntnisgrund abgespaltenen Wertungen zumisst. Denken, das die 
angeblichen Werturteil, wofern sie nicht ohne Begründungszusammenhang 
gefällt werden, verteufelt, stellt das dem Gedanken immanente kritische 
Moment still; Wertphilosophie, die nicht minder abstrakt ansichseiende 
Werte postuliert, überantwortet sich dem Dogmatismus... Durkheim hat der 
gleichen Vergegenständlichung der ursprünglich von der Ökonomie 
entlehnten Werte sich schuldig gemacht, die in deren Negation durch Weber 
supponiert ist." (Adorno 1979d) 
One may say that Durkheim’s theory contains only the first step of the critique of 
ideology: demonstrates only the function of an idea, but is unable to address the 
question of its truth – partly because truth involves moral judgment, and moral 
judgment is deemed beyond the scope of science. But Durkheim is neither critical nor 
neutral in his approach to this ‘irrational’ element of values – his approach is 
affirmative, regarding the very factuality (and functionality) as legitimising. This 
implicit moral judgment seems to be archetypical for many – even contemporary – 
functionalist approaches in social research16. 
                                                     
16 This paradox seems characteristic of studies of organisational culture (Schein, Schultz). First, 
a neutral approach ‘reduces’ culture to an object by, a phenomenon that the researcher refuses 
to understand in terms of its truth claim. The researcher cannot make any judgments about its 
truth or rightness. Then, the researcher analyses the ‘merits’ of the culture, not in terms of 
being true or right by its content, but in terms of its efficiency or functional adaptation – 
whether it ‘serves’ the organisation and brings success. It is a peculiarly indirect way of 
making a normative judgment. 
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2.4.3. Overcoming interpretations – critique or hermeneutic 
understanding? 
Despite the disagreements, critique of ideology and hermeneutic understanding share 
the intention to ‘transcend’, to get beyond, and to overcome a given interpretation. 
According to Gadamer, this is possible when confronted with another interpretation, 
i.e. of the Antique; and in interpretivist theories, the potential for overcoming existing 
interpretation emerges with the confrontation between different ‘social groupings’ 
resulting in ambiguity etc. And critical theory often uses a historical method not unlike 
Gadamer’s: to go back to previous historical periods to recover the hopes and visions 
for the future that have extinguished today with the ‘loss of meaning’. Yet basically, 
critique of ideology – and critical thought in general – is about ‘breaking the spell’ (of 
an ‘interpretation’) from within. 
2.4.3.1. Intellectual superiority? 
But how is this possible? Popper is appalled by the idea that one person (the 
sociologist) can achieve true objectivity and rise above other people (and their 
ideologies). This critique is primarily directed at the ‘sociology of knowledge’ 
developed by the conservative Mannheim who argued that this objectivity could only 
be reached by ridding oneself of subjective interests – but Popper seems to direct a 
similar critique against theories of ideology.  
This critique is highly relevant and deserves consideration. How can any critique of 
ideology or sociology of knowledge claim objectivity for itself, while everybody else 
has remained in the dark – and continue to live ‘in errour’? How can the critic or 
sociologist insist on being right all on his own, when no one apparently accepts his 
arguments? This is obviously impossible within a consensus-definition of truth – ‘if 
you do not agree, then I am wrong’. 
Yet I find this critique more fair against ‘sociology of knowledge’ – Mannheim’s as 
well as contemporary versions – than towards Adorno and Habermas.  
2.4.3.2. Emancipation – through explanation and consciousness 
Their critique of ideology is not ‘disinterested’ like Mannheim’s, but linked to the 
emphasis on emancipation – and based on the ideal of autonomy. A critique is not 
merely a ‘mechanical’ theory about the persistence and reproduction of an ideology – 
it is also a denunciation of the ideology; it is intended as a step towards emancipation 
and the progress of thought.  
"Das Erkenntnisinteresse der Aufklärungstheorie ist erklärtermaßen kritisch; 
es setzt eine spezifische Erfahrung voraus, die ebenso in Hegels 
Phänomenologie des Geistes wie in Freuds Psychoanalyse festgehalten ist - 
die Erfahrung der Emanzipation durch kritische Einsicht in 
Gewaltverhältnisse, deren Objektivität allein daher rührt, daß sie nicht 
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durchschaut sind. Kritische Vernunft gewinnt analytisch Macht über 
dogmatische Befangenheit" (Habermas 1971b) 
This idea of emancipation through knowledge is based on the assumption that 
ignorance or unawareness is closely associated with compulsion and lack of freedom – a 
negative version of the Enlightenment association of knowledge with freedom and 
autonomy (see previously, p.32). Habermas compares examples from both psychology 
and sociology: in both cases people’s behaviour may be determined by factors not 
realized by the subjects, exactly because the subjects are not aware of them. He argues 
that areas have been de-symbolized and excommunicated for various reasons: traumas in 
the past, or societal repression. Psychoanalysis deals with examples where an 
individual has reacted – unconsciously – to a traumatic experience in the past by 
denying it, and is then constrained in a fixed pattern of behaviour 
(‘Wiederholungszwang’)17. 
2.4.4. Habermas: true consensus or dogmatic accept? 
Habermas tries to preserve the possibility of a ‘critique of ideology’ in his critical 
modification of Gadamer’s hermeneutics. He faces the problem that the hermeneutic 
approach seems to exclude the concept of ideology. Because of his incorporation of 
hermeneutics, and – later – of pragmatic theory, thus accepting the consensus 
definition of truth, he has to modify and reformulate the problem of ideology. To 
anyone who wishes to preserve a critical approach to ‘interpretations’ while accepting 
some of the basic arguments presented by hermeneutics and pragmatics, it is necessary 
to understand Habermas’ dilemma, as well as his solution. 
2.4.4.1. Suspicious consensus – a Trojan horse 
Habermas basically preserves the suspicion against any consensus – although he 
cannot, like the philosophers of enlightenment, simply denounce prejudice and 
consensus. But he maintains that a consensus might be a Trojan horse that preserves 
injustice and social inequalities, by legitimating or confirming the given relations of 
power. The consensus or interpretation handed down by Tradition – or that ‘offered’ 
by a group, to draw the parallel to groups and organisations – may be infected with 
repression. This is possible, because due to the very nature of hermeneutic 
understanding, prejudice based on some ‘historical’ consensus retreats from critical 
                                                     
17 The very history (lesson?) of critical theory is (if one accepts their analysis) an example of a 
persisting ideology: its function in society is apparently strong enough to let it survive the 
revelation practiced by critique. In this case, the critique is without guarantee of ‘effect’ 
(emancipation and change) – because the critique faces powerful forces/structures, and because 
the critique is separated from a corresponding subject or agent capable of acting at a higher 
level. 
  55
attention – with other words a frame of interpretation allows us to focus on other 
aspects, because we no longer need to question this frame.  
Habermas now argues that such a ‘historical’ consensus may be unjust and erroneous, 
if it was established under conditions of power and inequality, if it was developed 
under conditions where critique was not possible – if the conditions for a free, rational 
dialogue were not met.  
"Nun lehrt aber die tiefenhermeneutische Erfahrung, dass sich in der 
Dogmatik des Überlieferungszusammenhängs nicht nur die Objektivität der 
Sprache überhaupt, sondern die Repressivität eines Gewaltverhältnisses 
durchsetzt, das die Intersubjektivität der Verständigung als solche deformiert 
und die umgangssprachliche Kommunikation systematisch verzerrt. Deshalb 
steht jeder Konsensus, in dem Sinnverstehen terminiert, grundsätzlich unter 
dem Verdacht, pseudokommunikativ erzwungen zu sein: die Alten nannten es 
Verblendung, wenn sich im Schein des faktischen Verständigseins 
Missverständnis und Selbstmissverständnis ungerührt perpetuierten. Die 
Einsicht in die Vorurteilsstruktur des Sinnverstehens deckt nicht die 
Identifizierung des tatsächlich herbeigeführten Konsensus mit dem wahren." 
(Habermas 1971a) (My italicisation) 
Having established this suspicion against consensus, Habermas criticizes Gadamer’s 
approach for its uncritical and affirmative approach: hermeneutic understanding is by 
nature compliant (‘charitable’ according to Lukes) and with an inherent tendency to 
confirm automatically a consensual agreement based on intersubjective understanding. 
He thus finds Gadamer’s recognition of authority as based on superiority in knowledge 
deeply problematic – on the contrary, Habermas argues that authority is more often 
threatened by, than based on rationality:  
“Dogmatische Anerkennung einer Überlieferung, und das bedeutet die 
Annahme des Wahrheitsanspruchs dieser Tradition, kann freilich nur mit 
Erkenntnis selber gleichgesetzt werden, wenn in der Tradition 
Zwanglosigkeit und Unbeschränktheit der Verständigung über Tradition 
gesichert wären. Gadamers Argument setzt voraus, dass sich die 
legitimierende Anerkennung und das Autorität begründende Einverständnis 
gewaltlos einspielen. Die Erfahrung systematisch verzerrter Kommunikation 
widerstreitet dieser Voraussetzung. Permanenz gewinnt Gewalt ohnehin nur 
durch den objektiven Schein der Gewaltlosigkeit eines 
pseudokommunikativen Einverständnisses. Eine derart legitimierte Gewalt 
nennen wir mit Max Weber Autorität. Deshalb bedarf es des prinzipiellen 
Vorbehalts universaler und herrschaftsfreier Verständigung, um dogmatische 
Anerkennung von wahrem Konsensus grundsätzlich zu unterscheiden. Vernunft 
im Sinne des Prinzips vernünftiger Rede ist der Fels, an dem bisher faktische 
Autoritäten eher zerschellt sind, als dass sie auf ihn sich gegründet hätten.” 
(Habermas 1971a) (my italicisation) 
It is worth noticing how Habermas’ focus on the ideal of a true consensus based on a 
free rational debate replaces Adorno’s emphasis on truth. Because of his incorporation 
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of hermeneutics and pragmatic theory, Habermas must abandon the strong concept of 
truth still adhered to by Adorno. Yet despite the consensus-definition of truth his 
approach is not neutral or disinterested: instead of denouncing falsity, he insists on the 
critical distinction between a consensus based on ‘free debate’ (critical rationality) and 
one biased by power and authority. And he thus criticizes ethnomethodologists and 
social constructivists for not being aware of this distinction: 
“Garfinkel behandelt die Geltungsansprüche, auf deren intersubjektiver 
Anerkennung jedes kommunikativ erzielte Einverständnis, und sei die 
Konsensbildung noch so okkasionell, hinfällig und fragmentarisch, doch 
beruht, als bloße Phänomene. Er unterscheidet nicht zwischen einem gültigen 
Konsensus, für den die Teilnehmer erforderlichenfalls Gründe angeben 
könnten, und einer geltungsfrei, d. h. de facto herbeigeführten, sei es auf 
Sanktionsdrohung, rhetorischer Überrumpelung, Kalkül, Verzweiflung oder 
Resignation beruhenden Zustimmung.” (Habermas 1981) 
There are two different implications of this critique. On the one hand, he criticizes the 
failure to distinguish free, rational debate from other processes. On the other hand, he 
argues that the critical researcher needs another method than hermeneutic 
understanding (which is in fact no method) to reveal a false consensus.  
2.4.4.2. Excurse – organisational parallels 
A similar critique can be summoned against Weick’s theory of enactment and 
sensemaking. It does not make a distinction between different forms of consensus, 
between dogmatic accept and true consensus, and it is not aware of the potential (even 
systematic) blindfolds of an established consensus or frame of interpretation. With the 
concept of groupthink, on the contrary, Sproull & Kiesler preserves a suspicion 
against consensus similar to Habermas’. Groupthink is an example of a suspicious 
origin of consensus, a consensus that was formed under biased conditions: The critical 
– and thus rational – potential of the process was inhibited by (attention to) authorities. 
Psychology vs. sociology/philosophy 
This comparison begs the question which of the two approaches is most universal or 
fundamental. Is ideology merely an example of socio-psychological processes or vice-
versa? I find the last option most acceptable: to regard the groupthink as an example of 
suspicious hermeneutic consensus. It would be problematic to see understanding 
merely as groupthink on ‘higher’ levels (organisation, society), because the implied 
psychological explanation of such phenomena – suggesting some inborn tendency to 
conformism – is unsatisfactory. Groupthink may be analysed as a low-level example 
of understanding, rather than due to some eternal laws about group processes. 
Repression or inefficiency – functionality or dysfunctional 
While both March and Sproull & Kiesler, as well as Adorno and Habermas maintain a 
suspicion against consensus, the cores (and basis) of their critiques is very different. 
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Critical theory focuses on repression and power, based on the ideal of autonomy and 
emancipation, while the former criticize inefficiency and sub-optimal solutions. In 
fact, having just read the previous section about organisational theory, the very 
mention of repression, power and emancipation may ring odd and incommensurable. 
March and Sproull & Kiesler are not interested in emancipation, but in organizational 
efficiency. 
Nevertheless I find the comparison reasonable, because they are all – in each their way 
– inheritors of the enlightenment with their emphasis on rationality as an ideal 
(Habermas more wholeheartedly than Adorno). And Sproull & Kiesler do imply an 
ideal of intellectual autonomy, which they think should and could (and will, with 
computer networks) be realized within modern organisations – an optimism that on the 
other hand distinguishes them more clearly from critical theory. This question of 
social ‘level’ is obviously a major difference: Sproull & Kiesler focuses on groups, 
and extend their analysis to organisations, while critical theory ‘focus’ on society, 
history and civilisation – well, just about everything. Still, both Adorno and Habermas 
also treat the lower levels: in the US Adorno has participated in group studies that 
continue to influence the field of social psychology; and Habermas bases his very 
ideal of rationality on a ’micro level’ of communicative action. 
One obvious conflict must be admitted however: are groups to be regarded as 
functional or dysfunctional? On the one hand, Adorno argues that groups are deeply 
socialized and thus determined by their ‘functionality’ in the ‘administered world’, 
bound to act and think in terms of instrumental rationality – they are functional. 
Ideology is functional by definition. Sproull & Kiesler, on the other hand, suggest that 
groups may – in some situations – be myopic and dysfunctional (when discarding or 
even ignoring alternatives, and accepting faulty reasoning), which would appear to 
undermine the (instrumental) rationality of the institution. It is thus be difficult to 
maintain, with March and Sproull & Kiesler, the idea of irrational and sub-optimal 
organisational processes within a fundamentally – albeit myopic and ‘biased’ – 
rationalized society as described by critical theory. I shall return to this dilemma 
later18. 
                                                     
18 Power vs. rationality. Sproull & Kiesler seem to assume a fundamental contradiction 
between power and rationality: status and hierarchy blurs the rationality of decision-making. 
But critical theory basically takes the opposite view: rationality and power are deeply 
integrated; rationality is not merely the fierce enemy of power assumed by enlightenment 
philosophers. Nevertheless, the contradiction may not be so irreconcilable: the power 
associated with rationality is not subjective – in the sense of belonging to an individual – or 
charismatic. It is instrumental also in the positive sense that it is de-personalized and even 
offers protection against random use of power. And Habermas even more whole-heartedly 
declares, that rationality is generally a threat to authorities, rather than their base. 
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 Organisational theories Critical theory, critique of ideology 
Theories March, Sproull & Kiesler, Argyris & Schön Adorno, Habermas 
Labels Myths, fiction, legends, illusions, theories-in-use Ideology 
Emphasis  Sub-optimal, inefficient, dysfunctional Repression, inequality 
Implicit ideal Rationality, efficiency, functionality (of system) 
Emancipation, autonomy, 
rationality 
Table 1. Two critical approaches to interpretation. 
 
Interpretations – local (enacted) or inherited? 
Despite the parallels there is an obvious conflict between the thesis that we are all 
fundamentally socialized into a common ideology, horizon or culture, and theories 
emphasizing local, ‘community’ cultures etc. It is problematic to assume that a social 
group on the micro- or meso-level (community-of-practice; organisation) can maintain 
its own interpretation, if it contradicts the ‘higher-level’ horizon or ideology. 
Heidegger says ‘language is already ahead of us’, and ‘language speaks’, thus 
emphasizing that meaning is predefined and independent of the individual language 
user, and must also be independent of a collective subject, a group or a community. 
‘Communities’ are not free to ‘invent’, enact or establish its own meaning. Language 
is not open to multiple individual interpretations. 
And on the other hand, if contradicting interpretations exist within a larger social 
constellation, then the higher-level interpretation cannot be as fundamental and 
generally shared as assumed in hermeneutics or theories of ideology. A high level of 
ambiguity would undermine shared horizons or ideologies. 
This problem suggests that local, low-level interpretations must somehow be ‘sub-
interpretations’ within the larger horizon19. It would be problematic to exaggerate the 
‘closedness’ of a group in an organisational setting. Such groups will often have to 
meet (external) criteria of success, which, despite problems of ambiguity, gives some 
measurement of their performance. A group or a team will often have to justify its 
suggestion or solution ‘externally’, i.e. to management. 
Habermas seems to suggest a ‘hierarchic’ ordering by acknowledging the role of 
ongoing (ethnomethodological) understanding – a vulnerable and occasional 
                                                     
19 Similarly Collin argues that subcultures may exist if the ‘meta’-culture is ‘tolerant’ and not 
total and exclusive (Collin 1987). 
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‘interpretation of the situation’ and ‘maintenance of consensus’ –within a more stable 
interpretation and context.  
"Die Ethnomethodologie ... befaßt sich mit der Interpretation als einer 
Dauerleistung von Interaktionsteilnehmern, also mit den Mikrovorgängen der 
Situationsdeutung und Konsenssicherung, die selbst dann hochkomplex sind, 
wenn die Beteiligten an ein eingewöhntes Situationsverständnis in stabilen 
Handlungskontexten mühelos anknüpfen können. Unter dem Mikroskop 
erweist sich jede Verständigung als okkasionell und zerbrechlich. Die 
philosophische Hermeneutik hingegen untersucht  die 
Interpretationskompetenz erwachsener Sprecher unter dem Gesichtspunkt, 
wie sich ein sprach- und handlungsfähiges Subjekt in einer fremden 
Umgebung unverständliche Äußerungen verständlich macht. Die 
Hermeneutik befaßt sich mit Interpretationen als einer Ausnahmeleistung, die 
erst dann erforderlich wird, wenn relevante Ausschnitte der Lebenswelt 
problematisch werden, wenn Gewißheiten kulturell eingespielten 
Hintergrundes zerbrechen und die normalen Mittel der Verständigung 
versagen." (Habermas 1981)  
Thus, he clearly distinguishes between the two levels: hermeneutic understanding 
through ‘merge of horizons’ is not about everyday understanding and bargaining 
(resolution of equivocality); yet he also recognizes the micro-level understanding – 
and sees no contradiction. 
It is dubious, however, whether ethnomethodologists would recognize this adaptation 
of ‘their’ processes as a micro-level phenomenon within a more ‘holistic’ culture: 
Garfinkel’s presented his methods as an alternative to large-scale sociological theories 
such as Parsons’, rejecting the idea of a ‘cultural dope’ submitted to pre-established 
rules and norms. And Powell & DiMaggio argue that neo-institutionalist theories are 
incompatible with functionalist or Marxist macro-theories of societies – an argument I 
shall discuss in the next chapter (see p.109). 
Nevertheless, it is often worth asking whether a local interpretation is really enacted, 
or whether it is inherited and accepted from the ‘outside’. 
2.4.4.3. End of excurse 
The question is not whether an ideology is false but whether the ‘language potential 
for critique’ was somehow repressed or otherwise put out of function, while consensus 
was formed. 
2.4.4.4. The limitations of hermeneutic understanding 
The possibility of false consensus, characterized by ‘systematically reproduced 
misunderstandings’ (ideology), constitutes a problem for the hermeneutic 
understanding as a ‘method’, because it is affirmative or ‘charitable’ by nature and 
makes no distinction between one or the other. There is apparently no way out of the 
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blindfolded consensus: there is no external (transcendental) reference (i.e. objective 
reality) from which this agreement can be criticized or questioned20. 
”Nun hat uns Hermeneutik darüber belehrt, dass wir, solange wir uns in einer 
natürlichen Sprache bewegen, stets beteiligt sind und hinter die Rolle des 
reflektierten Mitspielers nicht zurücktreten können. Wir verfügen deshalb 
über kein allgemeines Kriterium, das uns festzustellen erlaubte, wann wir im 
falschen Bewusstsein einer pseudonormalen Verständigung befangen sind 
und etwas, das in Wahrheit der systematischen Erklärung bedürfte, bloß für 
hermeneutisch aufzuklärende Schwierigkeiten halten” (Habermas 1971a). 
This is a problem for every ‘real-life’ process of understanding, and, in particular, for 
a social scientist. Therefore, critical sociology cannot be satisfied with merely 
‘understanding’ its object. The challenge is to identify a method that can tell the 
difference and recover from a deceptive consensus. The methodological question is 
essential to Habermas, who basically struggles with the critique raised by Popper. 
2.4.4.5. Potential for negation (critique) 
According to Habermas, this limitation characteristic of hermeneutic understanding – 
being spellbound by an existing consensus – does not hold for language in general. 
We have, within the universal structures of communication, other means of acquiring 
knowledge. In his Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Habermas argues that even 
though the researcher does not ’rise above’ the language games or communicative 
structures that he studies, even though the researcher has to become a virtual 
participant of this particular language game, there still remains possibility for 
avoiding, or rather: for modifying and countering the ’particular’ (myopic) framework 
                                                     
20 McIntyre argues, in his critique of Winch – who was inspired by Wittgenstein – that the very 
concept of ideology is based on the idea of ‘revealing’ something about society, of which the 
members are not aware and do not speak. "Clearly if the citing of reasons by an agent, with the 
concomitant appeal to rules, is not necessarily the citing of those reasons which are causally 
effective, a distinction may be made between those rules which agents in a given society 
sincerely profess to follow and to which their actions may in fact conform, but which do not in 
fact direct their actions, and those rules which, whether they profess to follow them or not, do 
in fact guide their acts by providing them with reasons and motives for acting in one way rather 
than another. The making of this distinction is essential of ideology and of false consciousness, 
notions which are extremely important to some non-Marxist as well as to Marxist social 
scientists... But to allow that these notions could have application is to find oneself at odds with 
Winch's argument at yet another point. For it seems quite clear that the concept of ideology can 
find application in a society where the concept is not available to the members of the society, 
and furthermore that the application this concept implies that criteria beyond those available in 
the society may be invoked to judge its rationality; and as such it would fall under Winch's ban 
as a concept unsuitable for social science." (MacIntyre 1970) 
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of the local language game (“den Bannkreis des bloß partikularen”), basically because any 
language always holds the potential for internal critique and correction:  
”Die allgemeinsten Kommunikationsstrukturen, die sprach- und 
handlungsfähige Subjekte zu beherrschen gelernt haben, öffnen nun aber 
nicht nur den Zugang zu bestimmten Kontexten; sie ermöglichen nicht nur 
den Anschluss and und die Fortbildung von Kontexten, welche die 
Teilnehmer, wie es zunächst scheinen möchte, in den Bannkreis des bloß 
Partikularen hineinziehen. Diese selben Strukturen bieten zugleich die 
kritischen Mittel, um einen gegebenen Kontext zu durchdringen, von innen 
aufzusprengen und zu transzendieren, um nötigenfalls durch einen faktisch 
eingespielten Konsensus hindurchzugreifen, Irrtümer zu revidieren, 
Missverständnisse zu korrigieren usw. Dieselben Strukturen, die 
Verständigung ermöglichen, sorgen auch für die Möglichkeiten einer reflexiven 
Selbstkontrolle des Verständigungsvorgangs. Es ist dieses im kommunikativen 
Handeln selbst angelegte Potential der Kritik, das der Sozialwissenschaftler, 
indem er sich als virtueller Teilnehmer auf die Kontexte des Alltagshandelns 
einlässt, systematisch nutzen und aus den Kontexten heraus gegen deren 
Partikularität zur Geltung bringen kann” (Habermas 1981).  
This argument recalls the asymmetrical character of critique, Poppers argument that 
critique is not based on a ‘framework’. The basic argument is that language is more 
than ‘meaning’, that it has a capacity for reaching beyond cultural systems of meaning. 
2.4.4.6. Alternative to hermeneutic understanding – explanation 
This method corresponds to the first step in the critique of ideology: to explain the 
social function of an ideology. And we recall that this step was related ‘dialectically’ to 
the second: to understand (and criticize on its own conditions) the content. 
‘Scientific’ method – systematic, monological, object-oriented 
To deal with suspicious consensus (an ideology, or theory-in-use, or organisational 
culture) another approach based on systematic explanation, which he labels ‘deep 
hermeneutics’, and which is similar to the scientific mode of ‘explanation’ (thus 
updating the classical distinction between understanding and explaining), is necessary. 
The critical researcher must apply the methods developed for Nature to the social 
world: a monological science based on a method (as opposed to the ‘art’ of 
hermeneutic understanding) and oriented towards an object (as opposed the 
intersubjective ‘mirror of human speech’) towards something external that can be 
controlled (and manipulated) for observation. 
"... offensichtlich kann die moderne Wissenschaft legitim den Anspruch 
erheben, dadurch zu wahren Aussagen über ’die Dinge’ zu gelangen, dass sie 
monologisch verfährt, statt auf den Spiegel der menschlichen Rede zu 
achten: indem sie nämlich monologisch aufgebaute und durch kontrollierte 
Beobachtung gestützte Theorien aufstellt.” (Habermas 1971a) 
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Methodologically he thus counters the argument that hermeneutic understanding is a 
necessary and adequate approach to the social world. The aim is to demonstrate how 
the consensus was produced in order to break its spell. He focuses on demonstrating 
that an ideology is (re-) produced (how it is accepted) . 
To some extent, this ‘method’ can be compared to ‘reduction of uncertainty’ in 
Weick’s definition. At least the very distinction between uncertainty and ambiguity 
corresponds to Habermas’ distinction between object-oriented and subject-oriented 
processes. 
There is also a parallel to Sproull & Kiesler’s demand for observation of group 
behaviour rather than accepting the account provided by a group member. Like 
Habermas, they argue that the participant is in no position to evaluate the process he is 
part of. Contrary to Habermas, however, Sproull & Kiesler do not seem aware of the 
potential logical and philosophical problems: in principle, one cannot simply 
transcend the consensus by ‘observation’ – as an understanding researcher one does 
not have an objective, external position and objective criteria on which the 
‘performance’ of the group can be estimated. Habermas does not emphasize mere 
(external) observation, but the application of a particular method. 
Translating results into natural language 
Now this ‘retreat’ or excurse to a monological method poses a new problem to 
hermeneutics. The researcher has moved beyond the realm of hermeneutic 
understanding, and now has to return, and to ‘import’ the results acquired. If he thinks 
he has revealed an ‘ideology’ (or a mismatch between espoused theory and theory-in-
use), this revelation must be stated in the language of the participants. Thus, while the 
critical researcher cannot initially be limited by ‘participant language’ (horizon, 
language game) – as required by Winch, to give an example – he is obliged eventually 
to translate the results to the language of his research ‘object’, by exploiting the 
‘potential for negation’. He cannot content with preserving the results in a scientific 
language, both because he has a ‘knowledge interest’ in emancipating people from 
repressive social structures by ‘opening their eyes’ and thus (potentially) breaking the 
spell; but also because the results must face a critical test in natural language. 
Yet this ‘translation’ is difficult exactly because the monological method (language 
game) of science is separated from that of intersubjective hermeneutic understanding. 
Knowledge acquired by this scientific method is not part of everyday language, 
because it is not dialogical: 
“Weil die hypothetisch-deduktiven Aussagensysteme der Wissenschaft kein 
Element der Rede sind, entfernen sich die Informationen, die aus ihnen 
abgeleitet werden können, von der in natürlicher Sprache artikulierten 
Lebenswelt.” (Habermas 1971a) 
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This argument corresponds somewhat to the one made by Benjamin about the 
incommensurability or incompatibility between information and experience (see p.17). 
Nevertheless, Habermas insists that this ’incommensurability’ cannot be absolute, 
because natural language is not hermetically closed and does have a potential for 
negation. 
”Wohl verlangt die Umsetzung des technisch verwertbaren Wissens in den 
Kontext der Lebenswelt ein Verständlichmachen monologisch erzeugten 
Sinnes in der Dimension der Rede, also des alltagssprachlichen Dialogs; und 
gewiss stellt uns diese Übersetzung vor ein hermeneutisches Problem – aber 
eben vor ein für die Hermeneutik selbst neues Problem. Das hermeneutische 
Bewusstsein entspringt ja der Reflexion auf unsere Bewegung innerhalb 
natürlicher Sprachen, während die Interpretation der Wissenschaften für die 
Lebenswelt die Vermittlung zwischen natürlicher Sprache und monologischen 
Sprachsystemen leisten muss. Dieser Übersetzungsprozess überschreitet die 
Grenzen der rhetorisch-hermeneutischen Kunst, die es mit der 
umgangssprachlich konstituierten und überlieferten Kultur allein zu tun 
hatte. Über das hermeneutische Bewusstsein, das sich an der reflektierten 
Übung jener Kunst gebildet hat, hinausgehend, müsste Hermeneutik nun die 
Bedingungen klären, die es ermöglichen, aus der Dialogstruktur der 
Umgangssprache gleichsam herauszutreten und Sprache für strenge 
Theorienbildung und für die Organisation zweckrationalen Handelns 
monologisch zu verwenden.” (Habermas 1971a)  
I think this requirement – of translating results – is essential also to organisational 
studies. There is here a parallel to the emphasis on ‘action research’ in some 
organisational literature, and the tradition in Scandinavian research in Information 
Systems was strongly inspired by critical theory (Thommesen 1997). It is necessary, 
however, to maintain a distinction between two very different types of ‘action 
research’: the critical approach aiming at emancipation from repressive social 
structure; and the more practical approach aiming at changing and improving 
organisational performance. 
2.5. Experience 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the role of experience in relation to interpretation. 
To what extent is an interpretation based on experience, and what does this imply? This 
question will be relevant for understanding the conditions for reduction of ambiguity in 
organisations. 
I shall contrast a popular and positive notion of experience (‘experiential learning’) 
with more critical conceptions, starting with Levitt & March, supplemented with some 
arguments from Benjamin. Basically, two ‘affirmative’ assumptions about experience 
flourishing in literature on organisational learning and knowledge management will be 
challenged, one regarding experience as the actual foundation of all knowledge, 
another regarding experience as superior to (instrumental) rationality. These 
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assumptions do not seem to be logically linked and may even appear to be mutually 
exclusive. 
Experience as the foundation 
The first is the assumption that experience is the actual foundation of all (practical) 
knowledge, of which rational (or prepositional) knowledge is just a faint and impotent 
afterglow. This assumption is implied in ethnomethodological and social constructivist 
theories of situated learning (Brown & Duguid 1996;Lave & Wenger 1991) and 
situated action (Suchman 1990). These theories integrate an interpretivist approach 
with the focus on experience. On the one hand they emphasize that knowledge is 
social and shared by some community. On the other hand they differ from cultural or 
symbolic interpretivist approaches by the functionalist assumption that this knowledge 
is competent and based on the situated experience with a domain, a successful to 
adaptation to the environment21. They emphasize situation and context in a local and 
physical sense – rather than context in a literary or cultural sense. 
The emphasis on indexicality and the situated character of language (Suchman 1990) 
differs from the focus on prejudice or horizon in the hermeneutic perception of 
language. For Gadamer, prejudice – in its tolerable form – refers to ‘heritage’ 
(‘Überlieferung’) and tradition: we shall modify or specify our critique of prejudice in 
order to be perceptive to the knowledge that comes to us from tradition. For Suchman 
and ethnomethodologists in general, the ‘unspoken’ refers to concreteness and 
actuality – rather than ‘abstract’ knowledge as well as tradition. They emphasize how 
practical experience compensates for inadequacy of language, not unlike the early 
Heidegger’s phenomenological view of everyday practice as the actual foundation, 
primary to language (and language as an articulation of practice) (Seel 1992)22.  
                                                     
21 Originally, the concept of learning was developed within psychology as a (behaviourist) 
alternative to any cognitivist assumptions about (human) behaviour. The concept of learning 
should thus avoid the problematic assumptions about intentions and knowledge ‘inside people 
heads’. Argyris & Schön actually use the concept of (organizational) learning quite differently, 
in that it includes rational analysis etc. March’ definition is somewhere in between: experiential 
learning is an alternative to ‘rational calculus’, but it does not exclude rational processes. 
22 Collin compares phenomenology with hermeneutics and criticizes the former for 
(methodologically) problematic assumptions about pre-linguistic mental processes, and for 
disregarding the important constitutive role of language: "En vigtig kritik imod det 
fænomenologiske standpunkt går ud på, at det fuldstændigt overser sprogets centrale rolle i 
konstitutionen af handling." "Forskellen ... ligger især i to omstændigheder: For det første 
implicerer det hermeneutiske argument ingen speciel ontologi for det mentale... For det andet, 
og mere vigtigt, anerkender det hermeneutiske argument, at den konstituerende kraft, som 
skaber menneskelig handling og dermed den sociale virkelighed, ikke udelukkende rummes i 
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As another example, the theory of situated learning, on which the concept of 
communities-of-practice is based (Brown & Duguid 1996), was originally intended to 
conceive the particular form of learning associated with apprenticeship into a craft, 
but the authors found the same principle was much more universal. In short, they 
extended the ideal of craft-based learning to a fundamental theory of human cognition 
(Lave & Wenger 1991). 
Experience superior 
The functionalist character of the theories implies the second assumption about 
experience: that experiential knowledge is a superior alternative to anticipatory rational 
calculation. The potential conflict between the two assumptions is evident in the very 
comparison in the latter: if rational calculation is regarded as a viable – albeit inferior 
– alternative, then it cannot simply be regarded as secondary and based on experience. 
Recapitulation: two alternatives to instrumental rationality 
Recalling the previous distinction between hermeneutic understanding and 
monological science, we may now recapitulate: one should distinguish between two 
different alternatives to ‘instrumental rationality’ as a way of learning or acquiring 
knowledge, hermeneutic understanding vs. experiential learning. 
 
Table 2. Two alternatives to instrumental rationality: hermeneutic understanding vs. 
experiential learning. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
det enkelte handlende individ, men derimod i det sociale fællesskab som helhed i kraft af det 
fælles sproglige medium, som forbinder dem." (Collin 1998) 
 Character Orientation Discipline Material Emphasis 
Instrumental 
rationality 
(method) 
Method, 
systematic, 
critical, 
monological 
Object: 
Nature, 
social 
structure 
Science of 
Nature, 
social 
sciences 
Data 
Domain 
isolated from 
context; (or a 
systems or 
functionalist 
approach) 
Hermeneutic 
understanding 
‘Art’, 
dialogical 
Subject:  
people, 
culture, 
historical 
period 
Arts, social 
sciences 
Text, 
cultural 
objects 
Social 
context 
Experiential 
learning Trial by error Object (?) (Practice) Routines 
Physical 
context 
(situated) 
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2.5.1. March: the fallibility of experiential learning 
March and various co-authors23 react to a popular tendency to see learning from 
experience as a superior and infallible method, compared to the countless inadequacies 
of rational action. Against this affirmative approach, he argues that experiential 
learning shares some of the problems – i.e. of ambiguity – faced by the latter, and that 
it produces a number of shortfalls or ’traps’ of its own, problems that are characteristic 
of this particular ‘logic of action’: “The same processes that yield experiential wisdom produce 
superstitious learning, competency traps, and erroneous inferences” (Levitt & March 1988).  
"students of policy making have come to appreciate the advantages of trial-
and-error intelligence. It is an appreciation that has merit and would certainly 
have pleased some classical students of politics, but it may be somewhat ill-
formed." (March & Olsen 1976b) 
The same critique applies to optimistic and uncritical assumptions about the 
adaptability of organizational learning, which is based on experiential learning 
"the literature on organizational learning is rarely uncoupled from the idea 
that learning is adaptive. Experience is viewed as producing wisdom and 
improved behavior. For purposes of studying experiential learning under 
ambiguity it is necessary to relax such an assumption. Modern organizations 
develop myths, fictions, legends, folklore, and illusions. They develop 
conflict over myths. The connection between environmental response to 
organizational action and individual and organizational interpretation of that 
response is often weak." (March & Olsen 1976b) 
2.5.1.1. Experiential learning: testing of routines 
March distinguishes between learning from experience (‘experiential learning’) and 
‘analysis and choice’ or rational calculation24. These two ‘forms of intelligence’ 
                                                     
23 In the following, I shall primarily refer to March without duly mentioning his various 
coauthors. This may be unjust, but easier for readability. 
24 Argyris & Schön do not agree on this distinction between learning and ‘rationality’. In fact, 
they see organizational learning as a very rational process. One reason for the disagreement is 
that Argyris & Schön have a normative approach, and that they see organizational learning as 
an all-encompassing category (and a particular method), whereas March already has a number 
of well-defined concepts capable of describing processes of change. One could argue that 
March’ definition is more narrow and precise, and that it owes to more to the ‘original’ 
behavioural sense of the word ‘learning’.  
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(‘logics of action’, or methods) are regarded as fundamental processes – in individuals 
as well as organisations25: 
“Organizational intelligence, like individual intelligence, is built on two 
fundamental processes. The first of these is rational calculation… The 
second process is learning from experience.” (March & Olsen 1976b) 
Experiential learning is based on a process of trial and error. A mode of action, a 
routine, whether a new one or picked from a ‘stock of routines’, is tested in a 
particular situation. The result is evaluated in terms of success or failure – if it proves 
(is regarded as) successful, the same routine will be applied (or evoked) in a similar 
situation in the future.  
"if a particular goal has been achieved on previous occasions by execution of 
a particular course of action, then evocation of that goal will be likely to 
evoke that course of action again. Habitual responses are extreme instances 
of this in which the connecting links between stimulus and response may be 
suppressed from consciousness." (March & Simon 1958) 
It is necessary here to emphasize two distinctions. First, we must distinguish ‘frozen’ 
routine behaviour from processes that changes and modifies the (stock of) routines. 
Second, we also distinguish between different such modifying or innovative processes, 
in particular between experiential learning and rational choice. Thus, although 
experiential learning is based on routines, it differs from actual routine behaviour by 
the emphasis on testing alternatives.  
As already mentioned, this process differs from the anticipatory calculation 
characteristic of rational action. Experiential learning is characterized as a ‚logic of 
appropriateness’ as opposed to ‚a logic of consequentiality or intention’, and it 
“involves matching procedures to situations more than it does calculating choices" (Levitt & 
March) – it is ‘retrospective’ and based on history rather than anticipating the future. 
“Routines are based on interpretations of the past more than anticipations of 
the future. They adapt to experience incrementally in response to feedback 
about outcomes.” (Levitt & March)  
Rational calculation depends on a model of the world that allows for predictions and 
requires that the ‘actor’ interpret causal relations in the environment. Experiential 
                                                     
25 There may be a change in March’ writings, away from the individual, towards organizational 
interpretations (‘cognitive institutions’). In March & Olsen’s discussion of ambiguity in the 
mid-70s, the individual has a clear and crucial role in the learning cycle. With their 
introduction of neo-institutionalism a decade later, however, they explicitly de-emphasize the 
individual. And Levitt & March treats the same material as the early March & Olsen, but have 
a stronger focus on interpretations – although they still refer to psychological ‘attributes’, i.e. 
‘attributes of individuals as historians’ and ‘features of individual inference and judgment’. 
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learning ‘shoots first and asks the questions afterwards’. Nevertheless, March argues 
that learning from experience, too, is based on interpretation of outcomes, in terms of 
observation, explanation and evaluation: what happened? Why did it happen? Was it a 
success? The crucial distinction between success and failure thus requires 
interpretation of history: i.e. was the application of the routine a success (evaluation, 
preferences)? Was this result – success or failure – in fact a product of the applied 
routine, or of some external factors? 
By this emphasis on interpretation, March’ concept of experience obviously differs 
significantly from those that emphasize a more fundamental structural difference 
between rationality and experience. It is often argued that experience is something 
prior to the ‘filter’ provided the Kantian ‘subjective’ categories such as causality and 
objects. As an example Benjamin characterizes experience as holistic and integrated, 
without specification of individual events (corresponding to ‘facts’, see also previous 
discussion, p.17). Benjamin distinguishes memory26 (‘Gedächtnis’) from recollection 
(‘Erinnerung’) – where the latter focuses on individual occurrences, and the former – 
which he associates with experience – is ‘accumulative’ and related to tradition.  
”In der Tat ist die Erfahrung eine Sache der Tradition, im kollektiven wie im 
privaten Leben. Sie bildet sich weniger aus einzelnen in der Erinnerung 
streng fixierten Gegebenheiten denn aus gehäuften, oft nicht bewussten 
Daten, die im Gedächtnis zusammenfließen.” (Benjamin 1992) 
Benjamin is inspired by Bergson, who regarded mémoire pure – pure memory – as 
unmediated/immediate memory characterized by ‘wholes’ and ‘duration’ (la durée) 
and saw intuition as a method capable of regaining this memory – as opposed to the 
methods employed by modern science27. 
                                                     
26 The translation of ‘Gedächtnis’ (in Benjamin’s sense) into ‘memory’ is problematic because 
this word rarely has the connotations implied by Benjamin. 
27 Adorno criticizes Bergson for defending a division of labour between science and 
philosophy, and thus accepting the split between science and true experience, and thereby 
accepting the general isolation of the ‘subjective’ (Adorno 1970b). He criticizes the attempt to 
hypostasise ‘intuition’ as an independent and self-reliant method, isolated from scientific 
knowledge. I.e. “In den Intuitionen besinnt sich die ratio auf das, was sie verga, und in 
diesem von ihm freilich kaum intendierten Sinn hat Freud recht, wenn er dem Unbewuten 
eine eigene Art von Rationalität zuschreibt. Die Intuition ist kein einfacher Gegensatz zur 
Logik: sie gehört dieser an und mahnt sie zugleich an das Moment ihrer Unwahrheit. Als 
blinde Fleche im Proze der Erkenntnis, aus dem sie doch nicht herauszubrechen sind, 
verhalten die Intuitionen die Vernunft dazu, auf sich selbst als bloe Reflexionsform von 
Willkür zu reflektieren, um der Willkür ein Ende zu berieten. In der unwillkürlichen 
Erinnerung versucht wie immer auch vergeblich der willkürliche Gedanke etwas von dem zu 
heilen, was er gleichwohl verüben mu...“ (Adorno 1970b) 
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The definition offered by March does not seem capture this aspect of experience28. 
Neither does he define experiential learning as a simple contrast to ‘rationality’. March 
& Olsen define the method as adaptive rationality, and they seem to characterize 
‘rational choice’ and ‘experiential learning’ as two different types of rationality, 
which both depend on interpretation of causality. Nevertheless their definition does 
imply that this interpretation of causality is different in the two approaches. While 
‘rational choice’ is based on prepositional knowledge, an objectified and causal 
description of the environment (including those parameters that can be affected by the 
‘agent’), ‘experiential learning’ instead focuses on the possible causal relations 
between the actions (routines) carried out by the agent and ‘changes in the 
environment’ (Outcome? Results?), and is therefore required to distinguish between 1) 
actions taken and 2) external factors as different factors producing the result. This 
distinction (interpretation) thus also requires emphasis on causality, but the focal point 
is different29. 
Despite the differences in the definition of experience, I find March’s arguments about 
the fallibility of experiential learning to have a general relevance and capable of 
inspiring a critique against those apparently ‘incommensurable’ theories. 
2.5.1.2. The weaknesses of experiential learning 
March argues that experiential learning faces some of the same problems as rational 
choice, such as ambiguity and complexity, without faring much better in these 
situations.  
“what would happen if a learning style appropriate to a world in which 
preferences are clear and outcomes unambiguous were extended to a world 
                                                     
28 Weber (who is inspired by Kant) rejects the very idea that the individual should have access 
to a ‘whole’ memory. The individual is dependent on rational (mediated, filtered) ‘recollection’ 
– which has the advantage over the hypothetical (but impossible) ‘photographic’ memory, of 
including new aspects, new contexts (new understandings?): "Nie und nirgends ist eine 
gedankliche Erkenntnis selbst eines eigenen Erlebnisses ein wirkliches 'Wiedererleben' oder 
eine einfache 'Photographie' des Erlebten, stets gewinnt das 'Erlebnis', zum 'Objekt' gemacht, 
Perspektiven und Zusammenhänge, die im 'Erleben' eben nicht 'gewusst' werden.“ (Weber 
1988) 
29 March’ definition of experiential learning also differs from the more philosophical concept 
of experience (Bergson, Benjamin) at another point: March & Olsen and Levitt & March also 
treat experiential learning as a deliberate strategy to be applied in organisations, and imply that 
this strategy could be based on formal routines (written rules) as well as informal ones. I would 
argue that experiential learning is basically associated with informal routines, but March’ 
definition formalizes the process and converts it to a method (a conversion that has probably 
already been done by some of the proponents of (organisational) learning that March aim to 
criticize). 
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in which it is hard to determine what happened yesterday, why it happened, 
whether we liked it, or whether yesterday is comparable to today?" (March & 
Olsen 1976b)  
With this argument they challenge the widespread (and functionalist) assumption that 
‘experiential learning’ – in some reasonably similar definition – is more adaptive, 
more efficient in ‘rapidly changing environments’ than rational choice. An example of 
this assumption can be found in contingency theory(Burns & Stalker 1961), according 
to which organic organizations “like other living things… adapt flexibly to changing 
circumstances”(Hatch 1997). 
One problem associated with learning from experience is the competency trap, where 
people (or an organisation) have become so experienced with one routine that any new 
routine will appear inferior, simply because it is not yet supported by a similar level of 
experience.  
"a competency trap can occur when favorable performance with an inferior 
procedure leads an organization to accumulate more experience with it, thus 
keeping experience with a superior procedure inadequate to make it 
rewarding to use." (Levitt & March 1988) 
One might say that experience (with a routine) is an extra asset, but also a (sunk) cost 
making the switch to a new routine – a procedure, or new technology – extra difficult. 
Another example of the fallibility of experience is the risk of superstitious learning, a 
misinterpretation of causality, which "occurs when the subjective experience of learning is 
compelling but the connections between actions and outcomes are misspecified", and it “often 
involves situations in which subjective evaluations of success are insensitive to the actions taken” 
(Levitt & March 1988). Thus, in periods of success there is a tendency to see the 
organisational actions as successful, where the success may actually stem from the 
environment rather than individual behaviour. But the opposite is also the case: in 
periods of decline every action appears to be a failure and the cause of the misery. 
March & Olsen also describes superstitious learning as a situation, where the 
organisation changes and sees this process as one of learning, but results are lacking, 
there is no connection between action and outcome: "The critical feature is that the 
connection between organizational action and environmental response is severed" (March & 
Olsen 1976b)30.  
                                                     
30 Most literature about scientific methodology will contrast its merits with a critical account of 
everyday experience. Thus, Andersen emphasizes the characteristics and pitfalls of ‘natural’ 
knowledge production: “I hovedtrækkene foregår denne kundskabsproces på følgende made: 
Vi gør os almindeligvis temmelig tilfældige iaggtagelser om de forhold, som berører os. Visse 
fænomener dukker ofte op, andre sjældent. Visse hændelser optræder i sammenhæng, andre 
isoleret. Vor hjerne bearbejder og lagrer de synsindtryk, følelser og hændelser, som optræder. 
Efterhånden opbygger vi vort lager af erfaringer. Vi har kendskab til dele af vor omverden, og 
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2.5.1.3. Epistemological pessimism or inadequacy of history? 
March offers – at least – two different explanations for the fallibility of experiential 
learning. Part of the explanation seems to be psychological, corresponding somewhat 
to the epistemological pessimism denounced by Popper. The other explanation focuses 
on logical problems in using (local) history to modify interpretations. 
Psychological explanation 
To some extent, Levitt & March offer a (individual) psychological explanation of 
misinterpretations. They argue that individuals are inclined to interpret their own 
results as successful (and disregard shortfalls): 
”individual decision makers often seem to be able to reinterpret their 
objectives or the outcomes in such a way as to make themselves successful 
even when the shortfall seems quite large.” (Levitt & March 1988)  
Similar tendencies characterize some cases of organisational learning, “particularly 
where the leadership is stable and the organization is tightly integrated” (Levitt & March 1988), 
as opposed to organisations characterized by conflicting fractions etc. Furthermore 
experiential learning suffers from certain (unflattering) ‘features of individual 
inference and judgment’ 
“individual human beings are not perfect statisticians… They make 
systematic errors in recording the events of history and in making inferences 
from them. They overestimate the probability of events that actually occur 
and of events that are available to attention because of their recency or 
saliency. They are insensitive to sample size. They tend to overattribute 
events to the intentional actions of individuals. They use simple linear and 
functional rules, associate causality with spatial and temporal contiguity, and 
assume that big effects must have big causes. These attributes of individuals 
as historians are important to the present topic because they lead to 
systematic biases in interpretation.” (Levitt & March 1988) 
There is in this psychological explanation a striking parallel to Bacon’s critique of the 
idols of the tribe, and those of the cave. Bacon argues that an ‘experimental method’ 
(not to be confused with ‘experiential learning’) is a necessary remedy against various 
fundamental human tendencies to erroneous inferences and prejudice. And the very 
                                                                                                                                            
vi har også grundlag for at tolke den og drage slutninger om den. En sådan vidensproduktion 
kan naturligvis i mange tilfælde lede til gode slutninger og fornuftig viden, som vi ofte kan 
anvende til at løse vore problemer med. Men måske giver denne type af viden os – lige så 
hyppigt – et dårligt billede af vor omverden. Den måde, hvorpå vi i vor hverdag tilegner os 
erfaringer, kan resultere i, at vi sammenkæder begivenheder, som i virkeligheden ikke hører 
sammen. Vore konklusioner kan således være forkerte. De er ikke i overensstemmelse med den 
virkelighed, som vi studerer.” (Andersen 1997) 
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category of superstitious learning can be compared with Bacon’s notion of a ‘tendency 
to over-generalize’:  
“The human understanding on account of its own nature readily supposes a 
greater order and uniformity in things than it finds. And though there are 
many things in Nature which are unique and quite unlike anything else, it 
devises parallels and correspondences and relations which are not there.” 
(Bacon 1994) 
On the one hand, the implied epistemological pessimism is problematic and 
unsatisfactory as an explanation. On the other hand it may be read as a critique of the 
intuitive, immediate judgment – emphasizing the need for (rational) critique and 
distance or mediation. Even though individual (mis-)judgment is the source of 
knowledge, it can still be criticized and modified by critical rationality. 
Structural problems of experience  
Besides the psychological explanation, however, March also emphasizes structural 
problems in learning from experience. "The past is not a perfect predictor of the 
future, and the experimental designs generated by ordinary life are far from ideal for 
causal inference" (Levitt & March 1988). On the one hand the question is to what 
extent the interpretation actually learns from experience. It is, to some degree, immune 
to experience. On the other hand, history – on which experience is based – is often 
insufficient for selection between interpretations. ”[T]he difficulties in using history to 
discriminate intelligently among alternative paradigms are profound” (Levitt & March 
1988). In their analysis, Levitt & March specifies problems with the paucity, 
redundancy and complexity of experience. 
The first problem concerns the paucity of experience. March argues that “history is not 
generous with experience” (March et al. 1999), and that “nature provides inadequate 
experience relative to the complexities and instabilities of history” (Levitt & March 
1988). This should probably be compared to the scientific methods for establishing 
causal relationships. Although in principle science faces the same basic problem in the 
philosophical argument that universal laws cannot be derived from any number of 
observations – i.e. Hume’s argument that the past can never serve to predict the future 
(i.e. sunrise) – scientific research is required to assemble numerous empirical results, 
whereas a single agent – organisation, individual or other – can only make a few 
experiments. The isolated experience of one agent is too limited for reasonable 
interpretation of events – also because the actual risks involved in real-life 
experimentations are greater, compared to the laboratory. On the one hand, experience 
is thus more vulnerable to the rigidity of interpretations, because there is insufficient 
material – ‘data’ – to rationally challenge such frames. On the other hand the inability 
to discriminate rationally between interpretations may also lead to ‘random drift’. 
Levitt & March proceed to emphasize that this problem is aggravated under particular 
circumstances: “when the environment is changing rapidly or involves many dangers 
or opportunities, each of which is very unlikely" (Levitt & March 1988). It thus seems 
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that ‘experiential learning’ fares no better than the bureaucratic or rational 
organisation, which is often regarded as inferior in that type of environment.  
The second problem concerns the redundancy of experience:  
“Ordinary learning tends to lead to stability in routines, to extinguish the 
experimentation that is required to make a learning process effective." (Levitt 
& March 1988) 
This argument repeats the emphasis on routines, and the tension between routines and 
experimentation (and thus experiential learning). Routines exclude experimentation 
almost by definition. Acting according to a routine is an alternative to 
experimentation. 
The third problem concerns the complexity of experience. Again they argue that the 
(objective) environment of an organisation is particularly complex.  
”Organizational environments involve complicated causal systems as well as 
interactions among learning organizations. The various parts of the ecology 
fit together to produce learning outcomes that are hard to interpret." (Levitt & 
March 1988) 
The authors suggest different strategies to improve the performance of experiential 
learning. Notably, they advice against ‘incremental development’, which “is likely to 
lead to random drift rather than improvement". Instead, they recommend less frequent but 
more abrupt changes31.  
The conservative nature of experience 
There are parallels between March’s critique of experiential learning as based on a 
limited horizon and insufficient empirical material and Benjamin’s critique of 
                                                     
31 Andersen offers this explanation for the inadequacy of experience, and the advantages of 
scientific method: “fejlslutninger begår vi alle, og det hænger bl.a. sammen med: at vor 
forestillingsverden er farvet af de erfaringer, vi har gjort os; at de informationer, vi har 
indsamlet, ikke er tilstrækkelige, relevante eller gode nok til det formal, vi ønsker at anvende 
dem; at vi mangler evnerne til at sammenstykke informationerne på en fornuftig made, dvs. 
mangler logisk sans, analytisk evne og evnen til at sammenfatte informationerne til en helhed. 
Det, der almindeligvis adskiller dagligdags tænkning og egentlige forskningsaktiviteter, er, at 
de sidste er underlagt mere systematiske fremgangsmåder end de første. Der stilles større krav 
til argumentation, begrundelse og dokumentation for fremgangsmåder og information i 
forbindelse med forskningsarbejde end ved dagligdags refleksion. Det tvinger (eller bør tvinge) 
os til at arbejde meget mere med egne forestillinger og fordomme og systematisk sætte os ind i 
eksisterende viden på området. Derfnæst til stadighed at reflektere over kvaliteten og 
relevansen af de informationer, vi anvender, og ydermere reflektere over holdbarheden og 
grænserne for holdbarheden af de slutninger, vi drager.” (Andersen 1997) 
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experience as bound by conservative retrospection. The critique  offered by a young 
Benjamin is thus worth bearing in mind, to avoid a more nostalgic reading of his 
concept of experience.  
According to Benjamin, experience in itself is conservative and discouraging – it is the 
evangelism of the philistines, for it cannot give us ideals or hope: 
“Haben [die Erwachsenen] uns je schon zum Grossen ermutigt, zum Neuen, 
Zukünftigen? O nein, denn das kann man ja nicht erfahren. Aller Sinn, das 
Wahre, Gute, Schöne ist in sich selbst gegründet; was soll uns da die 
Erfahrung? – Und hier liegt das Geheimnis: weil er niemals zum Grossen 
und Sinnvollen emporblickt, darum wurde die Erfahrung zum Evangelium 
des Philisters.”  
„Warum also ist für den Philister das Leben trost- und sinnlos? Weil er nur 
die Erfahrung kennt, nichts weiter.“  
„Wir kennen aber Andres, was keine Erfahrung uns gibt oder nimmt: dass es 
Wahrheit gibt, auch wenn alles bisher Gedachte Irrtum war. Oder: dass 
Treue gehalten werden soll, auch wenn bisher niemand sie hielt. Solchen 
Willen kann uns Erfahrung nicht nehmen. Dennoch – in einem sollten die 
Ältern Recht behalten mit ihren müden Gesten und ihrer überlegenen 
Hoffnungslosigkeit? Was wir erfahren, das wird traurig sein und nur im 
Unerfahrbaren werden wir Mut und Sinn gründen können.“ (Benjamin 
1991b) 
Although he is less dismissive in his later writing, he maintains a fundamental critique 
of experience as a mode of ‘living’. Though richer and fuller, it is also a heavy burden 
that encloses the subject in the past – a large-scale ‘competency trap’, if one is allowed 
a far-fetched and dubious analogy32. Benjamin’s concept of aura has a similar 
meaning: a sense of belonging that disables us of imagining a new and different world, 
of facing a new historical situation, where experience would be misleading33. 
                                                     
32 Of course there are fundamental differences in scope: Benjamin talks about the possibility of 
an adequate perception of the modern world; March about problematic decision-making on 
insufficient basis. And we cannot overcome that historical ‘competency trap’ by gathering a 
larger amount of data. It is a fundamental problem of modern science that it remains ‘tied’ to 
the existing world and incapable of relating to the new. In this perspective, there are also 
positive aspects of the fact that interpretations are resistant to experience (March): Some part of 
‘interpretations’, one that represents hopes and ideals, must survive preserve the potential for 
progress. Yet this is not an argument for preserving ‘values’ and protecting them against 
critique: the very separation between objective description and subjective values is misleading. 
33”Perceptionsformen (dvs. oplevelsesmåden) forandres fra erindrende fordybelse, til adspredt 
oplevelse. Herved taber perceptionen i intensitet, men samtidig frigør den sig fra erindringens 
konservative overlevering... Frigørelsen fra auraen betyder derfor samtidig menneskets 
frigørelse til at begribe sin samtid, og til at fantasere sin fremtid.” (Lübcke 1982) 
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Experience – in decline, or in abundance? 
Besides numerous other problems with the analogy, one difference between March 
and Benjamin must be emphasized. While Benjamin writes about the general and 
fundamental decline of experience, March the neo-institutionalist concluded that the 
‘logic of appropriateness’ is the norm rather the exception in modern organisations. To 
Benjamin and others, experience is a ‘form of knowledge’ that is inadequate and 
incompatible with the modern world, both because of a ‘revolutionary’ technological 
development that constantly changes work processes and renders previous experience 
superfluous, and because the very structure of modern media (and knowledge) 
disables communication with personal experience. 
March’s conclusion, on the other hand, does not agree with this historical view and 
seems to support the thesis that I set out to criticize: the idea of experience as the 
fundamental form of knowledge. Still, March’s approach is ‘ambiguous’: experiential 
learning is not fundamental in the sense that it is the basis of all knowledge, it is one 
of two alternatives, which, alas, happens to be the norm. It is not functional or 
superior. 
2.6. Summary34 
There are two different elements of interpretivist theories. The basic element could be 
labelled as static (‘product’): the notion of an (frame of) interpretation shared by a group, a 
‘culture’ or a historical period etc. The other element is the idea of ‘understanding’ as a 
process triggered by ambiguity: two (or more) different, even conflicting interpretations. 
Thus, either there is one dominating interpretation, and thus no ambiguity. Or there is 
ambiguity due to two or more contradicting interpretations. 
2.6.1.1. One interpretation – no ambiguity 
On the one hand (rationalist critique) any interpretation must ‘claim to be true’, and 
truth must be universal. Interpretations are not merely symbolic. They contain more 
than obviously subjective elements such as values and goals. To the extent that an 
interpretation deals with cause-effect relations in the environment or other types of 
statements about reality, they contain assumptions about an ‘objective’ world. Thus, 
                                                     
34 When I refer to (frames of) interpretation in the following discussion, I generally imply 
elements such as causality and evaluation – those that were presented in the beginning of this 
chapter. This definition is mostly useful, because it is also used by students of interpretation in 
organisation. It may be somewhat problematic, however, to assume this basic structure – which 
is fundamentally rational. When Gadamer talks of prejudice, he does not seem to assume these 
elements. Critical theory has often criticized that this structure, this superimposed split between 
objective, thingly causality and subjective values is a problematic straitjacket for critical and 
emancipatory thinking that must be countered (but cannot be avoided). And the next chapter 
will present some arguments for the idea that experience may have a very different structure. 
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an interpretation can be wrong (false). Interpretations ‘based’ on experience – in a 
complex environment – are dubious due to their limited basis in (local or personal) 
history. 
It may be argued that it is irrelevant to talk about the truth or falsity of an 
interpretation, if one acknowledges that the observer-outsider (the researcher) is in no 
better position to make final judgements about the ‘truth of the matter’. Nevertheless, 
renunciation on absolute truth and objectivity is no excuse for relativism. The ideal of 
truth is still based on that of universality – the idea of a universal interpretation, one 
that is ‘shared’ by all communities, groups etc. Rationality – including both modern 
science and critical theory – is based on the ideal of such a universal interpretation. 
The critique is directed against local or particular35 interpretations, based on 
particularity as opposed to universality. And the critique is based on the assumption 
that such particular interpretations can often be distinguished from ‘healthy’ 
interpretations by: their lack of universality, and their closed nature, the lack of 
exposure to rational critique. 
Another problem with the idea of a local, ‘enacted’ community-based interpretation is 
that this isolated view on an individual group or organisation seems to disregard that 
the organisation and its members exist within a modern world ripe with 
‘interpretation’ – and a ‘social body of knowledge’ of a certain structure. It is 
unrealistic to assume that people locally to any large degree ‘invent’ a private or local 
interpretation (meaning). It seems more likely that most of ‘their’ interpretations are in 
fact inherited (or learned) from ideas and theories already in circulation. To a large 
extent we are (innocent) victims of the interpretations we employ – as illustrated by 
Heidegger’s argument that language is always ahead of us. This critique could be 
termed the structuralist argument. 
Yet the structuralist argument should not be exaggerated to exclude any form of local 
interpretation. Under the microscope any consensus is vulnerable, as Habermas 
admits. But the argument emphasizes that local interpretations is based on a more 
fundamental background. 
2.6.1.2. Reduction of ambiguity – enactment, war or rational decision 
Ambiguity arises when two conflicting interpretations confront each other, and 
ambiguity can be reduced by very different processes. There is a potential for 
rationality in the process of understanding and reduction of ambiguity (Argyris & 
Schön, Sproull & Kiesler), as opposed to war (Kuhn) or negotiations. In the ideal 
process people are required to ‘understand’ each other, and that this process provokes 
                                                     
35 The word particular is used in the same sense as by Gadamer or Habermas: particular as 
opposed to universal. This meaning may be somewhat unfamiliar in English. 
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the exposure of tacit or implicit interpretations. Particular interpretations are brought 
to light and exposed to critique, whereby both (all) parties in such ‘confrontation’ 
learn more, both about the ‘alien’ interpretation and their own. This process requires a 
rich language, because people are ‘forced’ to shift attention from the issue ‘outside’ 
and turn ‘inwards’ to clarify and question implicit assumptions. This process can 
reasonably be characterized as rational, because emphasizes arguments and 
justification. 
However, as already mentioned there is also in face of ambiguity a potential for less 
rational ‘political’ processes emphasising bargaining, negotiation, mere strategic 
behaviour or ‘warfare’ over understanding.  
The question is how to identify factors that encourage a rational debate and inhibit 
warfare. Sproull & Kiesler’s suggestion of the number of alternatives considered as a 
neutral indicator of rationality implies that decision-making processes may be 
improved by ‘techniques’ that increase the number of alternatives. They also – 
implicitly – recommend techniques that dissolve consensus and encourage critique. 
The critical dilemma 
While individual interpretations suffer from lack of critique, processes characterized by 
ambiguity may suffer from too much – destructive – critique. 
Critique is – ambiguous: it is crucial to rational analysis and the progress of thought, 
but it may also be impotent and potentially destructive in practical situations. Critique 
means (further) postponement of action, and organisations are action-oriented. In 
practical situations, where action must be taken, and decisions be made – people 
cannot retreat to disengaged critical positions. It is tempting to conclude that critique 
is basically ‘impractical’ – and that the potential for critique is the advantage of theory 
over practice (experience). Dis-engagement – as opposed to commitment and 
‘engagement’– opens up for a critical distance. 
The problem for organisations is how to deal with critique. Critical voices are often 
disliked and ‘repressed’, not only to protect ‘powers that be’, but also because they 
may threaten stability and may fail to provide alternative courses of action. Compare 
Sproull & Kiesler’s example emphasizing the contradiction between ‘pleasantness’ 
and ‘efficiency’ of groups. A common reaction to this problem is the well-known 
requirement that critical voices are invalid as long as they do not provide alternatives. 
Yet this requirement is inhibitive to the debate and – as argued by Popper - logically 
untenable. Nevertheless, Gadamer seems to imply that hermeneutic understanding 
does take the most radical sharpness off critique, because understanding is 
fundamentally compliant: the understanding subject wants to understand and cannot 
simply reject statements ‘that he or she cannot verify’. 
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2.6.1.3. Two levels of application 
It is worth emphasizing that the principle of hermeneutic understanding etc. applies to 
two, even three different levels. First, it sets an ideal for processes of understanding 
within the object of research. Second, the social researcher must attempt to 
communicate with his ‘object’: to understand organisational action and actors by 
‘interpretation’. The problems of understanding are also methodological ones. At a 
third level interpretation is the very basis of this chapter, the conviction that different 
theories are not incommensurable, that it is possible to make them ‘meet on common 
ground’ in order to achieve a critical dialogue. 
2.6.1.4. The ‘usefulness’ of critical theory? 
I take inspiration from discussion of rationality and other forms of knowledge in critical 
theory, with the intention of building a ‘model’ for analysis of (individual) organisations. 
This use corresponds to an ‘instrumentalisation’ of critical theory, often using it ‘by 
analogy’, like in the somewhat problematic analogy between critique of ideology and 
‘deuterial learning’. Other critical researchers may denounce this instrumentalisation as 
abuse. Yet I think that some degree of ‘instrumentalisation’ is the price one might pay for 
testing the above fundamental assumptions about rationalization. It may seem paradoxical 
to see critical theory as a defender of rationality, but such defence is required today, 
because there is a strong tendency to discard the issue as irrelevant. 
                                                     
i Galilei plays a significant role in the history of thought. Haugeland sees Galilei as an 
important step towards the formalization of thought (Derrida: the development of non-phonetic 
writing), eventually the very idea of AI. His achievement was to apply mathematics and 
geometry to physical problems of velocity etc. by abstraction. He believed that his method 
corresponded to the true structure of the world and saw the university as a book, written in the 
language of mathematics. “What matters historically … is not just that Galileo used geometry, 
but how he used it. Traditionally, geometry was the study of figures and relations in space. But 
Galileo conceived of it more abstractly. So, for example, lines in his diagrams wouldn’t always 
represent lines or even distances in space, but might just as well represent times, speeds, or any 
other interesting physical variable… [Example: comparing the time spent an accelerating body 
covering a distance, to the time spent by a body of constant rate of speed]. Obviously Galileo’s 
main contribution is not the proof itself but the abstract representation in which such a proof 
could be given. Discovering and validating this strange way of representing instantaneous 
velocity, uniform acceleration, total distance, and so on cost Galileo many years of struggle. It 
looks so simple or even clumsy now; but it is one of the great achievements of the human 
intellect. What made it really significant, though, was not any particular result but rather the 
fact that now all the familiar techniques of geometry could be used to establish all kinds of 
results. Euclid’s whole deductive system could be abstracted away from geometric shapes and 
applied instead to motions” (Haugeland 1987). He also introduced the influential – and 
infamous – distinction between what may be termed objective and subjective (Locke: primary 
and secondary) qualities: “I believe that for external bodies to excite in us tastes, odors, and 
sounds, nothing is required in those bodies themselves except size, shape, and a lot of slow or 
fast motions [namely, of countless ‘tiny particles’]. I think that if ears, tongues, and nose were 
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taken away, then shapes, numbers, and motions would well remain, but not odors, tastes, or 
sounds. The latter are, I believe, nothing but names, outside of the living animal – just as 
tickling and titillation are nothing but names, apart from the armpit and the skin around the 
nose” (cited by Haugeland). Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, criticized Galileo for 
confusing idealized mathematical shapes with the ‘real world’. Geometrical shapes are 
idealizations of things perceived in the real world, shapes that we shall never meet in the 
sensible world: “Under udviklingen af stadig finere måleprocedurer, opstår da tanken om en 
helt plan flade, en ren cirkel, en fuldstændig lige linie. Sådanne genstande vil vi aldrig møde i 
vor sansbare omverden: De udgør et nyt genstandsområde af idealtypiske grænsetilfælde kun 
tilgængelige for en rent geometrisk og matematisk tankevirksomhed. For Galilei forelå der 
allerede en højtudviklet, ren geometri, og han behøvede derfor ikke spørge om, hvorledes det 
geometriske genstandsområde og den geometriske metodik viser tilbage til den 
førvidenskabelige, sansbare verden og den måleteknik, der benyttes i denne verden. I stedet 
kunne han på naiv måde tage geometrien for givet og endog gå et skridt videre, idet han 
erklærede den geometriske verden for den ’egentlige’, ’objektive’ verden, således at den 
verden, vi erfarer gennem vore dagligdags målinger, kun er at betragte som en tilnærmelse til 
den ’virkelige’ verden. Efter at have foretaget denne ’objektivering’ (’hypostasering’) af den 
geometriske verden lå det næste skridt lige for: Jo mere forfinede målinger, vi kan foretage, 
desto mere ’objektive’ resultater når vi frem til; da farver, lyde og lugte kun i begrænset 
omfang kan underkastes strenge målinger, er de følgelig mindre ’objektive’ end tidslig og 
rumlig udstrækning; ergo er kun den i tid og rum udstrakte virkelighed ’objektiv’, mens farver, 
lyde og lugte er noget blot ’subjektivt’. For Husserl er denne måde at se tingene på ikke 
holdbar. Den i tid og rum udstrakte, rent geometriske verden må ses som det, den er: Et 
grænsetilfælde. Dette grænsetilfælde udgør et konstitueret genstandsområde, idet de akter, i 
hvilke de geometriske genstande kan erfares på mest direkte måde, nødvendigvis forudsætter 
en række akter, i hvilke en sansbar verden af farver, lyde, lugte og former giver sig til kende. 
Denne verden – eller dette genstandsområde – omtaler Husserl som vor livsverden 
(’Lebenswelt’)... Enhver genstand viser i sidste instans tilbage til denne livsverden forstået som 
en sansbar verden med en bestemt eidetisk struktur. Da livsverdenen på denne måde må siges 
at være en nødvendig betingelse for enhver erfaring, kan den med rette siges at være en 
transcendental betingelse” (Lübcke 1994). Heidegger sees Galileo as a demi-god or Poet, 
whose mathematical ‘disclosure’ – frame of interpretation – of the world has laid the ground 
for modern science (Heidegger 1962). 
ii Compare Adorno’s critique of common sense, indeed in the very definition of critical 
thought. Common sense is to be distrusted as stubbornly obedient to a ‘reality’ that is unjust 
and repressive, and it is the crucial task of critical thought to oppose it. “Common sense, die 
Einschätzung der richtigen Verhältnisse, der am Markt geschulte, weltläufig geübte Blick, hat 
mit der Dialektik die Freiheit von Dogma, Beschränkung und Verranntheit gemein. Seine 
Nüchterneit gibt ein unabdingbares Moment von kritischen Denken ab. Aber der Verzicht auf 
verblendeten Eigensinn ist doch auch wiederum dessen geschworener Feind. Die 
Allgemeinheit der Meinung, umittelbar angenommen als eine in der Gesellschaft, wie sie ist, 
hat zum konkreten Inhalt notwendig das Einverständis. Es ist kein Zufall, daß im neunzehnten 
Jahrhundert gerade der abgestandene und durch die Aufklärung mit schlechtem Gewissen 
versetzte Dogmatismus auf den gesunden Menschenverstand sich berief, so daß ein 
Erzpositivist wie Mill gezwungen war, gegen diesen zu polemisieren. Der sense of proportions 
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vollends bezieht sich darauf, daß man in den Maßverhältnissen und Größenordnungen des 
Lebens denken solle, die feststehen. Man muß nur einmal einen hartgesottenen Repräsentanten 
einer herrschenden Clique haben sagen hören: 'Das ist nich so wichtig', muß nur beobachten, 
wann die Bürger vor Übertreibung, Hysterie, Narretei reden, um zu wissen, daß es gerade an 
der Stelle, and der die Berufung auf Vernunft am promptesten eintritt, unweigerlich um die 
Apologie der Unvernunft geht. Den gesunden Widerspruchsgeist hat Hegel mit der 
Dickköpfigkeit des Bauern hervorgehoben, der jahrhundertelang lernte, Jagd und Zins der 
mächtigen Feudalherren zu überstehen. Das Anliegen der Dialektik ist es, den gesunden 
Ansichten, die spätere Gewalthaber von der Unabänderlichkeit des Weltlaufs hegen, ein 
Schnippchen zu schlagen und in ihren 'proportions' das treue und reduzierte Spiegelbild der 
unmäßig vergrößerten Mißverhältnisse zu entziffern. Die dialektische Vernunft ist gegen die 
herrschende die Unvernunft: erst indem sie jene überführt und aufhebt, wird sie selber 
vernünftig. Wie verrannt und talmudistisch war schon, mitten in der funktionierenden 
Tauschwirtschaft, die Insistenz auf dem Unterschied der vom Arbeiter verausgabten 
Arbeitszeit und der zur reproduktion seines Lebens notwendigen. wie hat nich Nietzsche alle 
Pferden am Schwanz aufgezäumt, auf denen er seine Attacken ritt, wie haben nicht Karl Kraus, 
Kafka, selbst Proust, jeder auf seine Weise, das Bild der Welt befangen verfälscht, um 
Falschheit und Befangenheit abzuschütteln. Vor den Begriffen des Gesunden und Kranken, ja 
den mit ihnen verschwisterten des Vernünftigen und Unvernünftigen selber vermag Dialektik 
nicht Halt zu machen. Hat sie einmal das herrschende Allgemeine und seine Proportionen als 
krank - und im wörtlichsten Sinn, gezeichnet mit der Paranoia, der 'pathischen Projektion' - 
erkannt, so sird ihr zur Zelle der Genesung einzig, was nach dem Maß jener Ordnung selber als 
krank, abwegig, paranoid - ja als 'verrückt' sich darstellt, und es gilt heute wie im Mittelalter, 
daß einzig die Narren der Herrschaft die Wahrheit sagen. Unter diesem Aspekt wäre es Pflicht 
des Dialektikers, solcher Wahrheit des Narren zum Bewußtsein ihrer eigenen Vernunft zu 
verhelfen, ohne welches sie freilich untergehen müßte im Abgrund jener Krankheit, welche der 
gesunde Menschenverstand der anderen mitleidslos diktiert" (Adorno 1951). The comparison 
of ideology and common sense is also problematic, however. The philosophy of common sense 
assumes a practical ‘hands-on’ approach that is independent from, and uninfected by ideology 
(or idola theatri). Adorno does not simply identify common sense with ideology, but he argues 
that common sense is mostly conservative and conformistic – rather an (albeit not deliberate) 
ally than a threat to ideology and the powers that be. Nevertheless, he also seems to identify 
Being with the idols of the market place, and label these idols as ideology. 
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3. Ambiguity in organisations 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to identify organisational processes involving 
ambiguity. I shall present a theoretical framework that answers a number of questions. 
Why are there different interpretations in an organisation? Where do these 
interpretations come from – have they emerged locally, or are they ‘inherited’ from 
elsewhere? Having identified the nature of the interpretations will make it easier to 
discuss the conditions for ‘reduction of ambiguity’ and the potential for a rational 
resolution. 
3.1.1.1. Four arguments against the theory of rationalisation 
The discussion is based on theories (Weber, critical theory) that regard modern 
organisations as basically characterized by (instrumental) rationality, as the result of a 
historical process of rationalisation that has replaced experience as the ‘knowledge 
base’ of society. This theory will be confronted with – and qualified by – a number of 
arguments that seem to challenge the basic assumption of rationality. These critiques 
are roughly based on one – or a combination – of the following concepts: experience; 
interpretation; bounded rationality or fallibility. The emphasis on interpretation 
inspires a number of different critiques of the rational model, but it is worth 
recapitulating from the previous chapter that there may not be any conflict: the 
bureaucratic organisation results from an interpretation, but an interpretation of a 
particular form, and based on universal knowledge (rather than local interpretation).  
One critique against the theory of rationalisation argues that the cognitive 
interpretation (or culture) applied by an organisation is more relevant than, and prior 
to, organisational structure (Weick, Schultz, Schein). Organisational action should be 
understood in terms of symbol and meaning rather than rational calculation. 
Another critique, which is essential to this thesis, argues that an organisation is not 
based on a single unified ‘culture’, but hosts a variety of conflicting interpretations – 
“different and contradictory rationalities” in Weick’s words – implying an ambiguity that 
undermines rational decision-making (Weick, March). 
A third critique combines interpretation with an affirmative concept of experience 
emphasizing that local or ‘professional’ communities-of-practice are competent 
beyond the superficial canonical formal procedures (Brown & Duguid, Lave & 
Wenger, Powell). Rational action is an illusion, and experiential learning is the actual 
basic ‘form of knowledge’ in organisations. 
A fourth critique combines March’s disenchanted concept of experience (presented in 
the previous chapter) with that of bounded rationality, seeing institutional routines as 
sub-optimal and the haphazard product of processes that are generally ‘all-too-human’ 
and all but rational. This argument is found in neo-institutionalist theories and regards 
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organisations as a manifestation of a ‘logic of appropriateness’ rather than rational 
choice and design. 
3.1.1.2. Outline of the chapter 
The discussion in this chapter will generally be based on a comparison of the tradition 
from Weber to critical theory with neo-institutional theory. This comparison will 
evolve along two dimensions.  
On the one hand the two traditions disagree on the origin of organisational rules, as 
neo-institutionalists tend to emphasize the role of irrational processes, regarding them 
as based on habits and ’logic of appropriateness’. Thus the first section of this chapter 
will confront Weberian and critical theory with that critique of rationalisation that 
regards institutions as all-too-human rather than rational, based on retrospective 
experiential learning rather than rational calculation.  
On the other hand the two traditions agree in their emphasis on organisational rules (or 
routines) rather than individual – and collective – actors. In the next section I thus 
proceed to discuss their common focus on rules and routines by contrasting it with 
opposing views: on the one hand the emphasis on individual action, on the other hand 
the emphasis on a collective subject or community. 
Eventually, I shall arrive at the subject that is at the core of this thesis: the question of 
differentiation, networking and ambiguity in organisations. 
3.2. Routines and reification 
There is some parallel between the theory of reified behaviour and the theory of 
organisational action being governed by routines (or rules)36 (Argyris & Schön 
1996;Levitt & March 1988;March & Simon 1958;March et al. 2000;March & Simon 
1958;March et al. 2000). On the one hand, Adorno and March both observe the 
reification of organisational behaviour, as opposed to ideas of a collective subject 
‘behind’ the organisation, or of the organisation as a product of the cognitive efforts of 
its members. On the other hand, they offer quite different explanations for this 
reification.  
March’ institutionalism sees reification as the result of a fundamental characteristics of 
human nature, and this reference to behavioural assumptions is regarded as an 
improvement compared to the old institutionalists who merely analysed institutions as 
a fact, without any theoretical interest in their origin and genesis (Powell & DiMaggio 
                                                     
36 As pointed out previously, the terms rules and routines will generally be used as synonyms, 
except in situations where distinction is essential. 
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1991). Basically, new institutionalism may be seen as an attempt to preserve a 
‘disenchanted’ theory of bureaucracy, separated from the assumption of rationality and 
from the ‘grand theory’ of modernity and rationalization. In this respect, new 
institutionalism is offered as a new chapter in a classical sociological debate, i.e. 
between Durkheim and Weber. 
Adorno and other critical theorists, however, see reification as the very product of 
instrumental rationality. Powell & DiMaggio are both right and wrong in saying that: 
"Marxian analysts [treat] processes that institutionalists view as nearly universal as pathological 
departures from rationality ('false consciousness')" (Powell & Dimaggio 1991). They are 
wrong, because reified processes are not simply departures from, but (also) a logical 
product of, rationality – and this is where critical theory differs from i.e. ‘labour 
process Marxists’ such as Braverman; right because this reification is basically a result 
of instrumental or subjective rationalization within an irrational whole. 
The next two sections will present the two theories: first the theory of rationalisation, 
and then the neo-institutionalist ‘disenchanted’ theory of bureaucracy and 
fossilization. 
3.3. Weber and critical theory: bureaucracy and rationalisation 
Weber and Adorno see reification in modern organisations as the result of a historical 
process of rationalization and capitalism, characteristic of our own particular historical 
period more than others. Whereas large organisations have existed in previous periods, 
such as the Roman Empire, the organisations of the ‘administered world’ of today are 
historically unique in their extension into all areas of everyday life – what Habermas 
calls ‘colonisation of the Lifeworld’ – and by their application of refined modern 
technology: 
"Ihre neue und bestürzende Qualität hat die Organisation einzig durch den 
Grad ihrer Ausdehnung und Verfügungsgewalt gewonnen: die des 
Allumfassenden, die Gesellschaft durch und durch Strukturierenden. Die 
Tendenz auch dazu fehlte den großen Organisationen der Vergangenheit 
keineswegs; nur ist sie offenbar erst mit den Mitteln der modernen Technik 
ganz zu verwirklichen." (Adorno 1979a)  
3.3.1. The organisation as means to an end 
This emphasis on techniques draws attention to a basic characteristic of the 
organisation: Adorno defines organisations as consciously designed (means) to an end 
and fundamentally characterized by instrumental rationality (Zweckrationalität). 
"Organisation [ist] ein bewußt geschaffener und gesteuerter Zweckverband... 
Als solcher unterscheidet er sich ebenso von naturwüchsigen Gruppen, etwa 
dem Stamm oder der Familie, wie umgekehrt von dem ungeplanten Ganzen 
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des Gesellschaftlichen Prozesses. Wesentlich ist die Zweckrationalität. Eine 
Gruppe also, die auf den Namen Organisation Anspruch hat, ist so geartet, 
daß der Zweck, um dessentwillen sie existiert, sich möglichst vollkommen und 
mit dem relativ geringsten Kräfteaufwand erreichen läß. Die Beschaffenheit 
derjenigen, aus denen die Organisation sich bildet, tritt in deren Anlage 
zurück hinter der Zweckdienlichkeit des Ganzen. Der Name Organisation 
erinnert an Organe, Werkzeuge. Darin klingt an, daß die von der 
Organisation Erfaßten ihr primär nicht um ihrer selbst willen, sondern eben 
als Werkzeuge zur Realisierung des Zweckes angehören, dem die Organisation 
dient und der erst mittelbar - abermals, wenn Sie wolle, als 'Werkzeug' - 
ihnen wiederum nutzt. Mit anderen Worten, in der Organisation sind die 
menschlichen Beziehungen durch den Zweck vermittelt, nicht unmittelbar. Nach 
der amerikanischen Terminologie wäre jede Organisation eine sekundäre 
Gruppe. Solche Mittelbarkeit, der Werkzeugcharakter des Einzelnen für die 
Organisation und der Organisation für den einzelnen, setzt Momente von 
Starrheit, Kälte, Äußerlichkeit, Gewaltsamkeit. In der Sprache der deutschen 
philosophischen Tradition wird das von den Worten Entfremdung und 
Verdinglichung umrissen." (Adorno 1979a) (My italicisation) 
This predefined goal and instrumentalism distinguishes the human relations within an 
organisation from ‘primary groups’ or communities – corresponding somewhat to 
Tönnies’ classical distinction between ’Gemeinschaft’ and ’Gesellschaft’ (Tönnies 
1963), which inspired Weber. The organisation is a system of means, and the 
organisational members are themselves ‘tools’, means to the organisational end. It is 
illustrative that in Adorno’s definition organisations are not systems, because systems 
have no rationality. This may seem strange, because the idea of a rationally designed 
organisation is quite similar to the so-called systems approach(Churchman 1981). Yet, 
the difference is that Adorno’s concept of system is functionalist and resembles 
Luhmann’s in referring to something that is not designed: the society as a whole as 
unintended product of capitalist enterprise (Brunkhorst 1999). 
In principle, the definition of organisations as means is not controversial. March, too, 
defines organisations as “oriented to targets” (Levitt & March 1988).  
Instrumentality – the dialectics of means 
Rationality is instrumental, and as an instrument it is neutral, and although it originally 
serves the powers that be, it also gains independence from these. 
”Tænkningen ... er en slave, som herren ikke kan standse, når det passer 
ham. I og med, at herredømmet, da menneskene var blevet fastboende, 
tingsliggjorde sig selv til lov og organisation, måtte det indskrænke sig selv. 
Instrumentet opnår selvstændighed: åndens formidlende instans mildner 
uafhængigt af de styrendes vilje den økonomiske urets umiddelbarhed. 
Herredømmets instrumenter, som skal kontrollere alle: sprog, våben, sluttelig 
maskiner, tvinges til at lade sig kontrollere af alle. Således sætter 
rationalitetsmomentet sig igennem i herredømmet som et moment, der også 
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er forskelligt fra dette. Midlets karakter af objekt, som stiller det universelt 
til rådighed, dets ’objektivitet’ for alle, implicerer allerede kritikken af 
herredømmet, som hvis middel tænkningen voksede frem.” (Horkheimer & 
Adorno 1993) 
In the bureaucratic organisation, the oral command of the employer-capitalist over the 
employee-worker is mediated through rationality (written rules), which restricts the 
‘subjectivity’ on both sides, or at all levels of the hierarchy: it reduces the autonomy of 
the lower-echelon employee, but it also restricts random exercise of power by the 
manager. March et al make a similar point: written rules substitute for direct 
supervision: 
“it is often argued that written rules are used as substitutes for direct 
managerial supervision. The substitution, it is argued, has advantages of 
saving managerial effort, minimizing the dysfunctional consequences of 
making differences in status overt, and avoiding direct confrontations 
involving conflicts of interest.” (March et al. 2000)  
This aspect of rationality and instrumentalisation modifies the arguments made by 
Braverman and labour process researchers who emphasize that management is 
basically ‘control over labour’. By regarding ‘rationalization’ merely as a means of 
control over labour, and by regarding ‘rationality’ as pure ideology, designed to 
conceal power structures, they fail to grasp the ‘ambiguity’ or dialectics of the tool: 
that the tool gains independence of its user. It is true that rationalization is (also) 
‘control over labour’, but at the same time it is less direct control by management 
(leadership, capitalists). Control is reified – procedures etc. are not simply the ‘tools of 
management’. 
3.3.2. Three ‘sources’ of rules 
According to critical theory and the Weberian tradition, three different ‘factors’ 
explain the emphasis on rules in organisations. One factor is the principle of 
universality of modern law and administration, requiring that all people should be 
treated equal – ‘without personal regard’. The two other factors emphasize that the 
internal rules of an organisation reflect external laws determining phenomena of the 
environment: the laws of Nature, and those of the market. These three factors are 
mediated through Reason, which perceives and treats its material in terms of rules.  In 
the following I shall elaborate on each of these factor: 1) the principle of universality; 
2) scientific knowledge of nature; 3) the social environment – market economy. 
3.3.2.1. Universality and justice 
The very concept of a rule contains the ideal – and potential – of universality. Modern 
law is founded on the identification of justice with universality, as expressed in the 
principles of ‘equality before justice’ and ‘ohne Ansehung der Person’: the 
requirement that every person should be treated equally, without any regard of 
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personal characteristics. Adorno thus recognizes that a bureaucratic rule (a form) may 
actually represent an element of justice. An abstract procedure is a guarantee against 
being the victim of chance, bad luck and nepotism:  
“Der Einzelne, der etwa zu einer Behörde geht und von dieser sich Hilfe 
verspricht, wird, indem er auf den Unterschied seines individuellen 
Interesses von dem immerhin allgemeineren trifft, das die Behörde vertritt, 
geneigt sein, den Beamten, der ihm weniger gewährt, als er erwartet, 
vorzuwerfen, er verfahre nach Schema F. Der Klagende hat dabei oft genug 
nach dem Maß der heute möglichen Befriedigung von Bedürfnissen recht. 
Aber das Schema F, nach dem er behandelt wird, also die abstrakte 
Verfahrungsweise, die es den Bürokratien erlaubt, einen jeden Fall 
automatisch und 'ohne Ansehung der Person' zu erledigen, ist zugleich, wie 
im formalen Recht, auch ein Element von Gerechtigkeit, ein Stück Garantie 
dafür, dass dank solcher Beziehung aufs Allgemeine nicht Willkür, Zufall, 
Nepotismus das Schicksal eines Menschen beherrschen.” (Adorno 1979a) 
In this sense, the alienation characteristic of modern organisations is, paradox, a 
precondition for happiness: 
“Adorno affirms alienation as a precondition of all human forms of 
happiness and he views fragmentation as the great chance for potential 
freedom from all repressions of the ethical life, the insidious tyranny of 
neighbourhood opinion and the danger of totalitarianism associated with any 
notion of totality… From this point of view Adorno would reject the for-and-
against positions of the current conflict in political theory, both liberalism 
and communitarianism.”  (Brunkhorst 1999)  
The principles of universality and alienation constitute the (ideal) basis of the 
depersonalized bureaucracy of ‘public institutions’. Organisational processes are 
’removed’ from the realm of ’local judgement by community/charismatic leaders’ and 
’leveraged’ into the structure/system.  
“Die Entpersönlichung und Verdinglichung, die dem Einzelnen im 
Bürokraten greifbar werden, mit dem er zu verkehren hat, sind sowohl 
Ausdruck der Entfremdung des Ganzen von seinem menschlichen Zweck 
und insofern negativ, wie umgekehrt auch Zeugnis jener Vernunft, die allen 
zugute kommen könnte und die allein das Schlimme verhindert.” (Adorno 
1979a) 
Adorno’s emphasis on the positive aspects of universality and reification can be 
compared to an argument by March et al:  
“both written and unwritten rules create standards of appropriateness that 
balance the tendency of the consequential calculations made by an individual 
to be myopic with respect to the distant future, to the interests of distant 
others, and to the interests of collectivities.” (March et al. 2000) 
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This observation emphasizes the tensions between individual (or subjective) 
rationality and the ‘interests of collectivities’ – a tension that also plays a significant 
role in ‘transaction cost’ literature, which emphasizes the benefits of institutions in 
balancing the opportunistic behavior of individual actors37.  
3.3.2.2. Scientific basis - intellectualisation 
Organisations generally interact with Nature, and Nature is characterized by the ‘rule 
of (natural) law’. Man is able to control Nature because of his knowledge about these 
laws. In the modern world, production is more and more based on scientific 
knowledge replacing mythology, experience and tradition – as argued in the previous 
chapter – and the organized behaviour necessarily reflects this rule-based structure. 
The emphasis on rationalization corresponds to Marx’ observation of how craft-based 
knowledge was replaced with rational planning and ‘technological sciences’. For those 
who are used to see Marx as a defender of craft production, his critique of craft-based 
knowledge as conservative and blinded by specialization and secrecy may be 
surprising. He clearly characterizes the focus on the production process itself – 
completely disregarding the human hand – as a progress, which might be labeled as 
universalisation and ‘objectification’. 
“Es ist charakteristisch, daß bis ins 18. Jahrhundert hinein die besondren 
Gewerke mysteries (mystères) hießen, in deren Dunkel nur der empirisch 
und professionell Eingeweihte eindringen konnte. Die große Industrie zerriß 
den Schleier, der den Menschen ihren eignen gesellschaftlichen 
Produktionsprozeß versteckte und die verschiedenen naturwüchsig 
besonderten Produktionszweige gegeneinander und sogar dem in jedem 
Zweig Eingeweihten zu Rätseln machte. Ihr Prinzip, jeden 
Produktionsprozeß, an und für sich und zunächst ohne alle Rücksicht auf die 
menschliche Hand, in seine konstituierenden Elemente aufzulösen, schuf die 
ganz moderne Wissenschaft der Technologie. Die buntscheckigen, scheinbar 
zusammenhangslosen und verknöcherten Gestalten des gesellschaftlichen 
Produktionsprozesses lösten sich auf in bewußt planmäßige und je nach dem 
bezweckten Nutzeffekt systematisch besonderte Anwendungen der 
Naturwissenschaft.” (Marx 1890)  
                                                     
37 However, despite similarities with Adorno’s defense of universality, March et al’s emphasis 
on the necessity of repressing the individual, and the reference to myopic and egoistic 
individuals, is problematic in Adorno’s view – and also exposed to Poppers critique against 
epistemological pessimism, an image of human beings that has served as an excuse for 
totalitarian systems. On the other hand, if the citation above can be read as a critique, not of 
individuals, but of ‘subjective rationality’, then the parallels to critical theory are even stronger. 
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Yet his emphasis on sciences of technology as concerned with the tools and the 
production process seems too narrow for my purpose. The increasing role of science is 
not only associated with tools and machinery, but also with the material being 
manufactured. Chemical industry and biotechnology are obvious examples of this 
tendency. In the following I shall elaborate on the implications of this thesis by 
comparing with more contemporary writers. 
Thus, on the one hand, theories of rationalization correspond to Bell’s thesis that 
production is more and more based on theoretical knowledge, emphasizing "the strategic 
role of theoretical knowledge as the new basis of technological innovation." (Bell 1976). On the 
other hand, this development does not imply a sharp distinction between machine 
technology and intellectual technology, between industrial society and information or 
post-industrial society, as Bell would have it: "if industrial society is based on machine 
technology, postindustrial society is shaped by an intellectual technology" (Bell 1976). 
According to critical theory it’s rather a question of a general change – or 
development – in the total knowledge base of machines and industry (through 
rationalization, or intellectualisation). And in fact Marx’ comments on the scientific 
dissolution of craft mysteries is not restricted to tools and machines, and he therefore 
already includes the same development that Bell exaggerates into a shift away from 
industrial society38. 
Scientific knowledge – public good, not private property 
Bell further argues that market-oriented production is more and more dependent on 
knowledge produced in scientific institutions, and thus on public investments in ‘basic 
research’. Such research is by definition a ‘public good’, which cannot be ‘owned’ and 
thus will not receive private fundingi (Bell 1976). This emphasis on public good can 
be compared with Marx’ remark about the ‘unveiling’ of the trade mysteries and the 
emphasis on universalisation and a social body of knowledge, and it implies a critique 
of Drucker’s argument about the knowledge worker. Drucker argues that modern 
companies are increasingly dependent on knowledge work (an argument in itself 
similar to Bell or Weber), and that knowledge workers thus differ from the manual 
workers of the past (who were subjected to taylorisation) by the fact that they ‘own 
their own means of production’ (their knowledge) (Drucker 1999).  
                                                     
38 Comparison is not straightforward because it involves different, ‘incommensurable’ – in a 
non-radical sense – theoretical traditions. While Marxists – in the sixties – characterized 
society as late capitalism, other sociologists downplayed the focus on capitalism and preferred 
the term industrial society, which implied another mode of analysis and a different focus 
(Adorno 1968).  
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However, if ‘knowledge work’ is associated with a more scientific base of production 
(as stated by Bell), then ‘knowledge workers’ cannot "own the means of production": 
Science is not the individual property of those educated at the universities. On the 
contrary: scientific knowledge is universalised and ‘codified’ to a large extent – it is 
‘objective’ rather than ‘subjective knowledge’ (in Popper’s terminology). 
Organisations will sooner or later be able acquire relevant scientific knowledge, and to 
code this knowledge into organisational routines - although scientific knowledge 
cannot be acquired by simple taylorisation defined as: ‘careful study of motions’.  
Intellectualisation vs. Taylorisation 
It is thus useful to emphasize the distinction between the rationalization or 
intellectualisation described by Weber, and processes of taylorisation. Taylor’s 
‘scientific management’ did not have much to do with science in this sense. 
Taylorisation is transformation of the existing knowledge base, but does not in itself 
imply a change towards a scientific knowledge base. Taylor’s ‘scientific management’ 
is only ‘scientific’ in its method, which is applied to practical knowledge – by 
formalizing, measuring, splitting a process into its parts – but it does not replace the 
traditional, craft-based knowledge of the object of work with a scientific descriptive 
and prepositional knowledge (although this process may indirectly reveal new aspects 
of the material – and serve as input for scientific analysis). 
I must also object to another remark by Drucker, which implies either a peculiar 
definition of knowledge, or a misinterpretation of history: 
“Taylor showed that in manual work there is no such thing [as ‘skill’]. There 
are only simple, repetitive motions. What makes them productive is 
knowledge, that is, the way simple, unskilled motions are put together, 
organized and executed. In fact, Taylor was the first person to apply 
knowledge to work… This also earned Taylor the undying enmity of the 
labor unions of his time, all of which were craft unions and based on the 
mystique of craft skill and their monopoly on it… Taylor destroyed the 
romance of work. Instead of a ‘noble skill’ it becomes a series of simple 
motions.” (Drucker 1999) 
On the one hand, he is illustrative in emphasizing the change in the knowledge base of 
work and organisations, a change characterized by a separation between plan and 
execution, and between subject and object. And again the reference to the mystique of 
craft skill echoes Marx. It emphasizes the ambiguous ‘motivation’ for the tacit nature 
of craft knowledge: partly because skills are physical and context-dependent, partly as 
a strategic measure to secure trade monopoly. 
On the other hand, Drucker is overdoing his point with the confusing and misleading 
remarks that there was ‘no such thing’ as skill, and that Taylor was ‘the first to apply 
knowledge to work’. Taylor did not reject some ‘illusion of skill’ – his project was to 
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acquire knowledge from the workers and ‘systematize’ this knowledge. Craft skills 
are based on the form of knowledge characterized as ‘experience’ in this thesis – 
although it also includes inheritance or tradition. 
3.3.2.3. The social environment of organisations – market economy 
A third foundation for rationalization and rules, emphasized both by Marx and Weber, 
is the market economy, which both presumes and nurtures rule-governed behaviour. 
Weber argues that the expansion of market and the availability or free labour 
constitutes a necessary foundation for rational calculation: “En eksakt kalkulation, som er 
grundlaget for alt andet, er netop kun mulig på basis af frit arbejde” (Weber 1995)39. Lukács and 
critical theory emphasize the fundamental role of the exchange relation and the ‘rates 
of equivalence’ (or ‘exchange value’) in providing the numerical values necessary for 
calculation. 
Deceptive rates of equivalence 
This argument deserves some elaboration. In Adorno’s theory, the role of the 
‘equivalence’ – exchange – is central. This in itself is not unconventional, and 
economists generally agree on the importance of ‘rates of equivalence’. The difference 
is that Adorno regards the ‘artificial’ equivalences between incommensurable objects 
and negligence of individual differences as problematic, and thus as a deceptive 
foundation for ‘modern’ societies, whereas a liberal economist such as von Hayek 
regards the ‘rates of equivalence’ as a ‘harmless’ necessity. Hayek argues that 
capitalist economy, based on a ‘bounded’ rationality within capitalist enterprises, as an 
alternative to large-scale plan economy, provides a necessary and convenient 
‘reduction of complexity’ (without using that concept, however): 
"Even the single controlling mind, in possession of all the data for some 
small, self-contained economic system, would not - every time some small 
adjustment in the allocation of resources had to be made - go explicitly 
through all the relations between ends and means which might possibly be 
affected. It is indeed the great contribution of the pure logic of choice that it 
has demonstrated conclusively that even such a single mind could solve this 
kind of problem only by constructing and constantly using rates of equivalence 
(or 'values', or 'marginal rates of substitution'), i.e., by attaching to each kind 
of scarce resource a numerical index which cannot be derived from any 
property possessed by that particular thing, but which reflects, or in which is 
condensed, its significance in view of the whole means-end structure." (Hayek 
1986) (my italicisation) 
                                                     
39 “An exact calculation, which is the precondition for everything else, is only possible on the 
basis of free labour.” 
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The root of the disagreement goes back to Marx’ ‘labour theory of value’: Marx 
argued that the exchange relation was a mystification, and that it disguised the true 
source of value. According to Marx, all value is in fact created by labour, and 
capitalist profits are basically ‘stolen’ from the workers. Non-Marxist economic theory 
regards Marx’ theory of value as refuted: their basic argument being that any objective 
theory of value is an illusion. 
This raises a number of problems: if one accepts the critique against the labour theory 
of value raised by economic theory, how much damage will this do to Adorno’s 
theory? Must his critique of the ‘equivalence’ be rejected, because it is falsified? Does 
Adorno’s argument depend on the full validity of the ‘labour theory of value’? Not 
necessarily. I think that Lukács or Adorno accept that ‘the labour theory of value’ is 
problematic in its original form. Yet they argue that Marx was struggling with a 
relevant problem: how to establish a law of the whole, and how to identify the origin 
of values; while current economic theory have chosen to ignore this problem by 
focusing on individual capitalist subjects. 
Rationalization in the detail – irrationality of the whole 
Lukács, who integrated Marx’ and Weber’s theory and strongly influenced critical 
theory, argues that capitalism is based on thorough rationalization in the detail (inside 
the capitalist enterprise), and relative irrationality in the ‘whole’: the environment of 
the organisation, the market as the ‘unintended’ product of subjective capitalist 
activity40. This relative irrationality of the whole deserves further explanation. On the 
one hand, the market must be stable enough to allow for calculative estimation of 
profits. On the other hand, this calculation can only be based on probabilities. If there 
is an exact law of the whole – which there is, according to Lukács – then this law by 
definition must be ‘concealed’, it cannot be revealed to any of the capitalist 
‘entrepreneurs’: if any single capitalist knew the ‘law of the whole’, then he would 
gain monopoly, and the market regulation would break down: 
“es ist ja klar, dass der ganze Aufbau der kapitalistischen Produktion auf 
dieser Wechselwirkung von streng gesetzlicher Notwendigkeit in allen 
Einzelerscheinungen und vor relativer Irrationalität des Gesamtprozesses 
beruht... Denn die kapitalistische, auf privatwirtschaftlicher Kalkulation 
beruhende Rationalisierung erfordert in jeder Lebensäußerung dieses 
Wechselverhältnis von gesetzmäßigem Detail und zufälligem Ganzen; sie setzt 
einen solchen Aufbau der Gesellschaft voraus; sie produziert und 
reproduziert diese Struktur in dem Masse, als sie sich der Gesellschaft 
                                                     
40 Observe that Lukács’ theory is based on a fundamental distinction between organization and 
environment/market quite similar to the market/hierarchy distinction characteristic of the 
transaction cost school in economic theory. 
  92
bemächtigt. Dies liegt schon im Wesen der spekulativen Kalkulation, der 
Wirtschaftsweise der Warenbesitzer auf der Stufe der Allgemeinheit des 
Warenaustausches begründet. Die Konkurrenz der verschiedenen 
Warenbesitzer wäre unmöglich, wenn der Rationalität der 
Einzelerscheinungen auch eine genaue, rationelle, gesetzmäßig 
funktionierende Gestalt der ganzen Gesellschaft entsprechen würde. Die 
Gesetzmäßigkeiten aller Einzelheiten seiner Produktion müssen vom 
Warenbesitzer vollständig beherrscht sein, wenn eine rationelle Kalkulation 
möglich werden soll. Die Chancen der Verwertung, die Gesetze des 
’Marktes’ müssen zwar ebenfalls rationell im Sinne einer Berechenbarkeit, 
einer Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung sein. Sie dürfen aber nicht in demselben 
Sinn wie die Einzelerscheinungen von einem ’Gesetze’ beherrscht, sie dürfen 
unter keinen Umständen rationell durchorganisiert sein. Dies allein schließt 
freilich keineswegs das Herrschen eines ’Gesetzes’ für das Ganze aus. Nur 
müsste dieses ‘Gesetz’ einerseits das ‘unbewusste’ Produkt der selbständigen 
Tätigkeit der voneinander unabhängigen einzelnen Warenbesitzer sein, also ein 
Gesetz der aufeinander wirkenden ’Zufälligkeiten’ und nicht das der wirklich 
rationellen Organisation. Andererseits muss aber diese Gesetzmäßigkeit sich 
nicht nur über die Köpfe der Einzelnen hinweg durchsetzen, sondern sie darf 
auch niemals vollständig und adäquat erkennbar sein. Denn die vollständige 
Erkenntnis des Ganzen würde dem Subjekt dieser Kenntnis eine derartige 
Monopolstellung sichern, die gleichbedeutend mit der Aufhebung der 
kapitalistischen Wirtschaft wäre.” (Lukács 1970) (my italicisation) 
The basic argument is that the ‘values’ of capitalist calculation and exchange are not 
just helpful ‘approximations’, but that the law of the whole is concealed by necessity. 
Not by evil conspiracy, but due to the inherent logic of the market. Deception is the 
nature of the market. Economists seem to find this argumentation peculiar, and it 
might be criticized for assuming a ‘concealed order behind appearances’ – an 
assumption merely based on airy postulates that can be neither verified nor falsified. 
Nevertheless the thesis corresponds to the classical liberal argument about the 
‘invisible hand’ (Adam Smith) that transforms ‘private vice’ into ‘public virtue’. 
By the emphasis on the organisation’s relation to the whole, to totality, Adorno’s 
approach to organisations has a good deal in common with functionalistic approaches 
(Parsons) and systems theory (Luhmann). To pick up on a previous discussion, 
Adorno regards society as a whole as ‘system’, but a system without reason: 
“For Adorno modern societies tend to be closed systems. And a system has, 
as the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann today says, ‘no reason’ (keine 
Vernunft). In this respect Adorno’s analysis of modern society comes close to 
coherence with functionalistic approaches and systems theory. However, just 
that loss of reason which sociologists like Parsons or Luhmann would 
describe in a ‘neutral’, eventually affirmative way, becomes for Adorno the 
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object of a critique of ‘the system’ as an ‘administered world’ (verwaltete 
Welt).” (Brunkhorst 1999)41  
Insufficient vs. bounded rationality 
Despite all his critique of rationality, Adorno sees the fundamental problem of late 
capitalism not as too much, but too little rationality: bourgeois society suffers from 
insufficient rationality – a critique that implies an ideal of plan economy. It is a 
fundamental Marxist argument that capitalist rationality is limited and insufficient 
(‘borniert’), because it is constrained to the single capitalist enterprise – perhaps 
enhanced to trusts, monopolies etc. – but incapable of society as a whole. This 
irrationality or boundedness is structural, derived from social structures rather than 
‘human nature’ or ‘behavioural characteristics’. This of course does not mean that 
capitalist enterprises are rational, while society as a whole is irrational – the ‘local’ 
rationality of capitalist enterprises is so to speak ‘infected’ by the irrationality of the 
whole.  
Adorno’s critique of ‘insufficient rationality’ can be contrasted with from the concepts 
of ‘bounded rationality’, fallibility etc. emphasized by neo-institutionalists (see later) 
and others. As argued previously, the liberal economist Hayek defends the capitalist 
model against the socialist ideal of a fully planned economy, which would depend on 
an illusory ideal of a single omniscient individual. The capitalist rational planner, 
however, does not need detailed information about ‘external processes’, but can 
instead base his calculations on the filtered, ‘satisficing’ information of market prices 
(Hayek 1986). Basically, the fallibility and limited capacity of the (single) human 
mind is offered as a defence and legitimisation of the market system42, and Hayek 
defends the barter principle as a merciful veil over relations and connections that the 
individual reason cannot possibly apprehend. While Adorno’s and Lukács’ critique of 
capitalism is based on the ideal of a rational ‘whole’, liberal thinkers regard this idea 
as both illusory and totalitarian. 
                                                     
41 See also (Breuer 1987). 
42 “the doctrine of fallibility has been made the basis of a theory of political freedom,” Popper 
says, referring to (Hayek 2001), (Popper 1963). Hayek is one example of a liberal defence 
against the socialist idea of a rational planning of society. Also Polanyi’s elaborate emphasis 
on tacit knowledge was partly motivated as an argument against societal, top-down planning 
(by the State) of research –according to Polanyi decisions concerning research policy should be 
left to the superior judgment by researchers based on their tacit knowledge (Kragh & Pedersen 
1991). 
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Organisational purpose suffocating in instrumental rationality 
Adorno’s critique of the irrational whole is not restricted to capitalist enterprises. He 
raises a similar critique against ‘organisations’ in general, apparently referring to 
public institutions. Whereas organisations are ‘designed’ as instruments for a purpose, 
and thus based on a separation between means and ends, they tend to forget their 
fundamental purpose in society – their function in the whole – and regard themselves as 
‘ends in themselves’. There is a tendency to focus on operational ends while forgetting 
the long-term goals of the organisation, to use another and more contemporary 
terminology. Organisations are on the one hand expanding, imperialist and totalitarian, 
as also emphasized in Habermas’ thesis of the colonisation of the Lifeworld, and on 
the other hand exclusive: 
"Dieser Expansionsdrang jedoch verläuft bis heute einzig in der Bahn des 
Funktionierens. Immer neue Sektoren werden in den Mechanismus 
hineingezogen und beherrschbar. Die Organisation, die, was immer ihr 
erreichbar ist, verschlingt, verfolgt dabei technische Vereinheitlichung, wohl 
auch die eigene Macht. Kaum jedoch erwägt sie den Sinn ihres Daseins und 
seiner Erweiterung im gesellschaftlichen Ganzen. Die Trennung von 
Werkzeug und Ziel, die das Organisationsprinzip ursprünglich definiert, 
gefährdet mehr als je in der modernen Gesellschaft das Verhältnis der 
Organisation zu ihrem Rechtsgrund. Losgelöst vom Zweck außerhalb ihrer 
selbst wird sie zum Selbstzweck. Je weiter sie zur Totalität fortgetrieben 
wird, um so mehr befestigt sich der Schein, sie, das System der Werkzeuge, 
sei die Sache selbst. Sie dichtet sich ab gegen das, was ihr nicht gleich." 
(Adorno 1979a)  
One may say that Adorno thus emphasizes the pathology of a bounded, insufficient 
rationality. 
Again, the reference to the whole is crucial, and he does not criticize organisations as 
such. In fact, this speech was provocative in its particular historical context, because 
Adorno countered a general tendency among critical thinkers to worry about the effect 
of expanding organisations: in accordance with the critique against insufficient 
rationality, Adorno maintains that organisation and rationalization in principle is a 
progress. 
3.4. March and new institutionalism–bureaucracy as fossilization and 
inertia 
The theories of rationalisation will now be contrasted with new institutionalism, which 
is strongly influenced by March (in cooperation with Olsen), and which offers a 
different definition and explanation of the same phenomenon: ‘reified’ behaviour in 
organisations. Before presenting their alternative explanation, which emphasizes 1) 
experiential learning and a tendency to 2) imitation and isomorphism, I shall discuss a 
few selected aspects of this traditions. 
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3.4.1.1. Socialisation and routines – organisational vs. individual action 
Theories of organisational routines draw a clear distinction between organisational and 
individual action (Argyris & Schön 1996). Routines thus restrict opportunistic 
individual behaviour (March et al. 2000), and guarantee organisational stability when 
individual members leave or enter the organisation:  
“Routines are independent of the individual actors who execute them and are 
capable of surviving considerable turnover in individual actors." (Levitt & 
March 1988) 
Powell & DiMaggio emphasize that organisations are not a product of choices made 
by individuals: ‘new institutionalism’ is based on a rejection of ‘behavioralism’ ”which 
interpreted collective political and economic behavior as the aggregate consequence of individual 
choice” and regarded  “institutions as epiphenomenal, merely the sum of individual-level 
properties”. Weber’s ‘methodological individualism’ is rejected in favour of 
Durkheim’s faits sociaux: routines and institutions seem to describe the very 
‘collective’ behaviour that Weber banned as illusory43.  
In fact, new institutionalists emphasize a very strong degree of socialization of 
individuals, regarding “actors as themselves constituted by institutions” (Powell & Dimaggio 
1991), or thoroughly ’over-socialized’ as argued by Thomsen in his critique of March 
& Olsen’s Rediscovering Institutions:  
“March & Olsen afviser at analysere den institutionelle virkelighed på et 
metodisk individualistisk grundlag, og afviser også blankt at behandle 
præferencer og interesser som eksogene størrelser… [D]et [er] 
magtpålæggende for March & Olsen at ophæve ethvert skel imellem 
institutioner og de hermed sammenhørende individer og aktører... Næppe 
overraskende bliver slutresultatet, at de politiske aktører ikke alene er sociale 
væsner, men oversocialiserede helt ned til sokkeholderne.” (Thomsen 1994)44  
                                                     
43 This may illustrate that they exaggerate their critique of Weber – whose discussion of the 
‘iron cage’ (Weber 1995) is not based on the idea of ‘collective behaviour’ as the ‘aggregate 
consequence of individual choice’. March & Olsen might agree on one of Weber’s argument 
for ‘methodological individualism’: he wants to avoid referring to ‘collective actors or 
subjects’, i.e. treating a class or a people (or an organisation?) as an intentional acting subject. 
Nor does March & Olsen’s ‘collectivism’ treat their institutions as ‘collective subjects’. 
44 “March & Olsen refuse to analyse institutional reality on a methodologically individualist 
basis, and they also refuse to treat preferences and interests as exogenous phenomena… It is 
essential to March & Olsen to remove any distinction between institutions and associated 
individuals and agents… It is hardly surprising that political agents end up being not merely 
social, but thoroughly over-socialised.” 
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The implication of this strong degree of socialisation may be illustrated by comparing 
with an older text by March & Olsen. They appear to have changed their focus away 
from the individual, to a stronger emphasis on social structure. In their earlier work on 
ambiguity they thus emphasized the distinction between individual and organisation 
(‘any complex social structure’), defined as a distinction – or ‘weakening of the 
connection’ – between individual behaviour within the organisation and individual 
beliefs and preferences: 
"Any complex social structure has considerable capability for weakening the 
connection between individual behavior and individual beliefs and 
preferences… People attend to decisions not only because they have an 
interest at stake, but because they are expected to or obliged to. They act 
according to rules." (March & Olsen 1976a)  
The individual may think as it pleases, but is obliged to act according to organisational 
rules and roles. This is a fairly mild degree of socialization: even though the 
organisation and its routines determine individual behaviour – and thus is more than 
an epiphenomenon – individuals are still regarded as separate entities with their own 
minds. Individuals are only socialized in terms of behaviour rather than thoughts, thus 
not by commitment to organisational goals or by incorporation of scripts and routines. 
Since this argument, March & Olsen – and neo-institutionalism in general – have 
clearly strengthened their emphasis on socialization by no longer recognizing the 
distinction between individual and organisation. 
Compared with Adorno – differs in degree, form and scope  
Obviously, this emphasis on socialisation can be compared with Adorno’s emphasis 
on reification: he would agree in the sense that the individual is always largely a 
product of social structure. Adorno also argues that organisational members and social 
relations between them are mediated through and thus secondary to organisational 
purpose, and that organisational actions should be understood in terms of formal 
procedures rather than personal judgment. Adorno and new institutionalism thus agree 
against alternative theories that regard organisational action as a product of individual 
or collective decisions.  
At this point, by the way, it is worth emphasizing a distinction between different 
strands of social constructivism. One may thus draw two very different implications 
from the refusal to distinguish between individual and institution: 1) the ‘humanist’ 
approach concludes that there is neither alienation nor reification, that institutions are 
the living manifestation of their members and can be regarded as a collective subject 
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or community – as in the theory of communities-of-practice45; 2) while the ‘anti-
humanist’ emphasize that individuals are fully subsumed under social structure.  
“Socialkonstruktivismen udgør således ikke en teori, men den rummer et 
stort antal indbyrdes modstridende teoretiske indfaldsvinkler. Spaltningen 
mellem aktør og struktur er også synlig inden for socialkonstruktivismen: 
Michel Foucaults og Niklas Luhmann’s ’antihumanisme’ lader sig således 
ikke så let forene med de aktør- og handlingsteoretiske retninger, som 
emanerer fra den anglo-amerikanske ’interpretative’ sociologi.” (Järvinen & 
Bertilsson 1998)46 
It seems to me that March rather belongs to the latter category – despite Powell’s 
attempt to emphasize the ‘humanizing’ aspects. 
Despite the similarities between new institutionalism and Adorno’s theory of 
reification, a number of differences between the two positions must be emphasized. 
First, they differ in what could be called the degree of socialisation, as illustrated in 
Adorno’s critique of Parson’s assumption of a ‘perfect fit’ between sociology and 
psychology, between the individual and the social level (Adorno 1979e) – as 
illustrated in Parson’s suggestion that the super-ego represents social structure: 
"From the psychological point of view, institutionalized roles seem to have 
two primary functions. The first is the structuring of the reality situation for 
action of the individual... Second, they structure the 'superego content' for 
the individual." (Parsons 1950) 
                                                     
45 "Learners do not receive or even construct abstract, 'objective,' individual knowledge; rather, 
they learn to function in a community... They acquire that particular community's subjective 
viewpoint and learn to speak its language." (Brown & Duguid 1996). It may seem paradoxical 
that Garfinkel’s critique of Parsons’ view of the individual as a ‘cultural dope’ has led to the 
ethnomethodological and social constructivist dissolution of the individual – perhaps neo-
institutionalism is the unintended (and unwelcome) conclusion to social constructivism? 
Compare also Elkjær’s critique (of Lave & Wenger): “I find that Lave and Wenger focus too 
much on context and too little on individual experience. I simply find it hard to envision an 
interactional context that somehow is not based on the actions, interactions, experiences, 
emotions and thoughts of individuals - but socially shaped and shaping individuals... I believe 
that within the LPP framework the conceptual distinction between learning and practice and 
between the individual and the organization has 'dissolved'." (Elkjær 1999) 
46 “Social construction is thus not one theory, but denotes a large number of mutually 
conflicting theoretical perspectives. The split between agent and structure can be observed 
within social constructivism, too: the ‘anti-humanism’ of Michel Foucault and Niklas Luhmann 
is not easily reconciled with the agent- and action-theoretical schools emanating from Anglo-
American ‘interpretive’ sociology.” 
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Although Adorno obviously shares Parsons’ interest in the connections between 
psychology and sociology, he does not accept the full functionalist description of the 
modern society as a well-oiled clockwork. The individual can never merely be a 
‘social product’ (or ‘cultural dope’) – there will always be a ‘core’ of individuality and 
uniqueness, which is more or less suppressed or subsumed by social structure. Adorno 
criticizes theories emphasizing ‘full’ socialisation – eliminating the distinction 
between individual and institution – as neglecting the inherent conflicts and 
contradictions in modern society. By focusing on order, social theory maintains an 
affirmative approach to its object – thus, explanation turns ideological. 
Second, Adorno and new institutionalism seem to assume different forms of 
socialisation, the latter emphasizing ‘logic of appropriateness’ and a psychological 
disposition for ‘routines’ of any kind – an argument that I shall return to shortly. 
Third, they obviously differ in scope: new institutionalism focusing on ‘isolated’ 
institutions, whereas Adorno emphasizes totality – this difference, too, will be 
elaborated below. 
3.4.1.2. Routines – a restriction to rationality 
Despite March et al’s recognition of the virtues of routines and institutions (see p.86), 
these are basically regarded as restrictions to rationality, even irrational. This 
definition corresponds to the common sense connotations of the word ‘bureaucracy’: 
ridicule, awkward, rigid, fossilization – void of the rationality imagined by Weber. In 
this perspective, repeating existing procedures means avoiding considering 
alternatives, and “institutionalisation constrains organizational rationality” (Powell & 
Dimaggio 1991). Cohen & Bacdayan argue that "the concept of routine has been applied to 
mop up the 'residuals' of rationality" (Cohen & Bacdayan 1996)47.  
There appears to a fundamental methodological focus on irrationality, which is 
illustrated by March & Olsen’s earlier writings on ambiguity. They set out to explain 
the apparent mismatch between theoretical models of decision-making and 
organisational practice as observed in empirical studies and practical experience. In 
this case, ambiguity is basically defined, by March & Olsen, as a limitation (boundary) 
on rationality – as an explanation of the apparent ‘pathological’ irrationality of 
organisational decision-making, as compared with the ideal:  
                                                     
47 Yet Powell & DiMaggio refer Simon for arguing that habits (routines) are not simply 
irrational, but have the function of reducing complexity: “We learned from Simon’s … early 
work that habit must not be seen as a purely passive element in behavior, but rather as a means 
by which attention is directed to selected aspects of a situation, to the exclusion of competing 
aspects that might turn choice in another direction.” (Powell & Dimaggio 1991) 
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"Organizational choice often involves a curious paradox. The process is both 
surprising and not surprising. It is familiar to ordinary experiences; it is 
puzzling for many interpretations of that experience. Very few reports of 
organizational decision-making strike experienced participants in 
organizations as unusual. At the same time, many common observations 
about organizations are pathological from the point of view of theories of 
organizations. What is mundane to experience frequently becomes 
unexplained variance in the theories. What is standard in the interpretation of 
organizations frequently becomes irrelevant to experience… Despite their 
familiarity, the observations are theoretically curious. They appear to be 
partly inconsistent with several fundamental ideas implicit in ordinary 
conversations about organizations and decisions in them, as well as several 
conventional, and highly useful, theoretical treatments of organizations; 
rational models of individual choice, micro-economic theory, social welfare 
theory, interest group theories of politics and bureaucracy, theories of power, 
democratic theories of politics, theories of negotiation and bargaining, 
theories of planning, management theory." (March & Olsen 1976a) 
I find this citation illustrative, because it expresses the approach not only to ambiguity, 
but also to many of those phenomena that have occupied March: signal & symbol, 
routines, experiential learning, and bounded rationality. The citation says explicitly, 
what elsewhere remains implicit in similar studies: the researcher is almost ‘obsessed’ 
with irrationality, and hence rationality remains a point of measure for other types of 
‘information processing’ and is essential in identifying those phenomena. 
One may here compare Adorno’s remark that the institutions observed by Durkheim – 
often regarded as the sociological ancestor of new institutionalism – are primarily 
characterized by their irrationality. 
“Bei Durkheim … wird zum eigentlich Sozialen und von der Psychologie 
Abgegrenzten gerade die Irrationalität der spezifischen faits sociaux, das, 
was ihre Übersetzung in subjektives Denken, schließlich auch ihre 
vernünftigemässe Zueignung verwehrt. An den Phänomenen, auf die seine 
Aufmerksamkeit sich konzentriert, etwa der Konstanz der Selbstmordziffern 
über gewisse Perioden hin, haftet ein eigentümlich Blindes, Opakes, insofern 
'Irrationales'." (Adorno 1979d) 
One may say that this emphasis on irrationality corresponds to the duality between the 
two elements of ‘critique of ideology’, as evident in Lukes’ argument: in face of an 
phenomenon without apparent reason, an alien (or alienated) phenomenon – 
‘irrational’ beliefs included – one proceeds to explain the phenomenon (see p.49). 
3.4.1.3. Overcoming the descriptive attitude: a psychological explanation 
New Institutionalists argue that their own approach constitutes an improvement 
compared with the old institutionalism, namely by offering a theoretical explanation – 
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based on behavioural assumptions (a psychological or micro-sociological 
explanation).  
”Ifølge Williamson selv er ambitionen i den nye skole, og det der adskiller 
den fra den ’gamle’, at etablere en økonomisk teori, der ikke kun har 
eksistensen af institutioner indbygget, men også en teori der, baseret på 
veldefinerede adfærdsantagelser, kan forklare institutionernes dannelse, 
udvikling og evt. afvikling. Nyinstitutionalisterne er således ikke ateoretiske 
som dele af den gamle institutionelle skole og den tyske historiske skole.” 
(Thomsen 1994)48 
The descriptive attitude of the old institutionalism was regarded as unsatisfactory. This 
problem refers to a classical dilemma between theoretical-explanatory and historical-
empirical-descriptive approaches characteristic of many social (and historical) 
sciences. Thus, within the new science of economy of the late 19th century there was a 
conflict between those who build abstract theoretical models – the so-called classical 
economy, and the empirically oriented institutional economy (Boserup 1976;Weber 
1904). The institutional economists, i.e. the American Veblen, and the Germans 
Menger and to some extent Weber, criticized the classical economists of idealism and 
inattentiveness to empirical reality, a critique today repeated by new institutional 
economists (including evolutionary economy etc.) against neo-classical ditto. On the 
other hand, the institutional economists were criticized of lack of theoretical 
explanations. 
Factuality as mystification 
Before looking at the claimed theoretical improvement offered by new 
institutionalism, I shall shortly elaborate on another problem associated with the 
‘descriptive attitude’, a problem illustrated in Durkheim’s concept of ‘faits sociaux’ 
(social facts) (Durkheim 1972). It may seem a curious example, as the French 
sociologist does not really belong to the ‘classical institutionalism’, yet he did argue 
that institutions be described as ‘facts’, and he is a stronger inspiration to the new 
institutionalism than Weber and his methodological individualism (Thomsen 1994). 
Adorno argues against Durkheim that the wish to demonstrate the regularity in human 
behaviour, and to approach these institutions as facts, does in itself constitute a 
mystification and ‘enchantment’ of the social: 
                                                     
48 “According to Williamson, the ambition of the new school, and what distinguishes it from 
the ‘old’ one, is to establish an economic theory that not merely incorporates the existence of 
institutions, but also a theory that – based on well-defined behavioural assumptions – should 
explain the genesis, development and possible demise of institutions. New institutionalists are 
thus not atheoretical as parts of the old institutional school and the German historical school.” 
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"Der Kollektivgeist musste ihm, wider Hegel, zum fait social, zu 
tatsächlichem Geist werden, zu einem Subjekt sui generis... Paradox hat er 
ihn dadurch verdinglicht und jener magischen Ansicht sich selbst 
angenähert, deren Studium in seinen Schriften mehr und mehr dominiert". 
"[Webers] Soziologie war darin aufgeklärter als die positivistische 
Durkheims, dass sie methodisch wie inhaltlich die Entzauberung der Welt 
bezeugte, während Durkheim und seine Schule mit den Mitteln einer nach 
ihrem Telos zurechtgestutzten Tatsachenforschung am Zauber wiederholend 
mitweben." (Adorno 1979d)  
Factuality as ideology 
Analysis stops short after having detected regularity, and by labelling it as a fact any 
considerations as to its genesis are cancelled out. Adorno further argues that this 
factuality – and ‘irrationality’ – by Durkheim is turned into an affirmative and 
ideological argument. Durkheim’s theory of a ‘collective soul’ as the cohesive force 
across the division of labour in society is an obvious example. Adorno also refers an 
early Durkheim for the deliberate intention of saving younger generations from radical 
and rebellious thoughts by demonstrating the objective reality and inevitability of 
‘social facts’: 
“Wieder muß der Professor der Philosophie ihnen (den Menschen) 
begreiflich machen, daß die psychischen und sozialen Phänomene Tatsachen 
sind wie andren auch, Gesetzen unterworfen, daβ der menschliche Wille sie 
nicht nach Belieben stören kann und daβ folglich Revolutionen im strengen 
Sinn ebenso unmöglich sind wie Wunder.” cited in (Adorno 1979d) 
One may say that Durkheim thus makes what the positivist philosophers Moore and 
Hare characterized as a naturalistic fallacy: converting a statement about facts into a 
moral judgment (so to speak looking for ‘moral facts’).  
3.4.2. Two sources of organisational routines 
Two elements of the theoretical improvement of the new institutionalism – compared 
to the old – and of this theory’s distinction from a Weberian theory of rationalization 
and modernity will be emphasized. The first element is a micro-sociological or 
psychological explanation based on ‘behavioural assumptions’ regarding 
organisational actors – individuals – as ‘less than rational’, in some cases even arguing 
that the very concept of rationality is irrelevant. To some extent, this argument regards 
(‘disenchanted’) experiential learning, or logic of appropriateness, to be the most 
dominant mode of action in organisations. This element explains how reification, or 
bureaucratisation defined as increasingly routine-based behaviour, is produced ‘from 
within’ (the individual organisation) or ‘bottom-up’. The second element balances the 
narrow-eyed ‘local’ focus of the first by explaining why organisations are increasingly 
similar – how they ‘learn’ from others by mere imitation rather than efficient 
adaptation: 
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"bureaucratization and other forms of organizational change occur as the 
result of processes that make organizations more similar without necessarily 
making them more efficient." (Powell & DiMaggio)49 
This element requires an ontological step beyond the individual organisation, 
emphasizing organisational fields or institutions; yet the ambitions do not reach as ‘far’ 
society as a whole, such as critical theory – on the contrary, such ambitious ‘holistic’ 
theories are rejected by neo-institutionalists for not acknowledging the limitations of 
the human mind. 
3.4.2.1. Psychological explanation: irrational slaves of habits 
Basically, neo-institutionalists offer the micro-sociological or psychological 
assumptions presented in the previous chapter as explanation of institutions and 
routines: that routine behaviour is based in human psychology, and that logic of 
appropriateness or experiential learning is the more dominant mode of knowledge. 
Before I elaborate on these argument, I shall emphasize that at this point, new 
institutionalism thus differs from theories of modernization that emphasize 
rationalization as a radical break with traditional forms of knowledge. 
Routines – a psychological concept 
Neo-institutionalists argue that the tendency of organisational behaviour to be based 
on routines (or rules) reflect a fundamental psychological predisposition for routine 
behaviour (in private life). This also explains why individuals are easily socialised into 
organisational routines. Individuals are not driven by goals; they do not calculate 
                                                     
49 This distinction between two elements may seem misleading. On the one hand the distinction 
between external and internal factors seems reasonable. On the other hand, it is – within this 
tradition – mainly a question of applying the same mode of explanation/analysis at different 
levels: namely how a particular social system or field ’freezes over’, or institutionalises into a 
fixed pattern. The first ’element’ focuses at institutionalisation within an organization (caution: 
some argue a fundamental difference between organization and institution, apparently implying 
that institutionalisation is generally external to the organization). The second ’element’ focuses 
on institutionalisation at a higher level, a broader social system, i.e. an ’organizational field’ 
(Dimaggio & Powell 1991). It seems that March himself has shifted the emphasis away from 
the individual organization, to larger fields. Thus, Levitt & March distance themselves from 
March & Olsen’s earlier work on organizational learning under ambiguity (Levitt & March 
1988), presumably after having subsequently developed ideas about institutions (March & 
Olsen 1989). "In particular, both the emphasis on routines and the emphasis on ecologies of 
learning distinguish the present formulation from treatments that deal primarily with individual 
learning within single organizations (Argyris & Schön, 1978; March & Olsen, 1975) and place 
this paper closer to the traditions of behavioural theories of organizational decision making 
(House & Singh, 1987; Winter, 1986), and to population level theories of organizational 
change (Astley, 1985; Carroll, 1984)." (Levitt & March 1988) 
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various means to achieve some premeditated, value-based purpose, but act according 
to scripts etc: 
"the neoinstitutionalist rejection of intentionality is founded on an alternative 
theory of individual action, which stresses the unreflective, routine, taken-
for-granted nature of most human behavior and views interests and actors as 
themselves constituted by institutions." (Powell & Dimaggio 1991) 
This psychological explanation obviously differs from the argument that 
organisational procedures have been rationally adapted to an environment 
characterised by rules. 
The very concept of routines, applied by March since his first writings with Herbert 
Simon, seems to illustrate the (information) psychological explanation. This concept is 
very broad and spans phenomena that are often treated separately. As already 
emphasized, the concept of routines covers both psychological and organisational 
phenomena, a ‘confusion’ or integration of different ontological levels that others 
would find controversial and problematic. For comparison, Cohen prefers different 
concepts although he makes a similar psychological explanation when arguing that 
routines (defined as a purely organisational phenomenon) reflect individual skills or 
‘procedural memory’ (Cohen & Bacdayan 1996)50. 
March’ concept of routines also spans distinctions at another dimension, because it 
includes both informal and formal routines. Others may prefer more distinct concepts 
based on the argument that the dynamics of informal routines differs significantly 
from that of formal routines. Simply using the concept of routines makes it difficult to 
maintain and respect that distinction. One may again compare with Cohen, who 
reserves the concept of routines for informal phenomena, which are them 
distinguished from formal procedures. (Others again may distinguish between rules 
and routines). 
My purpose with this short discussion was not to scorn March or others for impure 
definitions of concepts, but to illustrate the implications of their psychological 
definition, and to prepare the reader for the difficulties in comparing different 
                                                     
50 "The properties of organizational routines arise from the way individuals store and enact 
their parts in those routines. As individuals become skilled in their portions of a routine the 
actions become stored as procedural memories and can later be triggered as substantial chunks 
of behavior. The routine of a group can be viewed as the concatenation of such procedurally 
stored actions, each primed by and priming the actions of others" (Cohen & Bacdayan 1996). 
Cohen also refers information psychologists – Stinchcombe – for arguing that organizational 
routines arise from individual skills. He also says that organisational routines enter into 
individual procedural memory  
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theoretical traditions. While theories of rationalisation focus on (the extension and 
refinement of) formal procedures as characteristic of modernity, March seem to regard 
these merely as a special case of a more fundamental category of routines. 
Experience and bounded rationality 
Generally, inertia seems to be the basic explanation for new institutionalist, as in 
related theoretical traditions, such as evolutionary economy. Nevertheless, as evident 
from the previous discussion of experiential learning, new institutionalists do not 
simply regard people (and organisations) as subsumed to routines. Routines can be 
changed and modified, and new routines can be incorporated. Yet they argue that this 
process of change or learning differs fundamentally from the ideal of rational choice.  
Again it is worth emphasizing a difference between different ‘interpretations’ of new 
institutionalism. Powell thus seems to argue a more radical break with the rationalist 
(intentionalist) theory of action) when emphasizing the ‘shift in theoretical focus’ 
“from discursive to practical reason” (Powell & Dimaggio 1991) and referring to more 
philosophical literature such as Bourdieu and phenomenology for inspiration, whereas 
March explicitly preserves the ‘ideal’ of rational action (‘rational choice’ or ‘logic of 
consequentiality’). This ideal has survived both with his early definition of bounded 
rationality and his more recent emphasis on logic of appropriateness. 
To start with the latter, March preserves the concept of rationality by emphasizing the 
view of organisational participants as ‘intendedly rational’ “problem solvers and decision 
makers”51 and seems to recognize it as a possible – however rare – strategy. Although 
logic of appropriateness may be the dominant mode of knowledge, when routines can 
in principle also result from ‘analysis and choice’ (rationality) - besides political 
processes (bargaining and conflict – reduction of ambiguity), and evolutionary 
processes (Darwinian model) (Levitt & March 1988). 
Obviously, also the classical concept of bounded rationality – which I already 
discussed shortly in relation to Adorno (p. 93) – is closely linked to that of rationality. 
                                                     
51 "the literature is full of attempts to develop the major implications of limitations on the 
awareness of alternatives, on the precision of information about consequences, and on the 
clarity and consistency of goals... There is no longer general acceptance of a model of 
superhuman organizational omniscience in the service of rationality. Instead, there is an 
inclination to accept the proposition that while organizations are intendedly rational, they 
frequently act on incomplete or incorrect information and without being aware of all of their 
alternatives. Similarly, there is no longer general acceptance of a simple view of a well-defined 
organizational preference function. Instead, there is an effort to accomodate in the theory the 
frequent observations of inconsistent and conflicting organizational objectives." (March & 
Olsen 1976b) 
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The concept is difficult to reject, but I also find it worthwhile to point out that it is also 
‘ambiguous’ in the attempt to encompass very different aspects, as evident in Hatch’ 
presentation: 
“1) imperfect and incomplete information; 2) the complexity of problems; 3) 
human information-processing capacity; 4) the time available for decision-
making processes; 5) the conflicting preferences decision makers have for 
organizational goals.” (Hatch 1997)  
While 5) ’conflicting preferences’ refers to ambiguity as the social dimension of 
organisational rationality (an issue that we shall return to in the last section (p. 112)); 
and 4) ‘time available’ corresponds to Gadamer’s emphasis on ‘hastiness in judgment’ 
(and shall play an essential role in the later discussion of media); 2) refer to objective 
characteristics of the environment, and 3) to psychological characteristics of the 
individual. 
The latter emphasis on limited individual capacity was already illustrated in March & 
Simon’s  
"picture of a choosing, decision-making, problem-solving organism that can 
do only one or a few things at a time, and that can attend to only a small part 
of the information recorded in its memory and presented by the 
environment." (March & Simon 1958) 
The argument is compelling, yet it is not obvious that it provides a reason for 
modifying the concept of rationality. First, it is hardly possible to actually specify the 
individual capacity. Second, the alleged limited capacity can be enhanced by modern 
technology. And third, it is hardly relevant to focus on individual capacity, because 
processes of critical rationality as defined in the previous chapter are not merely 
psychological or individual. 
As for the objective aspect, March & Olsen emphasized the complexity of the 
environment as a motivation for modifying idealist theories of decision-making in 
favour of a realistic and less heroic picture of organisational action: 
"We remain in the tradition of viewing organizational participants as 
problem solvers and decision makers. However, we assume that individuals 
find themselves in a more complex, less stable, and less understood world than 
that described by standard theories of organizational choice; they are placed 
in a world over which they often have only modest control. Nevertheless, we 
assume organizational participants will try to understand what is going on, to 
activate themselves and their resources in order to solve their problems and 
move the world in desired directions. These attempts will have a less heroic 
character than assumed in the perfect cycle theories, but they will be real." 
(March & Olsen 1976a) (my italicisation) 
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There is something odd about (part of) the concept of bounded rationality. For 
instance, this boundedness is characterized by ‘imperfect and incomplete information’. 
This definition seems to imply that ‘real’ or ‘unbounded’ rationality only deals with 
perfect and complete information. That is not how rationality has been defined in this 
thesis, or by Habermas or Popper. Rationality does certainly not presume perfect, 
complete, nor ‘full’ information. It is tempting to say that such an ‘absolute’ definition 
only thrives in classical economic theory. It seems that the concept of bounded 
rationality is defined by contrast, and that the ‘contrasting’ concept of rationality 
amounts to a caricature. 
Socialization – by scripts rather than values 
The emphasis on routines, scripts and logic of appropriateness implies a theory 
‘socialization’ that differs from the old institutionalists’ explanations, but probably 
also from Parsons’. The old institutionalists emphasized the value aspect of institutions 
and thus defined socialization as internalisation of organisational values and 
preferences by individuals. In this definition, social action is based on individual 
(subjective) rationality, but the values and goals are given by the system. To new 
institutionalists, however, socialisation is imitation rather than internalisation and 
commitment, and it is not based on values, but on ‘taken-for-granted scripts, rules, and 
classifications’: 
"For the old institutionalists, the salient cognitive forms were values, norms, 
and attitudes. Organizations became institutionalized when they were 
'infused with value,' as ends in themselves… Newcomers to an institution 
underwent 'socialization,' which led to 'internalization' of organizational 
values, experienced as 'commitment.' The new institutionalism departs 
markedly from this essentially moral frame of reference. 'Institutionalization 
is fundamentally a cognitive process' (Zucker 1983). 'Normative obligations 
… enter into social life primarily as facts' that actors must take into account. 
Not norms and values but taken-for-granted scripts, rules, and classifications 
are the stuff of which institutions are made. Rather than concrete 
organizations eliciting affective commitment, institutions are macrolevel 
abstractions, 'rationalized and impersonal prescriptions', shared 'typifications' 
independent of any particular entity to which moral allegiance might be 
owed. Neoinstitutionalists tend to reject socialization theory, with its 
affectively 'hot' imagery of identification and internalization." (Powell & 
Dimaggio 1991) 
There are some parallels between this rejection of values as the deciding factor of 
institutions, and Adorno’s critique of the concept of values in the sociologies of 
Durkheim and Weber. While Powell & DiMaggio seem to criticize the old 
institutionalists for assuming ‘moral’ commitment by organisational members, Adorno 
criticize the concept of value as blindfolding, to a large extent defined as a residual to 
rationality, and by the unwillingness of the researcher to look for further justification. 
Furthermore, the rejection of a ‘hot’ imagery of identification and internalisation is 
  107
compatible with Adorno’s general thesis of ‘the loss of meaning’ as a fundamental 
characteristic of contemporary ‘modern’ society. 
Despite these parallels, however, the new institutionalist solution – to focus on scripts 
and rules instead of values – seems to display problems similar to those criticized by 
Adorno: the very definition is implicitly based on the concept of rationality. I shall 
return to this issue in the discussion below (p.110). 
3.4.2.2. Similarity among organisations – epidemic rather than modern 
The second element of new institutionalism is aimed at explaining a tendency to 
isomorphism among organisations. Organisations – at least those in the same industry, 
such as pharmaceutical companies – tend to be structurally similar, and this 
isomorphism cannot be easily explained by the psychological and local processes 
emphasized in the first element of new institutionalism. The tendency of individual 
organisation to fossilize or ‘freeze over’ as a result of (isolated) internal processes 
does not explain why one organisation resembles another. The first element 
emphasized ‘structuration’ of the organisation as a result of ‘learning from experience’ 
– albeit a very fallible experience – while the second element emphasizes external 
factors 
In the Weberian tradition and critical theory, isomorphism was a logical consequence 
of the level of analysis: the focus is on rationalization and market expansion on 
societal and global levels. Organisational theory has generally retreated from this 
level, focusing instead on individual organisations, and on the variety among 
organisations. In this context, DiMaggio & Powell argue a step back in this 
development by insisting on general isomorphism rather than variety (Dimaggio & 
Powell 1991). They accept Weber’s explanation as historically relevant, as true at the 
time of Weber’s own writings. Today, however, other forces are driving 
bureaucratisation and isomorphism: i.e. imitation and legitimisation rather than 
efficiency and adaptation.  
New institutionalism focuses on ‘irrationality’ at a higher level. They set out to 
explain why similar inefficient solutions are adopted in different organisations: why 
organisations imitate others rather than designing a careful “match between the procedures 
and the adopting organizations” (Levitt & March 1988); why imitation and isomorphism is 
preferred to experimentation and variety.  
Instead of a general theory of bureaucratisation and rationalisation as a general 
tendency, it is suggested that routines or institutions (forms) spread – like a disease – 
among organisations. Organisations tend to imitate others rather than analyse and 
compare alternatives. DiMaggio & Powell suggest three ‘mechanisms of 
isomorphism’: coercive, where organisations are ‘forced’ to adopt certain routines 
(legislation, public regulation – such as the pharmaceutical industry); mimetic, where 
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an organisation imitates another; and normative, i.e. where a professional group spread 
to different organisations and impose their ideals on these. Levitt & March regard 
these processes as simply reflecting well-known epidemiological processes. 
Organizations and institutions 
How does one apply ‘institutional analysis’ to organisations? It is important to 
emphasize that neo-institutionalists (and Durkheim) use the term institution in a very 
broad sense. It simply describes ‘reified social behaviour’: fixed patterns of behaviour 
that cannot be explained at the individual level. It is thus much broader than the 
‘common sense’ meaning of the term, which refers to (public) non-profit organisations 
(i.e. ‘public institutions’) as illustrated by Castells’ definition of institutions as 
“organizations invested with the necessary authority to perform some specific tasks on behalf of 
society as a whole” (Castells 1998). Against this narrow definition, the broader meaning 
discussed here spans very different aspects of rule-like behaviour: rules (laws), norms 
and ‘habits (or tradition)’: 
“not only organizations, but actions, such as voting and shaking hands, can 
be conceptualized as institutions of the societies in which they are repeated 
and given similar meanings. This grounds the definition of institutions in 
repeated actions and shared conceptions of reality.” (Hatch 1997) 
In organisational analysis, there is a complex and ambiguous relation between the 
terms organisation and institution. It is problematic simply to describe an organisation 
as an institution (in this sense)52. One should not apply the sociological concept of 
institution – fait social – to an organisation without considering that the latter at least 
in principle has a larger potential for rationality, for being intentionally designed. For 
all their fallibility and ambiguity, organisational decision processes aim at designing 
or modifying organisational structure in terms of efficiency with respect to 
organisational goals. They are ‘intendedly rational’, and it is methodologically 
problematic to ignore the potential for intentionality. 
                                                     
52 Scott appears to be making a similar point when criticizing most classical institutionalists – 
except Weber – for not making a distinction between organisations and institutions. “Theorists 
in the 1950s and 1960s began to recognize the existence and importance of particular 
collectivities - individual organizations - that were distinguishable from both broader social 
institutions, on the one hand, and the behavior of individuals, on the other… On reexamination, 
we observe much conflation of the concepts of institutions and organizations in the writings of 
Veblen and Commons, Burgess and Willoughby, Durkheim, Cooley, and Hughes. Perhaps 
Weber may be regarded as an exception to this generalization because, in much of his work, he 
was attentive to the effects of broader institutional forces in shaping and supporting differing 
administrative systems. But most of the early theorists folded together their notions of 
organizations and institutions. Only recently have theorists recognized the value of 
differentiating between these concepts" (Scott 1995).  
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Thus, institutionalisation is mostly defined in some complementary relation to 
organisations: i.e. as internal structures or processes that have somehow frozen and 
appear impossible to modify; as ‘constraints to organisational rationality’, or as 
external conditions, i.e. inter-organisational patterns: "Organizational forms, structural 
components, and rules, not specific organizations, are institutionalized" (Powell & Dimaggio 
1991). In the perspective of the organisational decision maker, institutionalization 
comes from the ‘outside’. 
Macro-theories rejected 
New institutionalism applies organisational and institutional theory at a higher level. It 
challenges classical theories of sociology by ‘reducing’ social phenomena to 
organisational (institutional) explanations. Thus, DiMaggio & Powell imply a critique 
of the ‘grand theories’ of sociology: Parsons’ functionalist theory of society, as well as 
Marxist theories describing a society in the hands of rational, interest-seeking elites. 
DiMaggio & Powell argue that these theories assume a will to, and capacity for, 
rational adaptation, which is not confirmed in real-life, down-to-earth organisational 
studies.  
“Despite the findings of organizational research, the image of society as 
consisting of tightly and rationally coupled institutions persists throughout 
much of modern social theory… How can it be that the confused and 
contentious bumblers who populate the pages of organizational case studies 
and theories combine to construct the elaborate well-proportioned social 
edifice that macrotheories describe?” (Dimaggio & Powell 1991) 
Interestingly, this neo-institutional critique against ‘grand theories’ seems to repeat the 
classical conflict between theoretical work and empirical research, including the old 
institutionalist critique against abstract economic theories. Is new institutionalism 
basically a dys-functionalist non-theory? 
“We argue that a theory of institutional isomorphism may help explain the 
observations that organizations are becoming more homogeneous and that 
elites often get their way, while at the same time enabling us to understand 
the irrationality, frustration of power, and the lack of innovation that are so 
commonplace in organizational life.” (Dimaggio & Powell 1991) 
Nevertheless, new institutionalism offers one point of critique against Adorno’s 
approach as presented above (and critical theory in general): If one accepts that 
organisations are prone to ambiguity, mythomania and other forms of irrationality, 
how can one accept the thesis from critical theory and Weberian sociology etc. that 
there is a general tendency to rationalization in Western societies? Critical theory is 
based on the assumption – argument – that there is something ‘worthy’ of critique, as 
illustrated by Lukács’ assumption about a ‘law of the whole’. Adorno’s critique is 
based on a quasi-functional theory of ‘the whole’, and he is closer to Parsons than to 
the ‘Marxist theories of elites’ mentioned by DiMaggio & Powell. As a critique of 
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Adorno, some modification is required, however, because he does not accept the full 
functionalist description of the modern society as a well-oiled clockwork 
3.4.3. Discussion 
In my critique of neo-institutionalism, I shall primarily argue that the psychological 
explanation is problematic, that the neo-institutionalist inevitably base their own 
research on the concept of rationality, and that this paradox results in a problematic 
asymmetry between the social researcher and his object of research. I further argue 
that the fatalist implications are incompatible the actual historical development in 
technology and scientific knowledge. Finally I raise the question whether it is possible 
to maintain a strong theory of socialisation with a narrow focus on institutions instead 
of society as a whole. 
3.4.3.1. From fallibility and bounded rationality to epistemological pessimism 
I find the argument about psychological disposition for inefficient routines and limited 
capacity for ‘information processing’ problematic. It almost implies that people are 
basically lazy, narrow-minded and stupid – if the reader can allow for some 
exaggeration in order to make my point clear. It seems that the recognition of human 
‘fallibility’ – which Popper and others emphasized as essential to liberal freedom – has 
converged towards a form of epistemological pessimism – which he criticized as 
associated with authoritarianism. Perhaps March, Simon and others have started out 
with a concept of fallibility, yet ended up systematizing and refining it into something 
very different. 
3.4.3.2. Implicit methodological commitment to rationality? 
As already argued, neo-institutionalist researchers cannot escape the concept of 
rationality, which is forged into their own methods. If the new institutionalist avoids 
the question of the rationality of the institution, he will not have made his point against 
the ‘rationalist’ researcher. One may recall McIntyre’s argument (p.38) that the 
researcher cannot carry out his analysis without an evaluation of the rationality of the 
institution, of his research ‘object’.  
This is true both for March and Powell, although in different ways. March explicitly 
focuses on sub-optimal processes and routines as the unfortunate product of 
‘intendedly rational’ actors, whereas Powell seems to argue the opposite: people do 
not act rationally, but they still succeed in producing a functional or efficient outcome. 
March deliberately bases his research on the ideal of rationality and preserves the 
‘right’ for the researcher to inquire into the rationality, causality and means-end 
structure of the organisation to be studied; yet Powell also seem to imply rationality as 
a (unwilling) point of measure. 
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First, Powell seems obliged to argue that people do not act rationally, that routines are 
not a result of deliberate premeditation – and he thus remains linked to the concept that 
he claims to reject. Second, he tends to imply that the informal routines developed in 
organisational networks – to offer one example – are functional and adaptive, that they 
are more competitive and ‘liberated’ from the rigid structure of bureaucracy (Powell et 
al. 1996;Powell 1990). But it requires a scientific and rational analysis to determine 
whether it is actually functional rather than dysfunctional. There is no running away 
from the concept of rationality. 
3.4.3.3. Problematic asymmetry 
As a theory of fallible human actors and imperfect institutions new institutionalism is 
compelling and difficult to contradict. This approach avoids grand theories and 
reference to ‘the whole’. Yet as a theory of inevitable reification due to fundamental 
human conservatism and ‘resistance to change’, the theory turns fatalistic. There 
seems to be a problematic asymmetry in the argument. The researcher can see the 
‘inefficiency’ of a particular institution/organisations, the actors involved cannot. Or if 
the ‘inefficiency’ can somehow be explained to the actors, they will apparently still be 
unable to improve. An example of this dilemma would be the researcher involved in a 
case study, in ‘cooperation’ with the case organisation. This situation is illustrative, 
but also an example of a more fundamental relationship between theory and practice, 
as required in the previous discussion (about critique of ideology). The researcher is 
able to demonstrate that the organisation is based on inefficient routines, cultures etc. 
Organisational actors will then answer (ideally): ‘Gosh! Thank you! We never thought 
of that. How should we do to improve?’ In this case, the basic neo-institutional answer 
seems to be (in caricature): ‘don’t you worry. It’s human nature. And that’s how 
organisations normally are’. This answer is less than satisfactory. The dilemma 
corresponds to the basic dilemma in critique of ideology: How can people continue to 
live under the spell of an ideology, after critical theorists have managed to reveal and 
expose it?  
I argue that researchers’ critical observations of sub-optimal solutions will somehow 
be part of the same ‘system’ as the organisation or institution – or with Habermas: 
being practitioners of the same ordinary language. If researchers can argue 
inefficiency while referring to the same criteria as the ‘organisation’, then their 
critique is ideally part of an overall process of rationalization, where the organisation 
can improve. Researchers cannot maintain a position as in principle ‘smarter’ than the 
organisation they observe – assuming an epistemological pessimism on the part of the 
organisational members rather than the researchers. While researchers may be able to 
reveal inefficiency by using a method not applied in the ordinary life of the 
organisation, there is no convincing argument that the organisational members should 
not be able to understand – and perhaps counter – the critique. 
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3.4.3.4. Change and progress excluded? 
Thomsen argues that new institutional theory cannot explain significant structural 
changes in institutions (Thomsen 1994). A related question is whether new 
institutionalism excludes the idea of technological progress and improved productivity 
as significant factors in modern society. How can “the confused and contentious bumblers” 
have succeeded in producing modern science and technology? This perspective was 
essential to theories of rationalisation, which is one more reason not to reject them. 
3.4.3.5. Socialization without grand theories? 
In order to ‘constitute’ actors, institutions must be quite stable and coherent. This begs 
the question whether the critique against ‘grand theories’ of sociology does not in the 
end turn against new institutionalism itself: how can these “confused and contentious 
bumblers” be capable of socialization, or of (even unintendedly) maintaining stable 
institutions?  
This introduces the question of the relevant level or scope of the system of institution. 
The idea of a thorough socialization – today, in a world characterized by globalisation 
and expanding markets – requires a large-scale scope. In agreement with new 
institutionalism, I find the idea of a strong organisational ‘culture’ little convincing. 
Yet the question is whether the level of institutions is sufficiently stable and self-
contained to account for strong socialization (‘constitution’) of actors. I argue that 
there must be too many external impressions blurring the socializing effects of a single 
institution: local socialisation is weakened by globalisation. By renouncing on ‘grand 
theory’ and the higher levels of society, one must also renounce on ideas of strong 
socialization.  
3.5. Ambiguity in organisations: differentiation and networks 
I suggest a ‘structuralist’ theory of ambiguity in organisations resulting not from 
differences in (‘exogenous’) individual beliefs and interests, but largely reflecting 
complexities and ‘loose coupling’ in organisational structure. Daft & Lengel, Argyris 
& Schön, March & Olsen all emphasize ‘frames of interpretation’ that are somehow, if 
not determined by, then at least strongly dependent on organisational structure.  
3.5.1.1. Ambiguity resulting from individual differences? 
To emphasize this point I shall first present and criticize two examples of the opposite 
perspective, two different views that both seem to regard ambiguity as a result of 
individual differences, more or less implying that only single individual mind – or a 
very small group – is capable of rational action. The first example emphasizes 
organisational decision making as ongoing compromises and reduction of ambiguity; 
the other emphasizes political processes and conflicts of (individual) interests. 
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Weick criticizes the idea of regarding organisations as rational (see citation, p. 30). 
Larger groups such as organisations will be characterized by ambiguity, because all 
individuals cannot possibly share the same interpretation, they cannot muster the 
necessary fourfold agreement on purpose, means, action and evaluation. Daft & 
Lengel make a similar argument emphasizing diversity, thus apparently regarding 
organisations as ‘a large group of individuals’, a clash of individual minds:  
“Information processing at the organisational level must bridge disagreement 
and diversity quite distinct from the information activities of isolated 
individuals.” (Daft & Lengel 1986) 
Purpose – given or negotiated 
The argument that organisational actors cannot agree on a purpose – to focus on one 
‘element’ of interpretations – or on a well-defined preference function, seems to 
contradict Adorno’s definition of an organisation as a means for a purpose 
characterized by instrumental rationality. While Adorno defines organisations as a 
means for a given purpose that defines the social relations ‘within’ the organisation, 
and while Habermas would characterize organisations as part of the economic or 
administrative (state) systems and thus dominated by instrumental (purposive) 
rationality – to the exclusion of communicative rationality (which corresponds to 
‘reduction of ambiguity’), Weick seems to argue the opposite: that organisational 
members must agree on, or establish compromises, regarding the purpose. This idea 
also contradicts the idea of total control over the capitalist enterprise (Lukács). 
I recognize that Weick’s theory is more complex and cannot generally be reduced to 
‘methodological individualism’, but the argument as expressed in the citation is useful 
for critical discussion – and I find the it unacceptable, based on the arguments 
presented by Adorno and new institutionalists (at least in March’ version). To regard 
the organisational purpose as the result of an ongoing compromise and negotiation by 
individuals is to underestimate the primacy and ‘pre-given’ character of the 
organisation and the degree of ‘socialisation’: the extent to which organisational 
members are subsumed under organisational goals. This critique of ‘false 
personalisation’ and illusory ‘humanisation’53 of organisations is relevant, even when I 
                                                     
53 Compare Adornos critique of  phenomenology: “Das quid pro quo des Personalen und 
Apersonalen im Jargon; die scheinhafte Vermenschlichung von Sachlichem; die reale 
Versachlichung von Menschlichem ist das leuchtende Abziehbild der Verwaltungssituation, in 
der abstraktes Recht und objective Verfahrensordnung jeweils in Entscheidungen von 
Angesicht zu Angesicht sich vermummen” (Adorno 1964). And his critique elsewhere of a 
tendency to focus on the ‘human faces’ of organisations: „[es geht darum], was sie im 
gesellschaftlichen Ganzen vollbringt, und nicht um die wie immer fehlbaren Personen, die sie 
vorschiebt. Falsche Personalisierung ist der Schatten der Enthumanisierung. Wer über 
Organisation und Gesellschaft nachdenkt, muβ sich hüten, das Schlechte der Organisation 
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must recognize that organisational goals are not clearly defined and partly open to 
interpretation and negotiation.  
March and others seem to strike a more acceptable compromise between the emphasis 
on the ‘pre-given’ character of organisational goals, and the recognition that this goal 
may not be clearly specified: organisations are still defined as “oriented to targets” 
(Levitt & March 1988), but there may be ambiguity due to different preferences: “there 
is no longer general acceptance of a simple view of a well-defined organizational preference 
function” (March & Olsen 1976b). 
Ambiguity vs. organisational politics 
Another example of ‘methodological individualism’, emphasizes organisational 
politics and seeing organisations as battle fields on which individuals are struggling to 
secure their own (exogenous) interests: 
"By politics we mean the very stuff, the marrow of organisational process; 
by politics we mean managerial and staff concerns to secure careers, to avoid 
blame, to create success and to establish stable identities within competitive 
labour markets and organisational hierarchies where the resources that 
donate relative success are necessarily limited." (Knights & Murray 1994)  
This example differs from the former by emphasizing conflict rather than the potential 
for agreement and mutual understanding, but it nevertheless regards the process as one 
involving individuals. Two arguments against this political view will serve to 
elaborate on the perspective offered in this thesis.  
Again, I find it misleading to regard the organisational combatants as representing 
individual beliefs and preferences (interpretations), because it would ignore the degree 
of socialization: that organisational members to a large degree are socialised into 
interpretations already established in the organisation. I have to admit, though, that 
Knights & Murray not necessarily imply such (problematic) methodological 
individualism, but also encompass a more structuralist view: seeing organisational 
politics not merely as a clash between individuals, but as a structural disintegration of 
the organisation itself. Ambiguity is not primarily a ‘struggle’ between political actors 
in the organisations, but also a result of structural complexities. It would be foolish to 
deny that individuals are at play, but in this example the influence of the individual 
seems overrated. Seeing ambiguity/equivocality as a product of functional 
specialization etc. emphasizes the structural characteristics: it is not merely a 
Hobbesian bellum omnium contra omnes on an arbitrary battlefield, but a complex 
                                                                                                                                            
unmittelbar aus Individuen abzuleiten, während die Individuen deren Anhängsel sind und bis in 
ihre innersten Reaktionsweisen nach ihr sich richten müssen.” (Adorno 1979a) 
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organisational structure ’in conflict with itself’, and the interests forfeited by the 
members are largely defined by their roles. 
The other argument against this political view goes back to the (normative) ideal of 
hermeneutic understanding as the rational potential for resolution of ambiguity. The 
conflict should not merely be regarded as a (political) battlefield, because there is a 
potential for overcoming individual and particular (narrow) interpretations and 
reaching a common, more universal interpretation in which matters can be resolved 
and decisions be made. An example from Argyris & Schön illustrates the difference: 
“the members may treat the conflict as a fight in which choices among 
competing requirements are to be made, and weightings and priorities are to 
be set on the basis of dominance. The R&D faction, for example, may 
include the chief executive who is able to win out over the old guard because 
of his greater power, or the two factions may fight it out to a draw, settling 
their differences in the end by a compromise that reflects nothing more than 
the inability of either faction to prevail over the other. In both of these cases, 
the conflict is settled for the time being but not by a process that could be 
appropriately described as learning. If the conflict ends with a power play or 
a stalemate, neither side is likely to emerge with a new sense of the nature of 
the conflict, its causes and consequences, or its meaning for organizational 
theory-in-use.” (Argyris & Schön 1996) 
3.5.2. Three sources of ambiguity 
After this critique of ‘individualist’ approaches to organisational ambiguity, I shall 
present a more ‘structuralist’ perspective, based three sources of ambiguity suggested 
by Daft & Lengel: interpretations in organisations may be a product of 1) 
organisational structure, 2) professional background, and 3) environment. The latter 
two are external to the organisation, but they are not based on individual beliefs and 
preferences.  
3.5.2.1. Structural differentiation 
In the first example, separate functional departments have developed their own 
interpretation54. This argument emphasizes the local or internal source of 
                                                     
54 This source of ambiguity may derive from an inherent conflict between two basic elements 
of Weberian bureaucracy, between division of labour and rationality: division of labour and 
functional departmentalisation may inhibit rational planning across functions. This conflict 
seems to be the key to BPR-literature. What does Hammer & Champy imply with their demand 
of a ‘clean slate’: 1) that the existing system of routines – for some reason, or almost by 
definition – is conservative and irrational, and must be replaced by a new system, designed via 
rational analysis (classical anti-traditionalism discourse); or 2) that rule following and routine 
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organisational interpretations and corresponds somewhat to the theory of communities-
of-practice(Brown & Duguid 1996). On the other hand it is misleading to speak of a 
community making sense of their environment, because this perspective tends to 
forget that this environment to a large extent is given and defined by organisational 
structure. 
"Each department develops its own functional specialization, time horizon, 
goals, frame of reference and jargon... Bridging wide differences is a 
problem of equivocality reduction. People come to a problem with different 
experience, cognitive elements, goals, values, and priorities. A person trained 
as a scientist may have a difficult time understanding the point of view of a 
lawyer. A common perspective does not exist. Coding schemes are 
dissimilar. Interdepartmental communications thus can be complex, 
ambiguous and difficult to interpret... Equivocality is high when 
differentiation is great." (Daft & Lengel 1986) 
Thus, ambiguity is a result of the functional specialization (differentiation), which is 
largely based on a delegation of responsibility, where the complexity of the ‘whole’ – 
the totality of organisational processes – is reduced by allowing ‘autonomy’ to 
separate departments and subsystems. Complexity is reduced and ambiguity avoided 
by separating processes and applying and developing local interpretations within one 
unit or department, while keeping communication and coordination with the rest of the 
organisation at a minimum.  
This disintegration of the organisation is a parallel to the logic of the market as 
defended by Hayek and others. Whereas the market reduces complexity in the inter-
organizational relations, and thus in the organizations relation to its environment, 
functional specialization reduces complexity internally. 
Interdependence as a frequent but ‘loose’ coupling 
Differentiation in itself does not lead to ambiguity. As long as execution of tasks and 
processes can be kept within one department, and the interdependence is low or at 
least standardized, ‘local’ interpretations will not confront each other and result in 
ambiguity. Ambiguity only arises when for some reason communication across 
organisational barriers are increased. I thus see ambiguity as a consequence of 
increased interdependence, but this argument deserves further qualification, because it 
seems to contradict Daft & Lengel’s theory: they argue that interdependence increases 
uncertainty rather than ambiguity: 
                                                                                                                                            
action as such is inefficient and should be replaced by fulltime problem solving? But this 
argument would turn back on BPR, which basically results in new structures. 
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"Interdependence increases uncertainty because action by one department 
can unexpectedly force adaptation by other departments in the production 
chain. Frequent adjustments are needed when interdependence is high, and 
hence more information must be processed... When interdependence is low, 
departments experience greater autonomy, stability and certainty with 
respect to coordination." (Daft & Lengel 1986) 
To understand and resolve this contradiction it is necessary to distinguish between 
different degrees of interdependence, or between loose and strong coupling. High and 
constant interdependence – strong coupling – will require a standardized coordination 
(and shared interpretation), emphasizing problems of uncertainty. But there may also 
be a need for occasional, yet frequent coordination among loosely coupled units. 
3.5.2.2. Academic and professional specialization 
The second source of ambiguity is that different professions, i.e. scientific disciplines 
– lawyers, economists, biochemists – bring different interpretations into the 
organisation. In this case, ‘incommensurability’, conflicts and ambiguity are thus 
inherited from the differentiation of science – and of ‘Geist’ – into separate disciplines 
that can never be integrated in a unitary science. This source of ambiguity, and of 
organisational interpretations, emphasize that interpretations are not local, but derived 
from the ‘social body of knowledge’ characterised by fundamental processes of 
rationalisation, as argued previously55. 
When ambiguity reflects academic specialization, the conditions for a rational 
‘resolution’ may differ from the situations implied in the previous chapter. Can 
lawyers and biochemists be expected to achieve a common interpretation when there 
is no ‘hope’ for integration of these disciplines?56 
                                                     
55 The tendency to split scientific research into an ever-increasing number of separate 
disciplines contradicts a fundamental characteristic of Reason and rationalization: the unity of 
thought, the need to fit all knowledge into one coherent system (see Kant, Horkheimer & 
Adorno), often considered a necessary requirement in order to avoid contradictions etc. This 
was obviously a goal for the positivists; and it is also a basic characteristic in the critique of 
rationality (Horkheimer & Adorno). As long as the scientific disciplines operate in separate 
‘areas’ without overlapping, the risk of contradiction is avoided. 
56 Contradiction between scientific disciplines? By defining ambiguity as contradicting 
interpretations one is in fact emphasizing commensurability. If two interpretations can be 
‘caught’ in a contradiction, the road is opened for logical critique. Is it reasonable to say that 
there is ambiguity in this sense among scientific disciplines? Disciplines normally do not 
contradict each other – that would be unacceptable. Rather, they can remain indifferent to each 
other, because they focus on different fields/aspects of reality. Nevertheless, reality is not 
neatly partitioned into separated fields (‘reality is cross-disciplinary!’ as the cliché goes), and 
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3.5.2.3. Complexity, unanalysability of environments 
The third source might be labelled as the ‘objective’ source of ambiguity. Daft & 
Lengel suggest that in some environments cause-effect relationships are difficult to 
analyse, and that such environmental conditions constitute an external factor causing 
ambiguity: 
"Equivocality is related to the analyzability of cause-effect relationships in 
the external environment ... When environmental relationships are clear and 
analyzable, equivocality is low, and managers can rely on the acquisition of 
explicit data to answer questions that arise. For example, research by 
Wilensky (1967) and Aguilar (1967) found significant differences among 
organizations in the extent the environment was seen as rationalized and 
objective data collected. When the cause-effect relationships are unclear, 
information processing must reduce equivocality. Managers must discuss, 
argue, and ultimately agree on a reasonable interpretation that makes action 
sensible and suggests some next steps." (Daft & Lengel 1986)  
This argument is related to the idea of bounded rationality. March tends to argue that 
organisations in general face a more complex environment than individuals, and that 
organisational (subjective) ambiguity reflects this ‘objective’ complexity. Daft & 
Lengel, however, emphasize that environments differ in degree of complexity and 
analysability, and that some organisations are thus more exposed to complexity than 
others. A similar approach may proceed from this argument – differences in degree of 
complexity etc. – and categorize different types of organisations, corresponding to 
different types of environment; such categorisation is the basis of contingency theory, 
but is not necessary in the context of this thesis57. 
By emphasizing (reduction of) complexity I may have reached common ground shared 
by the two theoretical traditions discussed in this chapter. Habermas has borrowed the 
concept of systems from Luhmann’s systems theory, and Luhmann was inspired by 
March and Simon’s concept of bounded rationality (Luhmann 1975;Luhmann 1968).  
                                                                                                                                            
disciplines tend to be imperialist, stretching their perspectives and theories beyond neatly 
isolated domains. 
57 Some may question the very idea that complexity and analysability should be regarded as 
objective categories (Hatch 1997). Weick seems to argue that by associating ambiguity with 
complexity (as an objective category), one fails to focus on the issue of conflicting 
interpretations – and, as mentioned previously, he chooses the term equivocality to exclude 
objective aspects and focus on interpretations. 
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3.5.3. Cross-barrier communication – virtuality and networking 
Ambiguity is not a necessary consequence of differentiation. Differentiation explains 
the existence of different interpretations, but not why these should be confronted with 
each other. This thesis presents the argument that IT enables cross-barrier 
communication, coordination and cooperation58: so-called virtual or network 
processes. But first we must understand the organisational need for such cross-barrier 
communication – it is not simply a result of new technology. There must be a reason 
as to why organisations are interested in this opportunity (and accepting – not always 
consciously – the risks associated with increased ambiguity.  
In the following I allow myself to expand the issue of organisational networking to 
cover two quite different forms of cross-barrier communication, namely those that 
span differentiated units and departments internally, within one organisation, and 
those that involve cooperation between different organisations. 
3.5.3.1. Crisis in the bureaucratic organisation? 
It is often argued that new forms of organisation is a reaction to a crisis – or at least 
inadequacies – in the classical bureaucratic organisation, which adapts only slowly to 
changes in the environment. 
"what emerges from the observation of major organizational changes in the 
last two decades of the century is not a new, 'one best way' of production, but 
the crisis of an old, powerful but excessively rigid model associated with the 
large, vertical corporation, and with oligopolistic control over markets." 
(Castells 1998) 
Incapable of learning and innovation? 
A recurring argument is that the bureaucratic structure is slow at ‘learning’ and 
incompatible with the processes of innovation and Research & Development, 
processes that have become crucial in a ‘new economy’, where the ability innovate 
and diversify products is crucial. "The canonical formal organization, with its bureaucratic 
rigidities, is a poor vehicle for learning" (Powell et al. 1996). "[L]arge firms cannot create a 
hospitable atmosphere for R&D". "In large corporate pharmaceutical R&D, the atmosphere of 
industry replaces that of science" (Powell & Brantley 1998). It is difficult to launch this 
discussion without being caught up in business literature clichés and self-maintaining 
                                                     
58 The distinction between communication, coordination and cooperation is crucial for 
choosing between technologies: each process has particular requirements for the technology to 
be used. In the following I shall generally use the term cross-barrier communication to imply 
all aspects – although I do not imply, as some would, that all is basically about communication. 
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truisms about the mighty competitiveness of the new economy. If one is to accept any 
of these arguments, some critique and modification is highly required. 
It is worth remembering that while today it is often accepted as a truism that R&D is a 
creative and uncontrollable process incompatible with large corporations, the 
American economist Schumpeter once made the opposite argument: that the R&D 
departments of large corporations are the most common source of innovation. And it 
should be emphasized that internal R&D research is seldom submitted to the same 
degree of formal routines as the rest of the organisation; in pharmaceutical companies, 
research is often separated from the remaining development phase, because the latter 
is heavily regulated by formal routines, partly due to public regulation of the market. 
Thus, in line with my previous line of reasoning, I cannot accept, at face value, the 
argument about the total inadequacy of the bureaucratic organisation.  
Nevertheless some arguments about the need for networking should be emphasized. 
And it seems that organisational networks, internal as well as external, are most 
common in the early stages of the product life cycle, in relation to innovation, 
development of new products (and processes) etc.  
3.5.3.2. Internally: functional specialisation vs. project organisation 
Allen & Hauptman argue that organisational structure is often based on a choice 
between two different principles (Allen & Hauptman 1990). Normally, strong 
interdependence between tasks and short duration of projects will encourage project 
organisation over functional specialisation. By choosing this structure, however, the 
organisation must renounce on the advantages of functional specialisation: the link to 
scientific and professional knowledge. This argument emphasizes that there is a cost 
associated with the cross-disciplinary advantages of project organisation. But now, 
they argue, it-supported organisational networks allow a combination rather than a 
choice between two ‘incompatible’ strategies. Several departments can be involved in 
a development project, which will thus include a variety of relevant competencies, and 
be better able to make plans for production, marketing, testing etc. 
3.5.3.3. Externally: technological development and dispersed sources 
Externally, organisations may benefit from cooperation with other organisations. With 
an example relevant to the case study: pharmaceutical company may cooperate with 
other pharmaceutical companies, with small research-based companies, universities 
etc. Under certain conditions, cooperation is an attractive alternative to traditional 
‘market’ and ‘hierarchy’ relations. Buying a drug candidate (market) or a take-over of 
another company and vertical integration (hierarchy) are typical examples of 
traditional solutions that may prove risky and inadequate. To elaborate on the latter 
example relevant new technologies emerge from several sources, and even a large 
pharmaceutical company cannot buy all promising companies. Furthermore, R&D is a 
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process that is hard to control: small research based firms and even the internal R&D 
department may produce drug candidates that the drug company is not capable of 
producing and marketing without heavy – and risky – investments, because they lie 
outside its ‘core expertise’. 
A number of conditions that encourage cooperation are listed in the literature.  
Uncertainty 
Uncertainty is often given as a motivating factor behind network organisation: 
"The reduction of uncertainty, fast access to information, reliability, and 
responsiveness are among the paramount concerns that motivate the 
participants in exchange networks." (Powell 1990) 
“the network could be considered as an efficient alternative in the context of 
high technological uncertainties.” (Staropoli 1998) 
This argument may seem somewhat confusing in the light of the distinction between 
uncertainty and ambiguity presented in this thesis. Accepting it here would imply that 
uncertainty leads to networking, which again implies ambiguity. Rather than fully 
disentangling this reasoning one should contend that uncertainty in this particular 
context seems to be used in a rather vague sense – with no regard for the logical 
distinction from ambiguity and equivocality. Yet Staropoli’s reference to technological 
uncertainties suggests the next factor: the character of technological and scientific 
development. 
Technological development and dispersed sources of knowledge 
Cooperation is attractive when the industrial technology and knowledge base is 
complex and characterized by uncertainties and rapid development; and the sources 
for this knowledge are dispersed: 
“when the knowledge base of an industry is both complex and expanding 
and the sources of expertise are widely dispersed, the locus of innovation 
will be found in networks of learning, rather than in individual firms.” 
(Powell et al. 1996).  
"Strategic alliances appear to be an attractive organizational form for an 
environment characterized by rapid innovation and geographical and 
organizational dispersion in the sources of know-how.” (Teece 1992)  
With the biotechnological revolution, new techniques and drug candidates emerged in 
universities and small research based companies rather than the big pharmaceutical 
companies. Cooperation is a means to share the risks involved in a development 
project, and to speed up development. 
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3.5.3.4. Neither alternative nor attachment 
Yet network should not be regarded as an alternative that replaces bureaucracy, as it is 
often argued. It is better regarded as a complementary ‘layer’, which is added to – or 
superimposed on – traditional organisation. And it can thus be regarded also as a 
modification of the bureaucratic model, thus demonstrating some degree of 
‘flexibility’. 
Yet network cannot simply be ‘added’ to hierarchic organisation. Internal networks 
contradict the hierarchical command structure of the ‘original’ organisation, and 
external networks are in conflict with the general objective of the large corporation to 
control its environment. There are frictions and inconsistencies to be balanced against 
the advantages of network organisation: ambiguity, lack of routines, and conflicts of 
authority. These problematic aspects – or ‘challenges – must be emphasized in order 
to balance a common tendency to glorify organisational networks as superior 
alternative to the bureaucratic organisation. In this thesis I focus on the problems 
associated with the confrontation between different frames of interpretation: 
ambiguity. 
3.6. Summary 
I shall emphasize two elements in this chapter. First, I have argued that organisations 
should basically be regarded as rational and characterized by an ongoing process of 
rationalisation. This perspective may be modified, but cannot be replaced and rejected 
by alternative perspectives emphasizing culture, a fundamentally different form of 
practical reason, or a fatalistic theory of mere inertia and fossilization. Second, I have 
identified processes involving ambiguity emerging with increased coordination across 
the organisational and cognitive barriers that resulted from differentiation and 
specialisation. New conditions in the market and changes in the knowledge base 
require that different departments with different frames of interpretation – Marketing, 
Research & Development, Production – cooperate on development and innovation. 
3.6.1. The relevance of rationalisation 
I shall recapitulate a number of critiques against the rationalist concept of 
organisation, in order to discuss their relevance: whether they can be rejected, or if 
they are reasonable, whether the theory can be modified according to the critique, or 
whether it should be considered as falsified and thus rejected. I can already reveal that 
the latter consequence will not be regarded as justified. 
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 Based on Examples Relation 
between 
interpretation 
and reality 
Role of 
language 
Research 
attitude 
Symbolic 
inter-
pretivism 
Interpretation 
(culture) 
Weick, 
Schultz 
Symbols – a 
separate, 
independent 
sphere of 
Meaning 
Primary Neutral 
Competent 
practi-
tioners 
Experience 
(interpretation) 
Lave & 
Wenger, 
Brown & 
Duguid 
(Powell?) 
Functional, 
adaptive 
(nonverbal) 
‘interpretations’ 
Secondary Affirmative 
Bounded 
rationality 
Experience 
(fallible) 
March, 
Powell & 
DiMaggio 
Dysfunctional, 
suboptimal 
Secondary Neutral 
(critical – 
based on 
rationality) 
Ambiguity 
and 
differenti-
ation 
Interpretation Weick, 
Powell, 
March, 
Knights & 
Murray 
Focus on 
relations 
between 
different 
interpretations 
rather than 
reality itself 
(primary) Neutral 
Table 3. Challenges to rationalist theories of organisations59. 
 
                                                     
59 This table illustrates the four basic approaches mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, 
which I shall summarize shortly in this footnote. The symbolic interpretivist approach argues 
that the cognitive interpretation (or culture) applied by an organisation is more relevant than, 
and prior to, organisational structure or environment – organisational action should be 
understood in terms of symbol and meaning rather than rational calculation. Another approach 
combines interpretation with an affirmative or functionalist concept of experience emphasizing 
that local or ‘professional’ communities-of-practice are competent beyond the superficial 
canonical formal procedures – experiential learning is regarded as the actual basic ‘form of 
knowledge’ in organisations. The third approach combines March’s disenchanted concept of 
experience (‘logic of appropriateness’) with that of bounded rationality, seeing institutional 
routines as sub-optimal and the haphazard product of processes that are generally ‘all-too-
human’ and all but rational. The fourth approach argues that an organisation is not based on a 
single unified ‘culture’, but hosts a variety of conflicting interpretations –– implying an 
ambiguity (even political conflict) that undermines rational decision-making. 
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First I shall discuss shortly the two first counter-arguments presented in the 
introduction to the chapter: the ‘symbolic-interpretivist’ emphasis on meaning and 
‘culture’ as a separate, independent sphere; and the more functionalist emphasis on 
competent, experienced practitioners. Then I shall treat the last two counter-arguments 
more extensively, by summarising the conclusions made in this chapter. 
3.6.1.1. Symbolic interpretivism and competent practitioners 
The emphasis on a separate – ‘symbolic’ – sphere of meaning is problematic, because 
it cuts off the relation to reality and thus disregards that all organisations operate in the 
same world, and to a large extent apply methods and theories developed by modern 
science. And Schein in his theory regards ‘worldview’ as an important element of 
organisational culture, which implies an orientation to reality and a potential for 
critique and falsification. Furthermore, the emphasis on the ‘value’ aspect of meaning 
(interpretation) characteristic to many of these theories (though not Schein) seems 
somewhat desperate and forced in modernity. 
Theories emphasizing experience and competent practitioners, on the other hand, do 
not take into account the historical decline of experience, and the extensive reliance on 
modern science and rational calculation. 
3.6.1.2. ‘Real-life’ organisations – an exception to the rule? 
Comparing (and confronting) Weber and Adorno with March is difficult, because 
there is some degree of ‘incommensurability’ between a macro-level theory and a 
theory of organisations. On the one hand it is difficult to deny the neo-institutional 
argument about the shortcomings of all-too-human ‘contentious bumblers’ resulting in 
irrational or suboptimal solutions in the individual organisation. On the other hand the 
general theory of rationalisation as the central process driving the Western world is 
more compelling and relevant, and more convincing than the dys-functionalist and 
fatalistic image implied by neo-institutionalist theory. These two arguments are not 
‘easily’ reconcilable. DiMaggio & Powell thus argue that functionalist theories at the 
macro-level do not rhyme with the organisational actors pictured by neo-institutional 
theory (and observed in organisational studies). 
Exception to the rule? 
One solution – reconciliation – would be to argue that irrational tendencies exist as an 
‘exception to the rule’, and that (neo-) institutionalists ‘for some reason’ focus on – 
and over-generalise – irrational exceptions. This argument is unsatisfactory for (at 
least) two reasons. First, it seems to expand the notion of ‘exceptions’ to the extent 
that any universal theory is meaningless. Second, the empirical material has long since 
reached a quantity that cannot possibly justify the term ‘exception’. 
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A step in the over-all process of rationalisation 
Another tentative solution is offered here, which integrates methodological aspects. 
Organisational studies revealing inconsistencies and suboptimal solutions are not 
simply – in a long-term perspective – a neutral observation, but part of a process 
where problems are exposed, increasing the potential for modification and further 
rationalisation. Organisational studies thus constitute a ‘critical voice’ in the process 
of rationalisation – although this critique is obviously different from that practiced by 
critical theory. And researchers focus on irrationalities by necessity: it is the very 
modus operandi of (rationalist) research. 
It could be argued against this attempt at reconciliation that it implies that there is a 
rich communication and interaction between researchers and organisations – an 
assumption that is difficult to recognize by both parties (perhaps more to be regarded 
as an ‘exception to the rule’). Nevertheless, many organisational studies are carried 
out at Business Schools in some sort of cooperation with organisations and companies; 
and it can be argued that even when more theoretical studies are carried out separate 
from ‘real-life’ organisations, there must be a sort of ‘communication’ at a more 
abstract level, because it is fundamentally a subject-subject relation where theory 
implicitly must address the agents it describes. 
3.6.2. Structural ambiguity 
3.6.2.1. Complexity -> differentiation: variety of interpretations 
Modern organisations are characterized by differentiation: an organisational Babel 
tower of different interpretations. One may distinguish between internal, local 
processes of differentiation, and organisation-external ‘global’ processes. On the one 
hand, local ‘knowledge’ and interpretations develop around specialized functions 
within the organisation, such as marketing, production and development. On the other 
hand interpretations in the organisation are imported from a variety of (scientific) 
disciplines and professions from outside of the organisation – and in this case the 
internal differentiation is inherited from a more universal tendency to partition 
knowledge into separate ‘interpretations’. In both cases, differentiation can be 
regarded as a reaction to complexity in the environment: it is not necessarily based on 
the assumption that reality can be neatly partitioned into pure disciplinary domains, 
but on a more pragmatic will to focus on a limited set of ‘parameters’ in order to have 
a neat model (ceteribus paribus). 
3.6.2.2. Differentiation: potential for ambiguity 
This variety of interpretations within an organisation means that there is a great 
potential for ambiguity. This potential ambiguity can be regarded as a ‘cognitive’ cost 
associated with cross-barrier communication. The basic ‘idea’ behind differentiation 
as a means to reduce complexity is to avoid or minimize cross-barrier communication. 
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In principle, Development can ‘take over’ a product – or candidate – from Research 
without bothering about the internal processes and ‘norms’ of the researchers. 
Differentiation is characteristic of modernity – differentiation and (potential for) 
ambiguity cannot be nullified by enthusiastic praising of cooperating and 
communication. 
3.6.2.3. Need for cross-barrier communication 
The question is now why cross-barrier communication has become increasingly 
attractive despite the cost of ambiguity and other types of conflict. Three factors that 
seem to change the balance – between advantages and disadvantages – are emphasized 
here: need for innovation, development in industrial knowledge, and new technology. 
The first argument thus presumes that companies are increasingly dependent on their 
ability to develop and market new products, because market conditions have changed: 
greater competition and demand for greater diversity in products. Internally, the 
development process can be sped up by ongoing coordination between involved 
departments, rather than separated in succeeding steps. While I generally accept the 
argument about increased emphasis on innovation, I remain suspicious about the 
implied rejoicing over the renewed infallibility of market economy and the alleged 
collapse of monopolies. It worries me that it is difficult to talk about ‘need for 
innovation’ without being reduced to a mouthpiece for ideologically infected clichés 
stumbling recklessly out of the keyboard.  
The second argument emphasizes that the knowledge base of the industry is changing 
or developing rapidly, and that the sources of this knowledge are dispersed. New 
ideas, methods and technologies emerge outside the company’s own R&D 
department: in other companies, in start-ups or universities unable to develop and 
market the product themselves. Or the internal R&D may develop ideas and 
candidates, which the company itself cannot market. Of course there is also the option 
of buying and selling ideas and technologies – thus maintaining typical market 
relations rather networks – but these early stages are often still quite uncertain, and 
cooperation is means to share the risks involved in development. 
Finally, it is often argued that the development of information technology has changed 
the odds in favour of increased cross-barrier communication. It would be relevant to 
distinguish between two different versions of this argument. On the one hand, it is 
argued that computers have increased the capacity to deal with the complexity of 
organisational (production) processes, which makes it easier to coordinate across 
different functions, and to ‘monitor business processes’ as agued in BPR literature. 
This argument generally seems to suggest re-integration rather than networking 
(emphasizing the technology’s capacity to reduce uncertainty). On the other hand, it is 
argued that communication technologies have now become sufficiently developed to 
support the more complicated organisational communication processes, such as those 
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involving ambiguity. This argument recognizes that cross-barrier communication is 
complicated by ambiguity and is a process of understanding, negotiation etc., and it is 
this perspective that is in focus in this thesis. 
3.6.2.4. Network organisation: external vs. internal 
In my focus on cross-barrier communication involving ambiguity between different 
interpretations I have generally collapsed two otherwise quite different phenomena. 
On the one hand the emphasis on communication across internal barriers within the 
organisation, between different departments and professions etc. On the other hand the 
question of organisational networks in the sense of communication and cooperation 
between different organisations. I maintain that there are common traits justifying this 
parallel, because in both cases there is often a ‘clash’ between different interpretations 
or cultures, and in both cases cross-barrier communication may support and speed up 
development. Nevertheless, some of the potential differences deserve mentioning: 
Cooperation between different organisations may involve explicit conflicts of interest 
– potential competition, negotiation of conditions of the contract etc. – and the 
organisational framework is difficult to specify: there is no ‘higher’ authority 
corresponding to top management within an organisation. Of course, parallel problems 
may arise within an organisation: there are conflicts over resources, and internal 
relations may be ‘market-like’; yet in this case, there is in principle a ‘sovereign’ level 
of authority. 
Furthermore, there is an abundance of literature on the merits and disadvantages of 
(internal) project organisation, and it is problematic just to barge in on this domain 
referring only to a different strain of literature while claiming to have formed a new 
perspective. Yet I still find that the parallels justify that I span this phenomenon as 
well – although I recognize the need for further study of the domain literature. 
3.6.2.5. Potential for universality and rational resolution of ambiguity 
Given the nature of ‘local’ interpretations, what is the condition for resolution of 
ambiguity? Is there a potential for rational – understanding – resolution of ambiguity? 
Is this resolution of ambiguity, understood as a merger between different 
interpretations, ‘permanent’? Have individual and particular interpretations been 
overcome? 
One can imagine two ways of dealing with the increased ambiguity that has emerged 
with organisational networking. One scenario is a sort of vertical reintegration, where 
ambiguities are resolved by ‘realignment’ and tightening of the unitary, bureaucratic 
structure – this scenario corresponds to the view that organisational networks are 
temporary characteristics of industries undergoing a structural crisis, which will in due 
time be resolved by re-establishing traditional structures.  
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The other scenario emphasizes ad hoc resolution of ambiguity in individual projects. 
This does not seem to correspond with the idea of hermeneutic understanding as a 
merger and ‘transcendence’ of individual interpretations, because this result was not 
only ad hoc but implied a more profound change in interpretations – one that has 
implication beyond the actual project, even beyond the group of participants. On the 
other hand this dimension does explain why individual cooperation projects often 
develop into long-term ‘network’ relationships. 
                                                     
i One counter-argument to the emphasis on the role of (public) scientific knowledge is offered in the 
claim that today knowledge is no longer created in the ‘ivory towers of academia’, but by 
innovative, market oriented companies. Thus, Scarbrough et al. refers (Gibbons et al. 1994) for a 
theory of such a change in the ‘mode of knowledge production’ (Scarbrough et al. 1999). Gibbons 
et al. argue that the conventional mode of knowledge production – characterized by ‘problems 
defined by academic community’; disciplinary knowledge’; ‘homogeneity’; ‘hierarchical and stable 
organizations’; ‘quality control by the ‘invisible college’’ – is being replaced by a new model, 
characterized by ‘knowledge produced in context of application’; ‘transdisciplinary knowledge’; 
‘heterogeneity’; ‘Heterarchical and transient organisations’, that are ‘socially accountable and 
reflexive’. Without knowing the full length of their argument (Gibbons et al.) I shall nevertheless 
offer a few remarks to problematize their thesis (and thus defend the thesis of scientification and 
rationalization). 1) Even if it may be true that innovations are fostered in profit-based companies 
rather than in universities, it may still be based on theoretical knowledge acquired by researchers 
educated at universities. 2) The contradiction disciplinary vs. transdisciplinary knowledge 
production does not suggest different, mutually exclusive ‘modes of knowledge production’. On the 
contrary: transdisciplinary processes in organizations often depend on the specialized expertise 
supplied by disciplines or professions. (It is compelling to compare with Marx’ argument, however: 
he argued that the new ‘sciences of technology’ would dissolve the specialization characteristic of 
craft production. Yet specialization persists, or rather: specialization has assumed a different form). 
3) Finally, the historical thesis that knowledge was, ‘conventionally’, produced in the universities, is 
also problematic. Rather, there was a sharper distinction between theoretical and practical 
knowledge: theoretical knowledge had only limited practical implication. 
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4. The role and potential of intranets  
The third chapter – the last theoretical chapter – examines the role and potential of 
intranet media. What is their capacity for resolution of, or dealing with, ambiguity 
(hermeneutic understanding)? To what extent do they support or inhibit processes of 
hermeneutic understanding? These questions will be explored via a cross-disciplinary 
approach. These arguments will then be related to classical discussions about the 
traditional medium of text, more or less corresponding to different levels in the 
richness hierarchy, in order both qualify the concept and theory of media richness by 
applying a different perspective on similar issues, and to identify new characteristics 
of electronic communication and computer networks compared with the traditional 
medium of text – how do these new media affect the status of writing and its relation 
to speech?.   
4.1.1.1. Outline of the chapter 
The chapter opens with a characteristic of intranet-based media, focusing on 1) email 
and to a lesser extent other text-based media for horizontal, inter-personal, interactive 
communication – media with a potential for ‘colonising’ new areas for written 
communication; and on 2) hypertext, a medium that may be regarded as 
complementary to email with emphasis on universalisation, ‘capture’ and sharing of 
information and knowledge rather than exchange of messages, besides its capacity for 
‘unrestricted’ structuration and categorisation by links. 
Next I look at the contemporary discussion of media richness. The richness of a 
medium is generally determined by its capacity for feedback (interactivity), variety of 
cues (or modality), degree of personalisation and variety of languages. However, 
while Daft & Lengel argue that richer media are better suited for resolution of 
ambiguity in a timely manner, I shall emphasize – with Sproull & Kiesler – the 
potential conflict between the need for an open, ‘rational’ process and the ‘need for 
speed’. I admit that rich media offering a large variety of cues (sound, video) are 
convenient for conflict resolution and consensus making in a timely manner, but often 
at the cost of ‘rationality’, while the ‘poor’ text-based media (so far) characteristic of 
internet technology encourage critical verbalisation of frames of interpretation: in this 
case, communication mediated by ‘poor’ media is not impoverished, but emancipated. 
I shall then look at more philosophical discussions of traditional media, oral vs. 
written communication and to some extent nonverbal communication (art). The 
purpose is on the one hand to compare these discussions to the previous one of media 
richness, and on the other hand to emphasize the particular characteristics of the new 
media. While text is traditionally tangible and objectified (orphaned), electronic text-
based media are characterised by a high degree of interactivity (richer) and a 
paradoxical combination of ephemerality and potential for storage. 
  130
I suggest that organisations may be changed by three different changes associated with 
the new media: 
Verbalisation: virtual communication requires people to ‘put things in words’. 
‘Scripturisation’: new areas of communication are being transferred from oral to 
written communication, as when people use a mail in stead of the telephone 
Electrification: paper files are transferred to electronic files. 
4.2. The affordances of Intranet media 
An intranet is a local Internet with a firewall, where only a ‘limited’ number of people 
have access, usually the members of an organisation or company. While this 
restriction is a major difference from the principles of openness and universality 
characteristic of the ‘real’ Internet, an Intranet in a large, global organisation enables 
horizontal communication across internal organisational barriers in a degree that 
makes the Internet analogy quite relevant. 
The technical foundation of the Internet is a set of protocols that enables 
communication between all computers irrespective of differences in hardware, 
software etc. The term internet refers to the fact that these protocols provide a link 
between different (local) networks. 
An intranet can be regarded as a platform that allows access to all local computer 
networks, and – in principle – to all information systems used in the organization. It 
can also be regarded as the organisational application of a technology, the Internet, 
the effects and potential of which has already been analysed in discussed in other 
areas. 
4.2.1.1. Email and hypertext – two aspects of media 
Internet technology provides a platform – whether the Internet or an intranet – that 
hosts a number of different applications. I shall begin with the two most prominent: 
email and hypertext, which represent two different aspects of media, either as a 
medium for communication between people (an interface), as a subject-subject 
relation, or as a medium for organisation of knowledge, for representation, a subject-
object relation. These aspects correspond to different needs that the expected users 
have: 
"There are two major domains of concern for modern information workers: 
organizing the information with which they are dealing in ways that allow 
effective storage and access, and communicating and cooperating effectively 
with their colleagues about complex issues."(Conklin & Begeman 1989) 
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The objective is to clarify, how these media are affected by ambiguity, whether they 
can ‘contain’ ambiguity, and how well they support resolution of ambiguity.  
4.2.2. Email – (interactive) communication 
Email is one of the main applications of an Intranet. Obviously, emails are also used 
for communication outside the intranet, but the application is here regarded as part of 
the intranet to emphasize that there is more than web and hypertext to this technology, 
and also because email has significantly affected organisational communication. Email 
is a new medium, because it is text-based and highly interactive: the (potential) 
response time is much shorter than a postal letter; yet email is still more ‘flexible’ in 
response time than the telephone60.  
4.2.2.1. Linking across organisational barriers 
Email is associated with an increase in communication and coordination across 
organisational barriers. As already argued in the previous chapter, cross-barrier 
communication cannot be regarded as a new result of new technology, but it has 
created a new potential, which corresponds to the organisational need for coordination 
across functional specialisation etc. 
4.2.2.2. A new step in the scripturisation of communication 
This new medium affects the traditional balance between oral and written 
communication. There is a relative increase in written communication, because 
communication is transferred from oral to written communication. The written word 
enters – or colonizes – new areas of communication.  
Previous steps of scripturisation in organisational communication 
As already suggested, the development is a new step in a historical tendency towards 
written communication61. A tendency that is essential to modern organisation. The 
formal procedures described in the previous chapter are preserved as written rules – 
there is a strong association between the formal and the written. The replacement of 
the oral command from the employer to the employee by written rules is characteristic 
                                                     
60 Practical in communication across different time zones, i.e. between Denmark and U.S, and 
it enables callers to contact at any time. On the other hand, this feature provides a ‘social 
buffer’ (see p. 144): and email does not have the ‘power’ of a phone call, which automatically 
puts the caller in charge from the beginning (Emails can be stored and ignored). 
61 Although one might argue that the telephone was one step away from written 
communication: telephones allowed oral communication over long distances and thus replaced 
communication via written letters. 
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of rationalisation.  Organizations archive ‘communication’ documents, intending to 
preserve communication as memory, and to document decisions. Litterer and others 
see communication, coordination and documentation as the central feature of the 
modern organisation (Litterer 1961). 
The historical extension of (colonisation by) written communication has stopped at 
various barriers, as illustrated by the example of management information systems. 
MIS’s were expected to support management by providing updated and integrated 
information. Yet it turned out that managers often prefer oral communication: 
“managers typically prefer shorter, oral reports to longer written ones” (O'Reilly et al. 1987). 
And the theory of media richness, presented in the following section, suggests that the 
poor medium of writing – characterised by low feedback and lack of nonverbal cues – 
is inadequate for dealing with ambiguity. Furthermore, informal communication in the 
organisation is traditionally oral. 
New areas 
The features (‘affordances’) of electronic media open up for the adoption of written 
communication in new areas.  Because computer networks allow a form of written 
communication that is highly interactive, people feel encouraged to communicate in 
writing, where they would previously have preferred oral communication, i.e. by using 
email as an alternative to a phone call.  
Fossilization of communication 
As an important consequence of this ‘extension’ of written communication – a process 
that may be labelled the sedimentation or ‘fossilization’ of communication – these acts 
of communication now remain available as a mechanical memory. Thus, an old email 
can in principle be used to document (informal) decisions and agreements. They may 
also be use to preserve arguments and rationales.  
This potential, however, is weakened by the fact that email is still more ephemeral 
than traditional letters, as argued by Sproull & Kiesler (see p. 144). Emails disappear 
or a difficult to retrieve for other issues. And they tend to differ in style and 
composition from traditional written communication: emails are more context-
dependent, grammatically more ‘sloppy’, and shorter than paper-based letters. But 
these difficulties emphasize the perspective on email as a ‘trade-off’ between the 
classical categories of oral and written communication: email is accepted in informal 
communication because of its (perceived) ephemeral character. 
The distinction between communication and memory (archive), which was implied at 
the beginning of this section, is blurred or changed by computer media 
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4.2.2.3. Related technologies 
The effect seems mostly due to email, but internet technology also offers two other 
interactive, text-based media. Like email, discussion groups (BBS) support 
asynchronous communication, but in this case the correspondence is open to other 
members of the group and not just an exchange between two people. Chat (IRC – 
internet relay chat) supports synchronous communication between a large number of 
participants. 
Another example of the change from oral to written communication is the potential for 
automatic capture of oral communication (logs, tapes), which can then be preserved as 
transcripts (Culnan & Markus 1987). This aspect may be less significant and more 
hypothetical, however. When oral communication is automatically preserved, the 
resulting texts will suffer severely from the (loss of) contextuality characteristic of oral 
communication, which depends largely on ‘situated’ references to time (‘now’, 
‘yesterday’) and place (‘here’, ‘over there’) that are easily understood by the 
participants during the discussion, but will be difficult to decode later (and for 
outsiders). The same problem is relevant for email communication, but probably less 
severe: when people consciously address/use a textual medium, they will have to solve 
or avoid problems of contextuality, by omitting or reducing temporal and spatial 
references – as we have already learned to avoid depending on index fingers and nods 
of the head in telephone conversation (spatial reference). 
4.2.2.4. Further ‘enrichment’? 
Two arguments may be raised against the focus on email and written communication. 
First, it may be argued – based on the theory of media richness – that email is still a 
relatively poor medium that is insufficient in particular types of communication (and 
tasks) such as ambiguity, negotiation and consensus building, because it does not 
provide the necessary variety of cues, and because the response time is still too slow. 
By encouraging cross-barrier communication the medium has so-to-speak opened a 
Pandora’s box of problems that it proves incapable of handling. 
Second, it may be argued that the focus on email is ‘historical’ and simply lacks 
behind technological development. Internet technology in general has in many aspects 
moved beyond its dependence on text, changing the focus from hypertext to 
hypermedia, and supporting transmission (as email attachment) of ‘rich’ data: graphic, 
images, sound, movies. And even though it is still insufficient to support interactive 
video media via intranets, such as video meetings, that would certainly be the next 
step. 
The subsequent sections of this chapter, after the presentation of hypertext, will cast 
more light on the question of the capability or ‘affordances’ and possible inadequacies 
of electronic communication. 
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4.2.3. Hypertext: universality and structure 
The ‘web’ hypertext system as implemented in Berners-Lee’s World Wide Web is the 
other main application of the intranet. Two aspects of the web should be emphasized. 
First, it is a static medium characterized by openness and universality rather than 
interactivity. Second, the hypertext links provides a particular means for structuring 
and organising the content. 
4.2.3.1. Openness and universality 
Intranet technologies are often embraced as a platform for ‘corporate’ information to 
be shared by various departments. This perspective emphasizes the ‘universalising’ 
aspects of the technology. While it may be used as support for hierarchical 
bureaucratic organisations, it is also embraced as a ‘counterbalance’ or focal point for 
a ‘networked’ or distributed organization.  
"Rather than the old inflexible hierarchical pyramid, network organizations 
demand a flexible, spherical structure that can rotate competent, self-
managing teams and other resources around a common knowledge base." 
(Miles & Snow 1995) 
I shall return to the inherent problems of this vision – although they are obvious in the 
light of the previous discussion of the ambiguous knowledge base of organizations. 
‘Distribution’ replaced by archive, ‘sharing’ 
Hypertext enthusiasts emphasize the potential for capture of knowledge 
(communication) – regarding the medium as a means for protection against a versatile 
memory, a countermeasure to the ephemerality of electronic communication.  
“in an exciting place like CERN... [y]ou have so many people coming in 
with great ideas, doing some work, and leaving with no trace of what it is 
they've done and why they did it the whole organisation really needed this. It 
needed some place to be able to cement, to put down its organisational 
knowledge.” (Berners-Lee 1996) (my italicisation) 
While text-based, interactive media such as email, chat, and discussion groups support 
‘capture’ by transferring oral communication to text, hypertext converts vertical and 
horizontal communication – in the sense of physical transmission – to public files. 
Web technology changes the nature of distribution. ‘Distribution’ by email of 
documents, deadlines, decisions etc. is replaced by web publication. Instead of 
sending copies to readers/recipients, people (or departments, or other) publish and 
store information on the web. Correspondingly, readers must access such a site, be 
aware of changes, news etc., instead of receiving information. And this is one reason 
why the ability to navigate on the intranet is important. 
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This change in communication patterns is often described as one from ‘push’ to ‘pull’. 
It is based on the potential for having only one copy of a document on the network, 
because ‘access’62 has become so easy: People don’t have to arrive in person at the 
library of Alexandria to read the only exemplar of Plato’s dialogues; and employees 
do not have to physically visit company headquarters in order to read the standard 
operating procedures. 
The integration of distribution, publishing and storage also creates a dilemma, 
however. Using intranet for continuous and instant update of information and 
communication of news - and removal of outdated information – emphasizes the 
dynamic and ephemeral character of the electronic medium at the cost of the potential 
for archives and ‘memory’: ‘old’ information seems to vanish and may be difficult or 
impossible to retrieve.  
Dislocation: texts are separated from their local (situated) context 
When organisational documents developed for – and sometimes by – one department 
are made accessible on the intranet, they are potentially separated from their ‘local’ 
context. This ability of text to go beyond their context is of course not unique to 
intranets etc., but a basic characteristic of writing, which will be elaborated later in this 
chapter (p. 162). Historical texts survive the historical period in which they were 
written. The very concept of history is tied to writing: before writing, before someone 
wrote about it, there was only prehistory. It is reasonable to assume that this process 
of dislocation and de-contextualisation is accentuated or magnified with the potential 
for publishing documents – ‘sharing’ information and knowledge – on the intranet. 
When a text is taken out of context, it will cause a ‘shock’ of (hermeneutic) 
misunderstanding – ambiguity – in the mind of the ‘foreign’ reader, who will have to 
engage in a process of understanding by learning about the original context or frame 
of interpretation, and by becoming conscious about the reader’s own frame (mostly 
that of his department etc.). 
There seems to be two approaches to this problem. Either the organisation can try to 
avoid or at least reduce by establishing corporate standards and concepts. Or it may 
support the process of understanding by providing and emphasizing cues about the 
organisational context of the document. 
                                                     
62 Of course the term ‘access’ is misleading, because web users do in fact receive an electronic 
copy on their own computer. But the possibility for exact copies of data changes the very 
meaning of location, creating the illusion of ‘moving’ around on the Internet or Intranet (in 
cyberspace). 
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4.2.3.2. Links: an unconstrained means of structure 
The link is the basic feature of hypertext. Hypertext is primarily a tool for organisation 
of knowledge. The hypertext link is a meta-level sign; a ‘tool’ intended to capture a 
type of knowledge beyond words, sentences, and texts. 
Hypertext and databases 
“I needed to be able to keep track of things, and nothing out there, none of 
the computer programs that you could get, the spreadsheets and the 
databases, would really let you make this random association between 
absolutely anything and absolutely anything, you are always constrained.” 
(Berners-Lee 1996) 
Berners-Lee, the inventor of WWW, thus emphasizes that hypertext allows a network 
without structure or standardization – unconstrained, for instance, by the type 
definition requirements of a database, which can be regarded as another technical 
solution to the problems that Vannevar Bush aimed to solve with his early, pre-
computer idea for a hypertext system. Vannevar Bush envisioned a hypertext system 
based on selection by association as an alternative to the cumbersome retrieval process 
of selection by indexing characteristic of traditional hierarchical filing systems, but 
since his article in 1945, database technology was invented, providing another 
powerful alternative. Yet as Berners-Lee implies the advantage of databases comes at 
the cost of the difficulties in fitting all records into one set of types. 
Private tool vs. shared file 
Like Bush, Berners-Lee regarded hypertext as a personal tool, with the emphasis on 
subjective associations. But as illustrated by the above citation, Berners-Lee also 
emphasized the idea of moving beyond the personal sphere by linking different ‘files’ 
into one shared, universal hypertext, thus focusing stronger on the potential for 
intersubjectivity and universality – although it is true that Bush also envisioned inter-
subjective knowledge sharing, namely as exchange of ‘trails’ (individual hypertexts). 
By implementing his technically simple hypertext system, WWW, on the worldwide 
computer network, Berners-Lee’s gained the advantage of universality – the potential 
access to texts all over the world – over previous hypertext systems (and on a smaller 
scale, intranets offer hypertext – and hypermedia – beyond a limited working group). 
In some respects, internet technology can be understood as characterised by a collapse 
or (con)fusion between different ‘scopes’: from the personal tool over the potential for 
groupware to the Internet ideal of universality. This triangular perspective corresponds 
to the different traditions in the history of hypertext research and design. Various 
authors thus envision hypertext at three levels: individual tool (Bush 1945); group 
knowledge (Engelbart et al. 1973;Engelbart & Lehtman 1988); universally shared 
knowledge/’docuverse’ (Berners-Lee 1996;Berners-Lee et al. 1992;Nelson 1980).  
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"... where Bush conceived his memex as chiefly a private desk for working 
with a personal microfilm collection, we see ours as a potentially universal 
system for both public and private use." (Nelson 1980) 
These levels correspond to quite different, and sometimes contradicting needs. 
Hypertext offers an alternative to the principle, inherent in database technology,  of a 
logical structure as a common, unified ‘point’ of reference: a network of individual 
hypertexts, each organised and structured according to its own logic (framework). The 
personal associations underlying the links designed by one may be incomprehensible 
to others.  
Intranet structure – chaotic or ambiguous 
Intranets may expose a similar problem, though with a different scope. The individual 
sites of an intranet are seldom personal, but mostly belong to a particular unit and are 
structured according to its particular frame of reference or interpretation. This adds up 
to a total intranet that is chaotic or at least ambiguous in structure. 
Hypertext has the potential for a more systematic intraweb, but the technology is 
basically more flexible – like Berners-Lee, authors often emphasize the lack of 
constraints: "hypertext eases the restrictions on the thinker and writer", Conklin thus observes 
(Conklin 1987), corresponding to Berners-Lee’s argument above. The question is 
whether organisations should exploit the possibility for structure and hierarchy, or 
whether this would conflict with the ‘nature’ of the technology. Conklin discusses this 
dilemma of structure in relation to hypertext, and the considerations are relevant to 
intranets as well. 
On the one hand he does recognize some need for unstructured referential links – 
corresponding to Bush’ associative links – and admits that any hierarchy has the 
disadvantage of carrying an implicit assumption, which was implemented from the 
beginning and may have since lost its legitimacy:  
“the great disadvantage of any hierarchy is that its structure is a function of 
the few specific criteria that were used to create it... The creator of a 
hierarchical organization must anticipate the most important criteria for later 
access to the information.” (Conklin 1987) 
This problem is quite similar to the problems associated with interpretations and ‘basic 
assumptions’ in organisations. In an intranet, a hierarchical structure (local or not) 
may be regarded as the manifestation of such a frame of interpretation. The 
interpretation is embedded in the intranet structure. 
On the other hand, Conklin basically emphasizes the advantages of implementing 
(hierarchical) tree structure in hypertext systems, based on what he calls 
organizational links: “Organizational links connect a parent node with its children and thus form 
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a strict tree subgraph within the hypertext network” (Conklin 1987). Corresponding to the 
principles of rationality presented in the first chapter, emphasizing a unitary system (p. 
28), he argues that hierarchical structure supports abstract thinking:  
“abstraction is a fundamental cognitive process, and hierarchical structures 
are the most natural structures for organizing levels of abstraction.” (Conklin 
1987) 
The network structure with its emphasis on a filing system that is easy, fast, 
convenient and without constraints conflicts with the ideal of logical thought as 
characterized by hierarchy, coherence and constraints – as a guarantee for progressive 
thinking by elimination of contradictions and inconsistency. Lack of constraints is 
‘liberating’, but also a potential threat to the possibility for navigating the intranet, and 
to its usability in general. 
In his recognition of the limitations of single hierarchy, however – and one may add 
that the idea of a universal organisational interpretation (and conceptual hierarchy) 
poses similar problems – he suggests implementation of different, orthogonal, 
structures imposed on the same material:  
“One solution to this dilemma is to allow the information elements to be 
structured into multiple hierarchies, thus allowing the world to be 'sliced up' 
into several orthogonal decompositions.” (Conklin 1987) 
This may be compared to the idea of establishing different portals on the intranet. 
Portals offer a guided access to the intranet based on a particular set of categories and 
can be tailored to different functions or departments (perhaps even personalised). The 
comparison is also somewhat misleading, however, because portals do not in principle 
affect the actual structure of the intranet (or Internet).  
Even when not based on a deliberate strategy, this perspective is probably the most 
adequate understanding of many intranets. Even if they lack a unitary hierarchical 
structure, intranets are not necessarily chaotic, but ambiguous in the sense that they 
reflect the ambiguities in the ‘knowledge base’ of the organisation. Different sections 
of the intranet are structured according to different principles – resulting in an 
‘ambiguous’ intranet as a whole, making it difficult to navigate across different 
sections. This perspective emphasizes the problems of the idea of a networked 
organisation with a common knowledge base (see p. 134): Miles & Snow seem to 
disregard the fact that organizational ‘networks’ – or differentiation in general – are 
not only structural, but also cognitive: they do not have a common knowledge base, 
because they have different frames of interpretation, and the content would be highly 
ambiguous. 
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Embedded, unidirectional links 
Further adding to the potential for chaos, the web is based on a particular type of 
hypertext links: embedded, unidirectional links, the advantages and inadequacies of 
which are emphasized by Grønbæk et al:  
"The biggest advantage of the embedded links in WWW is their simplicity: 
there is no need for a specialized link server, and the WWW only has to 
manipulate tagged ASCII files. This simplicity comes at a cost however, as 
only the owner of a document can create links from the document. At the 
same time links to specific parts of a document can only be made if there are 
already target tags at the desired point in the document. It is impossible to 
see which documents point to a document, and there can only be one set of 
links from a given document. If two users wish to have different links from 
the same document, they must maintain two copies of the document, 
identical apart from the different links. This requires extra maintenance, if 
the original document is later changed." (Grønbæk et al. 1997) 
Thus, the web is virtually based on ‘goto’ commands (unidirectional links), a feature 
banished from structured programming languages. You can only move in one 
direction, not move back (not via the link, at least – it is possible thanks to the browser 
‘memory’): it is impossible to know, based on a web page itself, how many ‘foreign’ 
links point to a certain page – which makes it very difficult to maintain, if addresses or 
content is changed, because the ‘linking’ pages cannot be notified. Furthermore, the 
fact that WWW links are embedded restricts the potential as a personal tool: one 
person cannot link from a ‘foreign’ document on the Internet/intranet. 
As mentioned above, focus now tends to move from hypertext to hypermedia, because 
intranet increasingly supports ‘richer’ data. The question of media richness (‘rich 
data’) is somewhat different under this perspective.  
4.3. Mediated communication – impoverished or emancipated? 
In order to judge the potential of intranet media for supporting processes dealing with 
ambiguity it is relevant to look at the concept of media richness. Two different, almost 
conflicting views on media are prevalent in studies in organisational communication, 
as well as discussions about the Internet etc. To emphasize the extremes, electronic 
communication is regarded as either impoverished or emancipated. Essential in this 
discrepancy is a difference in view on nonverbal cues, seen as either useful for 
changing understanding, or as a distorting signal about status and hierarchy 
emphasizing social order at the cost of expertise etc. 
4.3.1. The theory of media richness and media/task fit 
Daft & Lengel argue that tasks or processes involving reduction of equivocality (or 
ambiguity) – “exchange of opinions in order to clarify opinions, defining problems and reaching 
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agreements” (Daft & Lengel 1986) – require rich media. While reducing uncertainty is 
primarily based on gathering of data, emphasizing the amount of information, 
reducing equivocality requires richness of information. This process operates on a 
meta-level and requires a meta-language. 
Media richness is defined as the mediums capacity to change understanding within a 
time interval. This emphasis on time is crucial to organisational decision making, as 
one may recall from the definition of bounded rationality. (One may also recall that 
Gadamer characterized hastiness in judgment as a primary source of inhibiting 
prejudices). Rich media support ‘communication transactions’ that overcomes 
different frames of reference or clarifies ambiguous issues. Huber & Daft suggests a 
hierarchy of media according to richness: 
“According to this perspective, face-to-face interaction is the richest 
medium, followed by video-phone and video-conferencing, telephone, 
electronic mail, personally addressed documents such as memos and letters, 
and formal unaddressed documents such as bulletins and flyers.” (Huber & 
Daft 1987)63  
This list illustrates the four dimensions of the richness hierarchy. Email is richer than 
letters (snailmail) due to the capacity for feedback; videophone is richer than the 
telephone due to the variety of cues and channels; and memos and letters are richer 
than bulletins due to the degree of personalization. The fourth dimension, language 
variety, is not clearly represented, except perhaps implicitly in the more formal 
language of bulletins. These four dimensions require a more extended presentation and 
discussion. Unfortunately, Daft & Lengel themselves are not very specific about 
relating frames of interpretation and reduction of ambiguity to media capacity. 
4.3.1.1. Capacity for immediate feedback (time) 
This dimension emphasizes interactivity: i.e. email supports a higher degree of 
interactivity than snailmail, while face-to-face and telephone supports synchronous 
interactivity. Immediate feedback enables and supports a dialogue that allows 
communication partners to explore ambiguities and disagreements. 
                                                     
63 Yates & Orlikowski criticize such categorisations for confusing genres with media. 
"Confusion arises when researchers compare genres of communication (e.g., memos or 
bulletins) with communication media (e.g., electronic mail or fax). Genres, however, may be 
physically created, transmitted, and stored in various media" (Yates & Orlikowski 1992). They 
thus introduce the term ‘genre’ to incorporate ‘social’ and non-IT aspects, and emphasize a 
distinction between genres on the one hand, and technology as storage and channels on the 
other. They may have a point, but I also think that they exaggerate the distinction between 
media and genre, thereby reducing ‘media’ to a narrow technical term.  
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4.3.1.2. Variety of cues and channels provided  
In technical terms this concerns the ‘bandwidth’ of the medium. Nonverbal cues 
further supports dialogue by enabling use of illustrative gestures and voice intonation, 
and by providing rich feedback about the reaction from the listeners – i.e. agreement 
or disbelief – and support attentiveness to those elements of an argument, where other 
participants remain sceptical or unable to understand – and one can focus on 
explaining (or discussing, justifying) those elements.  
Yet these examples also illustrate how ‘nonverbal cues’ support a rhetorical speaker – 
in his attempt at persuading rather than convincing – instead of a dialogue. They are 
useful indicators for the skilled speaker who may also employ techniques to 
manipulate his audience and avoid rational critique, as in the classical advice: ‘in lack 
of argumentation, raise the voice!’ In this emphasis on the potential on the potential of 
rich media for asymmetrical communication there is a parallel to Benjamin’s argument 
that the movie actor has no ‘control’ over his audience and is exposed to the detached 
judgment of the viewers. Compared with the theatre stage, the ‘poorer’ medium of 
film deprives the actor of his usual means to affect and ‘manipulate’ the audience: 
"[D]er Filmdarsteller, da er nicht selbst seine Leistung dem Publikum 
präsentiert, die dem Bühnenschauspieler vorbehaltene Möglichkeit einbüßt, 
die Leistung währen der Darbietung dem Publikum anzupassen. Dieses 
kommt dadurch in die Haltung eines durch keinerlei persönlichen Kontakt mit 
dem Darsteller gestörten Begutachters. Das Publikum fühlt sich in den 
Darsteller nur ein, indem es sich in den Apparat einfühlt. Es übernimmt also 
dessen Haltung: es testet. Das ist keine Haltung, der Kulturwerte ausgesetzt 
werden können." (Benjamin 1998) (my italicisation) 
Benjamin’s example illustrates the aspects, not only of nonverbal cues, but also of 
personalization: The audience assumes a role of testing spectators, undisturbed by any 
personal contact with the actor.  
I admit that nonverbal cues do not merely support the speaker, but also the listener: it 
is often emphasized that voice intonation may indicate lying. Yet Short et al add a 
curious twist to this argument by suggesting that this sound-based indicator may 
drown in richer media: “face-to-face communication ... distracts communicators from … vocal 
cues that might indicate lying” (Short et al. 1976) cited in (Culnan & Markus 1987) –
implying that one lies better with the face than the voice. 
In a critical review of literature focusing on the ‘filtering’ aspect of media – 
corresponding to media richness – Culnan & Markus observe that nonverbal cues have 
three main functions:  
1) Regulation of interaction: eye gaze and shift in voice intonation are used to 
indicate turn-taking, and this theme is a major occupation for studies in the 
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Conversation Analysis-tradition(Culnan & Markus 1987;Hutchby 2001). It has 
been expected that mediated conversation should suffer from the lack of such 
cues, yet empirical studies have not confirmed this to be fatal. Conversation 
partners develop alternative means of regulation – although chat groups may 
experience some problems (Hutchby 2001).Perception of communication 
partners, as illustrated in the discussions above. Short et al have suggested a 
theory of social presence, according to which media differ in their ”capacity to 
transmit information about facial expression, direction of looking, posture, dress and 
nonverbal, vocal cues.” (Short et al. 1976) 
3) Awareness of social context (Culnan & Markus 1987).  
4.3.1.3. Degree of personalization 
This dimension refers to potential for adapting the ‘message’ to the specific conditions 
and needs of a particular recipient, as emphasized by Sepstrup: 
“Effektiv information er så individuel og selektiv som mulig, fordi det giver 
størst mulig viden om modtagerne. Den mest effektive form for 
kommunikation er samtalen. Hvis det ikke var for omkostningerne per 
kontakt, ville den personlige samtale være den ideelle form for påvirkning.” 
(Sepstrup 1999)64  
Sepstrup perspective on media is somewhat different, however. He discusses various 
media from an explicit, asymmetrical ‘view of the sender’, as a means for someone to 
‘get the message through’ to the recipient, to affect the recipient. 
4.3.1.4. Language variety 
This refers to languages of different degrees of formalization, and the need to combine 
and shift between i.e. numerical text and natural language.  
On the one hand there are significant advantages in formalized languages, i.e. 
mathematical processing of numerical data, standardized databases etc. ‘Rich’ 
representations can be useless and must be reduced in order to specify logical 
arguments and identify contradictions. Some degree of formalization is necessary, i.e. 
for logical expressions or models. 
On the other hand, a formalized language can inhibit problem solving when dealing 
with equivocality. Language variety enables expression of frames of reference. 
                                                     
64 “Efficient information is as individual and selective as possible, because it provides the most 
knowledge about the recipients. The most efficient form of communication is the dialogue. If it 
wasn’t for the costs per contact, the personal dialogue would be the ideal form of influence.” 
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Reduction of equivocality – understanding (‘verstehen’) – operates on a meta-level 
and requires natural language65. Sometimes, sentences in formalized language must be 
criticized and discussed in natural language, because it has become necessary to 
question the very framework in which formalised sentences are embedded. 
It may now be possible to understand the somewhat paradoxical argument that rich 
media support clarification. One would assume that the result of clarification must be 
something explicit and largely independent of nonverbal cues. One may also recall 
Weick’s refusal to associate reduction of ambiguity (equivocality) with clarification. 
However, rich media – including nonverbal cues – support the intermediary process of 
clarification, and that clarity in some cases depends on natural rather than formalized 
language. 
4.3.2. Communication emancipated 
The theory about media richness and task/media fit has been subject to much critique. 
An influential critique is provided Sproull & Kiesler, who have tried to modify the 
theory, but to a large extent have also contradicted it. 
As emphasized previously, Sproull & Kiesler distinguish between two main effects of 
computer networks: both linking and buffering. (These are also the essentials of virtual 
teams). While the technology enables communication across geographical and 
organisational barriers, the use of media (text) also prevents immediate development 
of strong social ties in a group – ties that bias rational criteria in information 
processes. This argument refers to a social dimension of buffering or intermediation: 
whereas media, including language, is defined by the fundamental intermediation 
between subject and object: mediation in relation to a task or an object, Sproull & 
Kiesler’s argument draw attention to the intermediation between subject and subject – 
something that is also essential to Adorno. It is this social aspect of buffering that 
implies a critique of the richness hierarchy. 
                                                     
65 Proponents of the (positivist) logical paradigm of language argued that natural language is 
too broad a category that does not adhere to criteria of logic, but allows for meaningless or 
‘ambiguous’ (not in the specific sense used in this thesis) sentences, contradictions etc. – and 
thus cannot be the judge over i.e. scientific knowledge. It is often argued that philosophy must 
respect science and restrict itself to exploring its foundation and ‘cleaning up’ inconsistencies 
etc. The history of science brings numerous examples of philosophers’ problematic attempts to 
speculate about matters that are better treated by scientists – generally, the development of 
science has ‘pushed back’ philosophy from most areas. (And Habermas critique of hermeneutic 
understanding insists that this ‘form of knowledge’ has its limitation, that its validity is 
restricted to certain areas).  
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4.3.2.1. Social buffering increases rationality 
Basically Sproull & Kiesler argue that the tendencies to groupthink – which may 
distort the rational potential of problem solving processes, as argued in the first 
chapter – are strongest in face-to-face meetings, and that use of (relatively poor) text-
based electronic media may neutralize or inhibit such irrational tendencies. This also 
implies a critique of rich media, because they provide some of the nonverbal cues on 
which group members rely extensively for ‘social information’ about status and 
hierarchy. This argument confirms the importance of nonverbal cues – referred above 
– for information about communication partners and social context, but with a ‘power’ 
twist: social information is inhibitive to critical rationality. Conversely, Sproull & 
Kiesler argue that attention to these factors decreases with ‘poorer’ media: Text – “the 
primary medium of electronic mail” – “removes dynamic personal information and feedback” 
(Sproull & Kiesler 1991) – to the benefit of rational debate. Sproull & Kiesler further 
argue that electronic group members are not only less attentive to status and hierarchy, 
but to social convention in general, and thus less polite and less eager to reach 
consensus. 
Ephemerality 
This is a result not only of the lack of cues (and feedback), but also of the perceived 
ephemerality of email communication:  
“Although computer-based communication systems may permanently 
archive all electronic messages, people perceive the experience of sending 
and receiving messages as an ephemeral one. The immediate experience is 
conveyed by fingers moving on a keyboard and phosphor flickering on a 
screen; messages appear and disappear with the touch of a button… When 
people perceive communication to be ephemeral, the stakes of 
communication seem smaller. People feel less committed to what they say, 
less concerned about it, and less worried about the social reception they will 
get.” (Sproull & Kiesler 1991) 
It may seem curious that email should be more ephemeral than verbal communication: 
text is generally more tangible than speech, one would object. One generally 
emphasizes the tangibility of text, along with it’s potential as an aid to memory 
(individual or organisational) (Conklin & Begeman 1989). To some extent this 
paradox may be explained by the design of earlier mail programs, where storage, 
categorizing of, and access to old emails was less straightforward than today. Yet the 
paradox of ‘ephemeral text’ also illustrates the limitations of seeing a medium as a 
‘channel’ with varying degrees of filtering: messages are not merely sent from sender 
to receiver, but also stored. Culnan & Markus emphasize this aspect when making a 
point in apparent contradiction with Sproull & Kiesler (although referring to 
transcripts and not email): “A transcript turns each utterance into a public stand to which others 
can easily refer at later points in time” (Culnan & Markus 1987). 
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Sproull & Kiesler’s argument makes more sense, however, if one accepts that 
‘ephemerality’ refers not only to the ‘object’ of communication, the text itself, but also 
to the context: one has only a vague perception of other participants and their 
surroundings, as further argued by Sproull & Kiesler:  
“There are no tangible artefacts like someone sitting across a desk or ever 
growing piles of paper or bulging filing cabinets to remind people of their 
participation in communication exchanges. The lack of tangible artefacts and 
perceived ephemerality cause people to lose mental sight of their 
communication partners.”  (Sproull & Kiesler 1991) 
The point is that verbal face-to-face communication can be less ephemeral and more 
tangible than text messages in electronic communication, because what has been said 
has already caused visible and ‘irreversible’ reactions in the other participants – 
reactions that also exist in electronic groups but are not perceived by the speaker (or 
other members), and can more easily be ignored. The apparent contradiction with 
Culnan & Markus’ point about the ‘public stand’ may be resolved by a clear 
distinction between the ‘immediate’ effects within the group, and the (‘public’) effects 
beyond the group: in Culnan & Markus’ argument, group dynamics is ‘dissolved’ and 
exposed by the transcripts. 
Sproull & Kiesler thus argue that the ephemerality of email communication reduces 
social commitment from the participants, which increases the potential for rationality 
and thus may improve their results66.  
Benjamin: technology, art and the dissolution of aura 
There are some parallels between Sproull & Kiesler’s emphasis on buffering and 
ephemerality, and Benjamin’s theory of the role of technology in the dissolution of 
aura.  Benjamin argues that the technical development, which makes it possible to 
make multiple near-perfect copies of a piece of art, changes both human perception 
                                                     
66 Lack of authenticity (and honesty)? Others may emphasize negative and irrational 
consequences of ephemerality and decreasing attention to social convention: i.e. people may 
feel less inhibited from lying, resulting in dubious authenticity in electronic communication 
(i.e. people have false identities etc.). Compare pragmatic criteria for communication (incl. 
Habermas). One counter-argument would be that others will generally be less inclined to 
believe you, and thus will not be deceived. And perhaps one could refer to Popper’s argument 
about the irrelevance of the source of knowledge: we do not have to fear the source, as long as 
‘candidates’ for knowledge remain exposed to rational critique. Nevertheless Habermas and 
pragmatic philosophers of language seem to emphasize authenticity in communicative 
rationality: people should be honest when referring their own opinions and feelings. Obviously, 
authenticity and ‘commitment’ is crucial in electronic groups that are expected to deliver some 
result. 
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and the very status of art by dissolving its aura. Aura is defined as something essential 
to a ‘pre-modern’ world; it is a ‘sense of belonging’, of being part of a traditional 
context. Before its ‘technical reproducibility’, the aura of a work of art was tied to its 
uniqueness and tangibility (‘Dauer’), which established a distance to the observer: 
"Einmaligkeit und Dauer sind [im Bilde] so eng verschränkt wie Flüchtigkeit 
und Wiederholbarkeit [in der Reproduktion]." (Benjamin 1998) 
The aura evaporates when a work of art is brought ‘closer’ to the observer by 
improved technical reproduction, which destroys uniqueness (by repetitiousness) and 
dissolves tangibility (into ephemerality) – art can be ‘perceived’ outside museums, and 
without the awe-imposing effect of these ‘temples of art’. To Benjamin, ephemerality 
is something positive, a mental ’emancipation’ from aura (and experience).  Instead of 
the bond (commitment) to the traditional aura, detachedness becomes a characteristic 
of the modern condition – and a precondition of an emancipatory practice. 
Benjamin’s theory of evaporation of aura as a fundamental process - which is not 
merely the effect of technology67 - is a clear parallel to Weber’s theory about the 
‘disenchantment’ of the modern world.  
It may seem paradoxical when Benjamin thus argues that the technical mediation 
(film) brings the object (of art) closer – as in the example of the movie actor 
mentioned previously – but the point is that the physical proximity of the actor in a 
theatre is associated with auratic distance, the unreachability of the actor. Here is a 
parallel to Sproull & Kiesler’s argument that the electronic mediation (‘distance’) 
reduces the ‘distance’ in terms of status and hierarchy – while loosening the strong 
social ties characteristic of a face-to-face group. One may also compare Derrida’s 
argument that the power exercised by the spoken word can be much more ‘totalitarian’ 
than the one exercised through writing (referring to Gorgia, Plato etc.):  
                                                     
67 Adorno criticizes Benjamin’s essay about art and technology: he does not share the optimism 
regarding technology, and he cannot accept the inherent disregard of art as mere ritual. He is 
also very critical of – ’not impressed with’ – Benjamin’s category of detachedness: "derudover 
vil teorien om adspredelsen, trods dens chokagtige forførelse, ikke overbevise mig. Om ikke 
andet så af den simple grund, at i det kommunistiske samfund vil arbejdet være organiseret 
således, at menneskene ikke mere vil være så trætte og ikke mere så fordummede, at de har 
behov for adspredelse" (Adorno 1994). (His argument here – before World War II and the 
Dialectics of Enlightenment – is very Utopian. I suppose he argues differently 10-20 years 
later, but he always remained critical of the idea of ‘detachedness’, i.e. in his characteristics of 
the ’private sphere’ as inherently defined and restricted by Totality...). Yet, he finds the 
concept of aura and its evaporation useful. 
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"La dynastie de la parole peut être plus violente que celle de l'écriture, son 
effraction est plus profonde, plus pénétrante, plus diverse, plus sure." 
(Derrida 1972) 
4.3.2.2. The virtues of (textual) virtuality 
Electronic communication thus has certain characteristics, which in particular 
situations give electronic groups – or ‘virtual teams’ – some advantages over 
‘physical’ ones (and some weaknesses as well): 
Ignore faulty reasoning – focus on the task 
“They will more often ignore faulty reasoning promulgated by people who, 
face-to-face, have good social skills or organisational status” (Sproull & 
Kiesler 1991).  
Members of electronic group are less inclined to recognize a leader status, and they 
tend to focus more on the issue, and less on each other.  
”media appear to reduce consensus about leadership and to increase the 
focus of participants on the task at hand rather than on the individual 
members of the group.” (Strickland et al., 1978), cited in (Culnan & Markus 
1987) 
Whereas face-to-face interaction, ”[b]y directing too much attention toward the 
communicators, ... may lead to ineffective task outcomes” (Short et al., 1976). In other words, 
the ephemerality due to media only concerns the communication partners and the task 
at hand, apparently not the task or issue. 
One may ask whether this emphasis on ‘the task’ does not exclude situations 
ambiguity. Does not ambiguity and hermeneutic understanding require that one must 
shift focus from the ‘task at hand’ and instead try to understand the underlying 
interpretations of the communication partners? Does this not imply that it is necessary 
to focus on the communication partners? Only to some extent: recall Gadamer’s 
argument that understanding is not a question of psychology, not a question of 
revealing private, inner intentions; but of reconstructing the system of arguments and 
assumptions on which the argument is based. And the ultimate aim is to learn more 
about ‘the task at hand’ – although serious modification may be required. In the end 
the revelation of different, conflicting interpretations will generally still reveal more 
aspects of ‘the task at hand’. Thus, the whole process opens with apparent ambiguity 
in the task itself; this ‘objective’ ambiguity is then traced back to a ‘subjective’ 
ambiguity between frames of interpretation; and ideally, the resulting shared 
interpretation will include elements from several of the ‘original’ ones, and thus reveal 
more aspects of ‘the task at hand’ than any of the preceding interpretations suggested. 
More people consulted – more alternatives considered  
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"[E]lectronic groups will consult more people, which will increase the number of alternatives 
considered” (Sproull & Kiesler 1991), where face-to-face groups will normally consider 
only a few alternatives (often those suggested by high status members) and converge 
quickly towards a consensus. Electronic group members are less inclined to accept the 
first suggestion by a high-status member, and the text-based technology makes it 
possible for several members to offer proposals simultaneously.  
More conflict 
“They may experience more conflict in solving problems. Electronic 
discussions can result in riskier choices, and group members may be 
unconscious of this." (Sproull & Kiesler 1991)  
They may take long time to reach a solution – although the actual ‘cost’ in man-hours 
may be smaller – or perhaps not reach a solution at all. Notice that this observation 
indirectly confirms Daft & Lengel’s argument that rich media are convenient for 
reaching decisions in a timely manner. 
A ‘paradox’ in this and previous argument deserves some consideration, because Daft 
& Lengel seem to argue that electronic (poor) media will increase ambiguity. Is this 
comparison reasonable? Obviously, ambiguity is not simply a question of ‘number of 
alternatives’, because it is due to conflicting interpretations, and a (frame of) 
interpretation is ‘more’ than an alternative, at another cognitive level. Nevertheless it 
is reasonable to assume that ‘alternative solutions’ will often be based on different 
interpretations. 
By emphasizing the benefit of more alternatives in the previous argument, Sproull & 
Kiesler imply that increased ambiguity is an improvement of decision-making or 
problem solving (i.e. brainstorming). This positive attitude requires that ambiguity can 
be reduced by reasoning rather than negotiations, that alternatives are not 
incommensurable. If not, the ambiguity encouraged by media is frozen as 
disagreement and conflict – and thus inhibit rationality, as in the last argument. 
4.3.2.3. ‘Domination-free’ communication? 
Basically, Sproull & Kiesler suggest that electronic groups ideally constitute an 
example of the ‘domination-free’ communication, which constitutes an ideal – but 
seldom obtainable – situation in Habermas’ theory of communication. Electronic 
communication prevents or slows down the forming of consensus and social ties – and 
opens up the process for rational critique. Electronic media filter out social 
information that distracts attention from arguments themselves (and from inherent 
prejudices). Electronic media filter out ‘signals’ or nonverbal cues that operate below 
‘consciousness’ and provoke immediate – pre-conscious, routine-like – reaction. 
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One might criticize them for sociological naivety and technological determinism, 
when they argue that electronic mediation ‘brackets’ social structure and hierarchy and 
establishes a ‘domination-free communication’. Nevertheless, if one de-emphasizes 
the technological hype in their argument, one might recognize classical enlightenment 
and rationalist argument: the virtue of electronic mediation in groups is to emphasize 
language (logos); furthermore, the technology emphasizes written communication, 
and writing implies objectification and independence from the individual subject – and 
exposure to critique. 
4.3.3. Comparison 
I have argued that the there is a fundamental disagreement between Daft & Lengel and 
Sproull & Kiesler over the virtues of electronic media. While the former argue the 
need for rich media providing nonverbal cues etc. for resolution of ambiguity, the 
latter argue that ‘poor’ electronic, text-based media filter out social information to the 
benefit of open rational critique and problem solving. I tend to concur with the latter 
argument, and I certainly find that there is a need to ‘hold back’ on the general and 
widespread enthusiasm about rich media. 
Nevertheless this comparison requires a few more words of justification. It may be 
argued that my comparison is misleading, that I exaggerate the disagreement and 
overlook similarities. I shall try to reconstruct this counterargument in order to answer 
it properly. 
4.3.3.1. Is there any conflict? 
In fact, Sproull & Kiesler do recognize that electronic groups are only preferable in 
some situations or task types, while others call for face-to-face meetings etc. If their 
duality of tasks corresponds to the distinction between uncertainty and ambiguity 
(although they do not use it consciously), then there is perfect agreement between the 
theories – and I have only found a conflict because I have compared Sproull & 
Kiesler’s examples of uncertainty with Daft & Lengel’s examples of ambiguity. 
Commitment and negotiations 
"Face-to-face meetings are best when computer-based communication could 
impede performance or commitment to the group. If a decision requires 
complex and delicate multiparty negotiations, face-to-face communication is 
better than electronic communication because it is hard to persuade subtly in 
electronic communication. Even in these situations, electronic 
communication may still be useful to gather preliminary information and 
opinions in a premeeting meeting before a face-to-face meeting takes place. 
It also may be useful in the future to augment conventional face-to-face 
meetings with computer support in the meeting room... Face-to-face 
meetings are also best for generating commitment to a course of action, for 
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better or for worse. Thus, project teams may hold many face-to-face 
meetings early in their life to secure commitment to the team's goals and to 
decompose the task into parts. The individual members can agree to work on 
the parts by themselves. Teams can then stay in touch largely through 
electronic communication, thus attaining … simultaneous linking and 
buffering... Finally, some decision must be symbolically ratified as important 
ones. Face-to-face meetings permit the laying on of hands in a way no 
mediated communication can do." (Sproull & Kiesler 1991) 
Thus, Sproull & Kiesler acknowledge the virtues of rich media, arguing that face-to-
face is necessary for 1) generating commitment from group members, 2) “complex and 
delicate multiparty negotiations “, and 3) if the situation generally calls for immediate 
action rather than thorough analysis and consideration. While the last example 
corresponds to Daft & Lengel’s emphasis on the capacity for reaching decisions “in a 
timely manner”68, the second (and perhaps the first?) example clearly refers to processes 
involving ambiguity. And there seems to be a general acceptance of this conclusion, 
which is also adopted in a more recent text discussing media richness: 
"certain organizational tasks, or types of work, may be more effective when 
performed in virtual mode than others; in particular, exchanges involving 
knowledge elicitation or sharing may more readily lend themselves to the 
virtual mode than those involving consensus formation or conflict 
resolution." (DeSanctis & Monge 1999) 
Nevertheless, negotiations – where face-to-face is required – is only a limited and 
hardly representative example of ‘reduction of ambiguity’. It might even be argued 
that negotiation is often an alternative to reduction of ambiguity. Nonverbal cues 
support rapid convergence by inhibiting conflicts and shortcutting discussions; they 
are thus supportive in reaching agreement, but not in a ‘rational’ (interpretive) process 
of understanding. Furthermore, in the citation above Sproull & Kiesler add that even 
in these situations preparations may be augmented electronically, supporting 
brainstorming and preliminary information. 
Good solutions and correct answers 
Electronic groups, according to Sproull & Kiesler, are more suitable for problem 
solving, where good solutions are not disregarded when proposed by low status 
members, and generally in situations where correct answers are valued over faulty 
reasoning:  
                                                     
68Even though such decision is reached ‘in a timely manner’, however, it may require the same 
or more resources in actual workings hours. In the case study, an interviewee admits that much 
time may actually be wasted in physical meetings because no one has had the time for better 
preparations (Face-to-face thus supports the ‘bounded rationality’ of group decisions). 
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"Given the choice to convene a group, electronic meetings can be more 
appropriate than face-to-face ones. Group problem solving often falls short 
because a person with a good solution must convince others to adopt it, 
difficult in face-to-face meetings if the person with the correct answer has 
low status. Face-to-face groups do not always ratify an obvious correct 
answer when only one member proposes it; correct proposals may need to be 
endorsed by more than one person for the group as a whole to come to 
recognize their correctness... In electronic meetings, which are less 
influenced by status, support for correct answers might be more easily 
obtained from lower-status members." (Sproull & Kiesler 1991) 
To what extent is this category or ‘task type’ similar to ‘reduction of uncertainty’? 
Certainly, criteria such as ‘good solutions’ and ‘correct answer’ belong to a particular 
category of problems or tasks where rationality is essential – and a common 
interpretation is agreed upon. Nevertheless, the examples are more than mere ‘data 
collection’, the essence of reduction of uncertainty according to Daft & Lengel. 
Furthermore, Sproull & Kiesler emphasize that their discussion is not restricted to 
well-defined technical problems with correct solutions, because this would be a very 
unrealistic example of the problems real-life managers deal with.  
This discussion has demonstrated that there does remain a conflict between Sproull & 
Kiesler and Daft & Lengel, that they do not simply present similar distinctions and 
recommendations with different words. Sproull & Kiesler do not accept a general 
need for face-to-face in all cases characterized by ambiguity, only in a narrow ‘subset’ 
of these cases. The conclusion is thus confirmed: where Daft & Lengel emphasize the 
valuable role of nonverbal cues for reduction of ambiguity, Sproull & Kiesler argue 
that poor media encourage critical judgment by filtering out social information and 
thus reducing attention to status and hierarchy, indeed, to social convention in general. 
4.4. The poverty of text? 
The purpose of this section is to qualify the concept and theory of media richness by 
applying a different perspective on similar issues, and to identify new characteristics of 
electronic communication and computer networks compared with the traditional medium 
of text – how do these new media affect the status of writing and its relation to speech? 
Philosophical discussions of writing, compared with the spoken word, is thus a classical 
‘media richness’ issue.  
First, I shall shortly discuss aspects of a type of writing that is separated from, or at 
least not secondary to the spoken word: non-phonetic writing. After this, the discussion 
of phonetic writing will take a somewhat polemical starting point in a selection of 
critical perspectives on writing. These critical remarks will then initiate a 
consideration of various characteristics of writing (vs. speech), concluding with a 
reaction to the critique resulting in more or less a defence of written communication.  
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4.4.1. Non-phonetic writing, i.e. mathematical symbols, logical 
expressions 
There are two different categories of writing: the phonetic writing, which in principle 
represents the sounds of the spoken word, and the non-phonetic writing. One example 
of the latter is figurative or hieroglyphic writing like Chinese, in which the signs refer 
directly to ideas or objects by picturing or resembling them, without (intermediating) 
reference to sounds. In Saussure’s semiologic terms, the signifier (the ‘physical’ or 
material side of the sign) pictures or imitates the signified. Such signs are also 
categorized as iconic (Peirce) or mimetic (Adorno), and Hegel speaks of symbols as 
opposed to the (more advanced) sign:  
“einer Anschauung, deren eigene Bestimmtheit ihrem Wesen und Begriffe 
nach mehr oder weniger der Inhalt ist, den sie als Symbol ausdrückt” (Hegel 
1998) 
Saussure argues that the tendency of writing to become a secondary language, and 
even to replace the ‘primary’ spoken one (see p. 158) is stronger in figurative than in 
phonetic writing, but less fatal, exactly because the separation is absolute and does not 
really affect the spoken language. 
4.4.1.1. Pure writing – formalization and departure from the spoken word 
There is another type of non-phonetic writing, characterised pure writing: symbolic 
notation used in mathematics, formal logic, the sciences (i.e. chemistry) etc., where 
signs and letters refer to objects independently of spoken words. Such signs are based 
on reference without resemblance. Financial reports and budgets (‘numerical 
documents’ in the ‘media richness’ hierarchy) may be regarded as examples of pure 
writing in organisational settings – although they are never pure ‘numerical 
documents’, but normally include ‘verbal sensemaking’, the function of which is to 
interpret or analyse the meaning of the numbers. Nevertheless, calculations operate 
independently (and automatically) of any sensemaking. And when (large) numbers are 
more easily perceived visually, easier to read than hear (over the phone), this may 
reflect how mathematical notation has departed from natural language. 
Pure writing is the result of a historical process of formalization of scientific thought. 
Some of the milestones of this development were Leibniz’ automation of 
multiplication and division, and the formalization of logic, which was thus removed 
from the spoken word. To emphasize the point: these examples of pure writing are 
used as techniques to enable (complex) calculation, which would be virtually 
impossible without. This process of formalization and ensuing automation of thought 
was the precondition for the computer, and has culminated in the research in Artificial 
Intelligence, expert systems etc. (Haugeland 1987). 
Historical process from symbol to sign 
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Horkheimer & Adorno seem to refer to this development when they speak of a general 
tendency – in the over-all (dialectical) process of Enlightenment - to split the word in 
two and separate the semiotic (sign) from the mimetic (image, figurative) side. As 
opposed to the image (or symbol), the sign is based on an arbitrary relation between 
signifier and signified: "beim Zeichen als solchem hingegen geht der eigene Inhalt der 
Anschauung und der, dessen Zeichen sie ist, einander nichts an." (Hegel 1998) 69.  
In most respects, the sign represents a more advanced state of thought than the image. 
This argument anticipates the discussion of art and nonverbal cues (see Appendix C), 
because it corresponds to the argument that a picture or image – a ‘richer’ medium in 
terms of – is incapable of logical structure; that formalisation – impoverishing of 
language – enables a more precise knowledge (of nature). Hegel argues that human 
intelligence is set free by the sign and better equipped to dominate nature: 
"Als bezeichnend beweist daher die Intelligenz eine freiere Willkür und 
Herrschaft im Gebrauch der Anschauung denn als symbolisierend." (Hegel 
1998) 
The symbolic sign, on the other hand, is more conservative and less compatible with 
the revolutionary process of enlightenment. It is basically static and incapable of 
following the developments in knowledge, because it would be required to change 
along with new knowledge of the object it represents. Each time the progress of 
thought reveals fundamentally new aspects of some issue a symbol/image would have 
to change to reflect such changes. 
“Jede Abweichung in der Analyse brächte eine andere Bildung des 
Schriftnamens hervor, wie in neueren Zeiten nach der vorhin gemachten 
Bemerkung sogar in dem sinnlichen Gebiete die Salzsäure auf mehrfache 
Weise ihren Namen verändert hat. Eine hieroglyphische Schriftsprache 
erforderte eine ebenso statarische Philosophie, als es die Bildung der 
Chinesen überhaupt ist.” (Hegel 1998) 
Hegel’s discussion is illustrative in emphasizing the argument about the conservative 
nature of symbol or image. Yet it should be noticed that his argument is also 
misleading in this context: he does in fact not defend pure writing, but actually 
criticizes Leibniz’ idea of creating a universal figurative writing, independent of 
national languages and thus of the spoken word. Thus Hegel here argues against both 
                                                     
69 This distinction is classical. As already mentioned Peirce has a similar distinction, although 
comparison is confused by different, event contradicting labels: here, the icon is mimetic or 
resembling, while the symbol is arbitrary (corresponding to the sign in Hegel’s and Adorno’s 
definition). Peirce also includes a 3rd form of ‘representation’, the index, which is based on a 
natural or causal relation (Kjørup 1996). Saussure, on the other hand, defines signs as 
fundamentally arbitrary, which seems to imply that he does not recognize mimetic signs. 
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figurative and pure writing, and in defence of a phonetic writing that preserves the link 
with the spoken word: 
“Die Buchstabenschrift ist an und für sich die intelligentere; in ihr ist das 
Wort, die der Intelligenz eigentümliche würdigste Art der Äußerung ihrer 
Vorstellungen, zum Bewußtsein gebracht, zum Gegenstande der Reflexion 
gemacht.” (Hegel 1998) 
Dialectics of progress and separation of sign from symbol 
Horkheimer & Adorno, however, see a general tendency to separate the sign from the 
symbol, and from the word altogether. It may be difficult to go too much in detail with 
the implied ‘semiotic’ theory because their focus is not on writing in itself, but on a 
broader tendency in Western thought. The idea is that the word has a mimetic origin, 
and that it has a meaning beyond the reference (characteristic of the scientific signs 
discussed above). The scientific ideal is to strip the signs of any (metaphysical) 
meaning, and ‘purify’ its function as mere reference to an object. This is in accordance 
with the positivist theory of ‘meaning’ distillated from metaphysic connotations –thus 
using ‘meaning’ in quite a different sense. One may also compare Habermas’ theory 
of differentiation and the separation of science from natural language (p. 19). 
Horkheimer & Adorno recognize the element of progress in this development, but also 
emphasize the potential loss. Science concentrates on the sign by renouncing on the 
‘proper’ word, which remains as a ‘residual’ left to the arts (see later). Science focuses 
on calculation and renounces on meaning:  
”Als Zeichen kommt das Wort an die Wissenschaft; als Ton, als Bild, als 
eigentliches Wort wird es unter die verschiedenen Künste aufgeteilt, ohne 
dass es sich durch deren Addition, durch Synästhesie oder Gesamtkunst je 
wiederherstellen ließe ... Als Zeichen soll Sprache zur Kalkulation 
resignieren, um Natur zu erkennen, den Anspruch ablegen, ihr ähnlich zu 
sein.” (Horkheimer & Adorno 1968) 
Paradoxically, non-phonetic writing even tends to reverse its ‘emancipation’ from the 
mimetic tie to its object (the signified), because it ends up imitating relations and 
structures. Horkheimer & Adorno imply that the pure writing turns symbolic – that it 
regresses to a mimetic function, yet at another level. When Galileo uses geometry to 
picture velocity (see endnote, p.78), he represents ‘eternal’ laws. Symbols represent 
eternal repetition:  
“die sich wiederholende Natur … ist der Kern des Symbolischen: ein Sein 
oder ein Vorgang, der als ewig vorgestellt wird, weil er im Vollzug des 
Symbols stets wieder Ereignis werden soll...” (Horkheimer & Adorno 1968) 
Conservative nostalgia for metaphysical meaning? 
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It should be emphasized that Horkheimer & Adorno’s argument about the ‘loss of 
meaning’ is not merely a conservative and nostalgic longing for ‘aura’ and 
metaphysical meaning. They agree with the general enlightened critique of 
metaphysics, although Adorno in particular argues that something should be saved: for 
all the conservatism and traditionalism, metaphysics also contained some progressive 
and emancipatory aspects of importance to modern man. 
In his will to force out some sense and hope from metaphysics and philosophy Adorno 
can be contrasted with Derrida, who has no mercy for any form of inheritance. Derrida 
criticizes Hegel’s disregard of non-phonetic, pure writing, and sees it as illustrative of 
a general tendency in Western Thought to cling to a spoken language, which is – 
according to Derrida’s fundamental critique of Western civilization – burdened by 
metaphysical prejudice (in a negative sense). The critique of pure writing reflects the 
‘phono-centrism’ of Western metaphysics:  
"modstanden mod den logisk-matematiske notation har altid været logo-
centrismens og fonologismens kendemærke." (Derrida 1970)70  
Instead, Derrida welcomes this ‘rebellion’ by scientific practice, because he use of 
non-phonetic writing demonstrates and confronts the limitations of phono-centrism. 
He emphasizes, however, that science is ‘revolutionary’ merely in its practice that, 
because it still in its concept belongs to the phono-centric tradition: 
“le concept de la science ou de la scientificité de la science – ce que l’on a 
toujours déterminé comme logique – concept qui a toujours été un concept 
philosophique, même si la pratique de la science n’a en fait jamais cessé de 
contester l’impérialisme du logos, par exemple en faisant appel, depuis 
toujours et de plus en plus, à l’écriture non-phonétique. Sans doute cette 
subversion a-t-elle toujours été contenue à l’intérieur d’un système 
allocutaire qui a donné naissance au projet de la science et aux conventions 
de toute caractéristique non-phonétique. Il n’a pu autrement en être 
autrement. Il appartient néanmoins à notre époque qu’au moment où la 
phonétisation de l’écriture – origine historique et possibilité structurelle de la 
philosophie comme de la science, condition de l’épistème – tend à s’emparer 
de la culture mondiale, la science ne puisse plus s’en satisfaire en aucune de 
ses avancées. Cette inadéquation avait toujours déjà commence à donner le 
mouvement.” (Derrida 1967) 
”Alt det der til enhver tid har været knyttet til logos og fonê har fundet sin 
grænse i matematikken, hvis udvikling er helt afhængig af udøvelsen af en 
ikke-fonetisk skrift.” (Derrida 1970)71 
                                                     
70 “The resistance against the logical-mathematical notation has always been a characteristic of 
logo-centrism and phonologism.” 
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And he does not simply defend logical positivism against the ‘metaphysical’ critiques 
of formalization, because the associated philosophy of positivism is burdened with its 
own metaphysics, such as that of simplicity and logos: 
“Man må iøvrigt tage afstand fra den ‘naive’ side af formalismen og 
matematismen, der – må man huske – inden for metafysikken også har haft 
den birolle at komplettere og konfirmere den samme logocentriske teologi, 
som de netop først og fremmest kunne anfægte. Således gælder det, at 
Leibniz’s matematiske og ikke-fonetiske udkast til en characteristica 
universalis nøje hænger sammen med en simpelhedens metafysik, og 
herigennem med en forudsat eksisterende guddommelig fornuft, en 
guddommelig logos.” (Derrida 1970)72 
Despite the risk of deferring too much from the focus of this thesis, I have found 
Derrida useful in emphasizing some relevant aspects and advantages of pure, 
‘impoverished’ writing, an example of a formalized language according to the richness 
hierarchy. 
4.4.2. Phonetic writing (the written word) 
4.4.2.1. Writing as usurping – useless and harmful? 
The view of writing as impoverished speech, as something external, as an ill-tailored 
clothing of true, living knowledge is prevalent in much literature about organisational 
learning. The written word is seen as a vague reminiscence either of truly practical 
knowledge – a critique of writing obviously associated with an emphasis on the 
‘situated’ and experiential form of knowledge – or of the living thought in the spoken 
word. There is a general tendency to see writing as secondary, as an impoverished 
representation of the spoken word. The critique of writing can generally be 
summarized in two paradoxical claims: that writing is both useless and harmful. 
In Brown & Duguid’s words formal, written procedures – “Abstractions detached from 
practice” – “distort or obscure intricacies of that practice” (Brown & Duguid 1996). This 
                                                                                                                                            
71 “Everything that always has been associated with logos and fonê has found its limitation in 
mathematics, the development of which depended completely on the use a non-phonetic 
scripture.” 
72 “One must reject the ‘naïve’ element of formalism and mathematics, which – as one should 
remember – within metaphysics has had the secondary role of completing and confirming the 
very same logocentric theology that they more than anyone should be able to question. Thus, 
Leibniz’ mathematic and non-phonetic outline of a characteristica universalis is closely related 
to a metaphysics of simplicity, and hence with a presumed existing deified reason, a deified 
logos.” 
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reflects a general tendency in some of the ‘social construction’ literature seeing formal 
rules and procedures (canonical practice) as mere façade, window-dressing, behind 
which competent workers solve situated problems by the help of experience and 
collective memory. 
It should be noticed, however, that Brown & Duguid’s discussion does not explicitly 
concern the relation between the written and the spoken word; they tend to emphasize 
non-verbalized experience and practices, implying a general contrast to language in 
general. They seem to regard language itself is a usurper, and to suggest that this 
tendency is enhanced with writing. 
Writing qualifies poorly in the richness hierarchy, due to its low ‘variety of cues’, and 
low feedback (interactivity) – although this latter characteristic has changed with 
electronic communication. 
Plato: writing as forgetfulness 
The disregard of writing echoes Plato’s (or Socrates’?) denouncement of the ‘new’ 
medium in his Phaedrus dialogue. He refers to a myth of Theuth, the inventor of 
writing, proudly presenting his creation to Thamus, the king of Egypt: 
“This, said Theuth, will make the Egyptians wiser and give them better 
memories; it is a specific both for the memory and for the wit. Thamus 
replied: O most ingenious Theuth, the parent or inventor of an art is not 
always the best judge of the utility or inutility of his own inventions to the 
users of them. And in this instance, you who are the father of letters, from a 
paternal love of your own children have been led to attribute to them a 
quality which they cannot have; for this discovery of yours will create 
forgetfulness in the learners' souls, because they will not use their memories; 
they will trust to the external written characters and not remember of 
themselves. The specific which you have discovered is an aid not to memory, 
but to reminiscence, and you give your disciples not truth, but only the 
semblance of truth; they will be hearers of many things and will have learned 
nothing; they will appear to be omniscient and will generally know nothing; 
they will be tiresome company, having the show of wisdom without the 
reality.” (Plato 2000) (my italicisation) 
Writing is thus not only a poor aid to memory – “even the best of writings are but a 
reminiscence of what we know” (Plato 2000) – but worse: it is a threat to a persons true 
memory by replacing or repressing it, and it generally has negative effect on people. 
Writing is not merely secondary, but it also interferes in the subject’s access to his 
original knowledge or memory – there is a parallel to Benjamin’s argument that we 
have lost access to our private, individual experience, although Benjamin emphasizes 
the structure of messages, information vs. narratives, rather than writing (vs. the 
spoken word) (see p. 17).  
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Obviously it is problematic to compare Plato with a ‘social constructivist’ approach 
like that of Brown & Duguid, as they do not share Plato’s emphasis on neither truth, 
language nor the individual (soul). Nevertheless Brown & Duguid etc. tend to argue 
that the collective (unmediated) subject is more ‘efficient’ or functional, that it solves 
problems in a more competent way than suggested by the canonical (and written) 
practice. And even though criterions of ‘efficiency’ and ‘competency’ are different 
from that of ‘truth’, they still assume that practitioners have ‘better’ knowledge about 
their material. 
Plato specifies his critique of writing: 
“[W]riting is unfortunately like painting; for the creations of the painter have 
the attitude of life, and yet if you ask them a question they preserve a solemn 
silence. And the same may be said of speeches. You would imagine that they 
had intelligence, but if you want to know anything and put a question to one of 
them, the speaker always gives one unvarying answer. And when they have 
been once written down they are tumbled about anywhere among those who 
may or may not understand them, and know not to whom they should reply, 
to whom not: and, if they are maltreated or abused, they have no parent to 
protect them; and they cannot protect or defend themselves.” (Plato 2000) (my 
italicisation) 
So, writing – like art – is static, lifeless, and inflexible. And written text become 
orphans separated from their parent, unable to defend themselves against abuse and 
misunderstandings. This he contrasts with “an intelligent word graven in the soul of the 
learner, which can defend itself, and knows when to speak and when to be silent” – an argument 
that may be seen in the context of his general theory that we were all born with a true 
knowledge of things, a knowledge that we have forgotten and repressed – and that 
learning (cognition) is basically a process of recovering. The famous example is 
Socrates’ demonstration that a slave already knows (the proof) of the proper relation 
between the three sides of a triangle). 
Plato’s comparison of the written and the spoken word does not compare 
straightforward with the richness hierarchy. On the one hand his emphasis on dialogue 
– answering questions, defending oneself – implies a need for fast feedback (time), 
thus confirming one dimension of richness. On the other hand he does not praise the 
variety of non-verbal (vocal or visual) cues: truth is linked to language and 
verbalisation. There is in principle no reason to value video-meetings or face-to-face 
meetings over the phone, because all media allow for dialogue.  
Saussure: writing, the impostor 
A more recent example is Ferdinand de Saussure, who argues that linguistic research 
must focus on the spoken word and beware of the treacheries of writing. He argues 
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that voice – sound – is more privileged as a signifier due to its closeness to thought – 
although he does recognize that is not the only form of signifier: 
 ”La langue est une convention, et la nature du signe dont on est convenu est 
indifférente. La question de l’appareil vocal est donc secondaire dans le 
problème du langage.” (de Saussure 1968) 
The spoken word is the true research object of linguistics and should be studied 
independently of the written word, the sole function of which is to represent it. 
Saussure criticizes a tendency to focus on the written word because of its form and 
prestige. The tangibility of the written word distracts the attention from the true object 
of linguistic studies. 
“La langue a donc une tradition orale indépendante de l’écriture, et bien 
autrement fixe; mais le prestige de la forme écrite nous empêche de le voir.” 
(de Saussure 1968) 
This true relation between the spoken and the (secondary) written word is easy to 
forget for the linguist who is often left with the latter as the only witness – as in the 
case of a language that is no longer spoken. Saussure argues strongly against the idea 
that writing due to its apparent permanence and solidity is better suited to secure the 
identity and cohesiveness of a language over time – this mistake is understandable but 
deceived by the superficial solidity of the written word:  
“D’abord l’image graphique des mots nous frappe comme un objet 
permanent et solide, plus propre que le son à constituer l’unité de la langue à 
travers le temps. Ce lien a beau être superficiel et créer une unité purement 
factice; il est beaucoup plus facile à saisir que le lien naturel, le seul 
veritable, celui du son.” (de Saussure 1968) 
Saussure then gives a few examples of words that have survived merely through oral 
communication. Later he argues that the written word is immobile and thus unable to 
represent the incessant evolution of the spoken.  
The written word tends to usurp the spoken, by putting itself in its place – it has 
gained a reputation and assumed an unmerited importance, not the least aided by 
literary language: “La langue littéraire accroit encore l’importance imméritée de l’écriture” (de 
Saussure 1968). A tendency that seems to increase, the worse it misrepresents the 
spoken word. To focus on the written word is like focusing on the photograph instead 
of the person on the photo. 
And in a parallel Plato, Saussure proceeds to make the stronger argument (which 
seems to contradict the first (Derrida 1967)): that the tyranny of scripture affects and 
modifies the spoken word: 
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“Mais la tyrannie de la lettre va plus loin encore: à force de s’imposer à la 
masse, elle influe sur la langue et la modifie.” (de Saussure 1968) 
“Ces déformations phoniques appartiennent bien à la langue, seulement elles 
ne résultent pas de son jeu naturel; elles dues à un facteur qui lui est étranger. 
La linguistique doit les mettre en observation dans un compartiment spécial; 
ce sont des cas tératologiques.” (de Saussure 1968) 
4.4.2.2. Aspects of writing 
Inspired by the discussions above I shall emphasize a few characteristics of the written 
word: its tangibility, the tendency to orphanage – separation from its source, as 
opposed to the (relative) situated character of the spoken word, and the consequences 
for memory 
Tangibility 
Text is static, frozen, stable, eternal, and universal – as opposed to the spoken word, 
which inhabits the temporal medium of sound. Text is tangible as opposed to the 
ephemerality of the spoken word. Phonetic writing is time converted to space (death 
of the living word). Therefore, reading a written text allows another order of reading 
than if listening to a speech. 
This tangibility also characterizes figurative art, but phonetic writing has inherited the 
linearity of the spoken word, which is projected onto the lines of a text: 
“Le signifiant, étant de nature auditive, se déroule dans le temps seul et a les 
caractères qu’il emprunte au temps: a) il représente une étendue, et b) cette 
étendue est mesurable dans une seule dimension: c’est une ligne... Ce principe 
est évident, mais semble qu’on ait toujours néglige de l’énoncer, sans doute 
parce qu’on l’a trouvé trop simple; cependant il est fondamental et les 
conséquences en son incalculable; son importance est égale à celle de la 
première loi [the arbitrariness of the signifier, JT]. Tout le mécanisme de la 
langue en dépend... Par opposition aux signifiants visuels (signaux 
maritimes, etc.), qui peuvent offrir des complications simultanées sur 
plusieurs dimensions, les signifiants acoustiques ne disposent que de la ligne 
du temps; leurs éléments se présentent l’un après l’autre; ils forment une 
chaîne. Ce caractère apparaît immédiatement dès qu’on les représente par 
l’écriture et qu’on substitue la ligne spatiale des signes graphiques à la 
succession dans le temps.” (de Saussure 1968) 
This linearity distinguishes phonetic writing from pictures, sculptures etc., and from 
two-dimensional symbolic models (but not from music, a temporal art form).  
Obviously, tangibility corresponds to low feedback on the richness hierarchy. One 
could further argue that also the lack of temporality, lack of change, corresponds to 
low variety of cues – although may be problematic to confuse two different 
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dimensions by translating between feedback and variety of cues. As a mere 
representative of (spoken) words, text cannot offer more than speech. 
This characteristic of writing – that it is static and tangible – has ambiguous 
consequences. The critics emphasize inflexibility, rigidity and conservatism, as in 
Plato’s critique of the ‘unvarying answer’. Yet this rigidity, the ability to ‘freeze’ an 
impression into a tangible sign (or image) is also a precondition for ‘memory’. Hegel 
thus associates the sign with a mechanical memory:  
"Das von der Phantasie produzierte Bild ist nur subjektiv anschaulich; im 
Zeichen fügt sie eigentliche Anschaulichkeit hinzu; im mechanischen 
Gedächtnis vollendet sie diese Form des Seins an ihr." (Hegel 1998) 
Yet this is also where thought differs from memory (of the particular event): the static 
sign (or image) serves as a vehicle for categorization and subsuming different 
impressions under one sign. Thus, it always filters individual details from the 
particular impression or event. A more photographic memory would inhibit 
generalisation and comparison.  
To give one organisational example, Argyris & Schön seem to regard writing (or other 
forms of materialised representation) as a key to organisational learning, rather than 
being rigid and inhibitory:  
"the resulting understandings, priorities, and reframed norms become 
inscribed in the images, maps, and programs of the organisation and are 
thereby embedded in organisational memory." (Argyris & Schön 1996) 
March et al make a similar point, and it corresponds to Gellner’s argument that 
writing, due to its tangibility, is a vehicle for the progress of thought, because it is a 
precondition for avoiding repetition, overlapping and incoherence. There is a potential 
for accumulation and development rather than ‘random drift’. Gellner argues that 
writing – literacy – take ‘items’ of knowledge beyond custom, beyond the practical 
context and expose them for critical validation. Writing thus becomes a crucial 
element of a ‘critical rationality’: 
"But the really significant difference is between what may be called 
validation systems: the procedures and principles employed for extending 
and deciding the acceptance of new items. Primitive societies do not codify 
these, and they can only be extracted from their practice, which need not be 
consistent. Literacy, by creating a norm outside custom, or rather, providing 
the means for stabilizing such a norm, is supremely important." (Gellner 
1997) 
This aspect of the written word – tangibility – appears to change with electronic 
media. Sproull & Kiesler characterize electronic communication as ephemeral, at least 
in the perception of the users. Electronic texts may change, move or vanish without a 
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trace. It is paradoxical that this ephemeral medium also provides powerful means for 
storage. 
Objectification – orphanage 
As a consequence of this tangibility, a text is objectified and separated from its author. 
Texts are orphans, with ‘no parents to protect them’, as Plato put it. A text does not 
belong to its author, who thus has no authority in reading its ‘meaning’. 
The text can – eventually, after a process of the ‘miraculous understanding’ – be read 
by an outsider. This alien reader has to ‘achieve’ the foreign horizon by merging it 
with his own, corresponding to Gadamer’s characteristic of hermeneutic 
understanding. The discussion in this section will repeat some of the arguments 
presented earlier, yet in a new context, specifically focusing on texts. I thus seem to 
follow Gadamer ‘in reverse’: he developed the principles of classical hermeneutics – 
the study of texts – and extended them to a general ‘theory’ of understanding; now I 
more or less apply his general theory to texts in particular – at the risk of repeating 
myself.  
The ‘merger’ of horizons implied by Gadamer is not ‘participation’ as in Lave & 
Wenger’s theory – by hermeneutic understanding one does not simply ‘participate’ in 
a historical period, and one is not simply socialized (absorbed) into another culture. 
Furthermore, the possibility of understanding ‘across contexts’ or ‘across horizons’, 
and thus of overcoming particularity, appears to contradict any strong form of ‘social 
construction’. 
The text has something to tell us about an issue – they reach beyond their context. In 
his critique of Derrida, Habermas argues that while communication is always 
associated with a particular context, it will always refer to something beyond this 
context –the very readability of a text is an indication of this:  
“Das schriftliche Ausdruck erinnert nämlich mit größter Hartnäckigkeit 
daran, dass die Sprachzeichen ‘trotz der völligen Abwesenheit eines Subjekts 
und über seinen Tod hinaus’ die Entzifferbarkeit eines Textes ermöglichen 
und seine Verständlichkeit wenn nicht garantieren, so doch in Aussicht stellen. 
Die Schrift ist die testamentarische Verheißung des Verstehens.” (Habermas 
1998) (my italicisation) 
This dimension illustrates that it is misleading to regard the text as an impoverished 
medium compared with face-to-face communication, also because it implies a narrow 
focus on face-to-face communication as merely reciprocal identification between two 
individuals: 
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"Der wirkliche Sinn eines Textes, wie er den Interpreten anspricht, hängt 
eben nicht von dem Okkasionellen ab, das der Verfasser und sein 
ursprüngliches Publikum darstellen." (Gadamer 1960) 
It would be a mistake to read a text merely as an ‘expression’ of a given historical 
period or culture – as though it could only tell us about its own context or period. This 
corresponds to the emphasis on understanding based on ‘truth claim’ and content, 
discussed in the first chapter (p. 49). Gadamer criticizes this mistaken approach as a 
‘historical understanding’ that remains blind or deaf to the actual message: “Der Text, 
der historisch verstanden wird, wird aus dem Anspruch, Wahres zu sagen, förmlich herausgedrängt” 
(Gadamer 1960). The same critique is relevant against a ‘cultural analysis’ seeing a 
text as belonging to a closed horizon or ‘culture’. Human ‘existence’ is not situated. 
“Wie der Einzelne nie ein Einzelner ist, weil er sich immer schon mit 
anderen versteht, so ist auch der geschlossene Horizont, der eine Kultur 
einschließen soll, eine Abstraktion. Es macht die geschichtliche Bewegtheit 
des menschlichen Daseins aus, dass es keine schlechthinnige 
Standortgebundenheit besitzt und daher auch niemals einen wahrhaft 
geschlossenen Horizont.” (Gadamer 1960) (my italicisation) 
The historical method prefers to scavenge on dead material. The object of research 
should be neatly enclosed in a coffin and posing no risk of provoking or changing the 
interpretation or perspective of the historian: 
"Die stillschweigende Voraussetzung der historischen Methode ist daher, 
dass erst dann etwas in seiner bleibenden Bedeutung objektiv erkennbar 
wird, wenn es einem abgeschlossenen Zusammenhang angehört. Mit anderen 
Worten: wenn es tot genug ist, um nur noch historisch zu interessieren. Nur 
dann scheint die Ausschaltung des subjektiven Anteils des Betrachters 
möglich. Das ist in Wahrheit ein Paradox – die wissenschaftstheoretische 
Entsprechung zu dem alten moralischen Problem, ob jemand vor seinem 
Tode glücklich genannt werden könnte.” (Gadamer 1960) 
Indexicality of the spoken word – situated context 
There is a more physical aspect of context, besides the historical or cultural 
background mentioned above. In contrast to the orphaned text, the spoken word in 
everyday language is context-bound in a very situated sense. People use context-
dependent denominators to indicate time (‘now’, ‘tomorrow’) and space (‘here’, 
‘there’, ‘this’, ‘that’). They may be supported in the speech situation by pointing, yet 
mostly this is not necessary. These denominators lose their meaning when taken out of 
context. 
Problems of indexicality have gained renewed practical relevance, as the technologies 
of 20th (and 19th) century have changed the relations between speech and writing. To 
start with the oldest example, the telephone allowed a ‘virtual’ presence, where people 
had to accommodate to a spoken conversation without physical context. More 
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recently, it has become possible (or easier) to convert and preserve spoken 
communication with written transcripts (see Culnan & Markus, below); or people may 
use computer-based written communication in synchronous communication, thus in a 
situation where previously oral communication was the only option. Such texts 
become situated and indexical to a degree hitherto uncharacteristic for the written 
medium.  
The indexicality of language complicates the use of electronic media for 
organisational memory or knowledge management. There is today an extensive 
potential for keeping automatic records with the intention of preserving rationales, 
argumentation etc. As an example, Culnan & Marcus suggest that the possibility of 
written transcripts may change organisational communication (Culnan & Markus 
1987). 
This indexicality of language challenges the philosophical assumption that natural 
language sentences can be converted to ‘objective statements’, that communicative 
‘meaning’ can be (completely) reduced to, or projected on, objective references. The 
most ’notorious’ example of this view is the ‘logical paradigm’ in theories of language  
(Frege, early Wittgenstein), which aims to translate sentences from natural language 
into logical expressions (Andersen 1991). Husserl is another example (as referred by 
Habermas) of the assumption that context-dependent denominators can in principle be 
translated to objective or universal references in time and space, an assumption that 
was criticized by Tugendhat:  
“Husserl bemerkt selbst, dass sich z. B. die Bedeutung singulärer Termini 
nicht ohne weiteres nach diesem Modell erklären lassen – es gibt ‘subjektive 
Ausdrücke’, deren Bedeutung mit der Sprechsituation wechseln. Aber 
Husserl begegnet dieser Schwierigkeit mit der Behauptung, dass ‘jeder 
subjektive Ausdruck, bei identischer Festhaltung der ihm augenblicklich 
zukommenden Bedeutungsintention, durch objektive Ausdrücke ersetzbar ist’. 
Individuennamen sollen durch Kennzeichnungen, die Orts- und Zeitdeixis 
durch Raumzeitpunkte usw. substituiert werden können. Wie Tugendhat 
gezeigt hat, ist dieses Programm der Umstellung subjektiver Ausdrücke auf 
situationsunabhängige objektive Ausdrücke undurchführbar; singuläre Termini 
sind ebenso wie performative Ausdrücke Beispiele für genuine pragmatische 
Bedeutungen, die sich nicht unabhängig von einer intersubjektiv ausgeübten 
Praxis der Regelanwendung erklären lassen.” (Habermas 1998) (my 
italicisation) 
Indexicality is thus not merely a practical problem but an indicator of a fundamental 
characteristic of language. Lucy Suchman, in her ethnomethodological critique of 
Artificial Intelligence, argues that language is situated in every aspect: language 
‘works’ because language users know how to compensate for the ‘poverty’ of 
language, by applying and interpreting it in situ (and this context-awareness, she 
argues, can never be automated in a computer). This generalized argument has more to 
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do with language in general, and less with relation between the spoken and the written 
word, but as emphasized previously, the problem is actualised with new 
communication technologies73. 
Writing and memory 
This section will consider and answer some of the critiques of writing mentioned 
previously. Derrida’s critique of the allegedly dominating metaphysics of presence 
will be referred74. To a large extent I find his emphasis on mediation useful and 
relevant, and he is a good example of the disagreements between the two aspects of 
contextuality: he shares with a proponent of ‘situated action’ such as Suchman the 
emphasis on context, but he also criticizes the illusion of presence, in the sense of a 
situated practitioner with a firm grip on context. Derrida has much in common with 
Adorno, except that the latter insists on a reality beyond language. 
All this overlaps the previous discussion about reference vs. meaning, 
situatedness/presence/experience vs. interpretation/understanding. Language is a 
medium and essentially about ‘reducing richness’: ”language breaks the dictates of 
immediate perception and orders the chaos of the manifold impressions into identifiable things” 
(Habermas 1971a). Compare also Benjamin’s discussion of recollection 
(‘Erinnerung’) and mémoire volontaire. The difference is that the focus on signs 
emphasizes the role of media in a material or physical sense rather than ‘forms of 
messages’ (information vs. narrative). Derrida argues that writing has an important 
                                                     
73 Derrida, Adorno and Suchman would all agree that language does not reach the particular 
and individual. The difference seems to be that Suchman claims that practitioners ‘manage 
without’, that they have a firm – functional – grip on the particular (i.e. situated context), 
despite language: ”But the communicative significance of a linguistic expression is always 
dependent upon the circumstances of its use. A formal statement not of what the language 
means in relation to any context, but of what the language-user means in relation to some 
particular context, requires a description of the context or situation of the utterance.” (Suchman 
1990) 
74 Difficulties with identifying and specifying Derrida’s critique may be due to Derrida’s 
approach: Derrida deliberately tries to avoid a discursive or logical critique because it would 
draw him into the quicksand of metaphysics and rationality; instead he assumes the role of the 
literary critique who analyses the ‘efficiency’ of the argument (Habermas 1985) – he doesn’t 
want us to pin him up on a specific ‘position’ (and this seems quite different from i.e. 
Gadamer’s requirement). I.e. he shows how Socrates’ own argumentation in the dialogues are 
often perceived as ‘overwhelming’, as a drug – an ambiguous metaphor often used by 
Plato/Socrates, the ambiguity of which is seized by Derrida. The drug is both poison and cure 
(Derrida 1972) – and apparently has nothing to do with the strength of a logical argument. By 
defining argumentation as drugs one withdraws from the logical content of the argument – one 
refuses to ‘test’ it in the sense described by Gadamer or Adorno. 
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role in establishing a medium that focuses and filters, remembers and forgets. It would 
thus be mistaken to see it merely as an ‘aid to memory’. 
Derrida criticizes the disregard of writing by attacking the metaphysical assumption 
that the spoken word has a privileged role as signifier, being firmly linked to the 
signified ‘reality’, the truth (through its contact with the soul). Evidently, the 
proponents of situated action such as Suchman cannot be accused of this focus on 
language, yet their emphasis is surely on presence and the competent dealing with the 
world. Derrida argues that the assumption of the link between signifier and signified is 
untenable, an argument not unlike Adorno’s negative dialectics75; and he also suggests 
that we completely abandon the very notion of a ‘signified’, an argument similar to 
Heidegger’s assertion that there is no ‘an sich’ beyond language, but at this point 
incompatible with Adorno. 
According to Derrida’s critique, focus on the voice – the phonetic sign – allows the 
illusion of presence and lack of mediation76: 
“Derrida ist überzeugt, dass Husserl den Substratcharakter des 
Sprachzeichens nur darum als unwesentliches Moment vernachlässigen 
konnte, weil in der abendländischen Tradition die Lautgestalt vor der 
Schriftgestalt, die phonetische Verkörperung vor der graphischen 
Einschreibung einen fragwürdigen Primat genießt. Die flüchtige Transparenz 
der Stimme leistet einer Assimilation des Wortes an die ausgedrückte 
Bedeutung Vorschub. Schon Herder hatte ja auf das einzigartige 
Selbstverhältnis hingewiesen, das im Sich-Sprechen-Hören vorliegt. Wie 
Herder (und Gehlen) betont Derrida die Intimität und Durchsichtigkeit, die 
absolute Nähe des durch meinen Atem und meine Bedeutungsintention 
gleichzeitig belebten Ausdrucks.” (Habermas 1998) 
                                                     
75 See (Habermas 1985) for a comparison between Derrida and Adorno. 
76 Perhaps the spatial metaphors in the graphical user interface illustrate a paradoxical refusal to 
realize the degree of mediation and abstraction in the computer. I.e. Andersen observes that 
users of an IT system still use space and time indexes: ‘the file was here, and now it’s 
gone/over there’ (Andersen & Holmqvist 1991). The physical meaning of these terms is less 
obvious than they were before implementation of the IT system – i.e. a nostalgic reference to 
paper files. Thus, the workers/users continue to use outdated space/time metaphors – or: that 
they have survived only as metaphors, just as one can see in the current graphical user 
interface: there is no paper-basket or desk; on the other hand the file structure virtually 
resembles paper files and cabinets, but does not exploit the potential of the computer for easier 
categorization and location, i.e. databases offering multiple entries and ordering; or hypertext 
offering links and retrieval based on association. 
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Alternatively, the focus on the written sign would emphasize what is actually true for 
any sign, also the phonetic one: that it is non-presence and intermediation, because it 
establishes identity by ignoring or suppressing individual differences and uniqueness 
in time.  
„Für Derrida enthüllt sich im Gedanken der durch Präsenz beglaubigten 
Identität eines Erlebnisses der metaphysische Kern der Phänomenologie – 
metaphysisch insofern, als das Modell der anschaulich erfüllten 
Bedeutungsintention genau die zeitliche Differenz und Andersheit zum 
Verschwinden bringt, die beide für den Akt der anschaulichen 
Vergegenwärtigung desselben Gegenstandes und damit auch für die Identität 
der Bedeutung eines sprachlichen Ausdrucks konstitutiv sind. In Husserls 
Suggestion der einfachen Präsenz eines von sich aus Gegebenen geht jene 
Struktur der Wiederholung verloren, ohne die nichts dem Fluss der Zeit und 
dem Strom der Erlebnisse entrissen und als dasselbe präsent gemacht, eben 
repräsentiert werden kann... Die einfache Präsenz eines ungeschiedenen, mit 
sich identischen Gegenstandes zerfällt, sobald das Netz von Protentionen 
und Retentionen zu Bewusstsein kommt, in das jedes aktuelle Erleben 
eingebettet ist. Das ‚im Augenblick’ gegenwärtige Erleben verdankt sich 
einem Akt der Vergegenwärtigung, die Wahrnehmung einem 
reproduzierenden Wiedererkennen in der Weise, dass der Spontaneität des 
lebendigen Augenblicks die Differenz eines zeitlichen Intervalls und damit 
auch ein Moment der Andersheit innewohnt. Die innig verschmolzene 
Einheit des intuitiv Gegebenen erweist sich tatsächlich als ein 
Zusammengesetztes und Produziertes. Weil der Husserl der ‚Logischen 
Untersuchungen’ diesen ursprünglichen Prozess der Zeitigung und der 
Veränderung im Herzen der transzendentalen Subjektivität verkennt, kann er 
sich auch über die Rolle des Zeichens bei der Konstituierung von mit sich 
identischen Gegenständen und Bedeutungen täuschen.“ (Habermas 1998) 
Language (the sign) is incapable of reaching the particular and individual, as illustrated 
in the discussion about the indexicality of language. Words, qua their universality as 
concepts, are no longer names attached to their object: 
“Det vigtige ved [tegnene i naturlige sprog] er, at de er fjernet meget længere 
fra virkeligheden end regulære navne er. Navne er etiketter som klæbes på 
virkelighedens genstand i talerens hjerne, men sprogtegn er fjernet endnu et 
trin fra virkeligheden. Virkeligheden findes i vores mentale verden som 
repræsentationer.” (Gregersen & Køppe 1994) 77  
                                                     
77 “The important thing about signs of natural languages is that they have been separated 
further from reality than regular names. Names are labels that are attached to the real object in 
the mind of the speaker, but linguistic signs have been separated one more step from reality. 
Reality exists within our mental world as representations.” 
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Once the (illusion of the) link between signifier and signified is abandoned, texts can 
be perceived and analysed properly as ’drifting around’ in a complicated net of ’self’-
references. Written texts are thus fundamental in constituting our view of the world. 
The inspiration from Derrida requires a two-fold modification. First, his radical 
critique of the illusions of presence and immediacy is relevant, but a total exclusion of 
any form of situated experience takes the critique too far. Second, his rejection of the 
signified (beyond language) is problematic. 
I would like to further twist the arguments about writing in a more rationalist way: 
texts leave their subjects behind and strive for universality. They no longer belong to 
their author and are thus exposed to critique. 
4.5. Summary 
4.5.1. Discussion: the ‘ambiguous’ concept of media – channel vs. tool 
The comparison between the discussion of the ‘media richness’ theory and classical 
discussions of the written vs. spoken word and nonverbal media is confused by some 
degree of incommensurability due to two quite different perspectives on media: 
communication and reference (i.e. corresponding to the two functions of language, 
according to Adorno). Either the medium is perceived as a ‘channel’ for 
communication (between two parties), focusing on to what degree this channel filters 
relevant ‘cues’. With this perspective the richest medium is ‘no medium’, and media 
can be analysed in terms of ‘social presence’ and ‘virtual reality’. Or the medium is 
perceived as a material that can be shaped in order to express something, i.e. convert a 
rule-of-thump into a logical expression (though it is basically misleading to use 
conversion – from one medium/language to another – as an example). 
I shall discuss each perspective further in the following, eventually arguing that each 
emphasizes a number of aspects relevant for all media. It is necessary to combine the 
perspectives and not get entrapped in one of them. 
4.5.1.1. Interface perspective (subject-subject) 
This perspective primarily regards media as a link or channel. The theory of media 
richness implies – and imposes on the reader – a view on media merely as a ‘channel’ 
or an interface between communication partners. In this perspective, the question of 
richness analyses the degree of ‘filtering’ between communication partners (feedback, 
nonverbal cues etc.), and the logic of the richness hierarchy is compelling: the richest 
medium would be no medium, disintermediation. 
Media are measured on their ability to restore the ‘natural’ face-to-face 
communication, based on the ideal of presence, primarily between the communicators 
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– although the ideal of presence also has a parallel in the ‘reference’ perspective: 
presence in relation to a physical context. 
This perspective alone is misleading for two reasons. First, it ignores that there will 
always be a medium between people: language represents a cultural or social element 
that goes beyond the actual intersubjective relation. Second, it forgets the other aspect 
discussed below: without media (signs) we would be unable to say anything about 
anything – we could only point. Disintermediation would be ‘impoverished’, because 
we would be unable to express or describe ‘the matter’. 
Culnan & Markus, too, criticize the ‘filtering’ perspective based on the ideal of face-
to-face communication. Their critique confirms the arguments presented here, 
although their motivation and perspective is different from mine: they argue against 
comparison and suggest looking at computers ‘in their own rights’, as a 
(communication) technology with new functionalities that are incommensurable with 
traditional media and with the ‘filter perspective’. By narrowly comparing new media 
to well-known ones, one tends to ignore new qualities and characteristics – the 
‘horseless carriage’ syndrome: 
"In summary, the conceptual framework underlying much of the existing 
research on media effects assumes that face-to-face communication is the 
standard against which new media are to be evaluated and that the electronic 
media are deficient compared to face-to-face communication because they lack 
important communicative cues. We believe that these assumptions are too 
limited to support research on the organizational, as opposed to individual or 
interpersonal, impacts of these technologies. The electronic media have 
capabilities not found in face-to-face interaction, such as novel ways to 
address communication, new modes of communication storage and retrieval, 
and enhanced capabilities for the control over access to and participation in 
communication." (Culnan & Markus 1987) (my italicisation) 
Media as ‘transmitters’ of messages 
It may seem strange to associate this perspective with the interface perspective. It does 
not primarily regard communication as an interpersonal relation, but it is a 
‘mechanical’ theory about message transmission. Yet they both share the emphasis on 
‘linking’ and tend to exclude the ‘content’ or the message itself. 
Shannon & Weaver theory of communication thus focuses on communication as 
transmission of messages (Fiske 1990;Jensen 1990). As a general theory of media, this 
perspective is problematic in assuming that the message exists independently before 
the medium. A medium or a sign (or a system of signs) defines what can be expressed; 
it does not simply ‘transmit’ a pre-existing content. 
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Some theories about organisational communication seem to be based on the 
‘transmission’ perspective. Litterer argues that the need for communication arises with 
the increasing size of the firm: this increases the need for coordination, which again, 
increases the need for documentation:  
"With the increase in the size of the firm, there occurred an increase in the 
amount of detailed information necessary for efficient operation." (Litterer 
1961)  
Similarly, Yates, Allen, Sproull & Kiesler (ref. to Yates) seem to argue that new 
communication media facilitates increasing physical distribution of the company. 
They share a common emphasis on communication in the sense of coordination, 
transfer and exchange of messages. I agree that this is a relevant aspect, and that 
intranet media do support linking across organisational barriers, but I find it necessary 
to avoid the implied narrow perspective on media. 
4.5.1.2. Tool or ‘reference’ perspective 
In this perspective, media are primarily regarded as referring to some object (domain, 
environment, physical context), enabling ‘memory’, description, analysis, control or 
manipulation (a tool).  
Compared with Litterer etc, Weber, Lukács and critical theory argue that mediation 
(language, and IT) is not merely ‘communication’ as a reaction to physical distance, in 
the sense of transmission of messages between people, but necessary for 
rationalisation and calculation. Language – logos – is a means to control the world (by 
calculation, signs etc.), of controlling the material (and the work process). This is what 
Habermas categorizes as Labour (‘Arbeit’) – characterized by a subject-object-
relation, a fundamentally manipulative (instrumental) approach to an ‘objective’ 
world. 
Presence and transparency 
Within this ‘reference’ perspective on media, there are parallels to the richness 
hierarchy based on the ideal of presence and disintermediation. One example is the 
idea of a resembling image, ideally a photographic replica. The photograph has also 
been characterised as a natural (or mechanical) sign. In this perspective, the question 
of richness concerns the degree of filtering in relation to the object. As argued 
previously, however, this type of sign does not support analysis of causal relationships 
etc. . 
Another example is the tool perspective in information systems design. The ‘tool’ 
perspective is inspired by Hegelian and Marxian theory of practice (and Heidegger) 
and suggests that a computer system should be designed ‘as a tool’, meaning that it 
should be ‘transparent’ and thus allowing the focus on the object of work (Bannon & 
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Bødker 1991). Anything that distracts the user from this focus and forces his attention 
to computer ‘tool’ itself is an indicator of inadequate design. 
Andersen finds this emphasis on transparency problematic, because it ignores 
important aspects of the sign:  
“From a semiotic point of view, this ideal is not tenable as a general 
guideline. Assuming that the relation between the interface of the artefact 
and the work object is identical to the sign-function, the interface signifying 
the work object, this relation is in principle problematic, since it is not 
natural, but culturally coded. It can present the signified in a distorted 
manner, yes even be a lie, and there are many cases where the user is well 
advised to be suspicious and direct her attention towards the meaning 
producing mechanism of the interface.” (Andersen 1990)  
The tool perspective assumes an unbreakable bond between sign and object (signifier 
and signified) and is based on a naturalistic idea of signs as reference. Andersen argues 
that even the participant-worker may have to retreat from the participant perspective 
and assume the perspective of an observer in order to solve problems and mysteries 
(‘what happened’?) – corresponding to uncertainty and ambiguity in organisational 
theory. There are thus two different elements in his critique. On the one hand, he 
emphasizes the occasional need for dealing with ambiguity – as a semiotician he draws 
the attention to the ‘meaning’ (intersubjective) aspect. On the other hand, he criticizes 
the tool approach for associating the pc with ‘situated practice’ and direct 
manipulation: this ‘situated’ perspective disregards the need for rational abstraction 
from the work process (indirect, mediated manipulation), the need for a quasi-
‘observatory’ position (i.e. by looking at a model instead of executing the actual task). 
4.5.1.3. The two perspectives integrated 
As with language itself, the two aspects (or dimensions) are integrated. On the one 
hand, communication is always about something: a text has something to tell us; it 
refers to something. On the other hand, a tool or a word is always based on a 
perspective, a meaning (which is socially or culturally defined).  
Different types of technologies? 
To some extent the two perspectives (used to) correspond or apply to different media 
or technologies. Thus, email, documents, hypertext and graphical presentations are 
different types of material that can be used and shaped actively (tool technologies), 
while it is convenient to see telephone or video meetings as ‘channels’ that allow 
communication over physical distances, but filters the communication – some sort of 
virtual presence with a degree of filtering.  
This distinction, however, is being bridged by a convergence between communication 
and computer technologies. As an example, Groupware is often regarded as a 
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combination of ‘communication’ and ‘tool’ technologies. It is essential to groupware 
that it combines large-bandwidth ‘channels’ with shared tool and workspace. 
 Mediation Presence 
Subject-subject Buffering  (Sproull & Kiesler) Face-to-face 
Subject-object Models, signs,  symbolic notation Tool, picture 
Table 4. Two dimensions of media78. 
 
4.5.2. Media characteristics 
4.5.2.1. Problematic hierarchy79  
The theory of media richness is problematic insofar as it regards media as a ‘fall from 
grace’, a filter that distorts communication to a more or less tolerable degree. I can 
only accept part of the richness hierarchy: Natural language is ‘richer’ than more 
formal languages, insofar as it allows expression and critique of ‘frames of 
interpretation’ and thus is required for reduction of ambiguity. But nonverbal cues do 
not further enrich the rationality of the conversation: the possibility for justification 
and critique.  
4.5.2.2. Pure writing – formalisation 
Purification of language 
A central purpose behind a formalised language is to avoid the ambiguities of the 
natural languages. The logical paradigm of linguistics and the positivist definition of 
‘meaning’ intended to drive out all metaphysical connotations – meaning and 
interpretations in a ‘metaphysical’ sense – and provide a modern, purified language, 
ideally suited to deal with reality. The reason for presenting this background is to 
clarify the role of (pure) writing (and formalised language) in relation to the theme of 
this thesis: interpretations and ambiguity (in the sense defined previously). 
                                                     
78 Literature on groupware and Computer Supported Cooperative Work distinguishes between 
three ’aspects’ or dimensions: communication, coordination, and cooperation (Kühn & 
Abecker 1998). These dimensions cannot be completely separated, but groupware systems 
differ in their focus: i.e. group decision support systems mainly support coordination and 
communication, not actual cooperation. 
79 The richness hierarchy implies the following ordering (increasing richness): formalised 
language, natural language (spoken over written word), nonverbal ‘language’ (arts).  
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Eventually, the obvious ambiguities of the natural language, and the failure to ‘purify’ 
these (and the futility of the attempts) caused the collapse of the logical paradigm. It 
should be noted here, though, that ambiguity in this context is used in a sense that 
differs from the one defined in this thesis. Whereas I speak of ambiguity (equivocality 
in Weick’s later definition) due to conflicting interpretations, linguists merely imply 
that the meaning of an uttered sentence is unclear or ‘underdefined’ (outside its 
context). Pragmatic linguistics concluded that there must be more to the meaning of a 
sentence than the actual content of the words (and their constellation). 
Need for pure writing 
On the one hand, some material or content can best or even exclusively be expressed in 
writing and is highly inconvenient in rich media: one cannot (easily) exchange 
numbers and data over the phone or a simple video connection. Yet, these examples 
probably correspond to reduction of uncertainty and thus merely confirm the theory of 
media richness. 
On the other hand, symbolic notation may also be useful in less well-defined 
discussions, also in those that might be characterised by ambiguity or equivocality. 
Symbolic notation or some degree of formalisation may be used to emphasize and 
‘capture’ logical arguments. Such models may even be two-dimensional graphical 
representations, and thus spatial rather than temporal and sequential. Yet I am not sure 
this is a question of providing rich material for the ‘right’ side of the brain (Andersen 
1997), because the aim is to emphasize and represent multidimensional, logical 
structure rather than present a picture (imitation) – even though the representation is 
not temporal and sequential, it is a strong simplification.  
4.5.2.3. Writing and the spoken word 
Written documents can be distinguished from oral communication by their tangibility 
and orphanage (objectification). They tend to tear away from ‘their’ social context. 
They represent the hope of progress in thought. They may be ‘merely’ a 
‘reminiscence’ of what we know, but by founding the idea of objective rather than 
subjective knowledge, they can help us to know more than we knew. 
Electronic (intranet) media transform the relations between written and oral 
communication. Electronic text replaces tangibility with ephemerality and storage 
capacity (and search facilities etc.). Computer networks – by enabling transmission of 
exact copies – also change or dissolve the physical location of a text, which enables 
two quite different, new media: on the one hand email provides highly interactive, 
horizontal, interpersonal written communication; on the other hand, hypertext (the 
web) emphasizes universality by enabling access to shared knowledge and 
information, and hypertext links add an extra dimension to texts. 
  174
Email 
One may assume that email (and to some extent other electronic, text-based media) 
change the balance between written and oral communication. One may expect a sort of 
trade-off.  
First, areas of communication will ‘transfer’ from oral to written communication. For 
example, written communication will be used more for informal and interpersonal 
communication and will to some extent replace telephone communication.   
Second, this new electronic text will differ from traditional written material by being 
less formal and elaborate and more context dependent – yet it will still differ from 
face-to-face communication by adapting to the virtual co-presence, the lack of a 
shared physical context (like telephone conversation differs from face-to-face).  
This trade-off can be expected to have consequences for organisations (and in 
general). On the one hand the more extensive written material (sedimentation of 
communication) holds a potential both for documentation – i.e. of decisions made in 
the past – and for ‘capture’ of knowledge, to the extent that it is possible to preserve 
and generalise rationales etc. and ‘distillate’ a universal, even prescriptive content. On 
the other hand, the new written (electronic) material more strongly resist the attempts 
at capturing a universal content of relevance beyond present context (organisational 
memory systems), because of the strong contextuality (compared to traditional written 
material). 
Email also merges the written and the spoken word in another sense. According to 
Plato, text suffers from lack of dialogue, while the critical potential of (pre-electronic) 
groups is inhibited by conformist groupthink. Electronic communication has a 
potential for leveraging both text and dialogue – by integrating them. 
Text-based media, due to the lack of cues, emphasize verbalization, putting words to 
arguments and ideas, which is a better precondition for a ‘rational’ resolution of 
ambiguity. Poor media filter ‘noisy’ cues about hierarchy, status and social relations 
that tend to distort the rationality of the process. Text-based media relax on the 
temporal nature of the spoken word (of the medium of sound), which inhibits 
detachment and rational distance. One may conclude that rich media do support a 
‘fast’ conclusion – which may be a crucial requirement – at the risk of irrational or 
asymmetric ‘consensus’. 
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The web – hypertext 
In some sense, the web is a medium that is complementary to email. Instead of 
transferring messages it has the potential for storing a single copy of text or data. 
People do not in principle need to preserve a personal copy, because access is easy and 
immediate. Compared to email, this is another way of exploiting the capacity of 
computer networks for fast transmission of exact copies. This potential was 
emphasized by Ted Nelson and can be expected to have organisational consequences. 
"No copying operations are required among the documents throughout the 
system, and thus the problem of distributed update, so familiar throughout 
the computer world, are obviated." (Nelson 1980) 
For example, this potential can be exploited to achieve complete files and avoid 
redundancy. On the other hand, the ‘ephemerality’ of the medium allows easy update 
& removal of old data (at the risk of a porous memory, unless storage capacity is 
used). 
Because of the low interactivity, intrawebs are not well suited for reduction of 
ambiguity ‘in a timely manner’. Nevertheless, an intraweb (as the internet) may still be 
useful in reducing of ambiguity as a more time-consuming and ‘profound’ if it is 
possible to retrieve extensive ‘background’-information about (the source of) a text 
that is puzzling and ambiguous. This is a process more similar to hermeneutic 
understanding of classical text than the interactive processes of understanding 
emphasized by interpretivists and ethnomethodologists. 
Finally, the link feature allows an organisation of the material, which is constrained 
compared to database technology. An intranet (web) shared by many may thus contain 
multiple different and contradiction ‘organisational principles’: hierarchies, 
categorisations (based on interpretations). The structure of an intranet may thus be a 
manifestation of organisational ambiguity. 
4.5.2.4. Art and nonverbal cues 
The value of images – photos, graphical presentations, and the virtues of internet 
technology – in ‘knowledge processes’ is often overstated. A picture is static– it is 
extended in (two-dimensional) space, not in time. Its ‘richness’ inhibits explanations 
and logical inferences and does thus not support discursive thinking80. An image may 
                                                     
80 This argument seems to contradict Adorno’s and Habermas’ recognition of art as experience 
of the new. Adorno argues that art may speak the unspeakable, thus that art may symbolize 
what cannot be symbolized in language. And Habermas argues that art can experience – 
symbolize – new knowledge/content and thus go where language has not yet arrived… 
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‘convey more than 2000 words’, but it replicates the past, or the eternity, and is blind 
to future and to changes. 
Subconscious impressions – richness suspicious 
One argument in support of Sproull & Kiesler’s critique of ‘social presence’ and 
nonverbal cues may emphasize that they appeal to those of our senses that are most 
susceptible to subconscious ‘triggering’ of behaviour. This corresponds to the 
common argument that images are efficient for emotional, affective reactions. One is 
thus more likely to react ‘automatically’ on facial expression, voice pitch etc. Perhaps 
‘social presence’ is especially connected to those of our senses over which we have 
least conscious control81, against which we are least protected by consciousness: we 
react immediately to signs of status or lack of accept and attention, and we tend to 
adjust or retreat from our line of argumentation more out of concern with the reaction 
than with the ‘logical’ soundness of the argument.  
 
                                                     
81 This ‘hierarchy’ of the senses may be problematic? Some have suggested our impressions 
can in fact be divided into objective or primary qualities vs. subjective or secondary qualities. 
Thus, Galileo suggested that odours and colours be merely subjective (see p. 78). Others, i.e. 
Husserl, see this as ratio’s uneasiness with those impressions that are not easily subject to 
measurement and categorization. In Adorno’s theory of art (and in Schopenhauer’s), the 
potential of art for ‘speaking the unspeakable’ seems associated with impressions (senses, to 
some extent) that are least controlled by consciousness (or Will). 
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5. PharmaCo intranet – ambiguous challenges 
In this chapter, I shall identify problems of ambiguity in relation to the intranet. I shall 
discuss whether ambiguity does play as significant a role as presumed, compared to 
other issues, and whether it is reasonable to speak of a connection between intranet 
technology and ambiguity. I shall further look at what is being done to reduce or 
handle ambiguity. 
The key question concerns the role of the intranet in the dilemma between universality 
and differentiation (ambiguity). Is the intranet a vehicle for reducing ambiguity by 
establishing corporate standards and a corporate language? Or does the intranet 
increase ambiguity by enabling and encouraging communication across internal 
barriers – without affecting existing (local) interpretations, and without subsuming 
them to a common corporate standard. Does intranet support or enable bilateral – or 
network – cooperation and coordination, rather than centralized control and 
standardisation? 
The role of the empirical data in this thesis is to test the hypotheses about the role and 
effect of ambiguity; identify actual problems related to ambiguity; and to discuss 
various means to deal with ambiguity. 
5.1.1. Outline of the chapter 
First, I give a short overview of the case, which is treated as four sub-cases illustrating 
different aspects of the theme of research. Next, I describe the method applied in the 
case study. Then I report in more detail from each of the sub-cases. And finally I 
discuss selected issues related to one or more of the sub-cases. 
5.1.2. Four sub-cases 
The case study was carried out as part of a larger research project, to which this thesis 
belongs. The focus in the larger project was on organisational experimentation with, 
and implementation of intranet technology, in particular on applications that explored 
the technological potential for new organisational processes rather than mere 
publishing of material or automation (workflow): such as knowledge sharing, 
communication and coordination across organisational barriers. This focus was 
guiding in our choices of which intranet applications we wished to investigate deeper, 
as well as in our interview guides. In this thesis I have selected those examples 
corresponding to my own emphasis on ambiguity, which is related to but also different 
from the over-all focus of the research project. 
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5.1.2.1. Intranet as a whole 
The case is treated as four sub-cases, starting with a look at the intranet as a whole. To 
what extent does it succeed as a common platform for company information (and 
knowledge)? Can this ‘universalising’ technology compensate for structural 
differentiation (and ambiguity)? The organisation (primarily the IT department) has 
chosen a ‘laissez faire’ strategy to begin with: any department willing to invest the 
resources required can establish a site on the intranet. The quantitative success has 
been overwhelming, the total intranet growing rapidly with sites and applications of 
very different scope and ambition, but the usability of the resulting intranet is inhibited 
by ambiguous structure: it is difficult to navigate and find relevant information, and 
some information resources are redundant. 
After looking at the intranet as a whole, three applications will be investigated. Most 
are quite simple, but some of them have wider perspectives, and they all demonstrate 
relevant aspects of problems with ambiguity. By ‘simplicity’ I refer to a classification 
proposed by Gonzalez (Gonzalez 1998), which is worth mentioning, both because it is 
representative for much literature on intranets, and because it is in fact based on two of 
the ‘richness’ dimensions mentioned previously. Gonzalez imagines a development of 
the intranet use that is progressing in four steps: 1) Publication, where simple 
documents are published on the web; 2) Asymmetric interaction, for instance an 
interface with a database that allows search and retrieval; 3) Symmetric interaction, as 
in databases where users can also enter information, or discussion groups, 
emphasizing feedback; and finally 4) synchronous virtual environment, where 
interaction is enhanced by sound and video: variety of cues.  
Gonzalez evolutionary perspective on intranet applications may also be compared to 
Sproull & Kiesler’s distinction between 1st and 2nd order effects: they argue that 
organisations implement computer networks for the purpose of mere efficiency gains, 
only to realise that this Trojan horse has smuggled in more profound organisational 
changes: horizontal communication, upward influence, and breakdown of information 
fortresses. One difference between the two sources is that what Sproull & Kiesler 
present as a ‘sneak attack’ on classical formal organisation, has been converted to an 
intended strategy. 
The point in presenting these classifications is to give an idea of what our research 
team hoped to investigate. None of the examples, however, can be categorised beyond 
symmetrical interaction, and the only example at this level, SHARING, was no 
success. 
5.1.2.2. SHARING 
This application was chosen for further study as an example of a more sophisticated 
use of intranet technology – in its intentions rather than its design. It was envisioned as 
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a system for knowledge sharing, replacing top-down communication of formal 
routines with horizontal exchange of (written) informal routines – a database of Better 
Practices. It was a corporate database of process knowledge, shared by employees in 
all units of the company. It may be characterised as symmetric interaction in 
Gonzalez’ terms. In principle, the system offers an example of how the technology 
could support informal, voluntary ‘knowledge sharing’ – of practical knowledge. 
There are different possible motivations for such an organizational memory of 
informal routines. One is emphasized in the interviews – to enable knowledge sharing 
and avoid redundancy (and ‘reinventing the wheel’). Another is to protect against the 
‘porosity’ of an organizational memory based on unwritten rules (March et al. 2000). 
Finally, there is potential for rationalization and learning in making rules explicit and 
draw them to attention (Argyris & Schön 1996). 
SHARING is illustrative despite the lack of success, because this failure is hardly due 
merely to poor design, but also to problems with exchanging knowledge across 
organisational barriers (ambiguity). Furthermore it illustrates problems of 
verbalisation. 
5.1.2.3. SQUARE 
This application is illustrative as a complementary to SHARING. It is a database of 
(obligatory) formal routines, combined with a system for distribution via the intranet 
to relevant departments– and thus an example of top-down communication. It may be 
categorised as asymmetric interaction or even mere publication. This application 
demonstrates the technology’s capacity as a tool for reduction (elimination) of 
ambiguity, both because this is the essence of formal routines, and because SQUARE 
is based on the separation of a description of processes from a specification of the 
organisational context (unit, department) in which the processes are to be executed – 
assuming that (the description of) a process or routine can de-contextualised, that it 
persists independent of organisational changes. It also illustrates some simple but 
significant ‘1st order’ aspects of the technology: By replacing paper files, SQUARE 
promises a new degree of ‘version control’ by eliminating, in principle, every copy of 
an outdated document. 
5.1.2.4. ProjectWeb 
This application was designed as a standard website to be owned by a development 
project ’group’. It was chosen mainly for the long-term perspectives in using the 
technology to support a distributed or ‘virtual’ project group – characterised by high 
ambiguity. This sub-case illustrates the potential of this particular technology for 
support of communication (coordination, cooperation) and decision-making during a 
development project, across organisational barriers and geographical distances. Some 
of the projects are done in cooperation with other companies, i.e. a US biotech firm, 
thus almost qualifying for the term as a ‘virtual organisation’. 
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 SQUARE SHARING ProjectWeb 
Gonzalez 
hierarchy Publication
82 Symmetric interaction 
Publication 
(potential for 
interaction) 
Scope 
Pharmaceutical 
Division 
(Potentially 
corporate) 
Corporate Project, Core group 
Content Formal routines Informal routines News, Records (minutes, agendas) 
Direction of 
communication Vertical, top-down Horisontal 
Mostly vertical 
(potential for 
document sharing and 
horizontal 
communication) 
Table 5. Intranet applications. 
In the first group of interviews (on which this study is based), however, only a few 
simple functions were implemented. It thus contains a variety of documents produced 
during the project, including minutes, agendas, reports, information about deadlines 
etc. Access is restricted to project participants, usually only a very small fraction of 
the very large number of people involved in this type of projects. Initially, the 
application is primarily used as a tool for the project management group consisting 
representatives from the various departments involved in a project. 
5.2. Method 
5.2.1. Choice of research method 
The aim of the research project was to explore the organisational experimentation with 
new technology. To meet this purpose it was chosen to carry out a longitudinal case 
study based on qualitative data, primarily in the form of semi-structured interviews. 
Due to the explorative nature of the project, this method was more convenient than 
other and more quantitative data. It supports the forming of hypotheses, which may 
then later be used to design for instance surveys or questionnaires – in order to test 
these hypotheses. It may also be relevant to collect richer material, by observing users 
of intranet applications.  
                                                     
82 The application is based on a database, which would probably qualify as asymmetric 
interaction rather than mere publication. Yet it is basically push rather than pull. 
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The semi-structured interviews offer a rich material, which is less restricted to the 
initial formulation of a research problem than more structured interviews or more 
quantitative data. This is both an advantage and a disadvantage. On the one hand, it 
may not fit the research theme very nicely. On the other hand the material is suitable 
for interpretations other than those guiding the original interview. 
Other factors have led to the choice of semi-structured interviews over other types of 
data. All researchers were confident and had experience with this method. 
Furthermore, at least one of the research partners in PharmaCo argued that employees 
were fed up with questionnaires and not likely to spend much more time on this. From 
their perspective, the open interview is more reciprocal and may be more stimulating 
to the interview person. 
5.2.2. Research partners 
The research project was carried out in cooperation with PharmaCo, primarily the IT 
department, but also a manager in corporate headquarters responsible for the 
SHARING system, and the Head of the Project Directors’ department. All of these 
expected us primarily to provide an evaluation of the various applications.  
The IT department hoped for a detailed evaluation of the individual products delivered 
by their designers, preferably even support in development and redesign. Eventually, 
we agreed with this partner that we might provide a non-technical evaluation and not 
support in design. The IT department has a further interest in being informed about the 
general reception of the intranet, which they see as their success. They have taken the 
initiative with the intranet, but are being challenged by other departments, notably 
Communication, which finds that their department should be overall responsible for 
content; but also Line management is starting to worry about overall structure and 
usability. 
The manager responsible for the SHARING application was interested in evaluation 
(and documentation) of ‘his’ system, with the purpose of judging its future. 
Eventually, the system was terminated, partly based on a report produced by this 
research project. 
Finally, the Project Directors’ department as a user and purchaser of the ProjectWeb 
application was interested in an evaluation of the project. 
5.2.3. Description 
The case study consists of several phases or ‘sub-cases’, all carried out in the period 
dating from August 1998- January 2000. Initially, a ‘baseline study’ was carried out in 
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order to establish an overview of the intranet as a whole, and to select a number of 
individual applications for more detailed analysis.  
The data consist of 23 semi-structured interviews of 1-1½ hour. All interviews are 
recorded on tape, ten of them in summaries, the rest in written transcripts. Interview 
persons were selected via the various corporate partners in the research project. A 
table of interviews is presented in Appendix A. 
Generally the selection of interview persons was affected by the fact that the contacts 
were placed in the company head quarters: in the beginning we would interview 
people close to headquarters, and only slowly, the research would ‘spread out’.  
Most interview persons were more or less directly associated with sites or 
applications, and no ‘innocent’ end-users were interviewed. As a result the data tell 
more about the intentions behind the various applications and sites, and the history of 
implementation, rather than the actual use. Although the sources are thus somewhat 
biased and more inclined to optimistic idealism about the prospects rather than critical 
and sober evaluations, this bias is justified by the fact that it was a new technology 
still in a phase of experimentation. 
5.3. PharmaCo: ‘a global network’ 
PharmaCo has is mainly a pharmaceutical company, but it also has a Biochemistry 
division. Both divisions use similar production technology, but the markets are 
fundamentally different, and subsumed to different degrees of regulation.  
It is a multinational company with departments and affiliates in 60 countries. 
Organisational units have different cultures and a high degree of autonomy. Local 
affiliates are important for various reasons: for acquiring approval from regional 
authorities (Japan, EC, US); for securing access to markets, which requires an 
extensive sales network; for access to ‘knowledge’ in areas characterized by front 
research; and for developing application of biochemical products (industrial buyers). 
The company presents itself as global network of autonomy centers. It is also 
described as a matrix organisation: the long-term development projects involve a large 
number of various departments and functions. Characteristic of the industry, the 
company is ‘knowledge intensive’: research and development represents 1/3 of the 
budget, and occupies 1/3 of the employees. 
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5.4. Intranet as a whole 
5.4.1. Data 
The original baseline study was carried out August-December 1998 and based on nine 
interviews: People from the IT department and various ‘superusers’ – people 
responsible for local sites on the Intraweb (Interviews 1-9). The baseline study has 
previously been documented in (Bansler et al. 1999a;Bansler et al. 2000). A further 
follow-up interview with the Webmaster was carried out in 1999 (Interview # 15), and 
interviews related to the other sub-cases also contain general discussions and 
comments on the intranet. 
5.4.2. Description 
The company has chosen a liberal, bottom-up strategy for the implementation of the 
intranet. One reason for this choice was the wish to encourage multiple initiatives, to 
‘let a thousand flowers grow’, etc. Another motivation is economical and also reflects 
the role of the IT department, who assumed the initiative of the corporate intranet: a 
centralized corporate strategy would require an explicit major investment, and 
therefore be based on the ability to convince top management about the virtues of an 
intranet. Instead, the investment is now incremental and decentralized: any unit is 
allowed to set up a site on the intranet, with technical support from the IT department. 
The unit must pay a moderate price for a new site – which should cover the resources 
spent by the IT department, and motivate people to find a serious purpose for a site or 
application (Interview # 2). There is no central coordination of the sites – although 
several sites and applications developed for, or in cooperation with, central 
departments balance the bottom-up strategy.  
The intranet has grown rapidly from the beginning: the ever-increasing number of 
sites has surprised the IT department. It appears that every unit must have its own site. 
The sites are very different in scope and technical quality. There are central initiatives 
with top-down communication, like the pharmaceutical division’s database 
distributing formal routines to users in the units concerned (top-down) considered later 
in this chapter. At the other extreme a production unit designs its own site intended for 
internal communication (yet in principle open to everybody). 
The result of this liberal strategy is ambiguous. On the one hand, the intranet has a 
very rich and varied content: compared to companies with a more central, top-down 
strategy, the sites are experimenting with many different aspects of the technology 
(Bansler et al. 2000). 
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5.4.2.1. Usability threatened by disorientation 
On the other hand, a number of problems threaten the general usability of the 
intraweb. The lack of structure seems to cause disorientation for the users. They find it 
difficult to find the relevant information, and this problem inhibit the intranet’s 
potential as an information source, as one manager complains:  
“der ligger utroligt mange informationer på IntraWeb’en, som ikke bliver 
brugt, fordi folk ikke ved de er der. Der er f.eks. ikke mange der ved, at man 
kan finde en prisdatabase på Web’en, eller en ’product availability’  base, så 
der bliver stillet mange spørgsmål, som er overflødige i den forstand, at 
svaret allerede findes på Web’en.” (Interview # 11)83  
Furthermore, information may not be properly updated – although according to the 
Webmaster, users tend to trust the source and do not complain about outdated 
information (Interview # 15) – or worse: the same information is found at different 
sites and may not be identical. “folk møder modstridende oplysninger: ’der står en ting her og 
en anden ting dér, og så ved vi ikke, hvad vi skal tro på’”84, the Webmaster reports about user 
reactions (Interview # 15). 
These problems – ‘disorientation’; infrequent and insufficient update; overlapping 
information sources (redundancy); contradicting information – seem connected to the 
decentralized strategy and the lack of central coordination. One manager argues that 
individual departments fail to understand their own role in relation to other 
information providers: 
“Så kan man lægge alle de informationer ind, man gerne vil dele med andre, 
men uden nødvendigvis at tænke på, om andre bedre kunne vedligeholde 
nogle informationer, eller om de er der i forvejen.” (Interview # 11)85  
This argument implies that the problem may be solved by a clear definition of 
information responsibilities. Another manager finds that many sites are more focused 
                                                     
83 “there is so much information on the IntraWeb, which is not being used because people don’t 
know it’s there. For instance, not many people that there is a price database on the Web, or a 
product availability database, so a lot of questions are asked, which are superfluous in the sense 
that the answer is already on the Web.” 
84 “People find conflicting information: ‘it says one thing here and another there, and then we 
don’t know what to believe’.” 
85 “Then you can put out all the information that you’d like to share with others, but without 
considering whether others might be better at updating this type of information, or whether it 
might already be there.” 
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on ‘self-promotion’, on building an image of their particular unit, than they are 
concerned about sharing information of relevance to others: 
“I dag har mange afdelinger deres egne web-sider, som beskriver, hvilket 
ansvarsområde man har, og hvordan man kommer på nogen ting. Der står 
der mange dejlige ting om hver enkelt funktion. Det bliver ikke administreret 
sådan, at man tager udgangspunkt i de vigtigste forretningsprocesser i HC og 
angiver, hvilke ting der relaterer til disse. Der har overhovedet ikke i 
[PharmaCo] været nogen overordnet styring på brugen af Intraweb’en.” 
(Interview # 4)86 
5.4.2.2. Two solutions considered: portals or structuration 
Eventually, some level of central coordination is being considered, but the situation is 
complicated by the fact that the company is splitting up, separating the large 
pharmaceutical division from the smaller biochemical one. Accordingly, the intranet 
will also be separated in two, although they continue to share some part of it. 
The two divisions both wish to solve the problem of ‘disorientation’ on the intranet, 
but they consider quite different solutions. The Biochemistry division wants to 
establish its own portal. A portal is basically a separate website designed to guide the 
user through the intranet. It may contain relevant news, links and a search engine, and 
it is based a on a particular categorization of the content This is a moderate solution to 
the structural problems: they will help orientation by a central portal rather than 
affecting the content itself – and they hope that ‘content providers’ will adapt to the 
portal in the long run. But the portal is also a reaction to another problem. People in 
the Biochemistry division are looking forward to independence from the larger 
pharmaceutical division, as the Webmaster explains:  
“[PharmaCo] og dermed også IntraWeb’en er domineret af [pharmaceutical 
division = PD]: ’[PharmaCo] er [PD]’… [Biochemistry division] har … 
ønsket sin egen portal, sin egen indgang til IntraWeb’en. De vil ikke have al 
den støj, som alle [PD]-informationerne i princippet er. Hvis man har brug 
for [PD]-informationer, skal man bare kunne hoppe til [PD]-delen. Hvad 
angår de ’korporate’ nyheder, er de meget rare at have, men det er ikke dem, 
                                                     
86 “Today many departments have their own web-sites describing their field of responsibility, 
and how they get ideas. It says so many lovely things about every single function. It is not 
administered by starting out from the most important business processes in HC and then 
describing what things are related to these. There has in NN not been any over-all control 
whatsoever of the use of the Intraweb.” 
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der er de vigtige i det daglige arbejde. Til gengæld vil man tilstræbe at bringe 
meget lokale nyheder.” (Interview # 15)87 
The ‘portal solution’ may be sufficient in the Biochemistry division because there are 
fewer sites, and most of them are owned by central functions rather than local units. 
Thus the problems of overlapping sources is less severe than in the larger 
pharmaceutical division, which, besides the size, is more complex with numerous sites 
with very different scopes and perspectives, as the Webmaster explains: 
“Til sammenligning har [PD] mange sites, der kan handle om et emne eller 
være tilknyttet en afdeling; kun nogle få er tilknyttet funktioner – man har 
ikke helt så mange organisatoriske topsites i [PD].” (Interview # 15)88 
The pharmaceutical division now has plans for a more thorough re-organisation of the 
intranet. “Man har f.eks. ønsket at samle bestemte informationer på ét site, hvilket ville gøre det 
meget nemmere at finde rundt i, fordi man så vil vide, hvor man kan finde informationer af en 
bestemt type” (Interview # 15)89. Redundant information should then be removed from 
other sites. In the future new sites must be approved by a board, which will consider 
whether there is a need for a new site, or whether the information belongs to an 
existing site. The individual sites are then required to update their information 
frequently, or at least be checked with intervals. The Webmaster from the IT 
department approves most of these ideas, which can only be carried through now 
under the authority of the pharmaceutical division – the IT department did not have 
that authority:  
“Sådanne krav har [IT department] ikke kunnet stille som datterselskab, men 
når [PD] beslutter det, vil det være muligt at komme ud over meget af det der 
rod og redundans.” (Interview # 15)90 
                                                     
87 “PharmaCo and hence also the IntraWeb is dominated by the PD. PharmaCo is PD. 
Biochemistry has wanted to have its own portal, its own entry to the IntraWeb. They don’t 
want all the noise that PD information in principle is. If you need PD information, you should 
just jump to the PD section. As for corporate news, they are nice to have, but they are not 
important in everyday work. Instead they aim to bring very local news.” 
88 “In comparison, PD has many sites that may focus on a subject or may be belong to a 
department; only few of them belong to functions – there are not as many organization topsites 
in PD.” 
89 “For instance, there has been a wish to concentrate particular information at one site, which 
would make it easier to navigate, because you would know where to find information of a 
certain type.” 
90 “Being an affiliate, the IT department has not been able to make such requirements, but once 
PD makes the decision, it should be possible to get beyond all this mess and redundancy.” 
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The question is, however, what structure the pharmaceutical intranet should have. The 
leader in this initiative is convinced that it should be structured around organisation 
charts, but the Webmaster is not sure this is what the end users need. Others have – 
implicit, at least – suggested that all websites be related to basic ‘business processes’, 
an idea probably inherited from the company’s recent BPR projects. 
5.4.2.3. Good ideas outgrow the individual initiative 
One example illustrates the problems of redundancy and update of information. In a 
small production unit, it was decided to publish a telephone book on the website. 
Production is organized in teams, and it is important to be able to contact individual 
team members. This type of information overlaps one of the most successful corporate 
intranet applications, the telephone directory of all employees. Yet a local telephone 
book was found necessary, because extra information was needed that is not in the 
corporate telephone directory, such as membership of production teami. 
The problem of redundancy is perhaps perceived more on the corporate level than on 
the local one. They may not use the corporate directory, so redundancy is not ‘their’ 
problem – except that they invest resources that might have been saved. Which is 
illustrated by another problem in this case. 
The telephone directory was designed by a production worker who had just learned 
html. So he designed a quick and easy solution in html, with graphical illustration of 
team membership etc. This solution, however, is impossible to update. It was then 
realized, due to this and similar examples, that the unit should spent the next half year 
designing more durable solutions that would support updatability, rather than 
launching new initiatives.  
The example shows that this local initiative might have profited from more 
professional support early on; but it also shows that for the technology to serve as a 
reliable source of useful information, more routines are required rather than 
playfulness and experimentation. New sites and applications are often carried through 
(up to some point) by individual initiative, but they will soon require professional 
design and extensive routines guaranteeing frequent update. Pioneers prefer to focus 
on creative aspects and leave behind piles of routine work. All good initiatives 
outgrow the individual pioneers. 
There is an economic aspect to this. The example illustrates considerable hidden costs 
behind the intranet: the (local) resources spent on developing sites are often invisible. 
The technology has an appeal to top management, not least because it does not seem 
to require large, risky investments at top levelii. Investments are generally left to local 
initiatives. And at the local level, the investment in a website seems insignificant: yet 
the initial ‘price’ paid to the IT department is insignificant in comparison with ensuing 
costs, particularly in form of manpower. Individual pioneers are taken out of 
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production to spend full time on local websites. They spend long time developing 
solutions, which professional IT designers could have done faster and better (or there 
may already be generic products on the market), and amateurish solutions prove to be 
extra time consuming, when information must be continuously updated. 
All these are classical, intolerant arguments against ‘amateurs’ and in defence of 
rational planning and design. Yet the strength of these local initiatives is that they 
arise almost spontaneously from the ‘situated’ experience of the work processes and 
some – however vague – ideas about the potential of the technology. But the ends 
don’t seem to meet. Initiatives tend to run sour or out of steam, and local management 
is reluctant to make the next step of investment. 
5.5. A system for better practice sharing 
The SHARING system was a crucial part in a broader ‘knowledge sharing’ (or ‘better 
practice’ sharing) initiative envisioned to support and balance a reorganisation of the 
company towards more ‘decentralization’. This was an attempt to exploit the expected 
potential of the new technology for fundamental changes in communication behavior. 
The universality of the intranet should encourage and enable knowledge sharing across 
organizational barriers and ‘cultural’ differences (ambiguity), as an alternative to 
corporate, formal procedures.  
5.5.1. Data 
This case is based on various materials: 
Access to the website in question and a CD-Rom made for those units in the company 
that will not have access to the intranet + other material referring to the SHARING 
system. 
5 interviews: two moderators (reviewers), one facilitator, and two potential users. 
Participation in a meeting with moderators and facilitators.  
No actual users were found, and thus very little experience with the system was 
reported. The evaluation of the system is thus based on how a handful of people 
perceive the system and its intentions, rather than data about how it was used. Their 
comments and critiques from potential users and other people involved are presented 
and categorized – and I shall then discuss their comments in my own analysis in the 
next section. The confrontation between the idea behind the SHARING system and 
the experience of the people in question provide good observations about the 
fundamental problems in this type of system. 
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Yet it is worth considering the status of such interviews. They cannot be regarded 
simply as an expression of ’lived, situated experience’. Managers have been to dozens 
of management courses in various concepts and buzzwords, or they have been 
engaged in internal development projects with consultancy firms, where they – on 
some level – have been fed some of the same theories that researchers draw on. If they 
provide statements that confirm theories of i.e. personal networks, it is not simply an 
empirical confirmation of that theory; the statement may just as well be due to the fact 
that they have already heard about the theory, and have found it useful in their 
interpretation of own experience. The ideas circulate and recycle at the risk of living 
on self-maintaining processes, where vague and broad definitions protect against 
critique and falsification and guarantee survival, until they wear out – and people 
(organizational members and managers) grow tired of them. In one sense, the problem 
is the opposite to that of ambiguity: there is a ‘lock-in’ of interpretations and concepts. 
On the other hand it is also a question of ambiguity in a different sense: the ideas and 
concepts are used in many different and unclear meanings (with emphasis on lack of 
clarity). 
This material resulted in a confidential report made for the company with this author 
as a co-author (Bansler et al. 1999b), on which the presentation and description – not 
discussion and analysis – in this thesis is based. 
5.5.2. Background, context 
From 1997, it was decided to ‘loosen the grip’ in the sense that more autonomy was 
delegated to lower management, project managers etc. Some areas – for instance on 
work climate – should no longer be regulated by standard corporate procedures, 
thereby giving local management increased ‘freedom of method’.  
It may be misleading to speak of a deliberate reorganisation. To some extent, it was a 
matter of adopting a strategy to match the actual cultural and structural diversity of a 
rapidly growing global company, based on the realisation that the difficulties in 
enforcing the same guidelines in affiliates in countries as different as Denmark and 
Japan would outweigh the potential benefits. The company also hired an 
anthropologist in order to cope with this diversity – as a conscious strategy/policy to 
establish a common ground within a culturally diversified company. 
As an alternative to detailed corporate formal procedures, a fundamental policy, ‘the 
PharmaCo Way of Management’, was stated in the form of ten ‘fundamentals’. 
Organisational units were left to develop and apply their own solutions in the 
‘deregulated’ areas, as long as these ‘ten commandments’ were respected. Roughly 
spoken, the intention with the whole knowledge sharing initiative was that top-down 
‘enforced’ standard procedures should be replaced by local initiative, formal 
procedures replaced by problem solving - within certain limits. 
  190
However, this deregulation faced the risk of overlapping innovative efforts: that 
different units were solving similar problems over and over again, unaware of 
previous solutions – the danger of ‘reinventing the wheel’. As an answer to this 
problem it was emphasized that all units should share knowledge.  
”Virksomheden har tidligere været en topstyret organisation, hvor mange 
beslutninger er blevet taget centralt. Nu skal den i højere grad være 
rammestyret: beslutninger lægges ud, og der skal være plads til 
mangfoldigheden og forskelligheden. I gamle dage – og det er ikke så længe 
siden – var der fælles regler for, hvordan man f.eks. skulle lave 
klimaundersøgelser i [PharmaCo], med fast skema mm.. Nu siger spilleregel 
nr. 3, at alle afdelinger skal have en aktionsplan for, hvordan de vil forbedre 
deres klima – og så må de gøre det, som de vil... Med de forandringer i 
organisationen er det en vigtig mekanisme, at man lærer af hinanden. De to 
ting går hånd i hånd. [PharmaCo] siger, at hvis bare I overholder 
spillereglerne, kan I gøre tingene på jeres egen måde. Men så skal vi 
’pinedød’ også udveksle og lære af hinanden, så man ikke ender med noget, 
der ikke er en ’better practice’. [SHARING] er selvfølgelig kun én måde at 
udveksle erfaringer på.” (Interview # 13)91 
This principle was considered so important as to make it the first ‘fundamental’: “Each 
unit must share and use better practices”. And an intranet-based system for sharing best – 
better – practices was designed. 
5.5.3. The SHARING system: description 
The system was a database of better practices, located on the top site of the intranet. 
The intended users were managers of organisational units who were expected to 
voluntarily supply and retrieve better (best) practices. Formal routines are abolished, 
and people are invited to share – contribute and retrieve – informal routines. Instead of 
following a written rule, they are required to engage in problem solving. 
                                                     
91 “The company used to be top-down directed, many decisions being made at the center. But 
now decisions are delegated, and space is allowed for differences. In the old days – not so long 
time ago – there were common rules, for instance for the survey of work climate in PharmaCo, 
with fixed schemes etc. Now rule no. 3 says that all departments should have a plan for 
improvement of the climate – and then they can do it in their own way. With these changes in 
the organisation learning from each other is an important mechanism. These things go hand in 
hand. PharmaCo says that, as long as you don’t break the rules, you can do things in your own 
way. But then we must exchange and learn from each other, so you don’t end up with 
something that is not a ‘better practice’. Of course, SHARING is only one way to exchange 
experience.” 
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The system should contain ‘best (better) practices’, meaning administrative processes. 
It is thus a practical and process-oriented knowledge very different from the scientific, 
product-related knowledge (and procedures) used for documentation of a product, or 
from guidelines for production, tests etc. Such knowledge is stored in other systems. 
The better practices intended in SHARING should apply to situations that may be 
similar across very different organisational units - cross-functional, cross-unit, cross-
organisational… 
In principle, there are two different types of better practices. One is concerned with the 
interpretation of the aforementioned fundamentals, while another is associated with 
different ‘business processes’. Obviously there are overlaps: a better practice can 
belong to a particular business process, while demonstrating that it is in accordance 
with a particular fundamental. In one version of SHARING, better practices were thus 
stored – and thus retrievable – according to these two categories: under one of the ten 
fundamentals, and/or one of a dozen business processes. 
Generally, they system is not based on reuse of existing documents. Users of 
SHARING – as contributors – are expected to provide written descriptions of 
(generally) unwritten rules: local procedures and practices. And they are expected to 
present their ‘better practice’ in a form that can be read by potential users anywhere in 
the company: i.e. it must not be restricted to a particular context. 
A reviewer explained the requirements for a better practice according to the slogan 
‘sharing better practices’. It must be sharable, not too specific or technical. It must be 
better – at least in the sense that there must be something new to it, that it’s not 
already done by half of the company. It must be practical: it must be ‘in use’ and not 
just ‘a good idea’. And it must be in accordance with the fundamentals. 
It is also emphasized that a better practice should be simple – “something you might have 
thought of yourself, but didn’t” (Interview # 13). The aforementioned reviewer observes 
that people are reluctant to supply a practice to the database, because they consider it 
too simple, but argues that those are usually better than very technical and complex 
ones. The description of a better practice should be short. Rather than provide a 
complete description the application should provide a name encouraging the reader to 
contact the author over the telephone. 
One example of a practice is: a simple method to investigate work climate. The 
previous, ‘canonical’, corporate model was based on questionnaires with 85 questions, 
which made workers in the production sigh92. Simple guidelines to work with 
                                                     
92 Another example given by the facilitator was guidelines for interpreting the ‘ten 
commandments’. The new policy raised questions of interpretation: what does it mean to 
respect a fundamental; what type of local processes will be accepted; and which will be in 
  192
‘customer orientation’ inside the company – referring to the BPR concept of customer 
– is another example of a better practice. 
The intended readers of the system are managers facing a new task (that is not 
regulated by standard procedures) and thus engaging in a process of problem solving. 
They are supposed to look up the SHARING system to see if others have been in a 
similar situation, and what they have done. 
5.5.3.1. Evaluation or edition of content – varying approaches 
The SHARING system underwent a few changes during its short lifespan. One aspect 
of these developments illustrates the complexities in evaluation. In the initial phase it 
was designed as a system of best practices, and an editorial board of reviewers was 
appointed with the authority to accept or reject contributions. During the first few 
months they rejected 90 % of all contributions. This was regarded as problematic and 
discouraging to potential contributors, and the system of reviewers was abandoned, 
thus removing any form of filter – this change now reflected in a modified 
terminology, emphasizing (merely) better practices. 
This second model was also soon criticized, however. It was argued that much content 
was of low quality and relevance – mere banalities. Thus, a different review system 
was implemented: various managers were appointed as moderators with the task of 
reviewing both the existing content and new contributions, but with the emphasis on 
editing or at least encouraging the authors to modify their contributions by 
generalization and de-contextualisation. They should even act proactively as 
‘ambassadors’ of the system. An special team of so-called facilitators – described 
below – were appointed as moderators for those better practices related to the 
fundamentals, and they agreed that their task was basically not to reject any 
contributions but rather to determine, under which fundamental it should be 
categorized (Interview # 13). 
Facilitators 
In connection with the aforementioned re-organisation and implementation of the 
fundamentals, a team of ten ‘facilitators’ was appointed and relieved from other tasks 
in the company. Their job was mainly to audit all organisational units, and to some 
extent ‘identifying’ better practices in these units, and possibly suggesting ideas from 
the database. They saw SHARING as their tool and considered themselves its 
ambassadors (Interview # 13). 
                                                                                                                                            
conflict with the fundamentals? A large part of the ‘better practices’ actually concern 
interpretation of the fundamentals and are categorized accordingly.  
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5.5.4. The reception of SHARING 
Despite the high profile, the system never really took hold of the potential users. After 
the unfortunate initial phase, where only 10 % were approved, there was some 
increase in content, as 368 better practices were added in the first two years 1997-8. 
But then there was a sharp decline, with only 21 new better practices in the first half of 
1999, and it was eventually abandoned by 2000. 
Interviews and comments at the moderators’ meeting offer 3 explanations of the 
failures of SHARING.  
1) The material is of low quality and relevance.  
People have checked the system once or twice without finding anything, and have lost 
interest. Interviews offer three further reasons for the low quality and relevance. 
The system of moderators is insufficient. They are too busy to do more than just 
approving or rejecting. They don’t have time for actual editing; and if they do take 
some initiative like suggesting improvements to the contributors, then they are met 
with indifference – which leads to the second reason: 
People are generally unwilling to contribute. One major reason offered by the 
interviews refers to the fact that actually writing a contribution, describing an 
unwritten rule takes time. And they must make a further effort to present their ‘better 
practice’ to an anonymous reader who is not familiar with the particular context. So 
describing a ‘better practice’ for the SHARING system constitutes a task in itself, the 
purpose of which is too abstract to justify the effort by itself. Thus, a large part of the 
actual contributions were added in connection to an actual ‘project’, i.e. where a 
department was developing and writing down new procedures for their own use. 
Another reason offered for the reluctance to contribute refers to the culture of the company. While 
people are generally reported to be helpful and willing to answer personal requests (in oral 
communication), contributing to the SHARING system is perceived very differently: primarily as a 
over-zealous demonstration of own skills, as an attempt to profile oneself. With this reputation, 
contributors run the risk of ridicule – ‘they are laughed at behind their backs’. This is one of the 
reasons why people tend to disregard their own potential contributions, considering them banal and 
not worth bragging about. 
Many have suggested that the company might increase the motivation to contribute by offering some 
sort of reward. A real ‘payment’ for the effort was not suggested, rather a symbolic response – 
because the potential reader may remain anonymous to the contributor. 
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2) People are generally reluctant to consult the intranet for information 
This explanation ties the failure of the SHARING system to a more fundamental 
problem with the intranet in general, as discussed in the previous section: 
disorientation, redundancy, and infrequent update of information. 
Another explanation was labeled ‘culture’ in the interview. There is a ‘busy’ culture, 
and people tend to have a schedule corresponding to 150 % of their time. They tend to 
jump into new projects without much initial planning (‘left foot first’, Interview # 11). 
A handful of people considered relevant are invited to a meeting. One tends to rely on 
personal networks rather than spending time on gathering information and structure 
the task – strong rather than weak ties. It was acknowledged in one interview that this 
approach may not be the most efficient, and that spending more time on gathering 
information may in fact both result in a better solution and save time. 
3) The basic idea in the SHARING system may be mistaken 
One critique addressing the very foundation of the system concerns the type of 
knowledge intended. A ‘better practice’ refers to practical and process-oriented 
knowledge, which must be carefully adapted to a specific context.  
“Hvis man skal hjælpe og støtte skal man vide, hvor folk er henne og så 
tilpasse nogle initiativer, lidt som kognitiv undervisning, til de forhold, der er 
lokalt i den specifikke situation.” (Interview # 10)93  
A better practice described in very general terms may be more inhibitive than helpful, 
because the very adaptation is complicated and ‘expensive’.  
Another argument against the very idea behind the SHARING system is related to the 
former: It is argued that better practices are shared via personal networks – rather than 
the open, corporate-wide character of the SHARING system. This argument differs 
from the apparently similar previous one about the culture in the company because it 
claims that using personal networks is not merely a ‘culture’ that has formed in this 
particular company, but a basic necessity for sharing this type of knowledge94. 
                                                     
93 ”In order to help and support you must know where people are, and then adapt some 
initiatives – a little like cognitive teaching – to conditions that are local in the particular 
situation.” 
94 This coupling of particular channels and particular types of knowledge is argued in recent 
knowledge management literature. Hansen et al. thus argue that the so-called personalization 
strategy is more convenient for customized, innovative and tacit knowledge (Hansen et al. 
1999). Yet, ‘practical and process-oriented knowledge’ does not fit unambiguously into this 
categorization: practical knowledge can also be routinised… 
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Interviews emphasizing this form of knowledge sharing suggested that what is needed 
is not a database of ‘practices’, but of people and their qualifications – a system that 
helps finding the people who have the knowledge. As an illustration they find it 
problematic that authors of important company documents – i.e. handbooks – are 
anonymous. 
5.6. ProjectWeb: Communication in projects 
This sub-case report some experiences with using a website as a means for 
communication and ‘storing shared knowledge’ in a project that involves people from 
various departments in the company, in one case even with another company. 
ProjectWeb is a standard website designed to support document sharing etc. in 
individual projects in the company. The emphasis is on ‘horizontal’ communication 
across organisational barriers. Thus, it does not express the universality aspect 
associated with the intranet as a whole, or the SHARING system – as evident from the 
concerns about confidentiality. 
5.6.1. Data 
Based on 8 interviews with people from the project management department, carried 
out November 1999-January 2000: Project Directors and Project Assistants. Results 
have so far been reported in a confidential report (Thommesen et al. 2000). 
5.6.2. Communication in development projects 
Drug ‘development’ is not so much about developing a product, as about testing the 
effects and side effects of an already well-defined product. In this company, as in 
many pharmaceutical companies, development is separated from the research 
department that supplies the drug candidate (a chemical compound). Thus, the project 
produces a lot of knowledge in the form of test results, but most of this is considered 
irrelevant to the project itself, unless the tests report negative results that may halt or 
even cancel the project. 
Drug development is organized in large, long-lasting (10 years) projects that involve a 
large number of departments: production, the ‘clinic’ (responsible for clinical tests), 
marketing, registration, various affiliates, etc. (not to mention the external partner in 
the co-development project).  
Functional specialization + Project organization 
A few years ago, the company has appointed ten fulltime project directors each to be 
(also financially) responsible for 2-3 projects at a time. These project directors were 
being located on the same floor close to company headquarters – partly in order to 
strengthen communications with relevant departments at this site, partly to encourage 
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sharing of expertise and experience across projects – and thus removed from their 
former physical location outside corporate headquarters. As an example, One PD 
choose to leave his (device) development team to get closer to Marketing and 
Registration, not because he found the relation to these central functions more 
important, but because he believed that he had already well developed relations (his 
‘base’) to the local development and needed to improve those to the central functions. 
“Jeg har rimelig godt check på, hvad der foregår i [udviklingsafdeling], da 
jeg har siddet deroppe i ti år. Jeg kender hver eneste krog og har netværket 
deroppe, hvorimod jeg er svagere ’herinde’ i [det korporate hovedkvarter]. 
Og det er derfor jeg har valgt at sidde her.”(Interview # 18)95 
Each project is managed and coordinated by a core group of 10-12 people, consisting 
of a project director (and assistant) and representatives from the involved departments. 
Besides the need to coordinate distributed activities, the core group is (presumably) 
designed to draw on expertise from different departments. Project management, 
communication, and coordination etc. is thus a ‘virtual’ structure on top of the 
functional structure of line of business – with various disputes over authority between 
project management and line management (Interview # 23). It may also be described 
as a matrix organization combining project organisational and functional 
specialization. And the core group may be described as a virtual team.  
Ambiguity in a project 
Obviously there is a potential for ambiguity, because people participate with different 
perspectives and interpretations. To some extent this ambiguity is ‘deliberate’, because 
different perspectives can balance each other. The most obvious example of ambiguity 
is the tensions between the parties in the co-development project, but also in internal 
projects, different units are involved in the core group and the decision-making 
concerning strategies, trouble-shooting etc. Director, Quality Department, Marketing 
etc. are all pulling in different directions – and are assembled there for the very same 
reason. A Project Assistant gives one example:  
“der er hele tiden spørgsmålet om ’speed vs. quality’ (derfor er QA også med 
i core-gruppen – projektlederne har det med at gå meget hurtigt frem).” 
(Interview # 16)96 
                                                     
95 “I am quite update with what goes on at the development site, as I was up there for ten years. 
I know every corner, and I have my network up there, whereas I am weaker ‘in here’ in 
corporate headquarters. And that’s why I have chosen to sit here.” 
96 “There is always the question of speed vs. quality (and that’s why QA participates in the core 
group – project managers have a tendency to go very fast.” 
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Different phases of a project 
A project changes over time. The number of people involved increases exponentially 
over time, and then fades by the end, as marketing – and other departments – are 
taking over. Work in the core group changes in character. In the initial phase of a 
project, much time is spent discussing strategy etc., and whether the project is worth a 
long-time investment: extensive initial discussions are crucial, because it is better to 
stop the project early – before the expensive clinical tests. The meetings in this phase 
are usually long.  
“Vi har jo der her faser vi går igennem. Med de tidlige prækliniske faser, 
hvor det er meget internt og laboratoriearbejde, færre mennesker, og en 
masse diskussioner om strategier  og hvad man nu skal gøre, lægge planer... 
Der har vi meget mere brug for hinanden, netop i ‘core’-gruppen. Der 
foregår mange flere diskussioner.” (Interview # 23)97 
Later in the project the work is mostly characterized by coordination and reporting 
(short meetings), possibly trouble shooting. 
“Og så senere hen når det bliver stort, hvor det breder sig ud, så har man en 
masse planer og så arbejder folk meget mere selvstændigt i de forskellige 
enheder, der er meget mindre tværkoordinering af arbejdet. Det forandrer sig 
meget.”98 
”Når man så kommer over i fase 3, så handler det meget om logistikken og 
passer tingene nu sammen. Møderne bliver kortere og folk har i øvrigt ikke 
tid til at holde så mange møder. De har alle mulige andre aktiviteter. Så jeg 
synes der er meget stor forskel på tidlige projekter og senere. Det betyder 
også noget for den måde man kommunikerer på.” (Interview # 23)99 
                                                     
97 “We have these phases. In the early pre-clinical phases, with a lot of internal and laboratory 
work, fewer people, and a lot of discussion about strategies and what to do next, planning… 
That’s when we need each other in the core group. There are more discussions going on.” 
98 “And later on, when it grows big, when it expands, then you have a lot of plans, and people 
work more independently in their different units. There is less cross-coordination of the work. 
It changes a lot.” 
99 “Once you’re in phase 3, it’s all about logistics and do things actually fit together. Meetings 
are shorter, and people don’t time for that many meetings. They have multiple other activities. 
Thus, I think there’s a very big difference between early projects and later ones. This also has 
consequences for the way you communicate.” 
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5.6.2.1. Communication, documentation 
Several levels or categories of documents are produced during a project. A main 
product of the process is constituted by test results and registration documents. Their 
actual content is of limited interest to project management (unless it affects the 
schedules – ‘timeline’ – of the project; in the worst case, if intolerable bi-effects of the 
candidate result in a cancellation of the whole project); they are stored in the corporate 
database, DOCBASE, in order to be transferred to the authorities. 
Another category of ‘formal’ documents is related to the project itself: plans, 
strategies, annual reports etc. constituting the Project History are also stored in 
DOCBASE. Most of these documents are also instruments for corporate management. 
Agendas, presentations and minutes are not stored in DOCBASE, only in personal 
records (including that of the Project Director). They are seldom considered useful 
beyond the actual meeting. Yet often vital information – about decisions, clearing of 
authority – is not available in the Project History documents (but may be available as 
email communication). 
Much information in a development project is sensitive and guarded by strict rules of 
confidentiality. Marketing strategy, dates for ‘launch’ etc. are considered vital and not 
to be disclosed before absolutely necessary. 
The degree of confidentiality often depends on company policy or individual decisions 
by managers. Within the company, levels of secrecy vary between the projects, and 
project directors have different policies on this issue. One example was the project 
director who considered employees in small affiliates (in foreign countries) as less 
loyal to the company: 
”Problemet opstår, hvis man giver vores datterselskaber adgang til vores 
ProjectWeb. Vi får tit henvendelser, og der er jeg rimeligt restriktiv, fordi jeg 
ikke har nogen fornemmelse af, hvordan fungerer det her datterselskab. 
[PharmaCo] har et rimelig godt image i Danmark, og man er stadigvæk 
rimelig loyal, men det er man altså ikke, hvis man sidder i et lille 
datterselskab i f.eks. Spanien med 15 medarbejdere – så er der andre 
virksomheder, som er mere spændende. Der kan [PharmaCo] tit bare blive 
brugt som et springbræt til at komme videre – så kan man hoppe til Lilly og 
alt muligt andet, og så kan man simpelthen bare downloade alle vores 
dokumenter.” (Interview # 18)100 
                                                     
100 “The problem arises if the affiliates are allowed access to our ProjectWeb. We often get 
requests, and I am quite restrictive here, because I have no idea of how this affiliate works. 
PharmaCo has quite a good reputation in Denmark, and people are still quite loyal – which you 
will not be if you are in some affiliate in i.e. Spain with 15 employees. Then there are other 
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Another project director explained that one could not allow ‘a blacksmith in 
Production’ access to vital information. As for the outside, the company has been 
criticized for exaggerated secrecy: investors are interested in marketing strategies and 
dates to estimate the economic prospects of the company. 
Confidentiality issues are exposed during implementation of this technology, but they 
are not created by the technology – similar issues have previously been linked to 
decisions about mailings lists. But the new technology may provoke reconsideration 
and change the ‘cost-benefit’ balance between openness and secrecy. 
5.6.2.2. Communication etc. in co-development project 
Obviously, the organisational barriers between two independent firms raises particular 
issues of confidentiality and organizational politics, when conditions for the 
cooperation are questioned, or choices about future strategy to be made. Yet one 
should be cautious in over-emphasizing this as a particular characteristic of such a 
‘pure’ ‘network’ or ‘virtual’ organisation. Internal cooperation (in a matrix 
organisation) and coordination across internal barriers – functions, divisions, 
departments, affiliates – is also characterized by high ambiguity. It is difficult to 
decide to what extent ambiguities across internal barriers differ from those between 
different companies. 
There is one important difference in the organization of internal projects vs. the 
cooperative project: dualism or redundancy. In the co-development project, most 
levels/functions are mirrored in the two organizations, core group, chemists etc. 
PharmaCo needs its own experts to match the partners’ experts – one reason being the 
potential of learning new technologies. It must be assumed that specialization and 
division of labor is clearer in the internal project, and overlaps are avoided. It is worth 
noticing that both parties have hopes of extending the cooperation beyond the current 
project, as PharmaCo is interested in applying the same technology – developed by the 
partner – for other products. It is thus the intention to build a long-term ‘network’ 
relationship – which makes it even more crucial to achieve and maintain good 
relations. 
Communication difficulties 
The co-development project further faces a number of communication difficulties, 
which may, however, also characterize ‘internal’ projects in a globally distributed and 
strongly differentiated company. 
                                                                                                                                            
companies that are more interesting. In such a situation PharmaCo will often merely be used as 
jump board to move on – so you can jump to Lilly and anything else, and then you can simply 
download all our documents.” 
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In this case, communication, coordination and some degree of cooperation across large 
geographical distance is necessary, requiring extensive use of communication media, 
i.e. videoconferencing every two weeks in some work groups.  
Synchronous communication is awkward because of the time difference of 9 hours – 
which is one motivation for the interest in ProjectWeb or other similar solutions.  
Communication is further inhibited by lingual and cultural differences. The common 
language is English, which for both parties is only a secondary language, as many 
employees in the US Company are Asians. Both parties thus speak English with a 
different dialect. Furthermore, other – cultural – conversation conventions such as 
irony are very different: an ironic remark or a joke may be taken as an offence. 
5.6.3. Intentions: defeating time zones and building team spirit 
The intentions behind the development of ProjectWeb, concerned both document 
management and actual ‘knowledge management’: to share and store project 
knowledge in both discovery & development, covering both registration documents, 
project documents, ‘ideas’ etc. The first version was developed by people in Research, 
but when the IT department ‘took over’, the emphasis has been on creating a tool for 
Development – starting when a candidate has left Research until it is passed over to 
Marketing and others. (ProjectWeb is now also being used in other types of projects, 
but the case focuses on the use in the company’s development projects.) 
Besides ‘knowledge sharing’, another ambitious intention was mentioned in relation to 
the co-development project: it was hoped that this technology, by providing a platform 
for shared information, would contribute to the team spirit. 
”[samarbejdspartneren] har været mægtigt begejstrede for det de har 
etableret med Genentech, fordi det har givet utroligt meget for den der 
teamfølelse, at man har den fælles web og har adgang til de samme 
dokumenter, og det er det de håber, at vi også kan få her, fordi vi også har 
den tidsmæssige og den fysiske forskel.” (Interview # 21)101 
A more profane intention in relation to the co-development project was to avoid 
problems due to time-zone difference – by replacing real-time communication with 
asynchronous, written communication (shared documents, etc.). At first, this argument 
seems strange: if rich real-time communication media have been chosen because that 
                                                     
101 “The partner has been very content with what they have established with Genentech, 
because it has meant a lot for this team spirit thing that you have a shared web with access to 
the same documents. And that’s what they hope for us to get here, because we also have the 
temporal and physical separation.” 
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is what the tasks require, then it cannot be replaced by ‘poorer’ communication. Yet 
the time-zone difference may also constitute a problem for less ‘fragile’ types of 
communication: simply requiring a document is difficult, when people abroad cannot 
be reached over the phone because they are not at work. In this case, the problem may 
not be very different from the experience made by other human ‘information bases’ or 
experts, who feel that they spend too much time answering the same information 
requests over and over again over the telephone. 
The website was an alternative to the shared drives previously used to store the same 
documents. One problem with the old solution was the difficulties with identifying 
and locating these drives. The shared drive on a server was represented (mapped) on 
the individual PCs as a virtual drive with a random local name – thus, the same shared 
drive could have different names on individual PCs, which made addressing difficult 
(Interview # 20). With the introduction of ProjectWeb, the shared documents are 
assigned a ‘public’ address; ‘bilateral’ mappings are replaced by an ‘objective’ address 
in a ‘public’ ‘information space’. 
5.6.4. ProjectWeb – description 
ProjectWeb is a website, where news of common interest to a particular development 
project can be published, and where shared documents are stored. In the first102 
version, documents are stored according to predefined categories. It is a secure site on 
the intranet (in the co-development project, it is an extranet on a neutral server) with 
restricted access. The Project Director decides who has access. 
The first (‘official’) version did not support concerns of confidentiality by offering 
restricted areas (or documents) within the site – those who were allowed access to a 
site, would automatically have access to the whole content103. Such functionality was 
then implemented in the next version – as documents with restricted access – along 
with a chat function etc. 
Each development project has its own ProjectWeb. A new site is opened, when a new 
project starts in Development, and is closed when the project terminates, perhaps ten 
years later. 
                                                     
102 More correctly the second version, but the first was developed and used in the Research 
department. The second version that is examined here was the first to be designed by the IT 
department as a potential ‘standard product’. It will in the following be referred to as the first 
version. 
103 This may not be quite true (Interview # 20), but implementing further restrictions in access 
seemed to require better technological skills than the typical user had. 
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5.6.4.1. How it was used 
The most extensive bulk of documents, documentation for drug approval by 
authorities – clinical reports, registration documents –, have not yet been included. 
This is partly due to technical and economic problems: These documents are currently 
stored in an existing database, DOCBASE, and it was considered acquiring a new 
proprietary database in connection with ProjectWeb, but that solution was found too 
expensive. On the other hand, project managers are not very interested in these 
documents. 
Actual use varies among project teams (director + assistant). One characteristic 
difference, which was partly due to the lack of support for confidentiality, was that it 
was either used as a tool or working archive for the Core Group and the Project 
Director, or for large-scale, one-way communication to other participants in the 
project. In the first case, only a very small number of people are allowed access. In the 
second case, it could be several hundred. Without the possibility for restricted areas, 
management must choose between allowing a large number of users (and leaving out 
important information) and being very restrictive while using the site for confidential 
information 
As a working archive, ProjectWeb was used for semi-official documents that are not 
already stored in other corporate databases: minutes, agendas, and presentations. There 
appears to be no corporate policy for these records, and there are several overlapping 
archives. The project has a paper-based archive; now the website provides an 
electronic archive; and the Project Director normally maintains his own archive. The 
documents normally lose their relevance – as a reminder of recent decisions and 
rationales – after a short period, but they may suddenly gain renewed importance years 
after a project has concluded: one Project Director was thus called as witness in a trial 
years later and suddenly depended on his own archives. He hopes that ProjectWeb can 
relieve him of the task of maintaining these archives; this would require that these 
documents are stored after the termination of a project (Interview # 18). 
It is hoped that ProjectWeb can replace email for a number of functions: 
announcement of meetings and deadlines, distribution of agendas and minutes. Instead 
of sending an email, the material is published on the website, which people are 
expected to check frequently for new information, instead of receiving material. The 
web seems to offer particular advantages in case of documents (or information) that 
are frequently updated. Instead of passing documents around by email with chaotic 
consequences for version control, it is in principle possible always to publish the most 
recent version on a website. As an example several Projects have chosen to publish the 
Product Development Plan, a strategic document containing multiple applications 
(pre-clinical plan, marketing plan, etc.) that are revised at different times, on 
ProjectWeb. One Project Assistant compares with (paper) mail:  
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“Jeg har … valgt at lægge vores PDP [report], som vi laver en gang om året, 
ud på web’en. Der en masse underbilag, som bliver opdateret på forskellige 
tidspunkter – når vi skulle sende den ud p papir: man havde lige sendt den 
ud, og så kom der opdatering til. Det var simpelthen så irriterende. Men nu er 
den lagt ud på web’en, og så kan folk altid finde en opdateret PDP dér – med 
alle de bilag osv.” (Interview # 22)104  
So far, however, these documents are collected over email and assembled before being 
published on the web – the question is whether it will in the future be used for actual 
co-authoring. 
It seems that the ‘recipients’ (so far) do not check the website frequently enough: they 
do not retrieve the information by themselves and have to be reminded about 
deadlines. This may be primarily a question of getting used to a new technology, but it 
also illustrates two characteristic differences between email and web: one is that email 
is temporal, distributed at specific time, while the web is static – even though 
information on the web, too, is published at a point in time, it remains there. The other 
characteristic is spatial: an email is physically distributed to the recipients, while 
information on the web is located at a particular address.  
Perhaps this further illustrates one meaning of ‘empowerment’ in relation to intranets: 
it’s your responsibility to keep updated – instead of waiting for the mail. And the 
traditional excuse in relation to deadline problems: that the information was never 
received, is no longer valid – the information is published and ‘out there’. 
As a compromise between the static web and the temporal email, emails with links to 
the relevant pages are distributed. The second version of ProjectWeb included a new 
facility, where new information published will at the same distribute a reminder by 
email. 
According to the interviews, the changes in communication patters due to email were 
generally much more significant than the web. Negotiations about authority between 
different (contradicting) structures in the company are done in emails. One Project 
Director tells about occasional conflicts over authority with the Line management – 
such decisions are often made via email:   
                                                     
104 ”I have chosen put our PDP report, which we make once a year, on the web. There are a lot 
of enclosures that are updated at different times. When we had to distribute the paper version: 
immediately after you had mailed it, there was a new update. It was so annoying. But now it’s 
out on the web, and people can always find an updated PDP there – with all the applications 
etc.” 
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”Men nogle gange så bliver linien involveret på en eller anden led – og så er 
det tit det sker på en email.” “Det er tit en konfliktsituation. Så står der 
måske et sted at det er besluttet sådan og sådan, men ikke nødvendigvis hvor 
det er ‘clearet’ henne – hvis der ikke har været nogen procedure for det. Jeg 
tror det er nemmere i fremtiden. (Interview # 23)105 
Previously, such negotiations would probably be made over the phone, but now email 
offers documentation due to its ‘tangibility’: it can be used as a ‘weapon’ in case of 
ensuing conflicts:  
“jeg har tit haft glæde af at kunne gå tilbage og finde det som dokumentation 
og sige ’jamen I har selv været med til at beslutte det her for to år siden’. 
Men det er faktisk tit emails jeg bruger til det. Det har jeg lært at gemme..” 
(Interview # 23)106  
5.6.5. User comments 
5.6.5.1. Archives, records 
Most Project Directors claim that they have less need for ProjectWeb records and rely 
mostly on their own recollection of decisions etc.:  
“Som regel kan jeg huske hvorfor den [beslutningen] blev taget. Jeg har ikke 
det store behov… Men hvis der var en anden der havde overtaget projektet, 
så ville det være ret smart. Det er en kæmpefordel at have været i det så 
længe, fordi jeg kan huske det.” (Interview # 23)107  
Yet there are exceptions, where the person cannot rely on her own memory, and 
documentation is needed: questions of authority (agreements across boundaries) as in 
the above example, and responsibility (court hearings).  
The citation gives a crucial example of asymmetrical (organisational) benefit of 
records: in case of turnover. It is difficult for a newcomer to take over from someone 
                                                     
105 “But sometimes the Line gets involved somehow – and then it often happens in an email.” 
“It’s often a situation of conflict. Then it may be written somewhere that something has been 
decided, but not necessarily where the decision has been cleared – if there was no procedure 
for it. I think it will be easier in the future.” 
106 “I have often benefited from being able to go back and retrieve it as documentation and say: 
‘look, you took part in making that decision two years ago’. But I mostly use emails for that. I 
have learned to keep those.” 
107 “Normally I remember why the decision was made. I don’t have a great need… But if 
somebody else were to take over the project, then it would be quite useful. It’s a great 
advantage to have been there for so long, because I remember things.” 
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who relied extensively on her own memory; in ten-year projects, there is a large 
turnover, even in the core group, particularly marketing representatives. A Project 
Director thus reports a frequent change in the core group: 
”Hovedsagelig i Marketing, hvor man skifter ud hele tiden – det er en måde 
hele tiden at holde sig ’fit for fight’ på. Jeg tror vi har nr. 3 på i øjeblikket på 
det her projekt. Det er også fordi det er en udklækningsanstalt for General 
Managers, der skal udstationeres og køre et datterselskab et eller andet sted – 
så det kan nok ikke være anderledes.” (Interview # 18)108 
And he goes on to tell how a new representative from Marketing has been happy to 
find background material on ProjectWeb and thus better be able to acquire sufficient 
information about the current project: 
“vi har fået en ny mand på fra Marketing, og han var meget glad for, at han 
kunne finde alle tilgængelige informationer om projektet på web’en ved at 
bruge en dag på at kigge det igennem – og lige læse lidt baggrundsmateriale, 
og nogen af de sidste nye referater, dokumenter og tidsplaner. Tidligere var 
det næsten umuligt som ny mand at komme ind i et projekt, fordi... hvor var 
den viden henne? – den sad i hovedet på de andre projektdeltagere, og 
hvordan fik man den gjort tilgængelig. Det var meget svært, det tog tid, og 
som han sagde: da jeg kom til min afdeling her – man havde dårligt 
procedurer, og man havde ikke tid til at lære mig op, og det var lidt 
tilfældigt, hvad jeg fik ind på mit bord omkring afdelingen... og de ting, som 
var omkring projektet, det var også lidt sporadisk, hvad han fik af sin boss: 
’han havde vist modtaget det her referat eller det her dokument på et eller 
andet tidspunkt, og det kunne han da lige kigge på’. Han følte sig ikke 
fuldstændig sikker på, at han havde total-viden til at kunne sætte sig ind og 
påtage sig det ansvar at køre marketingsaktiviteterne for det her projekt. Men 
efter, at han havde været på ProjectWeb’en, så havde han et rimelig godt 
overblik over, hvad det her drejede sig om. En ny medarbejder kan lynhurtigt 
gå ind og blive opdateret på mange punkter.” (Interview # 18)109 
                                                     
108 “Primarily in Marketing where they substitute people all the time – it’s a way to stay fit for 
fight. I think we have no. 3 at the moment on this project. It’s also because it’s a place for 
breeding General Managers that are to be stationed an run an affiliate somewhere – so I guess 
it can’t be any different.” 
109 “We have new guy from Marketing, and he was very happy that he could find all available 
information about the project on the web by spending a day looking through it – and read some 
background material, and some of the latest minutes, documents and timetables. Previously it 
was almost impossible for a new man to enter a project because… where was all this 
knowledge? It was inside the heads of the other project members, and how did you make that 
available. It was very difficult, it took time, and as he said: when I arrived at my department – 
you hardly had any procedure, and there wasn’t much time for training, and it was quite 
coincidental what I received on my table about the department. And as for the project, it was 
  206
Another example of potential organisational benefit is the currently popular idea of 
knowledge management and having a shared knowledge base. The Project Directors, 
however, have difficulties in regarding the documents as a ‘knowledge base’. They 
find the documents in ProjectWeb useless for ‘knowledge sharing across projects’. 
They are often interested in each other’s projects and need to consult others, but they 
use personal communication, i.e. with other Project Directors, are all located at the 
same floor – partly for that very reason. 
In principle, the individual managers do recognize the need for records, but hope for 
secretaries to take care of such routine work, or expect the technology to solve the 
problem. 
”For mig har det været en meget stor lettelse, at jeg ikke behøver at printe 
alle de her dokumenter ud og gemme dem i et eller andet arkiv. Jeg ved altid, 
at jeg kan finde dem, og det har jeg stor gavn af.” (Interview # 18)110 
”Det vil helt klart være en gevinst at have dem liggende elektronisk, hvis du 
har søgekriterier inde. Som I kan se på mit kontor, er jeg ikke specielt god til 
at arkivere. Noget af det sværeste er at arkivere, så man kan finde det igen.” 
(Interview # 18)111 
However, ProjectWeb is not yet designed to function as a long-term archive. One 
problem is that a ProjectWeb site is in principle closed with the termination of the 
project, and the documents must be stored somehow.  
Categorisation 
Another problem has to do with categorization: filing a document is more than adding 
paper to a file – the document must be categorized, if one should be able to find it 
later. These categories may change over time: in the beginning of a project, there are 
still only few documents, and detailed categorization is unnecessary, but as the bulk of 
documents grow, it is much more difficult to navigate. Thus, another Project Director 
                                                                                                                                            
also rather sporadic what he got from his boss: ‘he may have received these minutes or this 
document at some time, and he could have a look at that’. He didn’t feel quite confident that he 
had sufficient knowledge to run the marketing activities for this project. But after having been 
on the ProjectWeb he had a good idea of what was going on. A new employee can quickly get 
updated on many issues.”  
110 “It has been a great relief to me, not having to print out all these documents and keep them 
in some archive. I always know where to find them, at that is very useful.” 
111 “Obviously, it would be an advantage to have them electronically, if you have the criteria 
for search. As you can see from my office, I am not particularly good at archiving. It is very 
difficult to archive in a way so that you can find it again.” 
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was skeptical to the idea of the application as an archive: “Jeg ved ikke om det bliver for 
stort. ProjectWeb er jo mere sat op til at være kommunikation” (Interview # 23)112. 
When a document is published, particular aspects (and categorizations) are important, 
and it is often associated with deadlines – but such time-related categories are not very 
useful for later search, unless one remembers or knows the relevant dates. Other 
categories are more ‘timeless’, and new categories (and associations) may emerge 
with time.  
Thus archives remain a difficult task in spite of the wonders of the web, and if 
distribution and records may be integrated by ‘up-front’ categorisation, then this task 
may best be supported by organisational routines, particularly in the form of well-
defined, general categories. On the other hand, the users were uncomfortable with the 
predefined document categories in the ‘first’ version of ProjectWeb: they were 
awkward and inadequate, and it seemed impossible to find a system that was 
acceptable to all the users. This problem was dealt with by allowing user defined 
categories in the next version: 
“Vi havde f.eks. fået stillet nogle – navngivne – dokumentkategorier op, og 
dem kunne du ikke lave om på. Og så fandt vi meget hurtigt ud af, at når 
man prøver at lave overordnede kategorier, der skal gælde for alle, så 
kommer du hurtigt til at mangle noget eller andet... Det er en af de ting, som 
er blevet forandret ved 3-eren: du opbygger selv dine kategorier fra den ene 
ende til den anden.” (Interview # 20)113  
5.6.5.2. Confidentiality 
The primary conflict between using the site as a tool – primarily a working archive – 
for the core group, or for broad communication within the whole project concerns 
confidentiality. This is partly a question of technical design, and the next version 
allows for different levels of access; although one Project Director fears that this 
solution – a complex system of different categories of people with particular access 
rights – will be too complicated. This solution corresponds to distribution lists used in 
email or postal communication.  
Whether or not this technical solution is satisfying, it does expose confidentiality 
issues and barriers for information sharing. Though most Project Directors prefer 
                                                     
112 “It may grow to big. ProjectWeb is more set up to be communication.” 
113 “For instance, some – named – document categories were set up, and you couldn’t change 
them. And we soon found out that when try to make universal categories that are useful to 
everybody, you will end up leaving something out… This is one of the things that have been 
changed in version 3: you build your own categories from beginning to end.” 
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secrecy, debates on the confidentiality of particular documents are often raised in the 
core groups. At least one Project Director has accepted a high degree of openness (and 
people from the IT department regard this secrecy to be in conflict with the very idea 
of internet technology). A number of reasons for maintaining secrecy about certain 
information are offered.  
Leaks and industrial espionage 
One is the fear of leaking strategic information – i.e. about marketing strategy and 
launch dates – to competitors. There are many people involved in a project, and 
managers expect that not all of them feel the same loyalty to the company, i.e. people 
in production who are salaried on an hourly basis, or people in affiliates. As one 
Project Director puts it: 
 “Resten, som sidder i lavere positioner i datterselskaberne, de skal have 
informationen, når de har behov for den, og ikke 2 eller 3 måneder eller flere 
år før.” (Interview # 18)114  
Another core group – in a different project – discussed the same problem, but didn’t 
reach a decision before the Marketing department distributed the paper files. 
Financial information 
Another issue of secrecy concerns financial information, which should apparently not 
be exposed internally. A project assistant thus tried to publish ‘rolling estimates’, 
because some participants in the project often telephoned for an update, but the Project 
Director put an end to this, arguing that it was not in the interest of everybody 
(Interview # 22). 
Organisational politics 
A third reason for secrecy has to do with organisational politics. Managers do not wish 
to reveal discussions from ongoing decision-making before a decision has been agreed 
upon internally. “[D]et kan jo være nogle strategiske eller politiske beslutninger, der skal tages i 
projektet, som I første omgang kun skal diskuteres af en mindre gruppe …”115, says the Director 
of the co-development project (Interview # 21), in which the political processes – 
between  two companies – are obvious. In such situations, minutes are sensitive – or it 
                                                     
114 “The rest of them, lower echelon in the affiliates, they get their information when they need, 
not two or three months or several years in advance.” 
115 “There may be some strategic or political decisions to be made in the project, which should 
first be discussed by a smaller a group…” 
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is not mentioned in minutes at all (until later), because documents are considered ‘too 
public’:  
“I det øjeblik, det bliver taget til referat, så kan det i princippet nå vidt 
omkring.  Og det er ikke altid, det behøver at komme ud på det tidspunkt, 
hvor referatet bliver skrevet. Det kan være, at der af forskellige årsager skal 
gå lidt tid, inder det bliver kommunikeret bredt ud.” (Interview # 21)116 
5.6.5.3. No use for chat and discussion groups? 
While some interviewees are positively curious about the new forms of (interactive) 
communication offered by intranet technology, most of them are suspicious about the 
usefulness of discussion groups, and especially of the chat function.  
One interviewee says that he might expect researchers to use discussion groups for 
theoretical discussions, but saw no other potential in this facility. No successful 
examples are reported in the company: discussion groups have been introduced 
everywhere on the corporate intranet and are almost never used. It seems that the 
success with Usenet and BBS from the Internet have not been reproduced on the 
organisational level (although Sproull & Kiesler report successful organisational 
examples). 
As for the chat function, an IT manager seemed to express a general perception when 
saying that chat ‘is just for teenagers’. Nevertheless the Assistant in the co-
development project was an exception in seeing the chat function as a convenient 
alternative to videoconferences for some purposes: she found the video meetings too 
frequent and not very useful.  
“man kunne godt bruge det i stedet for en videokonference, hvor det hele 
nogen gange går så langsomt – så kunne man begge to være online, så man 
sidder og skriver til hinanden.” (Interview # 22)117 
One reason for this may be purely technical and due to the inadequacy and 
unreliability of the system: the connection is unstable, and it is difficult to hear what 
other participants are saying; the facilities in the other end (the US Company) are 
limited: “Det udstyr de har derovre kan heller ikke zoome og dreje, og nogen gange kan man på 
                                                     
116 “The very moment it’s in the minutes, it can in principle get very far. And it does not always 
have to get out at the same time as the minutes are written. For different reasons it may take 
some time, before it is communicated broadly.” 
117 “you might use it instead of a videoconference, where everthing sometimes moves very 
slowly – then both could be online, writing to each other.” 
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grund af forbindelsen være i tvivl om, hvem der taler”118, as the Director explains (Interview # 
21). 
But there may be another reason for her interest in a written medium. She is 
responsible of accounting, and communication about figures requires ‘accuracy’ and is 
better mediated in text than voice – especially when one or both parties are forced to 
use a non-native language (English). The medium is so to speak inconvenient for her 
use, because it is too rich. In this case, it is not merely a question of the technical 
inadequacy of the videomeeting facilities – she may even prefer electronic 
communication to (or at least in addition to) meeting face-to-face. 
The director of the co-development project, however, has a different perception of the 
videomeetings. Although she recognizes the inadequacies of the technology, she finds 
that email communication is insufficient and problematic by itself:  
“Der er problemer med kommunikationen udelukkende via e-mails har vi 
fundet ud af. Der er misforståelser og fejlkommunikationer. Engelsk er ikke 
vores første sprog, men [samarbejdspartneren] har også mange som har 
anden etnisk baggrund, end at være amerikaner, så man bruger ordene lidt 
forskelligt, og det kan give anledning til nogen problemer ind imellem. Her 
kan E-mail godt give problemer, for du kan ikke med det samme spørge, 
hvad mener du? Eller fornemme på tonelejet hvordan det er ment…..altså 
nogen gange, hvis man bruger nogle ord så kan de godt for en amerikaner 
være virkeligt stødende eller virke hårde eller skældende ud. Og måske er de 
slet ikke ment sådan, man har bare ikke haft et andet ord til sin rådighed, og 
det kan man bedre fornemme når man har telefonen eller en 
videokonference.”119 (Interview # 21) 
In this case, the reason for a more positive perception of videomeetings may be that 
the Director has different tasks. The co-development project in particular offers 
numerous occasions for conflicts and ambiguities that she has to deal with. 
                                                     
118 “Their equipment cannot zoom or turn, and sometimes, due to the connection, you’re in 
doubts about who is speaking.” 
119 “There are problems with a communication only based on emails. There are 
misunderstandings and erroneous communication. English is not our first language, but [the US 
partner] also has many employees with non-American background, so you use the words a 
little different, and that may cause problems from time to time. This is where email may cause 
problems, because you cannot immediately ask ’what do you mean?’ Or guess from the 
intonation how it is intended... sometimes you may use words that to an American appear truly 
offensive or are perceived as rough or scolding. And perhaps it was not really intended that 
way; you just didn’t have another word available. And you can better sense that in a telephone 
or a videoconference.” 
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Example: the dangers of email communication. 
Asked for examples she told the following story. Tensions arose on one level between 
the companies, when one group in the US failed to meet a deadline and gave as reason 
– in an email – that they were busy with other tasks. This message caused 
dissatisfaction in PharmaCo: were they not supposed to give this project highest 
priority? Are they unable to meet the conditions in the contract? According to the 
Director the conflict was only resolved (‘ambiguity reduced’), when she had a 
telephone conversation with the corresponding project manager in the US company, 
who explained that they were busy not with another project, but with another part of 
the same project. 
”Mit seneste eksempel er fra i går, hvor en af [samarbejdspartneren] folk 
skriver at, noget af det de skulle lave for os, har de ikke leveret så hurtigt, 
som de godt kunne, fordi de havde nogle andre projekter, der var højere 
prioriteret. Og det støder så folk her, fordi de mener at aftalen er, at vores 
projekt har den højeste prioritet. Så reaktionen er: ”nå der kan man bare se, 
det er sådan de alligevel gør”. Og når jeg så taler med projektlederen der 
ovre, så fortæller han, at den person der har skrevet det ikke har engelsk som 
sit første sprog, og det hun mener er i virkeligheden, at der er andre dele af 
vores projekt, altså andre delprojekter af projektet, der har haft en højere 
prioritet. Men der var folk allerede begynde at gå i en forsvarsposition. Når 
jeg fanger sådan én, så er det jo min opgave at tage fat i min counterpart der 
ovre og gøre opmærksom på, at her er der noget som har stødt folk her ovre, 
og det er vi nødt til at få afklaret. Men det kan være mange ting. Det kan 
være svært nok internt, og det gør det ikke nemmere at det er en andet firma 
på lang afstand.” (Interview # 21)120 
This experience supports the theory of media richness. To some extent, the (potential) 
conflict is due to different interpretations. And the richness of the telephone, due to the 
variety of cues in sound + interactivity (high feedback), is necessary to negotiate and 
resolve the conflict. 
                                                     
120 “My most recent example is from yesterday, where one of their people write that they 
haven’t delivered something as fast as they could because they had other projects with a higher 
priority. And people here are offended because they think the agreement was that our project 
has the highest priority. Thus, the reaction is: ‘there you see, that’s how they do after all’. And 
once I speak to their project manager over there, he explains that the author of that mail doesn’t 
have English as her first language, and what she really means I that there are parts of our 
project that has a higher priority. But at this point people had already turned defensive. When I 
catch one like that it is my responsibility to get hold of my counterpart and explain that this 
was something that offended people here, and that we have to clarify it. But it could be many 
things. It is already difficult internally, and it doesn’t make it easier when it’s another company 
far away.” 
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5.7. SQUARE – organizational memory and unlearning 
5.7.1. Data 
Website. One interview with a manager in the Quality department, who took the 
initiative and was responsible for the development project. Part of an interview with a 
person in a non-pharmaceutical production unit. Several peripheral references to the 
system. 
5.7.2. Background, context 
The SQUARE system was first implemented in the pharmaceutical division, where 
many processes are regulated by written rules and extensively documented, partly due 
to the fact that this is a highly regulated industry. None of the instructions and 
procedures in the system is directly dictated by FDA and others but many of them are 
designed to satisfy the demands of the national health authorities. 
5.7.3. Intentions 
The immediate objective was to establish a document hierarchy in order to achieve 
ISO certification. Choosing an electronic solution also brought other advantages, by 
reducing the costs of updating procedures, and by – in principle – completely 
removing outdated versions. It is expensive to continuously print and distribute 
updated versions; and often people tend to stick to their old files and printouts, while 
ignoring the new versions. With SQUARE, it is less expensive to update the whole 
body of rules; and this reduces the problem of ‘unlearning’ because people – in 
principle – no longer maintain their own archives: the people and departments 
concerned would always only be in possession of the latest up-to-date version. 
The person in charge of the project mentioned a further motivation behind the 
SQUARE system. It should render the procedural documents independent of 
organisational changes. This would save the work of rewriting every document, each 
time the actual instruction or procedure is to be carried out elsewhere in the 
organisation. The implication is that most processes are in reality mainly left 
unchanged by more ‘structural’ changes in the organisation: the same processes are 
just executed by other people and/or departments. 
5.7.4. Description 
The system is designed to store documents concerning instructions and procedures in 
the organisation, and distribute the documents to the relevant departments via the 
Intraweb. In contrast to the SHARING system, the content is obligatory, and so is the 
system – employees are required to check for changes once a week: When a document 
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has been changed it will be indicated in SQUARE system in the listing of the relevant 
documents.  
A procedure, which formerly contained instructions about ‘who, what, where and 
when’, is separated into a document describing the procedure itself, and a distribution 
matrix determining who should read the document: the matrix specifies where in the 
organisation, i.e. in which of the 1000 departments in the company, a certain 
instruction or procedure is carried out, and in connection to which product. The 
documents are stored in an existing database, DOCBASE, but the distribution is based 
on the intranet, where people and departments are allowed access according to the 
matrix. The database contains two versions of every document, Word and PDF. The 
PDF is standard, because it looks the same on every platform. In addition to the 
electronic archive, it is still necessary to maintain a physical archive of signed paper 
documents, because they had not yet implemented an electronic signature that satisfies 
the demands of FDA. 
There are two different ways of using the SQUARE system, usually corresponding to 
different users – and to the classical distinction between plan and execution. Some 
people enter documents into the database, while others use the actual instructions and 
procedures in their work. 
Documents are first written as a Word document. As most users are not used to 
Adobe, the Word file will normally be sent to the Document Centre to be converted to 
a PDF. The electronic documents are then entered in the DOCBASE database, while a 
printout of the PDF file is signed by the authorized person in the corresponding 
department, and then returned to the Document Centre to be filed in the physical 
archive. 
At the time of the interview, the system was mainly used for documents on 
administrative procedures, but it was the intention also to use the system in the 
production. However, the more critical documents awaited the implementation of an 
electronic signature, before they can be entered. It was furthermore decided to use 
SQUARE as a common standard for the company, also to be used in the biochemistry 
division. 
The electronic distribution in principle replaces the old systems, where the users kept 
local files of the paper documents distributed by the Document Centre. 
5.7.5. In use 
The resulting system is reported as an overall success (according to the interviewee 
who was also responsible for the project), and judging by the number of hits, this is 
one of the most frequently visited sites on the company’s intranet.  
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A few still do not use the system as intended, however. They stick to their paper files 
and therefore take printouts of SQUARE documents.  
”For brugerne ude i afdelinger er det en fordel, at de ikke længere behøver at 
opdatere deres mapper. Der er dog altid nogen, der hænger ved det gamle. 
Nogle har svært ved at vænne sig til, at de ikke længere får dokumenterne på 
papir, og foretrækker så selv at printe dem ud for at beholde deres eget 
papirbaserede system – for dem betyder det nye system mere arbejde, mener 
de.” (Interview # 4)121 
This practice can be problematic, because it means that there will still outdated 
versions of the documents in these departments. It is hoped, though, that all users in 
time will get used to the electronic documents and give up their old paper based file 
systems. 
The decision to make the system a common standard for the company has been 
criticized by people from the Biochemistry production. Basically, the problem is that 
the whole process of changing rules – adding or replacing documents in the database – 
is too slow.  
“[SQUARE] er ikke særlig kundevenligt. Det er et elendigt system uden 
særlig gode søgemuligheder. Hvis kvalitetsstyringssystemet skal være noget, 
der du’r og som alle har et forhold til, og noget som driftsoperatører skal 
kigge i, så skal det ikke ligge i sådan et system som [SQUARE].” (Interview 
# 5)122 
”Proceduren til [SQUARE]-systemet er for langvarig: man sender sit 
dokument indtil en bibliotekar el. l., der konverterer det til PDF og laver de 
nødvendige links til databasen. Det tager måske 14 dage, og det du’r ikke.” 
(Interview # 5)123 
                                                     
121 “It’s an advantage for the users in the departments that don’t have to update their paper files. 
Yet some people stick with the old ways. Some have difficulties adjusting to no longer 
receiving paper documents and prefer to print it out in order to keep their own paperbased 
system – they find that the new system means more work.” 
122 “SQUARE is not very user friendly. It’s lousy system with no good search facilities. If the 
quality control system is to be something that works, that everybody can relate to, and that the 
operators can use, then it can’t be in a system such as SQUARE.” 
123 “The procedure for SQUARE is too slow: you submit your document to a librarian or other, 
who converts it to PDF an adds the required links to the database. It may take 14 days, and 
that’s no good.” 
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The resistance against using the ‘pharmaceutical’ system as a common standard also 
reflects the general feeling in the biochemistry division – before the separation – that 
the pharmaceutical ‘worldview’ – emphasis, internal regulation, etc. – was dominating 
the company as a whole and inhibiting development in the biochemistry division. But 
it’s not ‘merely’ a question of worldview and ambiguity, but also a very practical one: 
all processes in the pharmaceutical division heavily regulated by formal routines that 
must be approved at high level, partly due to legislative regulation of drugs, and this 
regulation is perceived as inflexible and unnecessary in the biochemistry division. And 
even in the Pharmaceutical Division, the DOCBASE database, on which SQUARE is 
based, is considered to rigid for their purposes: ”man kunne godt bruge det som arkivsystem 
– men det er alt for tungt.” (Interview # 23)124 
5.8. Discussion 
I shall discuss a number of issues emerging from the case study that illustrate and 
confirm the relevance of ambiguity. First I discuss the potential for ‘1st order effects’ 
of intranet media reflecting some of the characteristics presented in chapter 3. I thus 
focus on questions relating to relatively ’simple’ use of intranet technology. To some 
extent, PharmaCo has failed to realize this potential, and a shall therefore discuss some 
of the reasons that organizational members may not adopt shared electronic files or 
consult the web for information rather than making a telephone call. I argue that at 
least some these problems are related to the ambiguous structure of the intranet and 
discuss the perspectives for solving this problem. Finally I discuss a few additional 
issues: aspects of ambiguity in relation to SHARING, ProjectWeb and SQUARE. 
5.8.1. Potential of intranet technology: Information retrieval replacing 
paper files and ‘rich’ communication? 
By publishing information on the web the organisation hopes to replace different 
media corresponding to two different forms of ‘information retrieval’. On the one 
hand, electronic files should replace paper files – merely transferring existing content 
to a new medium. On the other hand the potential for finding information on the Web 
should replace (reduce) telephone requests, in order to save time and resources. This 
organisational motive was referred in one the interviews, who also noticed that people 
have become less helpful by simply referring to the web for information125:  
                                                     
124 “You might use it as an archive system, but it is too cumbersome.” 
125 Does this contradict the thesis that computer networks increase ‘horizontal’ communication 
in organisations (DeSanctis & Monge 1999;Sproull & Kiesler 1991)? Not necessarily, but the 
thesis may be qualified. This use of web communication may increase the ‘amount’ of 
communication, but there is a change of media and richness. Communication is moved from 
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“lige meget hvilken oplysning du skal have nu, så skal du bruge web’en. Alt 
findes derude nu… Der er ikke nogen service i firmaet mere. Hvis du ringer 
og spørger efter et eller andet, så hedder det: gå ud og kig på web’en.” 
(Interview # 20)126 
Vertical one-way communication? A website (web publishing) may be classified as 
vertical, one-way communication. This is probably reflected in the project assistant 
regarding ProjectWeb as the ‘ultimate communication tool’, because as a key person 
in all ‘official’ communication in a development project she handles one-to-many 
(mass-) communication, sending material to various segments of the project 
‘members’.  
5.8.1.1. Replacing paper files by a centralised master copy 
The potential of intranet for ‘advanced publishing’ (based on databases) is based on 
the traditional advantage of electronic files: dynamic, continuously updated 
information, and removal of outdated information (ephemerality); and the 
complementary capacity for storage, categorisation and search, with potential of 
computer networks for fast access and distribution, which in principle makes it 
possible maintain one copy of any type of information, enabling easy update and 
version control (Nelson 1980). This potential makes the solution of a centralised 
(unified, or universal) archive more feasible. 
To compare with the ‘old media’: with printing and paper files, one could only 
guarantee authenticity and version control by keeping the ‘master copy’ in a central 
archive. One could only avoid the inertia of distributed copies by simply refusing 
distribution and requiring readers to come and read the master copy in the centralized 
archive, and this solution is obviously unfeasible in the case of written rules in a 
global corporation. 
Computer networks have a potential for integration of records and distribution, storage 
and communication, and this has different implications depending on the type of 
information or files considered. 
                                                                                                                                            
the richer medium of the telephone – interactivity, verbal cues – to a text-based one-way 
communication. Use of web means easier access to information, which may encourage more 
people to actually seek useful information where previously they would have tried to manage 
without, but this communication is ‘poorer’ – with both positive and negative aspects. 
126 “No matter what information you need, you will have to use the web. Everything is out there 
now… There is no service in the company anymore. If you call and ask for something, the 
answer is: go and look on the web.” 
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5.8.1.2. Records vs. routines – different types of files 
Records (Project History), as a documentation of historical decisions, events and 
results differ from routines, whether formal (SQUARE) or informal (SHARING). 
Routines are prescriptive descriptions of processes – descriptions that ‘work both 
ways’: as a description of the past, as well as a prescription for future practice. 
Routines are an example of dynamic information, which emphasize other needs than 
records: control over changes, elimination of outdated information, whereas records 
are accumulative and emphasize completeness. 
Another example of ‘dynamic information’ and ephemerality is the possibility for 
replacing email distribution of working documents (project reports, see p. 203) by one 
copy on the web, where all changes and comments can be collected. 
5.8.1.3. Records, documentation 
Asymmetrical benefit of records – need for routines 
Records are an obvious example of how routines may counterbalance individual 
behavior (Levitt & March 1988;March et al. 2000). Individuals tend to be very 
selective in their records. They record only what they consider necessary and 
potentially useful and they often prefer to rely on their own memory. To them, the 
record does not offer sufficient benefit over their own memory to merit extra effort – 
the fact is that other parts of the organisation may benefit more from the record than 
the individual supposed to maintain it. 
Yet documentation (i.e. by minutes or email) may be probably particularly useful 
against a higher-ranking authority or one at a similar level – it is a form of 
rationalization that restricts random exercise of power. Documentation is a restriction 
on authority; it characterizes bureaucratic or rational authority as opposed to the 
charismatic one. 
5.8.1.4. A shared, complete record? 
ProjectWeb illustrates the potential for replacing personal files, such as the Director’s 
records. Intranet technology encourages the idea of avoiding redundancy in records. 
Previously there have been multiple overlapping archives: the ‘official’ project record 
maintained by the project assistant; the Directors personal record; personal records of 
the other members of the core group, etc. Each of these archives may be incomplete: a 
person may not have received documents presented at meetings he has not attended. It 
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would be helpful, if the multiple incomplete records could be ‘replaced’ by one 
complete record with easy access for all those involved127.  
5.8.1.5. Ephemerality – porous memory 
A tool for forgetting and unlearning 
Electronic files change the nature of written rules. In contrast to the purpose of 
records, the SQUARE application is perceived (by management) as a tool for 
unlearning, a ‘cure’ against the rigidity/inertia of local ‘memory’. It is a problem when 
people rely on their own memory and practical habits – and the potentially outdated 
paper files they are already familiar with – instead of consulting the most recently 
updated material. ‘You must access the system once a week! Do not rely on your own 
memory!’128 (see Plato, Benjamin). At this point, electronic files differ from paper 
files: while it has been a characteristic of written rules that changes (in them) tend to 
leave traces (March et al. 2000), the expected advantage of electronic distribution – in 
the SQUARE system – over paper files is that they do not leave traces, at least not 
locally. It is a means to avoid the ‘inertia’ of paper files. 
It may seem that a strengthening of central archives is paradoxical consequence of a 
characteristic of computer networks that have been expected to lead to 
‘empowerment’: increase in upward and horizontal communication: 
"Computer-based communication technology differs from many other 
workplace technologies because it has more potential to support upward 
influence and lateral influence, not just downward management control." 
(Sproull & Kiesler 1991) 
And for all the hype of the intranet technology as the key to knowledge management 
etc. enabling horizontal communication and empowerment, it may seem paradoxical 
                                                     
127 This would imply a fusion of personal tool and public files. Many visions about knowledge 
management and early ideas about hypertext suggest that people share personal files, publish 
their personal notes and ideas on a shared server. Shared electronic calendar systems support 
personal calendars while changing their role, namely into a semi-public message. Calendar 
systems expose the difference between making a reminder for yourself and a message for the 
secretary: having a blank blade in your personal calendar means you have no appointments, but 
may be very busy. In a calendar system it is a message signaling that you are available for 
appointments. There is a fundamental difference – between the personal reminder and the 
official message – which can hardly be removed by technology, but they may be integrated, i.e. 
if the effort in making the ‘message’ (or in generalizing, de-contextualising, etc.) is reduced. 
128 Again: the devaluation of memory, which in this case is practiced by ‘power’, seems similar 
to a characteristic of critical rationality: never take anything for granted, and be prepared to 
abandon prior convictions and basic assumptions in case of falsification…. 
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that the medium is so well suited for ‘distributing’ written rules (from a central 
archive), the hallmark of the ‘old organisation’. 
5.8.2. Failing to realize the potential 
So far PharmaCo has – like many other companies embracing the new technology – 
only been able to realize little of the potential benefits of the intranet. I shall discuss 
some of the most probable causes, based on two different perspectives. First, from 
what can be characterized as a ‘recipient’ perspective: why do people still prefer other 
sources of information? Why do they use the phone instead of retrieving information 
from the intranet, as mentioned by one of the interview persons? Second, from a 
‘sender’ perspective: why do they keep information in private (local), paper-based 
files? 
5.8.2.1. When do people prefer other sources of information?  
I shall start with two causes that are related to the (‘ambiguous’) structure of the 
intranet, and thus, in my opinion, to ambiguity. 
Disorientation: it is difficult to find relevant information 
This problem is partly due to ambiguity, because navigation is inhibited by the 
ambiguous structure of the intranet. The problem of disorientation is less relevant for 
an application like SQUARE, because in this case the source is obligatory and thus 
already specified to the user. 
Unreliable information 
Relevant information is found but unreliable, not updated, or overlapping other 
sources. This problem is partly due to the lack of a coordinated information strategy, 
and to the fact that development is driven by information providers rather than 
(representatives of) the potential recipients. They may not be ideal to judge the users’ 
needs: which information do they want, in which form, and how can they find them 
(and how do they read them)? Yet this problem is, indirectly, related to the above 
problem of disorientation (and ambiguity): if a department wants to publish 
information, it is difficult to find out whether similar information is already provided 
by others, or whether others may be better at providing and updating this particular 
type of information129. 
                                                     
129 Redundancy reflects the fact that functional specialization is not clear and well defined. If 
specialization were well defined, there would be less doubt about who is capable of providing a 
specific type of information. 
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People prefer social networks and trusted sources 
People prefer social networks (and oral sources) to written or electronic sources. Some 
of the interviews suggest that people prefer to use their personal network to achieve 
knowledge, and that they generally prefer to summon a meeting with the people 
considered relevant, rather than searching written (electronic) material130 (Interview # 
11). Although the interview was related to the SHARING system, the observation 
referred to the intranet in general. It was previously argued that the tendency to rely on 
trust and social networks for information is problematic, because it inhibits critique 
and limits the range of alternatives considered (p. 39).  
Furthermore the reliance on social networks may be economically inefficient for two 
reasons. One is that people spend a lot of time on face-to-face meetings that are not 
well prepared, as suggested by one of the interviews – corresponding to Sproull & 
Kiesler’s argument that electronic groups may take longer time, but require fewer 
man-hours. Another reason is that the tendency to consult experts over phone may be 
more ‘effective’ from the point of view the caller, but require too much time from the 
expert, as argued by Olivera: 
"In the firm under study, as in many other organizations, time is a valuable 
resource - both for individuals looking for information and, particularly, for 
the experts who provide information. Although calling an expert may be the 
most efficient way for an individual to obtain information, the expert may be 
underutilized as a resource, especially if other, less costly information 
sources are available. In fact, some of our respondents who are considered 
experts in certain domains complained about the frequency and types of 
information request they received." (Olivera 2000) 
                                                     
130 On the other hand, Culnan & Markus suggest that one new quality of computer-based 
communication is that people tend to ‘address by topic’ rather than people, as when different 
people are drawn to the same newsgroup on the Internet. This attitude is very different from 
seeking knowledge via personal relations. Yet this observation may not threaten the argument 
that people seek practical, process-oriented knowledge via personal networks: 1) the 
knowledge found in newsgroups is of a different type, not process-oriented; 1) finding a 
newsgroup on the Internet corresponding to one’s own, private interest is very different from 
consulting a database defined by corporate categories. This does not mean that people will not 
try to satisfy a professional interest at work. But it is likely that their interest is first and 
foremost professionally defined, or corresponding to more subjective preferences – and that it 
does not fit into the corporate categorization. On the other hand, they might be more interested 
in corporate level information, if it also offered corporately defined information. The whole 
idea behind SHARING was ambiguous: it was a corporate, highly profiled platform for 
information from local, anonymous contributors. 
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And this problem was obviously part of the original motivation for publishing 
information on the intranet. 
Information or knowledge characterized by ambiguity 
This argument modifies the previous critique of social networks etc. by admitting that 
certain types of information or knowledge – clarification of an issue (media richness 
theory), specification of a problem, non-codified knowledge (Augier & Vendelø 1999)  
– may require strong ties and rich media. The knowledge intended in the SHARING 
system may thus be more difficult than others to ‘entrap’ in poor media.  
Yet even if one accepts the need for trust and rich media, the critique (above) still 
holds: it is a potential inhibitor of critical rationality. And there may be a potential for 
‘rationalization’ in supporting learning or decision making based on trust and personal 
relations, by encouraging a specification (writing) of the arguments. 
5.8.2.2. Why do people prefer private, paper-based records? 
Why do people (and institutions) normally keep separate records (with different and 
mostly simple classifications, because they are paperbased and cannot exploit the 
potential of database technology (or hypertext))? It is not merely a question of 
conservatism and not yet having learned to use the new technology.  
Access, mobility 
One reason for maintaining personal paper files is availability: easy access requires a 
private copy at your hand. This condition has obviously changed with the new 
technology – and furthermore an electronic archive can offer the advantages of 
database technology and support search and retrieval. There remains the problem of 
mobility: paper files can easily be brought to a meeting – however, laptops and PDA’s 
are making it easier to bring and access electronic files. People without desk and 
desktop – such as production workers – face similar problems with access to electronic 
files, although PharmaCo has thus to set up PCs at the shop floor to allow easy access 
to the intranet. 
Personal notation 
Another reason for personal records is the facility for personal notes etc. as a means to 
understand and interpret the content, be it rules, agendas or minutes. The possibility 
for adding personal, graphic notations everywhere on a sheet of paper (i.e. arrows, 
notes in the margin) is one quality that is yet unmatched in electronic documents. The 
problem with the web – and other electronic files – is that it virtually takes the 
document out of your hands and derives you of the ability to make notes margin, 
underlining or symbols. There may be some technical opportunities for supporting 
both ‘public’ (official) and private/personal sides of a document, and some of the 
  222
intentions behind hypertext systems were to support personal notations, but it is still 
much easier – at the current state of technology – to add symbolic and nonlinear 
‘comments’ to a sheet of paper than a word document. 
Confidentiality, secrecy 
There is a further motivation for personal or local records, namely the possibility for 
filing confidential documents that are not (yet) considered suitable for the official 
records, as mentioned in relation to ProjectWeb. This problem is at least indirectly 
related to ambiguity: Both – confidentiality/secrecy and ambiguity – are a result of 
differentiation. Confidentiality may be motivated by political conflict and group 
interests that are largely defined by interpretations, or by the fear that others might 
misunderstand (mis-interpret) one’s intentions.  
Different interpretations, different categorizations 
The problems with establishing a common set of predefined document categories is 
illustrated in ProjectWeb, but relevant for other types of files and reflects the different 
interpretations and perspectives used by different departments. ProjectWeb provides 
some examples of ‘categorisation ambiguities’: Different projects use different 
classifications and it is therefore impossible to establish predefined (corporate) 
categories. Different participants in the same project use different 
classification/categories based on their own perspective/interpretation. Categorisation 
within a project changes over time 
The question is whether the new solution – no common categories – is satisfying. If 
any of the documents are to be stored in a corporate database, they must be filed 
according to a common set of categories. 
5.8.3. Problem: ambiguous structure131 
I shall discuss two questions related to problem of ambiguous structure. The first is 
whether a common structure and classification is indeed necessary to ensure 
searchability and usability of the intranet (necessary condition). This argument implies 
that the problems of usability etc. result from the current ambiguous structure. The 
second argument is whether such a common structure is possible, including the 
question whether the intranet would require an underlying ‘corporate’ (necessary) – 
                                                     
131 There is a parallel between experiences with intranets and the story of the tower of Babel. 
When human beings were one people with one language, they started building a tower to reach 
the sky, and God realized they could do anything they wanted. Once they had set themselves a 
goal, nothing could stop them. So God divided them into separate peoples with separate 
languages, and they were no longer able to agree on or pursue a common goal.  
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this latter argument implies the one presented in this thesis, that ambiguous intranet 
structure reflects organisational ambiguities and differentiation. 
5.8.3.1. Is a common structure necessary? 
It is often stated that structure is unnecessary if there are facilities for full text search, 
for instance implemented in portals also offering a particular classification.  Thus, 
Gonzalez argued that a variety of portals and search engines based on different 
perspectives is more useful – for the user (seeker of information) – than a single 
hierarchical structure (Gonzalez 1998), corresponding to Conklin’s recommendation 
of ‘multiple hierarchies’, 'slicing up' the world according to ‘several orthogonal 
decompositions’ (p. 137). 
This is hardly sufficient, however. Search machines can decrease the dependence on 
structure and classification, but only to some extent. The company has struggled with 
a shared corporate portal, but this faces some of the same problems of establishing a 
classification and a set of keywords that are meaningful to everybody. Without well-
defined keywords, a full-text search may result in a large number of irrelevant hits, 
which is difficult to use, not the least because the context of the document is 
unclear132. People in the pharmaceutical division found the portal solution to be 
inefficient, because it would not solve the problem of redundancy and infrequent 
update of information. 
One may further question, whether a well-defined structure is sufficient to guarantee 
realization of the potential discussed previously, such as replacing telephone contacts 
by ‘information retrieval’. It does not solve the other problems listed above. 
5.8.3.2. Is a common structure possible? 
Two possible solutions have been suggested in the interviews. One was to base the 
intranet structure on ‘organisation charts’, thus on organisational structure. It was 
argued – by the Webmaster – that structure might not be very helpful to the users. 
Based on previous discussions, I may add that it may be difficult to properly picture 
the structure of the organisation and relations between the units. 
Another solution would be to establish a structure reflecting Business Processes that 
cross (internal) organisational barriers. This idea is derived from BPR literature, and 
probably from the company’s participation in BPR projects. BPR is based on the idea 
                                                     
132 It appears that researchers (chemists, bio-chemists) in the company are quite content with 
full-text search, but this may have something to do with their profession: by specifying a 
particular compound, they will probably find a narrow range of sources. In other professions, 
however, a few words may not be a sufficient specification. 
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of focusing on organisational business process than run across functional 
specialisation, to rationalise a business process rather than rationalising individual 
processes within a function. Again it may be difficult to picture ‘business processes’ 
beyond a very simplified level. 
This brings us to one of the central arguments of this thesis: that the task of 
establishing a useful intranet structure is not merely technical, because it should reflect 
organizational structure or, more important, the organizational knowledge base. A 
common structure cannot simply be imposed: if a common structure is decided on the 
corporate level, employees in semi-autonomous units may find it too inconvenient for 
search and retrieval of information. It is not sufficient that the intranet structure is 
clear and unambiguous, if it is incomprehensible and useless to local users around the 
company. 
In this perspective it is a paradox that the intranet was envisioned as a countermeasure 
to strong differentiation and geographical ‘distributedness’ of an organization, even as 
a means to create a ‘corporate culture’ (Interview # 1), just as the extranet version of 
ProjectWeb see later was expected to encourage team spirit between the cooperating 
companies (Interview # 21). This vision seems to turn the causal relation upside down, 
by regarding the precondition as a consequence. 
This argument implies that, in order to ensure usability and thus realization of the 
potential, implementation of a unified intranet structure must reflect changes in the 
organization and its knowledge base. 
5.8.4. Writing and ‘sharing’ informal routines 
SHARING is expected to support sharing of written, informal rules – by ‘canonizing’ 
non-canonical practices – and thus solve the problem that informal rules are badly 
preserved in formal organisations (March et al. 2000). To support preservation and 
sharing etc. of informal routines is a basic idea behind knowledge management. The 
very constellation – written & informal – is unusual, because there has traditionally 
been a strong coupling between the written and the formal in organizations133. 
To put a ‘better practice’ into writing is an effort that requires resources. This is 
illustrated by looking at two different steps (or aspects) in writing a better practice for 
the SHARING system: 1) Explicitation – verbalisation; 2) Addressing an anonymous 
audience. 
                                                     
133 In contrast to a system of formal, written procedures such as the SQUARE system described 
later, SHARING must convince the reader of its usefulness. 
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From unwritten to written rule 
First, there is a problem of turning an unwritten rule/informal procedure into a written 
one. This in itself requires a conversion of the informal, situated knowledge into 
another form, a change towards ‘bureaucracy’.  
The potential incentive to make a written description of a locally implemented process 
deserves some consideration. Would anyone write down a procedure for himself? 
Procedures are mostly written to ensure that others behave in a required way; 
abstraction from ‘situated practice’ is motivated either by delegation of work or by 
problems that trigger analysis or sensemaking (reduction of uncertainty). And as 
emphasized previously, there is an asymmetric benefit to documentation, which is in 
the interest of the reader rather than the. In this case, contributors are expected to 
quasi-‘taylorise’ themselves. 
To avoid the difficulties in this step one might focus on existing written rules. By 
exploiting existing written material, locally applied written rules, one need not expect 
people to spend extra time and resources. This general suggestion is confirmed by the 
fact that a large part of the material in SHARING was actually added as a result of an 
ongoing process and considerations, rather than as a recollection of what was already 
done. Yet, as mentioned previously, this does not eliminate the problem of supporting 
non-local readers. See below.  
A new, anonymous audience 
‘Next step’ is relevant, either if one has succeeded in producing a written description, 
or if a particular department already has a local written procedure. This step on the one 
hand involves further generalization and de-contextualisation of an existing, locally 
implemented rule, in order to make it legible and ‘meaningful’ for the very different 
readers of a strongly differentiated organisation. The potential ‘transfer’ of a routine is 
inhibited by ambiguity. The idea of sharing or transferring better practice in a 
universal, corporate ‘repository’ does not take into account the ambiguity caused by 
different frames of reference due to differentiation, and functional and professional 
specialization. 
This illustrates that even though a ‘better practice’ like SHARING would stand a 
better chance, if one focused on already existing local written rules, there still remains 
a large problem (or challenge) in ‘going public’. The problem may be that what is 
already written is too specific and not authored for the average, anonymous reader of 
the corporation as a whole. Furthermore, especially when the system is voluntary, it 
may require an ‘audience’-oriented tailoring of the message, a re-contextualisation 
into foreign interpretations in order to emphasize the interest and relevance perceived 
by the reader or user. In this perspective, filing a Better Practice is a very difficult task 
of communication, because one has no idea of the potential reader. 
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There are two different approaches to the problem of ambiguity in this context. Either 
one may try to avoid ambiguity by focusing on existing networks and contacts: 
support communication and knowledge sharing among those with similar context, and 
avoid ambiguity due to different interpretations. Or one should encourage situations of 
ambiguity and support processes aimed at reducing ambiguity, by providing 
technology, techniques and initiatives that emphasize critical rationality over 
negotiation and politics. 
5.8.5. Any use for poor media in coordination across organizational 
borders?  
It is still worth considering whether the new facilities such as discussion groups and 
chat may be used ‘seriously’.  
A traditional advice in accordance with the media richness/task fit theory would be 
that the core group needs ‘rich media’ such as video meetings in the initial phase of a 
projects, because the emphasis on planning and strategic discussions can be expected 
to face ambiguity. In the later phases electronic communication – written, 
interactive/fast-feedback – may be sufficient and useful for many purposes.  
Especially in the co-development project it would seem practical to avoid face-to-face 
short meetings that require a lot of resources and man-hours in traveling. They already 
do this by using video-conferences, but at least one participants finds these meetings 
unsatisfying, possibly because the medium is too rich to her purpose: she needs to 
exchange information that is best transferred in writing. 
On the other hand it is to be expected that there in a ‘network’ project like this will be 
more ambiguity in all the phases, compared to an internal project where ambiguity 
decreases as planning gets more well-defined and emphasis is on execution and 
coordination. 
Yet electronic media may also be useful in the more strategic discussions the initial 
phase, by supporting brainstorming and preliminary discussions, and facilitating 
exploration of several alternatives before reaching a decision, according to the 
arguments of Sproull & Kiesler. Electronic media, perhaps with some Group Decision 
Support Systems functionalities, may expose and emphasize the various arguments and 
positions (and it would obviously require confidentiality and restricted access).  
5.8.6. Inflexibility of SQUARE – ambiguity? 
The negative reception in Biochemistry production of the QBIQ system reflects 
‘cultural’ differences, ambiguity, between two different parts of the company. The 
slow process of entering documents is too rigid in organisational units (outside the 
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pharmaceutical division) where changes – ‘innovations’ – are more frequent, and 
where changes to a lesser degree are subject to central control and authority. SQUARE 
is based on (and implies) one-way vertical communication: documents are generally 
entered by one category of people, and read by another.  
For the Biochemistry production unit – located far from company headquarters – the 
situation is different. To experiment locally with process changes they should enter a 
document and then wait for days or weeks for it to be effected in the system. 
There are two different factors slowing the change process. One is primarily 
technological: documents must be converted to a form – PDF – with which the users 
are not familiar. The other – and probably decisive – factor is organisational: new 
procedures must go through a process of approval. In the pharmaceutical division 
(administration and production), the technological delay is accepted because it 
corresponds to the organisational process of approval. In the Biochemistry production, 
the technological delay is inhibitive to local experimentation – and therefore annoying.  
5.9. Summary 
I argue that intranet has increased the role of ambiguity in PharmaCo, and I shall focus 
on two examples.  
Intranet as a whole has exposed the users to the ambiguities of conflicting frames of 
interpretations, both by its content and its structure, which is not merely a result of the 
laissez-faire strategy, but also reflects the ambiguous knowledge base of the company. 
The intranet has torn the ‘veil’ protecting organizational members from the 
complexities that were reduced by specializing into different interpretations. Different 
interpretations are projected (indirectly) on the shared information space or platform 
of the intranet. Yet the ambiguous structure also cause disorientation and threaten 
usability, and if these problems continue to discourage the users, they may turn away 
from the intranet and thus avoid ambiguity. Another scenario depends on the 
possibility for establishing a well-defined structure, based on a (useful) corporate 
classification, even a corporate language. In this case, users are being protected from 
ambiguity, which has been reduced ‘from above’. 
The use of the ProjectWeb application in the cooperation project – and internal 
projects – is another example. In this case, cross-barrier communication and ambiguity 
is obviously not a result of the technology. The co-operation project has already been 
decided for economic and strategic reasons, and only then it is decided to adopt a 
technology that may support communication (and team spirit?). Yet the choice of the 
technology seems to reflect that the virtual cooperation has faced difficult conditions. 
It seems that cooperation suffers somewhat from the relatively ‘low’ degree of 
communication forced by physical distance and time zone difference. The technology 
will enable processes that were impossible without. 
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i Lesson: the usefulness of a telephone directory depends on its association with other information, 
i.e. office or production team (or more ambitious: competencies, experience). In a large organization 
it varies significantly from unit to unit (division, functions) what type of information is relevant. I.e. 
in this production unit, people (locally) are interested in team membership, whereas information 
about  their ‘office’ is meaningless, because workers do not have any. This variation in information 
requirements is not supported by the current corporate directory. Would it be possible to avoid 
redundancy and keep all information in the one directory? Yes, requiring a more sophisticated 
database design with different types of information according to functional association – but it may 
be a very complicated solution. Another solution would be to build a local interface with additional 
information to the corporate directory… This example illustrates that the ‘differentiation’ into 
different functions and specializations (and interpretations) is not merely a question of needing 
different information (i.e. to be solved by different portals or different databases), but also of 
needing the same (corporate) information in different contexts. (Some product-related sites in the 
pharmaceutical division provides another illustrative example: they integrate information from 
numerous functions and departments in the company, and the question arises: who should be 
responsible for updating the information? How can we ensure that they will include all associated 
information and not just those in their own interest. This illustrates the enormous difficulties in 
coordinating the information providers in that division). And this is why the purely decentralized 
and separated solution is unsatisfying: the problem arises with ‘overlapping’ information sources 
rather than purely redundant ones… 
ii The IT department has chosen to avoid large, long-term and high-cost investments. They want to 
show their (internal) ‘customers’ that they can make visible results ‘step-by-step’ – and the 
customers are unwilling to make large (and risky) investments. This strategy seems to run into some 
trouble, however: in order to avoid redundant solutions (developing practically similar solutions for 
different sites) they hope to make more general and generic ones ‘for reuse’ (and this could also be 
described as a knowledge management problem). Yet such a generic project will seldom have a 
particular ‘customer’ in the company and would require an investment out of ‘their own pockets’  – 
this is the fundamental dilemma behind the very practical problems of not having ‘spare time’ 
besides the workload of ‘projects-on-order’. Another example is the fact that the IT department has 
intended to redesign the intranet portal, but were incapable of this investment until the Biochemistry 
division was willing to order a similar product. (The IT department is expected to function as an 
independent unit and has been converted to an affiliate, yet they are unable to make proper 
investments of their own…)  
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6. Conclusion 
First, I shall recapitulate how the individual chapters contributed to the argument that 
intranet media increase the role of ambiguity based on contradicting frames of 
interpretation. 
In the first chapter I presented the ideal of rationality in order to argue understand the 
‘challenges’ of ambiguity. On the one hand, ambiguity is inhibitive to rational 
processes and a source of conflicts and suboptimal compromises. On the other hand, 
ambiguity is also an ‘opportunity’, because there is a potential for a rational and 
universal resolution by revealing and overcoming particular frames of interpretation. 
In the next chapter I focused on the role of ambiguity in organisations, partly in order 
to distinguish between technological and organisational causes. I argued that 
organisations are fundamentally characterised by processes of rationalisation and 
differentiation into different frames of interpretation, emerging as a reaction to 
complexity. Ambiguity increases with a tendency to more frequent and extensive 
cooperation across internal (and external) organisational boundaries (and frames of 
interpretation). This tendency to organisational networking of virtual organisations is 
motivated by various non-technological factors, but computer networks increase the 
potential and create new opportunities and forms of cross-barrier co-ordination. 
In the third chapter I focused on the role and potential of intranet media. I focused on 
two different intranet media that may ‘link’ across boundaries and thus increase 
ambiguity in different ways. Email support increased horizontal communication, while 
hypertext – the web – represents the ideal of universality by providing a shared 
‘space’. Differentiation and ambiguity in the organisational knowledge base is 
projected onto the web, where individual frames of interpretation are embedded in the 
structure of the web. 
The case study described in the fourth chapter illustrated that attempts to realise the 
potential of intranet technology were inhibited by an ambiguous structure, which 
reflected a laissez-faire strategy as well as the underlying organisational structure. So 
far, the intranet has primarily been used for simple publication, but people are unable 
to locate relevant information, which again results in redundancy. Thus, while the 
intranet exposes organisational members to the ambiguities inherent in the 
organisation, disorientation may discourage users who will then avoid using and thus 
avoid ambiguity. In PharmaCo intranet technology has been adopted in the wish of 
achieving a unified corporate culture, or building team spirit in a cooperation project. 
Yet the technology is unlikely to create such results by itself, and organisational actors 
are considering different measures to structure the intranet. 
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6.1.1.1. Universality or networking: two scenarios 
On the one hand, the organization may strive to fundamentally reduce ambiguity by a 
corporate resolution of ambiguity: establishing (‘universal’) corporate standards, 
classifications, even a corporate language, and define clear responsibilities for various 
types of information in order to avoid redundancy, conflicts and outdated information. 
The question is whether this strategy is realistic: the underlying complexity and the 
centrifugal forces of differentiation has not disappeared. The point is that it requires 
more than a mere technical solution: defining responsibilities is an organisational 
solution based on a centralised strategy; and the corporate categories etc. must to some 
extent be adapted locally in order to be useful. 
On the other hand, the organisation may avoid standardisation and instead support the 
ongoing bilateral, ad hoc, resolution of ambiguity, basically without affecting existing 
(local) interpretations and cognitive barriers? As an example, rich media134 and group 
dynamics can support ad hoc resolution of ambiguity. There are several problems with 
this strategy. For one, the ideal process of understanding (resolution of ambiguity) 
does not leave the individual interpretations intact. Furthermore, the process is time-
consuming and may be overlapping and repetitive, if it starts from scratch at every 
new attempt. And as mentioned before: while the process has a potential for rationality 
and transcendence, it is also vulnerable and prone to irrational factors. 
6.1.1.2. Further research 
This discussion inspires a number of ideas for further research, many of which aim at 
providing stronger and richer documentation for theses presented, and monitoring 
future development. 
There is a need to explore in more detail the general use and usability of the intranet as 
a whole; to confirm the thesis of an ambiguous structure reflecting organisational 
ambiguity; and to confirm a connection between usability problems and structural 
ambiguity of the intranet. This could be done in the same company, in other 
companies with similar problems, or even as a comparative study. 
There is a need to explore various alternative approaches to the problem, in PharmaCo 
as well as in other organisations. Which solutions have been, and are being 
considered? Which solutions are generally available or offered on the market? What 
are the organisational implications of such solutions? 
I would also like to pursue the central thesis of the increased role of ambiguity as part 
result of intranet technology. One example would be to explore the extent to which 
                                                     
134 While ‘poorer’, text-based media aim at a lengthier but probably also more durable process. 
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organisational members retrieve or search information and documents provided by 
other units and departments, and whether increased use implies problems of 
understanding (navigation included).  
Another example would be to study the further use and adoption of intranet media in 
cross-boundary cooperation projects: How does the extranet reflect ambiguity? How 
do people handle ambiguity in association to, and with, these media? Will they 
experiment further with text-based communication? 
Finally, I would like to explore the thesis that intranet media, email or other, extend 
the adaptation of written communication to new areas, and that this ‘cementation’ of 
communication has organisational implication. 
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Appendix A: Table of Interviews 
The data consist of 23 semi-structured interviews of 1-1½ hour. All interviews are 
recorded on tape, ten of them in summaries, the rest in written transcripts. 
Interview 1 IT Department, 
Web Design 
Manager Intranet as a 
whole 
24/8-1998 
Interview 2 IT Department  Intranet as a 
whole 
31/8-1998 
Interview 3 IT Department Director Intranet as a 
whole 
18/9-1998 
Interview 4 Pharmaceutical 
Division 
Manager SQUARE 12/10-1998 
Interview 5 Biochemistry 
Production 
Controller Intranet as a 
whole 
(SQUARE) 
23/10-1998 
Interview 6 Pharmaceutical 
Division 
Secretary Intranet as a 
whole 
26/10-1998 
Interview 7 IT Department, 
Security 
Manager + 
Assistant 
Intranet as a 
whole 
14/10-1998 
Interview 8 Communication  Intranet as a 
whole 
 
Interview 9 Corporate HQ Manager SHARING 10/12-1998 
Interview 10 Bioechemistry 
Division 
Manager SHARING 18/6-1999 
Interview 11 International 
Operations 
Manager SHARING 14/6-1999 
Interview 12 Bichemistry 
Division 
Manager SHARING 22/6-1999 
Interview 13 Biochemistry 
Research 
Manager, 
(Facilitator) 
SHARING 9/6-1999 
Interview 14 Biochemistry 
Division 
Manager SHARING 26/5-1999 
Interview 15 IT Department, 
Web Design 
Webmaster Intranet as a 
whole 
17/9-1999 
Interview 16 Pharmaceutical 
Development 
Assisant ProjectWeb 17/11-1999 
Interview 17 Pharmaceutical 
Development 
Assisant ProjectWeb 22/11-1999 
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Interview 18 Pharmaceutical 
Development 
Director ProjectWeb 23/11-1999 
Interview 19 Pharmaceutical 
Development 
Director ProjectWeb 29/11-1999 
Interview 20 Pharmaceutical 
Development 
Support 
Assistant 
ProjectWeb 30/11-1999 
Interview 21 Pharmaceutical 
Development 
Manager ProjectWeb 2/12-1999 
Interview 22 Pharmaceutical 
Development 
Assisant ProjectWeb 2/12-1999 
Interview 23 Pharmaceutical 
Development 
Director ProjectWeb 4/1-2000 
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Appendix B: Capture – communication converted to memory 
The idea behind ‘capturing’ is to preserve a universal, (partly) de-contextualised 
element by saving people the trouble the ‘overhead’ – extra trouble – required in 
making this universalisation and de-contextualisation. To make it automatic or at least 
sufficiently effortless. 
Will new media – incl. Intranet – is whether it will make it easier to ‘capture 
knowledge/memory when it is created’? This opportunity arises because electronic 
media change or blur the distinction between speech and writing: i.e. automatic 
transcripts convert spoken language to text; chat and emails enable a form of written 
communication that resembles the spoken word; discussion groups or conference 
systems allow written communication in situations, where it was previously 
impossible. Electronic media have gained new territory for written communication in 
organisations. When ‘content’ is transferred to writing, it is available for manipulation 
by computers, i.e. by providing search facilities. 
Transcripts 
The simplest example is the idea of using transcripts, i.e. as an alternative to minutes. 
Culnan & Marcus suggest that complete written transcripts may have ”profound effects 
on intraorganisational communication and decision-making” by preserving the process of the 
discussion, including all the initial positions that have been abandoned or modified 
before conensus is reached (for whatever reason: authority or the strength of the 
argument), while minutes are restricted to “a single person’s understanding of the consensus”.  
"complete written transcripts differ from minutes in several important 
respects. Minutes are generally written by a single individual (although the 
position of secretary may rotate) and so are more likely to represent a single 
person's understanding of the consensus than does a transcript, which records 
each participant's observations as they occur. Minutes rarely capture the 
initial positions of each participant or the interim postures taken as the 
consensus evolves. A transcript turns each utterance into a public stand to 
which others can easily refer at later points in time". "[T]he availability of 
transcripts could have profound effects on intraorganizational 
communication and decsion-making... For example, transcripts of 
proceedings might be useful in reducing the experience gap of new 
organizational members. On the other hand, they may inhibit opinion change 
and prevent formation of consensus. The availability and awareness of public 
stands may make a reinterpretation of the past impossible, thus altering 
workgroup processes in incalculable ways." (Culnan & Markus 1987) 
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The intention is to ‘photograph’ communication (discussions, etc.): using an automatic 
and ‘subjectless’ medium seems to offer two advantages135. On the one hand, people 
are relieved of the extra effort spend in expressing, recollecting and ‘communicating’ 
what has happened: writing the minutes after a meeting, or giving a summary of a 
rationale (and discussion) behind a decision after it has been reached. These efforts are 
inhibitory in organisational settings (and elsewhere), as there’s generally an assymetric 
benefit in records and documentation: those who make the records are not the same as 
those who benefit. On the other hand subjective interpretation (and filtering) is 
avoided – or postponed136. 
This idea of automatic memory confronts a number of difficulties, which are evident 
in the light of the previous discussions. One example is the problem of physical 
‘situatedness’: oral communication will contain numerous deictic references (temporal 
and spatial) the meaning of which is evident in situ, but lost to the outsider. And the 
fact that the material has not been ‘interpreted’ means that logical arguments and 
positions are not clarified: it may take some effort to see the meaning of those ‘initial 
positions’ that were ignored in the final decision – because it requires active 
                                                     
135 In this respect, transcripts offer the same characteristics, as in Benjamin’s comparison 
between the photograph and the painting. Even though the photographer obviously can choose 
perspective, apply techniques and arrange the setting and the posture of the model, Benjamin 
finds it less interesting to view photography as art – and suggests instead viewing art as 
photography. The photography is characteristic in being unconsciously ‘designed’, it allows 
impressions that would be ‘filtered out’ by the conscious painter – and Benjamin further argues 
that the perception of the photography focuses on elements that were not intended by the 
photographer: “Aller Kunstfertigkeit des Photographen und aller Planmässigkeit in der Haltung 
seines Modells zum Trotz fühlt der Beschauer unwiderstehlich den Zwang, in solchem Bild das 
winzige Fünkchen Zufall, Hier und Jetzt, zu suchen, mit dem die Wirklichkeit den 
Bildcharakter gleichsam durchgesengt hat, die unscheinbare Stelle zu finden, in welcher, im 
Sosein jener längstvergangenen Minute das Künftige noch heut und so beredt nistet, dass wir, 
rückblickend, es entdecken können. Es ist ja eine andre Natur, welche zur Kamera als welche 
zum Auge spricht; anders vor allem so, dass an die Stelle eines vom Menschen mit 
Bewusstsein  durchwirkten Raums ein unbewusst durchwirkter tritt” (Benjamin 1991c). 
136 There are parallels to Suchman’s defence of her ethnomethodological method, which 
requires extensive use of video cameras: actions are situated, carried out in a purposeful 
reaction to the conditions met. People are not able to consciously recollect their actions, exactly 
because these actions were situated and not the execution of a premeditated plan. “Such studies 
require extended participant observation of the internal life of a setting, in order to understand 
what participants themselves take to be relevant aspects of their activity. Importantly, this may 
include things that are so familiar to them as to be unremarkable (and therefore missing from 
their accounts of how they work), although being evident in what they can actually be seen to 
do” (Suchman 1990). A major difference, of course, is the emphasis on video: neither tape nor 
transcript would recall the ‘situated context’. 
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understanding as described by Gadamer, implying attempts to reconstruct and 
improve the argumentation by ‘acquiring’ the perspectives or horizons on which it is 
based. 
Instead of making an automatic photograph, other approaches may impose various 
degrees of structure on the communication in order to make the content more useful 
for later use. 
Written communication 
The use of electronic meetings, as described by Sproull & Kiesler, is a mild version of 
this solution: members of a group are required to use written communication during 
decision making. People have thus already made an effort to put their contribution in 
writing: There may be a stronger tendency to finish the sentences and to achieve more 
clarity; and there is a smaller degree of ‘indexicality’, especially if people are 
physically separated – they already have to compensate for the physical separation by 
verbalizing more of the content, unintendedly also making it more useful for later 
readers. 
Structure – formalised language 
Conklin and others have taken a step further by attempting to impose a simple 
structure – called gIBIS – on decision processes (Conklin & Begeman 1989). This 
structure is based on a distinction between Issues, Positions and Arguments, and it is 
supposed to support both discussion/decision making during software development 
projects – by making arguments and positions clear – and memory. During meetings, 
participants are expected to fit their arguments into this structure, and the authors 
emphasize the necessity of simplicity: "... discussions are clearer and the whole method works 
better if Issues are just a single question, Positions are just a single response, and Argument nodes 
each contain a single objection or supporting point". In principle, this is a rather vague 
version of the basic intention of the ‘logical paradigm’: to reduce sentences in natural 
language to logical expressions (to ‘clarify’, see discussion). 
The normativity in their argument reflects the inherent conflicts and the problem in 
structuring natural language discussions, and experiments with the system suggest that 
people experience ”the problem of classifying the rhetorical type of an utterance and placing it on 
the decision map (issue net) in an appropriate place quickly enough so as not to inhibit the 
conversations” (Bannon & Kuutti 1995). Another problem – recognized by the authors – 
is that discussions are restructured or ‘broken down’ into simple elements, which 
make them difficult to ‘re-collect’ and understand for later readers outside the original 
context etc. (see Conklin & Begeman for elaboration), and thus threatens the system’s 
value as a memory – the support of which was in fact the primary motivation for the 
system. It may be added that the system may not be well suited for ‘reducing 
equivocality’, as the gIBIS structure seems to inhibit representation of ‘frames of 
interpretation’. 
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The wellknown databases of ‘frequently asked questions’ is another example, as 
illustrated with Ackerman’s organisational memory systems. The idea is to preserve 
and reuse responses from Technical Support to specific questions. However, the 
material in itself was found to be inadequate for the purpose because it was too 
specific, too context dependent. They therefore chose to edit the material by 
generalization and de-contextualization (Ackerman 1994). 
Basically, the idea presumes that the situated oral commucitation has a content of of 
‘objective statements’ that is not completely context dependent, that all statements are 
not merely situated or performative. This idea corresponds somewhat the intention of 
the logical paradigm to translate natural language into objective statements. It would 
probably be more feasible in situations, where people have retreated from everyday 
practice, from the role of a participant to that of an ‘observer’, i.e. in connection with 
problem solving. 
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Appendix C: Nonverbal ’communication’ – art  and media 
richness 
The theory of media richness suggests that nonverbal cues enrich communication, 
while others claim that rich data constitute a better source of knowledge. These 
assumptions lead to the expectation that the enhanced graphical (and video) facilities 
associated with internet technology constitute a further qualitative revolution of IT-
based communication. In this context there is some parallel to the idea that 
(nonverbal) art – based on other media/material than verbal language – constitutes 
another form of experience, one that may recover what was lost from (verbal) 
language. A comparison with Adorno’s concept of art may put the idea of rich media 
and rich data in a new perspective. 
One major difference should be kept in mind, however. A work of art implies active 
and ‘conscious’ shaping of the material, without which there would be no art. The 
theory of media richness, by contrast, basically regards the medium as a filter that is 
more or less disturbing – the richest medium is disintermediation: no medium at all. 
Beyond the boundaries of language - Adorno 
Adorno wants to reach beyond (or expand) the boundaries of language (by ‘speaking 
the unspeakable’). He argues that art – music, for instance – may recover what was 
lost in language: 
"That which is silenced by the medium of language as such comes back to 
language by the means of the sublanguage of art that is modern." (Brunkhorst 
1999)  
This argument is based on the idea, presented previously, that language has been split 
in two, separating science from art, and the semiotic from the mimetic aspects of 
language. According to Adorno, the word has its roots in the (mimetic) symbol: “Wie 
die Hieroglyphen bezeugen, hat das Wort ursprünglich auch die Funktion des Bildes erfüllt” 
(Horkheimer & Adorno 1968). This symbolic function preceded the concept and still 
remains an element of language: “Das vorbegriffliche, mimetische Element der Sprache” 
(Adorno 1964). Words have a history and cannot be regarded merely as arbitrary 
‘Spielmarke’ corresponding to the previous definition of signs , “einer blank 
nominalistischen Sprachtheorie…, der die Worte austauschbare Spielmarken sind, unberührt von 
Geschichte” (Adorno 1964).  
Imitation vs. knowledge 
Whereas Science has reduced the word to a sign that serves as a tool to ‘know’ 
(‘erkennen’) and control the world instead of resembling it, art has preserved the 
remaining aspects of the word: sound, image – the word proper. Yet the word has been 
further split between the different art forms: the verbal arts of i.e. poetry and novels, as 
well as nonverbal arts: music, painting, sculpture – and all attempts during the 
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Romantic Era to reintegrate these into a common art form, the Gesamtkunstwerk (such 
as the opera), have been futile137. Art has preserved the capability to resemble or 
imitate the world (mimesis), by renouncing on the ability to know the world: 
”Als Bild soll [die Sprache] zum Abbild resignieren, um ganz Natur zu sein, 
den Anspruch ablegen, sie zu erkennen. Mit fortschreitender Aufklärung 
haben es nur die authentischen Kunstwerke vermocht, der blossen Imitation 
dessen, was ohnehin schon ist, sich zu entziehen.” (Horkheimer & Adorno 
1968)  
This split between science and art, between mimesis and semiosis, cannot heal: neither 
form of knowledge can be reduced to – or replaced by – the other. Despite his critique 
of the formalization of scientific knowledge, Adorno recognizes the advantages of this 
development. And although art preserves the potential for ‘speaking the unspeakable’, 
mimetic behaviour is also problematic, if it contends with a mere replication of ‘what 
is already there’. True art should not be mere imitation, not just a secondary 
representation of an object – or even a ‘tertiary’, indirect representation of the idea 
behind the object, as mentioned in this encyclopaedia definition of mimetics: 
“Efterhånden bliver [betydningen efterligning – af personers handlinger, 
tilstande, erfaringer] fremherskende. Hos Aristoteles er m. som efterligning 
princippet for kunsten. Men der er her ikke tale om efterligning i betydningen 
kopiering el. afbildning. M. vil tværtimod sige en skabelse (poiesis) og 
involverer dermed en afstand til den givne virkelighed (natur). 2. Hos Platon 
nedvurderes kunsten, idet den blot er efterligning af en efterligning (f.eks. 
billede af et bord, der selv er afbillede af ideen om et bord).” (Lübcke 1983)  
                                                     
137 Later – compare to Dialektik der Aufklärung from 1946 – Adorno developed a theory about 
‘transgression’ of the art forms: modern art transgresses the classical borders of the art forms, 
yet without destroying these borders: “Adorno developed the ‘transgression theorem’ in the 
1960s. ‘Transgression’ means the transgression of borders between music and painting, 
sculpture and text and so on, or between ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture, between art and life, theory, 
philosophy and art. Adorno’s word for ‘transgression’ is ‘infringement’ (Verfransung). 
‘Transgression’ does not mean ‘regression’ that cuts down all differences and overcomes all 
limits… Adorno gives the name Verfransung … to the internal dissolution of the boundaries 
between the individual art forms and between art and life, which was long ago anticipated by 
surrealism and has become ubiquitous since the 1960s. The explosive dynamic between 
classical modernity, neo- and post-avantgardism forces art of its own accord to transgress the 
particular boundaries of its forms. Music, the classical temporal art, spatializes itself by 
consciously renouncing its expressive force, and painting gives itself temporal form by 
becoming expressive and non-representational. Adorno was always interested in the 
transgressions and overlapping moments on the boundaries of poetry and music, music and 
writing (the silent reading of the score as the ideal of listening to music), of philosophical essay 
and art, notes and literature” (Brunkhorst 1999)). Compare also Habermas’ critique of Derrida 
(Habermas 1985;Habermas 1998). 
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The complex view on mimesis is evident in Adornos disagreement with Benjamin, 
who argues that the development of photography makes the very art of painting 
superfluous (Benjamin 1991c;Benjamin 1998). Against Benjamin, Adorno argues that 
the technology has ‘emancipated’ the art of painting from the role of mere replication, 
just as the iconoclastic ban on images138 liberated painters from obedient ‘replication’, 
glorifying and elevating existing objects or persons. Furthermore, mere imitation is 
conservative: it locks our attention on the past and is incapable of the new or potential. 
Schopenhauer’s hierarchy of arts: purity and independence 
In his view on art, Adorno is inspired by Schopenhauer, whose discussion – and 
hierarchy – of the different forms of art is relevant and illustrative for the discussion of 
media richness. According to Schopenhauer, theoretical – scientific– knowledge is 
subsumed to the subjective Will (‘Wille’), which imposes a specific form or 
perspective (and a filter) on impressions. This idea is inspired by Kants philosophy and 
corresponds somewhat to Adorno’s critique of an (instrumental) rationality, and to 
Derrida’s critique of the suppression of the particular. Schopenhauer, too, argues that 
art offers a means – in particular cases – to avoid this veil (‘Nebel’): 
“Jedes Kunstwerk ist demgemäß eigentlich bemüht, uns das Leben und die 
Dinge so zu zeigen, wie sie in Wahrheit sind, aber, durch den Nebel 
objektiver und subjektiver Zufälligkeiten hindurch, nicht von Jedem 
unmittelbar erfaßt werden können. Diesen Nebel nimmt die Kunst hinweg.” 
(Schopenhauer 1859)  
In Schopenhauers ‘hierarchy’, the art forms  are ordered according to their decreasing 
dependency on random material in time and space. Sculpture, which shapes figures in 
space, ranks higher than architecture, which merely shapes space, but lower than 
painting, which creates its own space. Poetry ranks even higher, because it makes use 
on free imagination (‘Phantasie’), the role of which is crucial in making the observer 
an ‘accomplice’. I.e. a wax figure is not art, despite its perfect replication of the object, 
because it leaves nothing to ‘imagination’, through which the perceiver must 
‘participate’ in the work of art: 
“Aus dem in Rede stehenden ästhetischen Grundgesetze wird ferner auch 
erklärlich, warum Wachsfiguren, obgleich gerade in ihnen die Nachahmung 
der Natur den höchsten Grad erreichen kann, nie eine ästhetische Wirkung 
hervorbringen und daher nicht eigentliche Werke der schönen Kunst sind. 
                                                     
138 According to Brunkhorst the ban of images (iconoclasm) was also a means to achieve 
’disintermediation’, which thus is an ideal of art: ”The second aspect of the ban on images that 
has a similar function in the Bible and in modern art is to produce a direct, unreduced 
experience of the object. There should no longer be any access to the true reality of works of 
art that is mediated through (beautiful or ugly, more or less perfect) copies” (Brunkhorst 1999).  
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Denn sie lassen der Phantasie nichts zu thun übrig. Die Skulptur nämlich 
giebt die bloße Form, ohne die Farbe; die Malerei giebt die Farbe, aber den 
bloßen Schein der Form: Beide also wenden sich an die Phantasie des 
Beschauers. Die Wachsfigur hingegen giebt Alles, Form und Farbe zugleich; 
woraus der Schein der Wirklichkeit entsteht und die Phantasie aus dem 
Spiele bleibt. - Dagegen wendet die Poesie sich sogar allein an die Phantasie, 
welche sie mittelst bloßer Worte in Thätigkeit versetzt.” (Schopenhauer 1859)   
The greatest effect, however, is achieved in music, because it does not indirectly 
represent or replicate the ideas behind the things, but directly represents the universal 
will behind the ideas139 – and any attempt at ‘musical painting’, to use music for 
illustration of something, is contrary to the essence of music:  
“Ligesom kunstværket bliver jo renere, i jo højere grad kunstneren formår at 
frigøre sig fra det individuelt-tilfældige, står kunstarterne jo højere, jo 
mindre brug de behøver at gøre af tilfældigt stof i tid og rum og jo større 
spillerum de giver fantasien. Skulpturen, der former skikkelser i rummet, står 
højere end arkitektur og havekunst, der blot former rummet, men lavere end 
maleriet, der skaber sit eget rum; da skulpturen må lægge hovedvægten på 
formen, på skikkelsens skønhed, mens maleriet kan lægge hovedvægten på 
det sjælelige udtryk, er skulpturen ifølge sit væsen mere livsbekræftende end 
maleriet: den var oldtidens foretrukne kunstart, mens maleriet er den kristne 
tids. Mens beskueren af billedkunstens værker er bundet til et bestemt 
billede, er den frie fantasi det stof, som digtekunsten fremstiller sine billeder 
i; den har derfor, især i sin folkelige form, langt større virkning end 
billedkunsten, der gerne lader folket koldt. Men størst virkning udgår fra 
musikken, der ikke – som de andre kunstarter – indirekte afbilder ideerne 
bag tingene, men direkte afbilder viljen bag ideerne, - derfor er alle forsøg på 
                                                     
139 Schopenhauer distinguishes between idea (in the Platonist sense) and concept (as it is 
constructed in science or philosophy: arbitrary signs). Concepts belong to science, and to use 
them in art is mistaken. A work of art should thus not be based on, or illustrate, a concept.  ”In 
Folge der vorhergegangenen Kapitel und meiner ganzen Ansicht von der Kunst, ist ihr Zweck 
die Erleichterung der Erkenntniß der Ideen der Welt (im Platonischen Sinn, dem einzigen, den 
ich für das Wort Idee anerkenne). Die Ideen aber sind wesentlich ein Anschauliches und daher, 
in seinen nähern Bestimmungen, Unerschöpfliches. Die Mittheilung eines solchen kann daher 
nur auf dem Wege der Anschauung geschehn, welches der der Kunst ist. Wer also von der 
Auffassung einer Idee erfüllt ist, ist gerechtfertigt, wenn er die Kunst zum Medium seiner 
Mittheilung wählt. - Der bloße Begriff hingegen ist ein vollkommen Bestimmbares, daher zu 
Erschöpfendes, deutlich Gedachtes, welches sich, seinem ganzen Inhalt nach, durch Worte, 
kalt und nüchtern mittheilen läßt. Ein Solches nun aber durch ein Kunstwerk mittheilen zu 
wollen, ist ein sehr unnützer Umweg, ja, gehört zu dem eben gerügten Spielen mit den Mitteln 
der Kunst, ohne Kenntniß des Zwecks. Daher ist ein Kunstwerk, dessen Konception aus bloßen 
deutlichen Begriffen hervorgegangen, allemal ein unächtes.” (Schopenhauer 1859) (my 
italicisation) 
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illuderende tonemaleri musikkens væsen imod. Det musikalske forløb er en 
fuldstændig parallel til verdensforløbet” (Sørensen 1995) (my italization).  
”[S]o zeigt uns eine Beethoven'sche Symphonie die größte Verwirrung, 
welcher doch die vollkommenste Ordnung zum Grunde liegt, den heftigsten 
Kampf, der sich im nächsten Augenblick zur schönsten Eintracht gestaltet: es 
ist rerum concordia discors, ein treues und vollkommenes Abbild des 
Wesens der Welt, welche dahin rollt, im unübersehbaren Gewirre zahlloser 
Gestalten und durch stete Zerstörung sich selbst erhält. Zugleich nun aber 
sprechen aus dieser Symphonie alle menschlichen Leidenschaften und 
Affekte: die Freude, die Trauer, die Liebe, der Haß, der Schrecken, die 
Hoffnung u.s.w. in zahllosen Nüancen, jedoch alle gleichsam nur in 
abstracto und ohne alle Besonderung: es ist ihre bloße Form, ohne den Stoff, 
wie eine bloße Geisterwelt, ohne Materie.” (Schopenhauer 1859) 
And even though Adorno does not share Schopenhauers appeal to ideas and a 
universal Will, he generally accepts the idea that music has an advantage for its lack of 
form. 
 
